Strasbourg, 10.06.2011 – Addresses by Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych (Tuesday 21) and Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan (Wednesday 22) will be among highlights of the summer plenary session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in Strasbourg on 20-24 June 2011.
Support for fledgling Arab democracies will be the main theme on Tuesday, when the parliamentarians will decide on the Moroccan Parliament’s request for “Partner for Democracy” status with the Assembly, followed by statements from the Speakers of both chambers of the Parliament, Abdelwahed Radi and Mohamed Cheikh Biadillah. Tunisian Foreign Affairs Minister Mohamed Mouldi Kefi will also take part in a debate on the situation in Tunisia.
This will be followed by a joint debate on sharing responsibilities for asylum seekers and refugees in Europe, and on the interception and rescue at sea of asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants. A number of refugees and asylum seekers who have come together to form a “living library” will be present during session week to share their personal experiences.
Wednesday sees a debate on follow-up to the report of the Council of Europe Group of Eminent Persons “Living together in 21st century Europe”. Bulgarian Foreign Minister Nikolay Mladenov will also address the Assembly on the same day.
On Thursday, the Assembly holds its biennial debate on the state of human rights in Europe. German Federal Justice Minister Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger and the Attorney General for England and Wales Dominic Grieve will take part in a joint debate on national parliaments as guarantors of human rights in Europe, and on the role of parliaments in the consolidation and development of social rights in Europe. This will be followed by the ceremony to award the Parliamentary Assembly’s Human Rights Prize for 2011 to the Russian NGO “Committee against Torture”.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Gryshchenko will present the Communication from the Committee of Ministers to the Assembly on Monday afternoon, and answer questions from parliamentarians. On Wednesday, there will also be a debate on reform of the Assembly.
Source:PACE. Published in Strasbourg on 10 June 2010
Showing posts with label Ukraine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ukraine. Show all posts
Tuesday, June 14, 2011
Friday, June 10, 2011
Ukraine - the case of YuliaTymoshenko
The Group of the Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament announced that it will not support the proposed, EPP initiated joint resolution on the case of the former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko later today.
Its Vice-President Hannes Swoboda stressed that the Ukrainian authorities must of course avoid any perception that judicial measures are used selectively, and confirmed that also the S&D Group insists that a maximum transparency of investigations, prosecutions and trials must be guaranteed; in particular where it concerns leading politicians who are in opposition to the government.
"The European integration process is of the greatest importance for the pursuance of economic, social and political reforms in Ukraine", said Mr. Swoboda, "and respect for the rule of law, incorporating fair, impartial and independent legal processes is for our Group a prerequisite for the further development of relations between the EU and Ukraine".
"But this also means that all political forces inside and outside Ukraine must refrain from any interference in the work of the country's judicial authorities", said Mr. Swoboda.
Mr. Swoboda welcomed the approval of the law against corruption by the Verkhovna Rada and stressed that all political forces in Ukraine should cooperate with the authorities to take care of its full and impartial implementation as from 1 July 2011.
"The European Union should assist the government of Ukraine in its further efforts to bring about the necessary reform of the judiciary system in the country. The resolution which is now presented to the European Parliament does, however, not reflect this willingness to make a joint effort to bring about the necessary reforms in Ukraine" said Mr. Swoboda.
The S&D Group in the European Parliament will continue to keep a critical eye on the internal developments in the country, but also wants to express its clear support for the Ukrainian decision to go the European way.
Source: S&D. Published on 9 June 2011.
Its Vice-President Hannes Swoboda stressed that the Ukrainian authorities must of course avoid any perception that judicial measures are used selectively, and confirmed that also the S&D Group insists that a maximum transparency of investigations, prosecutions and trials must be guaranteed; in particular where it concerns leading politicians who are in opposition to the government.
"The European integration process is of the greatest importance for the pursuance of economic, social and political reforms in Ukraine", said Mr. Swoboda, "and respect for the rule of law, incorporating fair, impartial and independent legal processes is for our Group a prerequisite for the further development of relations between the EU and Ukraine".
"But this also means that all political forces inside and outside Ukraine must refrain from any interference in the work of the country's judicial authorities", said Mr. Swoboda.
Mr. Swoboda welcomed the approval of the law against corruption by the Verkhovna Rada and stressed that all political forces in Ukraine should cooperate with the authorities to take care of its full and impartial implementation as from 1 July 2011.
"The European Union should assist the government of Ukraine in its further efforts to bring about the necessary reform of the judiciary system in the country. The resolution which is now presented to the European Parliament does, however, not reflect this willingness to make a joint effort to bring about the necessary reforms in Ukraine" said Mr. Swoboda.
The S&D Group in the European Parliament will continue to keep a critical eye on the internal developments in the country, but also wants to express its clear support for the Ukrainian decision to go the European way.
Source: S&D. Published on 9 June 2011.
Tuesday, May 17, 2011
Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers – Ukraine presents its priorities
Ukraine has just taken over the chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for the next six months.
Ukraine considers the Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers as an opportunity to contribute to the developments of modern European processes in which the Council of Europe plays a significant role. It will ensure that the goals and priorities of the Council of Europe will continue to be pursued, in particular the strengthening of democracy, respect for the rule of law and protection of human rights. Ukraine intends to initiate practical steps in order to advance in the implementation of the main priorities of the Council of Europe and strengthen the Organisation’s political role.
Within the framework of its Chairmanship, Ukraine will focus on the following priorities:
1. Protection of Children’s rights. The Ukrainian Chairmanship intends to strengthen the coordinating role of the Council of Europe in implementing regional and national initiatives of member states with regard to the protection of children’s rights, with an emphasis on the implementation of existing programmes and decisions of the Organisation as well as the development of new priorities.
2. Human rights and the rule of law in the context of democracy and stability in Europe. The Council of Europe created an efficient system of human rights protection. As a second priority of its Chairmanship, Ukraine will give special attention to the prevention of violations. The international conference on “The role of prevention in promoting and protecting human rights” to be organised in Kyiv on 20-21 September, will be a practical contribution of the Ukrainian Chairmanship to this end.
3. Strengthening and developing local democracy. Strengthening democratic processes at local and regional level in Europe, by ensuring effective implementation of the principles of local self-government in European countries, using the potential of the Council of Europe as a standard setting Organisation in this area constitutes a further priority for the Ukrainian Chairmanship. The 17th session of the Council of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for Local and Regional Government will be held on 3-4 November in Kyiv under the Ukrainian Chairmanship.
To promote continuity within the Council of Europe, prior to assuming the chairmanship, Ukraine had held consultations with the United Kingdom and Albania as forthcoming chairs. As a result, for the first time ever three consecutive chairmanships of the Committee of Ministers will work along the same lines in pursuing the goals of reform of the Council of Europe, thus setting a new practice in the modus operandi of the organisation.
Chairmanship’s website
http://www.coe.int/t/dc/files/presidences-sessions-cm/presidences/ukraine/default_EN.asp?
Source: Council of Europe. Published on 11 May 2011.
Ukraine considers the Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers as an opportunity to contribute to the developments of modern European processes in which the Council of Europe plays a significant role. It will ensure that the goals and priorities of the Council of Europe will continue to be pursued, in particular the strengthening of democracy, respect for the rule of law and protection of human rights. Ukraine intends to initiate practical steps in order to advance in the implementation of the main priorities of the Council of Europe and strengthen the Organisation’s political role.
Within the framework of its Chairmanship, Ukraine will focus on the following priorities:
1. Protection of Children’s rights. The Ukrainian Chairmanship intends to strengthen the coordinating role of the Council of Europe in implementing regional and national initiatives of member states with regard to the protection of children’s rights, with an emphasis on the implementation of existing programmes and decisions of the Organisation as well as the development of new priorities.
2. Human rights and the rule of law in the context of democracy and stability in Europe. The Council of Europe created an efficient system of human rights protection. As a second priority of its Chairmanship, Ukraine will give special attention to the prevention of violations. The international conference on “The role of prevention in promoting and protecting human rights” to be organised in Kyiv on 20-21 September, will be a practical contribution of the Ukrainian Chairmanship to this end.
3. Strengthening and developing local democracy. Strengthening democratic processes at local and regional level in Europe, by ensuring effective implementation of the principles of local self-government in European countries, using the potential of the Council of Europe as a standard setting Organisation in this area constitutes a further priority for the Ukrainian Chairmanship. The 17th session of the Council of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for Local and Regional Government will be held on 3-4 November in Kyiv under the Ukrainian Chairmanship.
To promote continuity within the Council of Europe, prior to assuming the chairmanship, Ukraine had held consultations with the United Kingdom and Albania as forthcoming chairs. As a result, for the first time ever three consecutive chairmanships of the Committee of Ministers will work along the same lines in pursuing the goals of reform of the Council of Europe, thus setting a new practice in the modus operandi of the organisation.
Chairmanship’s website
http://www.coe.int/t/dc/files/presidences-sessions-cm/presidences/ukraine/default_EN.asp?
Source: Council of Europe. Published on 11 May 2011.
Thursday, October 28, 2010
Remarks by HR/VP Ashton after EU - Ukraine Ministerial
I am pleased to welcome Foreign Minister Gryschenko to Brussels. Ukraine is a European country. Our relationship is very important and we want to deepen and to develop it.
In the course of the conversations we had we covered a wide-range of issues for both the EU and for the Ukraine, particularly in view of our up-coming Summit on 22 November.
We want to move forward on the negotiations for an Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. We also look for progress in our dialogue on visa liberalisation.
We are looking forward to the local elections this weekend. Ukraine has a habit of good elections, and should preserve and of course build on that.
There was discussion too of the recent ruling of the Constitutional court. We know that further constitutional reform is a key priority and we hope that it would be carried through an inclusive process with the aim of establishing a lasting system of checks and balances that accord with European standards.
We had a good and extensive exchange of views on our relations with Russia, which is a strategic partner for both of us.
And we have been looking at the situation in Belarus, which is preparing for elections on 19 December. The conduct of those Presidential elections will be very important for our relations.
And we discussed Transnistria in the Republic of Moldova. The EU and Ukraine are partners in the 5 + 2 settlement format. We will continue our co-operation, and we both want to see the moves forward.
And finally, we discussed the issue of piracy which for Ukraine is a major issue because of the hostages that have been taken who are Ukrainian and our ability to collaborate effectively, not just in the missions we have to fight piracy but also as strategic partners together in this sense. To be able to develop ways in which we can support leadership in the region in order to be able to deal with this issue. But more than anything a great pleasure to see you and I am also looking forward to a visit I hope to make very soon to Ukraine.
Brussels, 26 October 2010
Monday, October 25, 2010
Russia In Moldova – Soft Power Or Soft Force?
Depictions of the election campaign in Moldova as “a war between East and West” for influence in the tiny country (such as a recent analysis by the U.S. geopolitical research firm Stratfor) are mistaken if only for the simple reason that just one side is fighting this war. But to understand what I mean, it is important to look at the different ways the concept of “soft power” is understood by Russia and the West.
The term “soft power” came into widespread use in the 1990s in the West to signify “the attraction of a positive example.” This is the kind of “soft power” that the European Union exerts in Moldova. The bloc does nothing to force Moldova to cooperate or integrate with it; on the contrary, it has established a mass of difficult conditions that limit the opportunities for rapid integration.
The EU’s message to Moldova is simple: The more you are like us, the faster integration will proceed, not sooner and not later. It is therefore not surprising that as soon as Moldova elected a government that espoused a European path of development, Europe opened up to Moldova to a degree that previously no one had dared dream of.
Russia in recent years has also taken up the banner of “soft power,” but it understands this term as the cloning of the outward manifestations of Western soft power. Russia has begun financing “nongovernmental” organizations and “independent” mass media outlets that are willing to advance the Kremlin’s understanding of Russian interests (interests that, as a rule, contradict the interests of Moldova itself).
Nothing Attractive
In particular, Russia is pushing the idea of an “Eastern vector” of development for Moldova, at a time when the overwhelming majority of Moldovans support further European integration. The problem, though, is that Russia has no universal idea that might be attractive to other countries. The communist ideology that it offered in the 20th century has been nearly completely marginalized now. In the meantime, the West is attractive to Moldova because of the practical results of the idea of democracy, which has demonstrated itself as the most effective means of social organization. Those results are beneficial most of all to those countries that are trying to imitate the West and so there is no reason to compel anyone in any way.
But Moscow is inclined to see democracy as a hostile ideology that is being spread by the West in order to increase its own influence in Russia’s neighborhood. And this particular interpretation can’t help but color Russia’s actions in the region. Moscow really is battling against the West for influence in the region, while the European Union is content with merely remaining a positive example that is attractive to Moldova mainly through its pragmatism and the mere fact of its existence.
Russia, unfortunately, in its virtual isolation so far has nothing to offer in competition against the West (or to attract Moldova). It cannot boast of an effective system of government or a high standard of living or an active citizenry whose rights are protected. Instead, what Russia is presenting in Moldova (and other countries) as “soft power” -- in contrast to the natural attractiveness of the West -- is highly reminiscent of the old Soviet joke “everything they try to build turns out to be a Kalashnikov.”
'False-Flag Operation'
Russia’s social engineers understand the term “soft power” as a synonym for “information war.” The idea of an information war is simple – it is a complex of measures designed to prompt the population of the target country to begin to act contrary to its own interests and in support of Russian interests without even realizing it. Political campaigns and campaigns in the media targeting political leaders and forces that Moscow opposes have become the norm in Moldova.
But all of Russia’s efforts to employ soft power inevitably end up turning into the use of “hard power” – that is, the use of direct force or economic power against another country. No one in Moldova is surprised by the periodic introduction of undeclared trade embargoes against Moldovan goods. While the Kremlin elegantly shifts the blame for these embargoes on chief Russian health inspector Gennady Onishchenko, when it comes to it political and media campaigns, Moscow prefers to act through intermediaries, taking advantage of political or geopolitical actors that have some credibility with the target audience for its political message.
This is the tried-and-true “false-flag operation.” It is no secret that Russia still has serious levers of influence within Romania left over from the days of socialist brotherhood. Moscow’s influence has only been bolstered by the global economic crisis. Of course, Moscow prefers not to advertise these levers but rather to use them to guide events in the “proper” direction. In particular, it is unlikely that Russian media would have any significant influence on Moldova’s pro-Western (pro-Romanian) electorate, while Romanian information sources are highly regarded.
In this context, it is hard not to be skeptical of the unsubstantiated claim in the Stratfor report that the United States has asked Romania to set up nongovernmental organizations, media outlets, and investment funds in Moldova. True soft power does not need to resort to irrational or covert methods. The genuinely interesting thing about this claim is how widely it has been re-reported in recent days throughout the region.
The very idea that there is a standoff between East and West in Moldova is itself an artificial idea that has been imposed from the outside. The majority of Moldovans long ago made their choice in favor of European integration. There is not a single serious political force in the country now that would not espouse European integration, if only because that position wins votes.
But that position does not suit Moscow, so it keeps on fighting.
By Irina Severin. Published on 24 October 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_In_Moldova__Soft_Power_Or_Soft_Force/2199530.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.
The term “soft power” came into widespread use in the 1990s in the West to signify “the attraction of a positive example.” This is the kind of “soft power” that the European Union exerts in Moldova. The bloc does nothing to force Moldova to cooperate or integrate with it; on the contrary, it has established a mass of difficult conditions that limit the opportunities for rapid integration.
The EU’s message to Moldova is simple: The more you are like us, the faster integration will proceed, not sooner and not later. It is therefore not surprising that as soon as Moldova elected a government that espoused a European path of development, Europe opened up to Moldova to a degree that previously no one had dared dream of.
Russia in recent years has also taken up the banner of “soft power,” but it understands this term as the cloning of the outward manifestations of Western soft power. Russia has begun financing “nongovernmental” organizations and “independent” mass media outlets that are willing to advance the Kremlin’s understanding of Russian interests (interests that, as a rule, contradict the interests of Moldova itself).
Nothing Attractive
In particular, Russia is pushing the idea of an “Eastern vector” of development for Moldova, at a time when the overwhelming majority of Moldovans support further European integration. The problem, though, is that Russia has no universal idea that might be attractive to other countries. The communist ideology that it offered in the 20th century has been nearly completely marginalized now. In the meantime, the West is attractive to Moldova because of the practical results of the idea of democracy, which has demonstrated itself as the most effective means of social organization. Those results are beneficial most of all to those countries that are trying to imitate the West and so there is no reason to compel anyone in any way.
But Moscow is inclined to see democracy as a hostile ideology that is being spread by the West in order to increase its own influence in Russia’s neighborhood. And this particular interpretation can’t help but color Russia’s actions in the region. Moscow really is battling against the West for influence in the region, while the European Union is content with merely remaining a positive example that is attractive to Moldova mainly through its pragmatism and the mere fact of its existence.
Russia, unfortunately, in its virtual isolation so far has nothing to offer in competition against the West (or to attract Moldova). It cannot boast of an effective system of government or a high standard of living or an active citizenry whose rights are protected. Instead, what Russia is presenting in Moldova (and other countries) as “soft power” -- in contrast to the natural attractiveness of the West -- is highly reminiscent of the old Soviet joke “everything they try to build turns out to be a Kalashnikov.”
'False-Flag Operation'
Russia’s social engineers understand the term “soft power” as a synonym for “information war.” The idea of an information war is simple – it is a complex of measures designed to prompt the population of the target country to begin to act contrary to its own interests and in support of Russian interests without even realizing it. Political campaigns and campaigns in the media targeting political leaders and forces that Moscow opposes have become the norm in Moldova.
But all of Russia’s efforts to employ soft power inevitably end up turning into the use of “hard power” – that is, the use of direct force or economic power against another country. No one in Moldova is surprised by the periodic introduction of undeclared trade embargoes against Moldovan goods. While the Kremlin elegantly shifts the blame for these embargoes on chief Russian health inspector Gennady Onishchenko, when it comes to it political and media campaigns, Moscow prefers to act through intermediaries, taking advantage of political or geopolitical actors that have some credibility with the target audience for its political message.
This is the tried-and-true “false-flag operation.” It is no secret that Russia still has serious levers of influence within Romania left over from the days of socialist brotherhood. Moscow’s influence has only been bolstered by the global economic crisis. Of course, Moscow prefers not to advertise these levers but rather to use them to guide events in the “proper” direction. In particular, it is unlikely that Russian media would have any significant influence on Moldova’s pro-Western (pro-Romanian) electorate, while Romanian information sources are highly regarded.
In this context, it is hard not to be skeptical of the unsubstantiated claim in the Stratfor report that the United States has asked Romania to set up nongovernmental organizations, media outlets, and investment funds in Moldova. True soft power does not need to resort to irrational or covert methods. The genuinely interesting thing about this claim is how widely it has been re-reported in recent days throughout the region.
The very idea that there is a standoff between East and West in Moldova is itself an artificial idea that has been imposed from the outside. The majority of Moldovans long ago made their choice in favor of European integration. There is not a single serious political force in the country now that would not espouse European integration, if only because that position wins votes.
But that position does not suit Moscow, so it keeps on fighting.
By Irina Severin. Published on 24 October 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_In_Moldova__Soft_Power_Or_Soft_Force/2199530.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.
Thursday, October 14, 2010
PERSPECTIVES OF GOOD COOPERATION BETWEEN S&D AND THE PARTY OF REGIONS OF UKRAINE
S&D leader Martin Schulz and the president of the Party of Regions of Ukraine, Mykola Azarov, agreed today in Brussels to further continue and intensify the contact between the main Progressive Group in the European Parliament and this Ukrainian party.
The two officials had a formal meeting and signed the Memorandum between the S&D Group and the Party of the Regions of Ukraine.
The document is meant to intensify the contacts between the two organisations with a view to supporting the Party of the Region's ambition to strengthen the Ukraine's EU-integration process.
Said Martin Schulz, signing the memorandum:
"The document signed today represents the opening of our cooperation for the coming two years and will contribute to better mutual understanding in bringing Ukraine nearer to the EU, and the EU nearer to Ukraine. For S&D it is an important moment.
"In a spirit of one important point for us, as Socialists in Europe, we need Ukraine as a strategic partner of the EU. I think Ukraine, and I am grateful that prime-minister Azarov shares my view, also needs the EU. We discussed very intensively before we signed the agreement that we will cooperate on the basis of all European values: democracy, openness and freedom; and in the light of this mutual understanding, I'm looking forward with a lot of hope for our cooperation."
As a follow up to the singing of the memorandum, the debate "The future of EU-Ukraine relations" concluded that European perspectives are important for the country.
Said Adrian Severin, S&D vice-president, responsible for the Group's foreign affairs issues, who chaired the debates:
"Unity is extremely important when we speak about Ukraine. The guiding principle should be therefore to achieve the cohesion of the country, in economic, social and political terms.
"We hope and wish to have in Ukraine a 'pro-Ukrainian leadership', which strives for democracy and cohesion in Ukraine.
"This represents, at the same time, a pro-European approach of Ukraine, consistent with the aim of political association, economic integration and institutional convergence with the European Union, before sharing with the latter the institutions.
"The presence of the prime-minister Mycola Azarov is a message of the vision of Ukraine on its own European future".
Click on socialistsanddemocrats.eu to see a video of the signing the memorandum by Martin Schulz and Mykola Azarov and an interview with Adrian Severin on the conclusions of the round-table "The future of EU-Ukraine relations"
The Future of EU-Ukraine Relations: Speech by PM of Ukraine Mykola Azarov
Chairman, Members of the European Parliament, Excellencies and ladies and gentlemen,
I would like to express my gratitude to the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament and to the Kyiv Centre for International and Comparative Studies for the opportunity to address this distinguished and esteemed audience.
Just prior to the opening of the conference Mr. Martin Schulz and I signed the memorandum of co-operation between the Party of Regions of Ukraine and the Group of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament
The relationships between the two political forces that we represent are those of partnership and co-operation. The memorandum, without doubt, shows the significantly enhanced European dimension of policy in my party which is the leading political force in Ukraine, as well as in the policy of the Ukrainian government in general.
The memorandum marks the end of a rather long period in the Ukrainian history when our political opponents did their best to create the image of the Party of Regions as an anti-democratic, anti-European political force in hope it would be rejected by the rest of Europe. They worked hard at that, and there are still those who believe these misrepresentations.
But that is behind us. Today we have turned a new page in Ukrainian-European relationship.
Let me ask a direct question: did the Party of the Regions have a vision of Europe that guided it when it took part in this year’s democratic elections and when it formed the new government?
Some believe that our only motive was to serve the interests of our electorate, as well as of the political and business community of the eastern regions of Ukraine situated along our border with Russia.
We are certainly acting on to the mandate of our voters. But we did get support all over Ukraine - in the east and in the west, in the south and in the north. This support was greater in some regions than in others, but people supported us across the country.
That is why I will give you a totally different answer. I expect some are going to find this answer rather surprising in view of the stereotypes about people who come from the Donbass area and speak Russian – the language I am addressing you in.
My answer is – we see our goal first and foremost in creating a truly European order in Ukraine, in creating the European spirit – the goal that our opponents liked so much to speak about and did nothing to achieve.
Let me explain our vision in greater detail.
First, in order to start implementing the policy of “transformation towards Europe” we had to win the democratic elections in a dignified, truly European manner. Our candidate Viktor Yanukovich did that. And let me emphasize a very important fact – it was not a victory in a so called “third round” conducted due to a court order. It was a victory in elections conducted in full compliance with Ukrainian legislation and with European standards. This fact is confirmed by multiple election observer missions, that of OSCE among them
Secondly. Having won the country’s leadership in a transparent, democratic and European manner it is absolutely in our best interests, never mind any other party, to consolidate that approach.
This approach is now facing a further test: the local elections to be held on October 31st this year. These elections should and will be conducted as free, democratic, dignified European-like elections. As the head of the leading party, I personally invited European institutions to take part in missions observing the pre-election period and the elections themselves. Speaking to you here on the ground of the European Parliament, I am inviting all of you as well: visit Ukraine and see with your own eyes what is going on in our country. You will find the situation as I have just described it.
Third. We all know that transparent electoral procedures are necessary but not sufficient for a European-type democracy to function. To function, a European-type democracy needs to be efficient. This kind of efficiency can be achieved through the president, the government and the parliament majority working together, in harmony. We have succeeded in establishing this kind of cooperation in Ukraine - this is a real achievement.
Let me assure you: as long we are in office, the rest of Europe is not going to witness unsightly situations like those that took place in Ukraine not long ago, when the president could officially instruct the foreign minister and Ukrainian diplomatic missions abroad to launch a campaign traducing the acting prime-minister. I am sure such embarrassing events will never happen again as long as we are in government.
I am happy to say that the Group of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament has promised to support us in pursuing the goal of strengthening society, of overcoming the divisions that had formed in the past years. Let me repeat that the memorandum we have signed today says that our European friends will support “the endeavour by the Party of Regions to overcome the current partisan and political divisions and to establish a climate of democratic consolidation in Ukraine”.
Fourth. It is characteristic of the European democratic model that a political force that has won leadership as a result of democratic elections focuses effort and resources towards reforms aimed at a vibrant, dynamic advancement of the society. If this policy is not followed, parties once leading rapidly slip into political oblivion. This slide is what is happening now with the parties of the “orange” political sector in Ukraine.
Naturally, we are not ready to follow them into their unfortunate fate. This is not the choice we make. That is why, from our very first days in office, we took upon ourselves the difficult task of launching sometimes uncomfortable reforms aimed at bringing Ukraine close to the European standards.
I am not going now to elaborate on the purely economic reforms. We have described all the reform process in great detail in the agreement we signed with the International Monetary Fund. This important institution, by the way, had declined any cooperation with the previous Ukrainian leadership, has renewed support and credits for Ukraine. This demonstrates the IMF’s faith in the new Ukrainian leadership, a leadership that is not just good not at writing attractive plans on paper, but also at keeping promises. The IMF experts are sure: our leadership team will not use a cent of the money they lend on anything else but the realization of deep structural reforms.
Recently we have been discussing a truly revolutionary new tax code. In this regard, let me give you just one but one very important fact – during all the nineteen years of Ukraine’s independence there had not been a single political force that had enough political will to present and adopt a document that significant.
I also would like to mention that we adopted the law "on the basic principles of the functions of the natural gas market", a law fully in compliance with EU norms and standards. Adopting this law made it possible for Ukraine to join the Energy Charter treaty.
I would like to say a few words about our social reforms. Our team has taken up the challenge of eradicating the greatest evil, the main obstacle on the way to Ukraine’s Europeazation - the evil of corruption.
We started with the reform of our judicial system which, in the unanimous view of both Ukrainian and European experts, is the sphere that is most heavily affected by the canker of corruption.
Last July we adopted a law on the judiciary and the status of judges that is essentially European. The process of improving the health of the judicial system started almost immediately. Law-enforcement structures got to work efficiently, and during the past few months more top officials faced charges of theft and corruption than had been the case during the whole 5-year period of the previous government.
We have considerably expedited the process of the judicial reform. The President formed the relevant working group in August. The group has been efficiently working on a new version of the criminal code of Ukraine and a new law on the public prosecutor's office, the work being guided by the recommendations of the GRECO group of the Council of Europe. We have also been working hard on the development of the newly proposed package of anti-corruption bills, the main focus being made at working out the mechanisms for effectively enforcing those laws since these mechanisms had been very not clearly formulated in the previous versions of the bills.
Fifth. European democracy is the democracy of the middle class, of the sector of population with an economic stake in society. Poverty is the main enemy of democracy, since it provokes the emergence of dictatorships and authoritarian regimes and stimulates the growth of extremist and nationalist attitudes among the population.
As back we did in the midst of the electoral campaign, we again state it clearly: the Party of Regions is totally against the populist answers to the problem of poverty. We see the only way of fighting poverty to be ensuring steady economic growth, with the priority going to the development of high-tech sectors.
There is a point I would like to emphasize especially: upon winning power, we faced the severe consequences of the preposterous – and this is not an exaggeration – preposterous populism of the previous government, when any ready cash used to be wasted in order to patch the holes constantly emerging in the state budget or thrown in to the abyss of buying food. As a sad result we had an unprecedented 15% fall in the general economic growth and a 25% fall in the industrial production.
We have managed to stop this disastrous policy, to stop the plundering of the state budget or spending it “on food”. The result was almost immediate: within the first half year alone we have achieved GNP growth of 6% and the industrial production growth of 12%. We have not yet caught up with the rapid pace of “the Asian tigers”, but we are seriously ahead of the EU states in this aspect. The Ukrainian stock market is now one of the world’s top five most intensively developing markets. Investors’ faith in Ukraine’s economy is steadily growing.
Alongside tax reform and the pension system reform this steady economic growth provides us with the opportunity for a balanced approach towards industrial development and technological advancement, while enabling the growth in peoples’ income and social protection for the vulnerable. We are fully determined to create a wide and vigorous middle class of well-to-do Ukrainians – people who will never cast their votes for dictators and populists out of poverty or despair.
And finally - sixth. European-type democracy is inconceivable without guaranteeing human rights and freedoms. During our term as the parliamentary opposition we did not allow our opponents to shrink the spectrum of democratic freedoms in Ukraine. All the gains that the young Ukrainian democracy has achieved during the years of independence have been fully in effect. Having won national leadership, we advocate the rigorous observance of essential human rights and freedoms, including the freedom of press and the establishment of independent public TV.
We have also promised our voters to enhance the range of language and humanitarian rights. Ukraine is a multi-ethnic country, and the duty of the government is to guarantee for all the minorities and ethnic groups the right to enjoy a wide variety of state services in one’s mother tongue. To solve this problem, we turned to the European example of dealing with issues of this kind, namely the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The Charter was ratified in Ukraine long ago – but on paper only as it was practically ignored by the previous government.
On the basis of the Charter - that is already being actively implemented by our local authorities - and taking into account the recommendations offered on the issue by the Council of Europe, we are going to adopt a new law on languages. We expect this law to provide wide guarantees for language, educational and other humanitarian rights for the entire Ukrainian population.
Let me focus now on our international policy.
The goal we intend to pursue is to bring a true European sense into Ukraine’s foreign policy, not just in warm-worded speeches but in reality.
What do I mean by stressing “in reality”? Let me dwell on five important issues in this regard.
Issue 1. As regards national security, we have been taken into account both our own experience and the experience of those states that in the past found themselves on the front line of geo-political confrontation. To ensure our security we have chosen a European model, the model of non-participation in any military-political alliances. In our internal political language, we call this priciple “vneblockovost”, meaning being out of any block.
Let me emphasize this: we have chosen this model because it represents a European tradition and is widely understood and successful. History has shown us the fruits of this approach – neutral European states enjoy stable and succuessful development. Having said this, I want to point out that Ukraine is going to contiunue her active cooperation with NATO, the EU and other regional institutions to propote further enhancement of international security.
Issue 2. We have absolutely rejected the previous government’s approach to Ukraine’s relations with Russia, our neighbor and our largest economic partner. We consider the previous political attitude to be confrontational and deeply anti-European in essence.
Why do we claim that the previous policy was in fact anti-European?
By way of example, look at the official website of the President of Russia. You will see that Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel, one of the most respected European leaders and representing a major European state, found the time and the opportunity to meet with the Russian leader sixteen times within the past two and half years. Keep this figure in mind when you hear that during the same two years there was only one meeting between President Yushchenko and President Medvedev. Moreover this was a short informal meeting during a CIS summit.
When one hears voices saying that Viktor Yanukovich has been meeting with his Russian counterpart too often, one should take into account that we have dropped far behind many European countries as regards the intensity of the agenda in of our dialogue with Russia; we are also behind when it comes to investment from and trade with Russia. That is why we have set a, rather ambitious, goal of reaching the pre-crisis level of $40bn in Russian-Ukrainian trade turnover, while German-Russian trade turnover in 2008 alone was estimated at $63.7bn.
Issue 3. In the recent years Europe has been enhancing its presence in developing world markets. In contrast, during the past five years there has not been any state visit by a senior Ukrainian leader to countries such as India or China. Today we are doing our best to make up the lost ground, and we do it following the European experience.
I have recently read in the press that during the latest visit of the Chinese prime-minister Wen Jiabao to Italy the agenda included signing trade contracts for the total sum of € 2.25bn. As we don’t have time to wait for the Chinese leaders to visit Kyiv, our President paid a visit to Beijing this September, heading an impressive group of Ukrainian entrepreneurs. As a result, a number of documents were signed, bringing a potential total investment of $4bn. You see, we have even succeeded in getting a little ahead of Italy in this aspect. But on the whole, our new policy towards Russia and China shows we are ready to follow the lead of our fellow Europeans.
Issue 4. Mistakenly, in recent years Ukraine positioned herself on the front line of the geo-political confrontation, the government justifying this choice by sloganizing about “the export of democracy” and “the orange revolution”. Ukraine’s previous position on joining NATO finished in Europe being split in half on the issue and it seriously damaged our relations with many countries.
For this reason, one of the goals of our leadership team is to exclude any repetition of this scenario regardless of other political developments. We are determined to contribute to turning Eastern Europe away from a battlefield for spheres of influence and into a region of security, stable development and cultural dialogue.
Kyiv supports political initiatives aimed at the enhancement of Europe’s security system, be it steps initiated in Moscow or in any European capital. In this respect, it is not co-incidental that the issue of Ukraine’s role and place within the modern geo-political, economic and security space was one of the major topics discussed during the meeting between Presidents Viktor Yanukovich and Nicolas Sarkozy in Paris on October 7th this year. The EU intends to work on this issue in full cooperation with Russia.
Ukraine is determined to vigorously promote the initiatives for enhancing the system of European security during the term of Ukraine’s presidency in the OSCE in the year of 1213.
And finally, the fifth issue is developing the Ukraine-European Union relationship.
While we were in political opposition, our party did learn some important lessons from Europe. One of these lessons is choosing an appropriate approach towards our bilateral relations.
For years we have seen “the orange leaders” beg Europeans to give them “a perspective on EU membership” or for ’“some political hints”. This, frankly, could hardly be considered as proper European behaviour against the background of economic and political destabilization in Ukraine.
We are convinced that our relations with the EU should be established politically and reflected in agreements. If we set off on a route we should know what the final goal of our destination is. This is the logic of life. But we well realize that it is unwise to concentrate all our efforts on the final goal alone – there is a whole way to go. That is why we support the pragmatic approach suggested by the EU and, from the very beginning, have focused on realistic and practical steps, have been willing to compromise and have worked to reach mutually binding formal agreements reflecting those compromises.
There are three important points I would like to discuss in this regard.
The first point is political association and political dialogue. We view the association as the best form of relationship with Europe think that it will serve both parties for a long time being to come based as it is on compromise.
The second point is the free-trade zone. Yes, there has been some slow down in the talks on free trade, but we should not over-dramatize this fact. Our standpoint here us quite clear: we should move forward towards well-known “four freedoms”: that is the free flow of goods, services, capital and labor. If, in order to ensure these freedoms, we need to change the approach, let’s go ahead and change it. If not, let us seek goals that are a bit less ambitious and reach agreements wherever they are reachable.
Let me illustrate this point with an example. Recently a free-trade agreement has been signed between the EU and South Korea. It took South Korea several decades to develop its powerful economy, its high-tech industry, to gain its international reputation before this country came to the conclusion that free trade with Europe is more profitable than protecting South Korean market from competition. Ukraine has been independent for just 19 years, and only now has approached a point when technological advancement can become a part of the country’s agenda.
Another example is Malaysia, a country that is ready to start free-trade negotiations with the EU, a country that is far ahead of Ukraine in its economic and technological development. I have recently read an interview of my Malaysian counterpart Najib Tun Razak who said: Our strategy is high-quality economic advancement, and this is the reason why we are not ready to accept any kind of investment indiscriminately, as, for example, investments in mass-production of consumer goods involving hard human labor. And on the contrary, we will give priority to investments raising the value of human input and stimulating innovative technologies.
I have given these examples to emphasize that Ukraine, just like our colleagues from Europe and Asia, wants the free trade with Europe to become a powerful stimulus for innovative technological development.
What we cannot allow is the death of whole branches of our economy that could be swallowed by the new competition.
And finally, the third point – a plan of action concerning visa-free entry to Europe for Ukrainian citizens. I want to make our standpoint towards this issue absolutely clear. We consider the visa-free entry to the EU a powerful stimulus for the Europeanisation of the Ukrainian people, helping them get move towards a true European outlook, attitudes and values.
Unfortunately, the requirements that the EU often imposes for Schengen visa applicants from Ukraine are far too severe, and this impedes Ukraine’s Europeanisation. In fact, we see an absurd situation today: Ukrainian citizens, who have enough money to travel over the world, give up European travels facing the mega-bureaucratic and often humiliating red tape they have to go through seeking Schengen visas.
Instead they choose to go to Turkey, Egypt, Thailand or the Arab Emirates - countries that do not impose such visa obstacles. Sure, we want our citizens to travel all over the world, to learn about many different cultures. But let me ask you: isn’t Europe interested in welcoming Ukrainian tourists and thus providing them an opportunity to learn European values and ways first hand, directly from Europeans themselves? That is it surely in the EU’s best interests and the current approach of erecting a visa fence against fellow Europeans is a disservice to Europe as a whole.
Having said all this, I want to make it clear that I am far from saying we are moving ahead “super-smoothly”, without errors and difficulties.
My goal is to promote the understanding of our agenda, aimed – let me repeat what I said before – aimed at creating a common European homeland, not in speeches but in practice.
We will greatly appreciate any assistance, any criticism concerning errors and shortcomings in our work – we do have them, in just the same way as any party, any leadership.
This is the goal of the agreement with Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament that we signed today – to launch the relationship of partnership and to exchange both constructive criticism and support that is so important between partners.
Thank you for your attention. I will now appreciate your questions, your criticism and your comments.
I would like to express my gratitude to the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament and to the Kyiv Centre for International and Comparative Studies for the opportunity to address this distinguished and esteemed audience.
Just prior to the opening of the conference Mr. Martin Schulz and I signed the memorandum of co-operation between the Party of Regions of Ukraine and the Group of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament
The relationships between the two political forces that we represent are those of partnership and co-operation. The memorandum, without doubt, shows the significantly enhanced European dimension of policy in my party which is the leading political force in Ukraine, as well as in the policy of the Ukrainian government in general.
The memorandum marks the end of a rather long period in the Ukrainian history when our political opponents did their best to create the image of the Party of Regions as an anti-democratic, anti-European political force in hope it would be rejected by the rest of Europe. They worked hard at that, and there are still those who believe these misrepresentations.
But that is behind us. Today we have turned a new page in Ukrainian-European relationship.
Let me ask a direct question: did the Party of the Regions have a vision of Europe that guided it when it took part in this year’s democratic elections and when it formed the new government?
Some believe that our only motive was to serve the interests of our electorate, as well as of the political and business community of the eastern regions of Ukraine situated along our border with Russia.
We are certainly acting on to the mandate of our voters. But we did get support all over Ukraine - in the east and in the west, in the south and in the north. This support was greater in some regions than in others, but people supported us across the country.
That is why I will give you a totally different answer. I expect some are going to find this answer rather surprising in view of the stereotypes about people who come from the Donbass area and speak Russian – the language I am addressing you in.
My answer is – we see our goal first and foremost in creating a truly European order in Ukraine, in creating the European spirit – the goal that our opponents liked so much to speak about and did nothing to achieve.
Let me explain our vision in greater detail.
First, in order to start implementing the policy of “transformation towards Europe” we had to win the democratic elections in a dignified, truly European manner. Our candidate Viktor Yanukovich did that. And let me emphasize a very important fact – it was not a victory in a so called “third round” conducted due to a court order. It was a victory in elections conducted in full compliance with Ukrainian legislation and with European standards. This fact is confirmed by multiple election observer missions, that of OSCE among them
Secondly. Having won the country’s leadership in a transparent, democratic and European manner it is absolutely in our best interests, never mind any other party, to consolidate that approach.
This approach is now facing a further test: the local elections to be held on October 31st this year. These elections should and will be conducted as free, democratic, dignified European-like elections. As the head of the leading party, I personally invited European institutions to take part in missions observing the pre-election period and the elections themselves. Speaking to you here on the ground of the European Parliament, I am inviting all of you as well: visit Ukraine and see with your own eyes what is going on in our country. You will find the situation as I have just described it.
Third. We all know that transparent electoral procedures are necessary but not sufficient for a European-type democracy to function. To function, a European-type democracy needs to be efficient. This kind of efficiency can be achieved through the president, the government and the parliament majority working together, in harmony. We have succeeded in establishing this kind of cooperation in Ukraine - this is a real achievement.
Let me assure you: as long we are in office, the rest of Europe is not going to witness unsightly situations like those that took place in Ukraine not long ago, when the president could officially instruct the foreign minister and Ukrainian diplomatic missions abroad to launch a campaign traducing the acting prime-minister. I am sure such embarrassing events will never happen again as long as we are in government.
I am happy to say that the Group of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament has promised to support us in pursuing the goal of strengthening society, of overcoming the divisions that had formed in the past years. Let me repeat that the memorandum we have signed today says that our European friends will support “the endeavour by the Party of Regions to overcome the current partisan and political divisions and to establish a climate of democratic consolidation in Ukraine”.
Fourth. It is characteristic of the European democratic model that a political force that has won leadership as a result of democratic elections focuses effort and resources towards reforms aimed at a vibrant, dynamic advancement of the society. If this policy is not followed, parties once leading rapidly slip into political oblivion. This slide is what is happening now with the parties of the “orange” political sector in Ukraine.
Naturally, we are not ready to follow them into their unfortunate fate. This is not the choice we make. That is why, from our very first days in office, we took upon ourselves the difficult task of launching sometimes uncomfortable reforms aimed at bringing Ukraine close to the European standards.
I am not going now to elaborate on the purely economic reforms. We have described all the reform process in great detail in the agreement we signed with the International Monetary Fund. This important institution, by the way, had declined any cooperation with the previous Ukrainian leadership, has renewed support and credits for Ukraine. This demonstrates the IMF’s faith in the new Ukrainian leadership, a leadership that is not just good not at writing attractive plans on paper, but also at keeping promises. The IMF experts are sure: our leadership team will not use a cent of the money they lend on anything else but the realization of deep structural reforms.
Recently we have been discussing a truly revolutionary new tax code. In this regard, let me give you just one but one very important fact – during all the nineteen years of Ukraine’s independence there had not been a single political force that had enough political will to present and adopt a document that significant.
I also would like to mention that we adopted the law "on the basic principles of the functions of the natural gas market", a law fully in compliance with EU norms and standards. Adopting this law made it possible for Ukraine to join the Energy Charter treaty.
I would like to say a few words about our social reforms. Our team has taken up the challenge of eradicating the greatest evil, the main obstacle on the way to Ukraine’s Europeazation - the evil of corruption.
We started with the reform of our judicial system which, in the unanimous view of both Ukrainian and European experts, is the sphere that is most heavily affected by the canker of corruption.
Last July we adopted a law on the judiciary and the status of judges that is essentially European. The process of improving the health of the judicial system started almost immediately. Law-enforcement structures got to work efficiently, and during the past few months more top officials faced charges of theft and corruption than had been the case during the whole 5-year period of the previous government.
We have considerably expedited the process of the judicial reform. The President formed the relevant working group in August. The group has been efficiently working on a new version of the criminal code of Ukraine and a new law on the public prosecutor's office, the work being guided by the recommendations of the GRECO group of the Council of Europe. We have also been working hard on the development of the newly proposed package of anti-corruption bills, the main focus being made at working out the mechanisms for effectively enforcing those laws since these mechanisms had been very not clearly formulated in the previous versions of the bills.
Fifth. European democracy is the democracy of the middle class, of the sector of population with an economic stake in society. Poverty is the main enemy of democracy, since it provokes the emergence of dictatorships and authoritarian regimes and stimulates the growth of extremist and nationalist attitudes among the population.
As back we did in the midst of the electoral campaign, we again state it clearly: the Party of Regions is totally against the populist answers to the problem of poverty. We see the only way of fighting poverty to be ensuring steady economic growth, with the priority going to the development of high-tech sectors.
There is a point I would like to emphasize especially: upon winning power, we faced the severe consequences of the preposterous – and this is not an exaggeration – preposterous populism of the previous government, when any ready cash used to be wasted in order to patch the holes constantly emerging in the state budget or thrown in to the abyss of buying food. As a sad result we had an unprecedented 15% fall in the general economic growth and a 25% fall in the industrial production.
We have managed to stop this disastrous policy, to stop the plundering of the state budget or spending it “on food”. The result was almost immediate: within the first half year alone we have achieved GNP growth of 6% and the industrial production growth of 12%. We have not yet caught up with the rapid pace of “the Asian tigers”, but we are seriously ahead of the EU states in this aspect. The Ukrainian stock market is now one of the world’s top five most intensively developing markets. Investors’ faith in Ukraine’s economy is steadily growing.
Alongside tax reform and the pension system reform this steady economic growth provides us with the opportunity for a balanced approach towards industrial development and technological advancement, while enabling the growth in peoples’ income and social protection for the vulnerable. We are fully determined to create a wide and vigorous middle class of well-to-do Ukrainians – people who will never cast their votes for dictators and populists out of poverty or despair.
And finally - sixth. European-type democracy is inconceivable without guaranteeing human rights and freedoms. During our term as the parliamentary opposition we did not allow our opponents to shrink the spectrum of democratic freedoms in Ukraine. All the gains that the young Ukrainian democracy has achieved during the years of independence have been fully in effect. Having won national leadership, we advocate the rigorous observance of essential human rights and freedoms, including the freedom of press and the establishment of independent public TV.
We have also promised our voters to enhance the range of language and humanitarian rights. Ukraine is a multi-ethnic country, and the duty of the government is to guarantee for all the minorities and ethnic groups the right to enjoy a wide variety of state services in one’s mother tongue. To solve this problem, we turned to the European example of dealing with issues of this kind, namely the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The Charter was ratified in Ukraine long ago – but on paper only as it was practically ignored by the previous government.
On the basis of the Charter - that is already being actively implemented by our local authorities - and taking into account the recommendations offered on the issue by the Council of Europe, we are going to adopt a new law on languages. We expect this law to provide wide guarantees for language, educational and other humanitarian rights for the entire Ukrainian population.
Let me focus now on our international policy.
The goal we intend to pursue is to bring a true European sense into Ukraine’s foreign policy, not just in warm-worded speeches but in reality.
What do I mean by stressing “in reality”? Let me dwell on five important issues in this regard.
Issue 1. As regards national security, we have been taken into account both our own experience and the experience of those states that in the past found themselves on the front line of geo-political confrontation. To ensure our security we have chosen a European model, the model of non-participation in any military-political alliances. In our internal political language, we call this priciple “vneblockovost”, meaning being out of any block.
Let me emphasize this: we have chosen this model because it represents a European tradition and is widely understood and successful. History has shown us the fruits of this approach – neutral European states enjoy stable and succuessful development. Having said this, I want to point out that Ukraine is going to contiunue her active cooperation with NATO, the EU and other regional institutions to propote further enhancement of international security.
Issue 2. We have absolutely rejected the previous government’s approach to Ukraine’s relations with Russia, our neighbor and our largest economic partner. We consider the previous political attitude to be confrontational and deeply anti-European in essence.
Why do we claim that the previous policy was in fact anti-European?
By way of example, look at the official website of the President of Russia. You will see that Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel, one of the most respected European leaders and representing a major European state, found the time and the opportunity to meet with the Russian leader sixteen times within the past two and half years. Keep this figure in mind when you hear that during the same two years there was only one meeting between President Yushchenko and President Medvedev. Moreover this was a short informal meeting during a CIS summit.
When one hears voices saying that Viktor Yanukovich has been meeting with his Russian counterpart too often, one should take into account that we have dropped far behind many European countries as regards the intensity of the agenda in of our dialogue with Russia; we are also behind when it comes to investment from and trade with Russia. That is why we have set a, rather ambitious, goal of reaching the pre-crisis level of $40bn in Russian-Ukrainian trade turnover, while German-Russian trade turnover in 2008 alone was estimated at $63.7bn.
Issue 3. In the recent years Europe has been enhancing its presence in developing world markets. In contrast, during the past five years there has not been any state visit by a senior Ukrainian leader to countries such as India or China. Today we are doing our best to make up the lost ground, and we do it following the European experience.
I have recently read in the press that during the latest visit of the Chinese prime-minister Wen Jiabao to Italy the agenda included signing trade contracts for the total sum of € 2.25bn. As we don’t have time to wait for the Chinese leaders to visit Kyiv, our President paid a visit to Beijing this September, heading an impressive group of Ukrainian entrepreneurs. As a result, a number of documents were signed, bringing a potential total investment of $4bn. You see, we have even succeeded in getting a little ahead of Italy in this aspect. But on the whole, our new policy towards Russia and China shows we are ready to follow the lead of our fellow Europeans.
Issue 4. Mistakenly, in recent years Ukraine positioned herself on the front line of the geo-political confrontation, the government justifying this choice by sloganizing about “the export of democracy” and “the orange revolution”. Ukraine’s previous position on joining NATO finished in Europe being split in half on the issue and it seriously damaged our relations with many countries.
For this reason, one of the goals of our leadership team is to exclude any repetition of this scenario regardless of other political developments. We are determined to contribute to turning Eastern Europe away from a battlefield for spheres of influence and into a region of security, stable development and cultural dialogue.
Kyiv supports political initiatives aimed at the enhancement of Europe’s security system, be it steps initiated in Moscow or in any European capital. In this respect, it is not co-incidental that the issue of Ukraine’s role and place within the modern geo-political, economic and security space was one of the major topics discussed during the meeting between Presidents Viktor Yanukovich and Nicolas Sarkozy in Paris on October 7th this year. The EU intends to work on this issue in full cooperation with Russia.
Ukraine is determined to vigorously promote the initiatives for enhancing the system of European security during the term of Ukraine’s presidency in the OSCE in the year of 1213.
And finally, the fifth issue is developing the Ukraine-European Union relationship.
While we were in political opposition, our party did learn some important lessons from Europe. One of these lessons is choosing an appropriate approach towards our bilateral relations.
For years we have seen “the orange leaders” beg Europeans to give them “a perspective on EU membership” or for ’“some political hints”. This, frankly, could hardly be considered as proper European behaviour against the background of economic and political destabilization in Ukraine.
We are convinced that our relations with the EU should be established politically and reflected in agreements. If we set off on a route we should know what the final goal of our destination is. This is the logic of life. But we well realize that it is unwise to concentrate all our efforts on the final goal alone – there is a whole way to go. That is why we support the pragmatic approach suggested by the EU and, from the very beginning, have focused on realistic and practical steps, have been willing to compromise and have worked to reach mutually binding formal agreements reflecting those compromises.
There are three important points I would like to discuss in this regard.
The first point is political association and political dialogue. We view the association as the best form of relationship with Europe think that it will serve both parties for a long time being to come based as it is on compromise.
The second point is the free-trade zone. Yes, there has been some slow down in the talks on free trade, but we should not over-dramatize this fact. Our standpoint here us quite clear: we should move forward towards well-known “four freedoms”: that is the free flow of goods, services, capital and labor. If, in order to ensure these freedoms, we need to change the approach, let’s go ahead and change it. If not, let us seek goals that are a bit less ambitious and reach agreements wherever they are reachable.
Let me illustrate this point with an example. Recently a free-trade agreement has been signed between the EU and South Korea. It took South Korea several decades to develop its powerful economy, its high-tech industry, to gain its international reputation before this country came to the conclusion that free trade with Europe is more profitable than protecting South Korean market from competition. Ukraine has been independent for just 19 years, and only now has approached a point when technological advancement can become a part of the country’s agenda.
Another example is Malaysia, a country that is ready to start free-trade negotiations with the EU, a country that is far ahead of Ukraine in its economic and technological development. I have recently read an interview of my Malaysian counterpart Najib Tun Razak who said: Our strategy is high-quality economic advancement, and this is the reason why we are not ready to accept any kind of investment indiscriminately, as, for example, investments in mass-production of consumer goods involving hard human labor. And on the contrary, we will give priority to investments raising the value of human input and stimulating innovative technologies.
I have given these examples to emphasize that Ukraine, just like our colleagues from Europe and Asia, wants the free trade with Europe to become a powerful stimulus for innovative technological development.
What we cannot allow is the death of whole branches of our economy that could be swallowed by the new competition.
And finally, the third point – a plan of action concerning visa-free entry to Europe for Ukrainian citizens. I want to make our standpoint towards this issue absolutely clear. We consider the visa-free entry to the EU a powerful stimulus for the Europeanisation of the Ukrainian people, helping them get move towards a true European outlook, attitudes and values.
Unfortunately, the requirements that the EU often imposes for Schengen visa applicants from Ukraine are far too severe, and this impedes Ukraine’s Europeanisation. In fact, we see an absurd situation today: Ukrainian citizens, who have enough money to travel over the world, give up European travels facing the mega-bureaucratic and often humiliating red tape they have to go through seeking Schengen visas.
Instead they choose to go to Turkey, Egypt, Thailand or the Arab Emirates - countries that do not impose such visa obstacles. Sure, we want our citizens to travel all over the world, to learn about many different cultures. But let me ask you: isn’t Europe interested in welcoming Ukrainian tourists and thus providing them an opportunity to learn European values and ways first hand, directly from Europeans themselves? That is it surely in the EU’s best interests and the current approach of erecting a visa fence against fellow Europeans is a disservice to Europe as a whole.
Having said all this, I want to make it clear that I am far from saying we are moving ahead “super-smoothly”, without errors and difficulties.
My goal is to promote the understanding of our agenda, aimed – let me repeat what I said before – aimed at creating a common European homeland, not in speeches but in practice.
We will greatly appreciate any assistance, any criticism concerning errors and shortcomings in our work – we do have them, in just the same way as any party, any leadership.
This is the goal of the agreement with Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament that we signed today – to launch the relationship of partnership and to exchange both constructive criticism and support that is so important between partners.
Thank you for your attention. I will now appreciate your questions, your criticism and your comments.
Tuesday, October 12, 2010
Thursday, October 7, 2010
Štefan Füle European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Ukraine and the World: Rethinking and Moving on 7th annual meeting of Yalta
European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy
Ukraine and the World: Rethinking and Moving on
1 October 2010
Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honour to participate in this conference. I am grateful to the Board of YES for its kind invitation. I look forward to a stimulating debate.
Turning to the subject of this particular session, “The Global Order and its Key Players” I should like to make some general observations and then focus my intervention on one key player that I know best - the European Union.
Since the collapse of the Communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1991, there has been a number of attempts to define an emerging “new global order”.
While I don’t intend to better the attempts of others today, I should like to highlight some key elements which help in understanding the global and regional challenges that we face at the beginning of the 21st century.
Compared to the certainties of the Cold War, partly forged in this very building in February 1945 and sustained at a huge human cost, the picture today is highly complex involving a multiplicity of actors.
Perhaps the most distinctive and important aspect of the Global Order today is the impact of globalisation. I refer here to the extraordinary processes by which liberalised trade and capital flows have combined with vastly improved services, transport networks and revolutionised means of communication to create globalised economies and societies. We have all witnessed the benefits and dangers of these processes at first hand.
As a result, we are seeing today the emergence of multiple global players and a multi-polar world. Some of these players are nation-states with powerfully developing economies. Some are non-state actors which nevertheless carry more economic weight than states and some of which have a greater potential to influence public opinion than governments.
The clearest examples of this are of course multi-national business and investors. But the new global players also include national and international media organisations. Many of these organisations are able to draw upon powerful new communication technologies. As a result they are often faster and more flexible than the traditional national media. Civil society actors and networks are also playing an increasingly important domestic and global role.
These are new realities to which we need all to adapt: nation states as well as international bodies such as the UN, the International Financing Institutions, the OSCE and, of course the EU. And it is clear that all of the institutions I have mentioned are engaged in a process of reflection and reform in order to adapt to our rapidly changing realities.
At the same time there is also strong agreement, that common challenges can best be met by shared responses, whether in the areas of tackling poverty; disease; climate change; terrorism or promoting economic development. In some cases the answer is closer coordination; in some, shared responsibilities and in some defined areas the best answer is pooling of national sovereignty.
The European Union has undergone extraordinary changes in the past 20 years. Its membership has enlarged beyond recognition to include countries from South, Central and Eastern Europe. It has established the world’s largest, most prosperous and sophisticated single market and a single currency which is today the world’s second currency. It is the leading trading and exporting power in the world and the second largest source of foreign direct investment. It is the largest global provider of development aid. And today, following the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU is developing the tools to ensure that it has a stronger, unified voice on the international stage.
As the force of globalisation continues to grow - with all the prospects that it holds out for economic development and prosperity - I believe that the trends towards greater convergence and cooperation in Europe are unstoppable. As President Barroso recently expressed it, in an address to US partners:
“We either stand together and prosper or we fall separately. That is a fact of life in the 21st Century1”.
Ladies and Gentlemen, what do these developments represent for Ukraine? The picture I have drawn of globalised economies and societies involving complex interactions between a multiplicity of actors presents a dilemma for every state. Choices have to be made between relying on what could be deceptively described as “known certainties” on the one side, and a reform agenda which apparently takes more risks by embracing change in order to stimulate sustainable growth and prosperity on the other.
Such an agenda includes promoting increased competitiveness of industries and businesses so that they can participate in international markets and attract attention around the globe; the development of an attractive and reliable investment climate; the modernisation of infrastructure and efforts to ensure that the workforce is equipped with appropriate skills and experience. And here, to be clear, I am not just talking about political stability but, first and foremost, about respect for the rule of law.
At the same time an environment in which innovation and creativity can flourish requires the existence of open societies in which a free media, civil society and diverse political actors can thrive. These reforms are particularly necessary in a world in which the competition for attention from a multiplicity of actors and investors is increasing.
President Yanukovych has repeatedly stated that the path towards the European Union “is one of reform”. He is absolutely right in this. Reform is key to exploiting the enormous potential that exists in the relationship between the EU and Ukraine. In the European Union itself, we have recognised the importance of a reform response to the economic and financial global downturn in our Europe 2020 strategy2.
Ukraine has undertaken a number of important economic reforms in recent months. What is important is that these reflect common reform priorities of Ukraine and the EU. As such they draw us increasingly close. For its part the EU will respond to these positive steps. Above all it will continue to support Ukraine in driving forward the reform agenda.
However reform involves much more than a political decision to move in a particular strategic direction. Reform is a process that needs to be delivered in the short, medium and long-term. For example Ukraine’s imminent accession to the Energy Community is an excellent development. But it is only the beginning of a long path of reform that will transform the energy sector and thereby attract substantial inward investment. Let me be blunt here: any strategic decision to move towards the European Union without a reform process to accompany it, is illusory and just rhetoric.
Dear Ukrainian friends, the European Union is ready to accompany you in implementing your economic reform agenda. We are a passionately committed partner in this. We are ready to show flexibility where we can. We are ready to make compromises where we can.
But I have to stress that there is an area where we will not compromise. We will not compromise on those common values which form the basis of our relationship: respect for human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles. This is the fundamental understanding that has bound together the Member States of the European Union since its establishment. And it is this same commitment that will ultimately define how close the EU and Ukraine come together.
Turning to the new EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, I should like to underline its importance. The Agreement offers Ukraine the prospects of political association and economic integration with the EU. It is much more than words on paper. It is essentially an ambitious blue-print for reform, addressing all of the issues I have already outlined. The Agreement offers the prospect of a gradual opening of the EU’s internal market of 500 million consumers to Ukrainian businesses and investors, a market 10 times larger than any of Ukraine’s other neighbours.
This is not an abstract or theoretical exercise. Once in place, it is estimated that the deep and comprehensive free trade area with Ukraine will bring substantial benefits to our citizens. For Ukraine the impact of the agreement is likely in time to be overwhelmingly positive, involving real income increases; gains in international trade; productivity; employment generation and ultimately poverty reductions. It will impact positively on consumers, businesses, investors and workers. One study from 2007 estimates improvements in overall social welfare of more than 5% and long-term skilled and unskilled wage increases of more than 4% as direct effects of an extended FTA with Ukraine3. These kinds of projections are useful; but they are only models. The benefits in terms of prosperity and increased revenue will only be achieved and enjoyed if the right conditions are in place.
Equally important, the process of reform through approximation to EU standards is a process of modernisation which will strengthen Ukraine’s capacity to compete on international markets beyond the European Union.
Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen there is still much work to do if the EU and Ukraine are to enjoy the full benefits of our developing relationship. We are deeply committed to completing our work on the Association Agreement. We believe this offers Ukraine the prospect of coming much closer to the European Union in practical and tangible ways. This represents the best way of making progress towards future steps in our relationship. We look to all our Ukrainian partners, its political leaders, business and civil society to make this a reality.
Only by working closely together we will be able to provide an answer to the challenges of the present and the future. It is important that we do not stay prisoners of the past in our thinking and in our actions. Instead we should work together to unleash our full potential in the interests of all our people.
The question is not that Ukraine needs Europe. Or indeed, as mentioned last night, that Europe needs Ukraine. We need each other to realise our full potential. This requires a commitment from both sides. We are ready for that. Are you?
Source: Website of Štefan Füle European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy
Friday, October 1, 2010
Kremlin's Ruling Party Boosts Ties Across The Former Soviet Union
As Kyrgyzstan gears up for crucial parliamentary elections on October 10, former Prime Minister Felix Kulov's Ar-Namys party has picked up a key endorsement from Russia's ruling United Russia party.
Ar-Namys on September 22 signed a cooperation agreement with United Russia, the colossus that controls executive and legislative branches across the Russian Federation and is headed by Russia's most powerful politician, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Following a model that seems to have worked in Ukraine, where a pro-Western president was replaced earlier this year by a pro-Russian one, United Russia is also now working actively with friendly parties in Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia -- all countries whose political vector is up for grabs in the next 18 months.
According to a United Russia press release, the Kyrgyzstan agreement includes not only political cooperation, but also calls for the development of "equal and mutually beneficial cooperation between Russia and Kyrgyzstan in the economic sphere, the creation of beneficial conditions for the development of entrepreneurial, investment, and scientific activity."
Further blurring the lines between party activity and national policy, the cooperation agreement was signed on United Russia's behalf by the head of the party's Supreme Council, Boris Gryzlov, who is also speaker of the Russian State Duma.
Deepening Ties
The Ar-Namys agreement is just the latest in a series of such pacts United Russia has signed with parties throughout the former Soviet space. Earlier this month, United Russia signed a similar pact with Moldova's Democratic Party, headed by former Communist Marian Lupu.
Lupu told a press conference after returning from Russia that the agreement with United Russia is part of his party's "pragmatic" view of relations with Russia.
"We need relations of cooperation, not confrontation with Russia. This is the message of the political agreement we signed. Second, Moldova cannot ignore and will not ignore the Russian Federation. Third, we have to be pragmatic and constructive if we want the best for the citizens of Moldova," Lupu said.
Moldova is expected to hold parliamentary elections in November, and analysts say Moscow hopes to split Lupu away from the pro-Western, four-party ruling coalition.
United Russia also has a cooperation agreement with the Renewal party in Moldova's breakaway Transdniester region.
In Georgia, United Russia works with the opposition For A Just Georgia movement of former Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli, which describes itself as "having a classic right opposition orientation."
Sergei Markov, a Russian Duma deputy and United Russia official, told RFE/RL's Georgian Service that the key issue is improving relations between the two countries.
"United Russia's main goal is to support those political forces that are in favor of better relations between Georgia and Russia. Noghaideli is among them," Markov said.
"But he is not the only one coming out for such a position. Some lawmakers even from [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili's party in private conversations acknowledge the insanity of his policies."
United Russia also has cooperation agreements and provides direct financial assistance to the ruling parties in the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
In 2005, United Russia signed a cooperation agreement with the Party of Regions in Ukraine. Earlier this year, Party of Regions head Viktor Yanukovych became president of Ukraine, embarking on a noticeably more pro-Russia course than his predecessor.
Konstanin Kosachyov, who is chairman of the Russian State Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee and heads United Russia's Commission on Interparty and International Ties, told RFE/RL's Russian Service that working with Yanukovych is "simple."
"For us any president of Ukraine is absolutely fine who is realistically oriented toward the interests of Ukraine. [Former President Viktor] Yushchenko interpreted those interests in a false way. Yushchenko thought they consisted of getting as far from Russia as possible and quickly moving toward the West," Kosachyov said. "That is precisely why we had such a hard time with him. But with Viktor Yanukovych, it is simple for us. He has a significantly more precise and adequate understanding of Ukraine's interests."
United Russia's overriding concern in all of these alliances is advancing Russia's political and economic interests in the region. That is why the party, which proclaims itself in Russia as right-of-center, is comfortable working with left-leaning parties in Moldova and Ukraine, a right-leaning ally in Georgia, and parties of indeterminate ideology in Kyrgyzstan, South Ossetia, and Transdniester.
'Pragmatic Line'
The key factor in United Russia's alliances is the willingness of partner parties to adopt what it calls a "pragmatic" line in relations with Moscow.
Petre Mamradze, a spokesman for Noghaideli's For A Just Georgia party, lays out a position typical of United Russia's partners.
"We are doing everything we can to improve relations with Russia. Being realists, we see this is the ruling party of Russia. According to all opinion polls, the overwhelming majority of this enormous country supports Vladimir Putin and the party that he heads. For Georgia, this is a fact; it is reality. And if we ignore it, we will disappear," Mamradze said.
United Russia's aggressive alliance-making seems to fit into the larger pattern of Moscow's evolving foreign policy. A Foreign Ministry working paper that was leaked to the Russian version of "Newsweek" magazine earlier this month emphasizes that Russia no longer views the world in terms of "friends" and "enemies," but exclusively in the framework of "interests." It urges Moscow to create a range of formal and informal tools for advancing Russia's modernization agenda through foreign ties.
In the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the concept paper emphasizes "supporting the activity of Russian economic operators in the CIS space." It sets the goal of "actively attracting Ukraine into the orbit of economic cooperation with Russia" and "facilitating the expansion of the activity of Russian business in Kyrgyzstan."
The paper does not list promoting stable democratic development in the CIS as a national interest for Russia, and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev told a conference in Yaroslavl this month that parliamentary democracy has been "a disaster" for Kyrgyzstan.
United Russia's position at the nexus of politics and business in Russia means that parties allying themselves with United Russia can expect significant material support in their election campaigns. Noghiedeli's For A Just Georgia and Lupu's Democratic Party both have slick, multimedia websites, for example.
Alexander Rondeli of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) says Moscow is "acting now often not through state channels, but through the party United Russia, which can also hardly be considered a political party."
"But if you take this as an attempt to influence the political situation inside Georgia and set up some sort of pro-Russian opposition against the current authorities, you can also assume that definitely without financial contributions this won't work," Rondeli said.
By Robert Coalson. Published on 29 September 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Kremlins_Ruling_Party_Boosts_Ties_Across_The_Former_Soviet_Union/2171505.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.
Ar-Namys on September 22 signed a cooperation agreement with United Russia, the colossus that controls executive and legislative branches across the Russian Federation and is headed by Russia's most powerful politician, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.
Following a model that seems to have worked in Ukraine, where a pro-Western president was replaced earlier this year by a pro-Russian one, United Russia is also now working actively with friendly parties in Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia -- all countries whose political vector is up for grabs in the next 18 months.
According to a United Russia press release, the Kyrgyzstan agreement includes not only political cooperation, but also calls for the development of "equal and mutually beneficial cooperation between Russia and Kyrgyzstan in the economic sphere, the creation of beneficial conditions for the development of entrepreneurial, investment, and scientific activity."
Further blurring the lines between party activity and national policy, the cooperation agreement was signed on United Russia's behalf by the head of the party's Supreme Council, Boris Gryzlov, who is also speaker of the Russian State Duma.
Deepening Ties
The Ar-Namys agreement is just the latest in a series of such pacts United Russia has signed with parties throughout the former Soviet space. Earlier this month, United Russia signed a similar pact with Moldova's Democratic Party, headed by former Communist Marian Lupu.
Lupu told a press conference after returning from Russia that the agreement with United Russia is part of his party's "pragmatic" view of relations with Russia.
"We need relations of cooperation, not confrontation with Russia. This is the message of the political agreement we signed. Second, Moldova cannot ignore and will not ignore the Russian Federation. Third, we have to be pragmatic and constructive if we want the best for the citizens of Moldova," Lupu said.
Moldova is expected to hold parliamentary elections in November, and analysts say Moscow hopes to split Lupu away from the pro-Western, four-party ruling coalition.
United Russia also has a cooperation agreement with the Renewal party in Moldova's breakaway Transdniester region.
In Georgia, United Russia works with the opposition For A Just Georgia movement of former Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli, which describes itself as "having a classic right opposition orientation."
Sergei Markov, a Russian Duma deputy and United Russia official, told RFE/RL's Georgian Service that the key issue is improving relations between the two countries.
"United Russia's main goal is to support those political forces that are in favor of better relations between Georgia and Russia. Noghaideli is among them," Markov said.
"But he is not the only one coming out for such a position. Some lawmakers even from [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili's party in private conversations acknowledge the insanity of his policies."
United Russia also has cooperation agreements and provides direct financial assistance to the ruling parties in the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
In 2005, United Russia signed a cooperation agreement with the Party of Regions in Ukraine. Earlier this year, Party of Regions head Viktor Yanukovych became president of Ukraine, embarking on a noticeably more pro-Russia course than his predecessor.
Konstanin Kosachyov, who is chairman of the Russian State Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee and heads United Russia's Commission on Interparty and International Ties, told RFE/RL's Russian Service that working with Yanukovych is "simple."
"For us any president of Ukraine is absolutely fine who is realistically oriented toward the interests of Ukraine. [Former President Viktor] Yushchenko interpreted those interests in a false way. Yushchenko thought they consisted of getting as far from Russia as possible and quickly moving toward the West," Kosachyov said. "That is precisely why we had such a hard time with him. But with Viktor Yanukovych, it is simple for us. He has a significantly more precise and adequate understanding of Ukraine's interests."
United Russia's overriding concern in all of these alliances is advancing Russia's political and economic interests in the region. That is why the party, which proclaims itself in Russia as right-of-center, is comfortable working with left-leaning parties in Moldova and Ukraine, a right-leaning ally in Georgia, and parties of indeterminate ideology in Kyrgyzstan, South Ossetia, and Transdniester.
'Pragmatic Line'
The key factor in United Russia's alliances is the willingness of partner parties to adopt what it calls a "pragmatic" line in relations with Moscow.
Petre Mamradze, a spokesman for Noghaideli's For A Just Georgia party, lays out a position typical of United Russia's partners.
"We are doing everything we can to improve relations with Russia. Being realists, we see this is the ruling party of Russia. According to all opinion polls, the overwhelming majority of this enormous country supports Vladimir Putin and the party that he heads. For Georgia, this is a fact; it is reality. And if we ignore it, we will disappear," Mamradze said.
United Russia's aggressive alliance-making seems to fit into the larger pattern of Moscow's evolving foreign policy. A Foreign Ministry working paper that was leaked to the Russian version of "Newsweek" magazine earlier this month emphasizes that Russia no longer views the world in terms of "friends" and "enemies," but exclusively in the framework of "interests." It urges Moscow to create a range of formal and informal tools for advancing Russia's modernization agenda through foreign ties.
In the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the concept paper emphasizes "supporting the activity of Russian economic operators in the CIS space." It sets the goal of "actively attracting Ukraine into the orbit of economic cooperation with Russia" and "facilitating the expansion of the activity of Russian business in Kyrgyzstan."
The paper does not list promoting stable democratic development in the CIS as a national interest for Russia, and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev told a conference in Yaroslavl this month that parliamentary democracy has been "a disaster" for Kyrgyzstan.
United Russia's position at the nexus of politics and business in Russia means that parties allying themselves with United Russia can expect significant material support in their election campaigns. Noghiedeli's For A Just Georgia and Lupu's Democratic Party both have slick, multimedia websites, for example.
Alexander Rondeli of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) says Moscow is "acting now often not through state channels, but through the party United Russia, which can also hardly be considered a political party."
"But if you take this as an attempt to influence the political situation inside Georgia and set up some sort of pro-Russian opposition against the current authorities, you can also assume that definitely without financial contributions this won't work," Rondeli said.
By Robert Coalson. Published on 29 September 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Kremlins_Ruling_Party_Boosts_Ties_Across_The_Former_Soviet_Union/2171505.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
Statement by Herman VAN ROMPUY, President of the European Council, following his meeting with Viktor YANUKOVYCH, President of Ukraine
"I am pleased to welcome President Yanukovych back to Brussels. Our regular meetings demonstrate the continued dynamism of the EU - Ukraine relationship.
We have continued our discussion on issues of fundamental importance for the EU - Ukraine relationship, ranging from the status of the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, through a broad range of reforms.
Ukraine is seeing a period of political stability, based on a strong parliamentary majority. This enables Ukraine to move forward with important reforms. The agreement found between Ukraine and the IMF on a new Stand-by Arrangement demonstrates the government's willingness to find solutions. Fulfilment of the criteria of the Stand by Arrangement will enable the EU to move forward with the disbursement of our Macro-financial Assistance to Ukraine.
With Ukraine moving forward in her reform process, the EU stands by her side, to support and assist with both advice and financial resources.
Ukraine is a European country, and we share basic core values, on which we build our societies. Democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights are the core values we share and strive to implement in practice. We also discussed the importance of guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary and the freedom of the media.
Over the past years, Ukraine has received considerable respect for the consolidation of democracy and the freedom of speech. Ukraine's legacy as an open society is an important one, and needs to be further built upon.
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
PACE committee welcomes ‘political will’ for ambitious reform in Ukraine, but warns that democratic principles need to be respected
The Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has welcomed the political will being shown by the new government in Ukraine for an “ambitious and far-reaching package of reforms” – but warned that they were being implemented in a hasty manner.
In a draft resolution unanimously approved yesterday at a meeting in Paris, the committee said the reforms needed “wide political consensus and public support”, which in turn was only possible if parliamentary procedures and democratic principles were strictly respected.
For the reforms to be successful, government and opposition should also jointly implement constitutional changes first, the committee declared. “Lasting political stability” in Ukraine required a clear separation of powers, as well as a proper system of checks and balances between the executive, legislature and judiciary.
The parliamentarians also expressed their serious concern at allegations that democratic freedoms – such as freedom of assembly, expression and the media – have come under pressure in recent months. “Any regression in respect for and protection of these rights would be unacceptable for the Assembly,” they said.
The co-rapporteurs, Renate Wohlwend (Liechtenstein, EPP/CD) and Mailis Reps (Estonia, ALDE), intend to return to Ukraine in the near future to discuss their findings and conclusions with the authorities and other relevant parties, if possible before the Assembly debates the report at its forthcoming plenary session (4-8 October 2010).
Source: PACE. Published in Strasbourg on 10 September 2010
Wednesday, August 4, 2010
EU-Ukraine: Partners for securing gas to Europe
Procurement Notice: Preparatory studies for the modernisation of the Ukrainian Gas Transit and Storage - 28/07/2010
In the framework of the Joint Commission-Ukraine-IFI Declaration agreed at the March 2009 EU-Ukraine Joint Investment Conference on the modernisation of the Ukrainian Gas Transit System, the procurement notice for the technical feasibility study and the environmental and social impact assessment study has been issued. Details are available on the website of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) at the following address:
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/workingwithus/procurement/notices/csu/100723F
International Investment Conference on the Modernisation of Ukraine's Gas Transit System, Brussels 23/03/2009
Ukraine is a key transit country for oil and gas supplies from Russia to the EU and has expressed its wish to be integrated in the EU and South East Europe energy markets. Energy is therefore a sector that will continue to be at the centre of EU-Ukraine relations and where co-operation will continue to grow substantially over the coming years. The gas transit system of Ukraine represents the backbone of gas supplies to Europe, accounting for 20% of the EU’s gas consumption and 80% of Russian gas exports to the EU, as well as carrying substantial quantities of Central Asian gas.
In this context, an International Investment Conference on the Modernisation of Ukraine's Gas Transit System is scheduled to take place in Brussels on 23rd March 2009. This conference, to be co-hosted by the European Commission and the Government of Ukraine, will bring together representatives of the EU, Ukraine and third countries, as well international financial institutions and the private sector.
The conference will be a major step forward in ensuring that the Ukraine’s gas transit system operates at the highest levels of efficiency, transparency and reliability.
Joint Declaration:
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/energy/events/eu_ukraine_2009/joint_declaration_en.pdf
Conference Documents:
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/energy/events/eu_ukraine_2009/index_en.htm
Source: European Commission External Relations
Monday, July 26, 2010
Eastern Europe's Frozen Conflicts Look To Kosovo Ruling
The International Court of Justice's (ICJ) ruling that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia was legal is of direct interest to other countries with secession crises or frozen conflicts.
The ICJ has said its ruling approving Kosovo's declaration of independence is unique to Kosovo.
That essentially means the justices do not want it to stand as a precedent for the world's many other places where regions have seceded or want to secede from their home countries.
But as the instant reaction of many governments to the July 22 decision makes clear, the court's ruling is being regarded -- rightly or wrongly -- in more universal terms. And nowhere more so than by parties involved in secession crises or frozen conflicts themselves.
'Guidance' For Bosnia's Serbs
Among the first to react to the court's ruling affirming Kosovo's 2008 unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia was the leader of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Serbian entity, the Republika Srpska.
Prime Minister Milorad Dodik suggested that if Kosovo's secession from Serbia did not violate international law, then the same standard should be applied to the Bosnian Serb entity's long-standing desire to leave Bosnia.
"For a long time, we in the Republika Srpska have not been happy in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Dodik told reporters in Banja Luka late on July 22.
"We respect the Dayton agreement [that ended the war in Bosnia], but the ICJ decision can serve us as guidance for our continuing fight over our status and our future."
Haris Silajdzic, a Bosniak who is the chairman of Bosnia's tripartite presidency, immediately responded that the country's borders were immutable.
"Any attempt at disintegration will be prevented, as it was the last time," he added.
The Serbian entity has never made a secret of its aspiration to join Serbia proper, a desire that directly contributed to the four-year war in Bosnia. The war ended after the intervention of NATO with the Dayton peace agreement in 1995 creating Bosnia as a federation of Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats.
Legal Limbo
Dodik's regarding the ICJ ruling as "guidance" for the future may be a measure of how much secessionist movements will regard the ruling as vindicating their efforts -- despite the court's own deliberately narrow interpretation.
The ICJ ruled that international law contained no "prohibition on declarations of independence" and so Kosovo's declaration "did not violate international law."
But the court avoided ruling on whether Kosovo's statehood was legal under international law, leaving the decision on whether to recognize the territory's independence to individual countries.
Thus far, 69 countries have recognized Kosovo's independence, including the United States and many European Union members.
Several major powers -- including Russia, China, and Spain -- concerned about secessionist regions of their own, have not recognized Kosovo.
No Change In Transdniester
In Moldova, officials of the breakaway Transdniester region have yet to comment publicly on the ICJ's decision.
But top advisers to Moldova's government say the ruling will not change any of the main players' views of the crisis, including those of Transdniester's main backer, Russia.
"On the Transdniester side, we all know what their statements over the last 18 years have been [demanding full independence], so I don't see how the ICJ decision could change that," says Nicu Popescu, a foreign-policy adviser to Moldova's Prime Minister Vlad Filat.
"As for Russia's statements and policies, Russia has constantly supported Moldova's territorial integrity and I'm absolutely sure that this stance will continue, and there's no reason at all why Russia's support for Moldova's territorial integrity should change."
The predominantly Russian-speaking population of Transdniester attempted in 1990 to secede from Moldova and since then has maintained a separate but unrecognized government with Moscow's support.
Georgian Stalemate
The Georgian government, which has lost two regions to secessionist movements backed by Moscow, also sees the court decision as doing little to change the status of its frozen conflicts.
"I think the decision probably will be used by regimes that are encouraging such kinds of small separatist regions," explains Kote Kublashvili, the chairman of Georgia's Supreme Court.
"Because prior to the decision, those regimes already used the situation very well and officially declared that [the Kosovo] case will affect other would-be-recognized separatist regions. Today's decision and those which have been made before [regarding recognition of Kosovo] will be widely debated first in terms the legal but also the political point of view."
South Ossetia fought a war of secession from Georgia in 1991-92, and Abkhazia did the same in 1992-93. Both have been recognized as independent by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru -- but no other countries -- in the wake of the 2008 Russia-Georgia war.
Leading figures in the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia say they are encouraged by the court's ruling.
"The fact that Kosovo has been recognized in accordance with international law can be seen as a definitive precedent for Abkhazia, and I think it will serve as an important precedent for Abkhazia," says Irakly Khintba, a Sukhumi-based political analyst.
"I'm not saying that Abkhazia will be recognized simply because it recognized Kosovo. But it is a serious political and historic step [for Abkhazia], that demonstrates that, in the current political environment, it is possible to recognize a state in spite of the will of the 'master state' that it is trying to separate from."
The deputy speaker of South Ossetia's parliament, Valery Dzitsoity, says he regards Pristina's situation as directly comparable to Tskhinvali's. "And moreover, I believe that South Ossetia has more of a foundation to expect recognition of its independence from the West than Kosovo," he adds.
Dzitsoity says that this is because "South Ossetia declared its independence at a time [September 1990] when Georgia was only recognized by Ukraine and was not a member of the UN. And Kosovo is separating from an internationally recognized state and a member of the UN."
No Agreement In Nagorno-Karabakh
Yet another frozen conflict whose parties may look to the ruling is Nagorno-Karabakh, the predominantly ethnic Armenian region that broke away from Azerbaijan following the breakup of the Soviet Union.
The head of the opposition Armenian Revolutionary Federation parliamentary faction, Vahan Hovhannisian, hailed the ICJ ruling.
"The judgment clearly states that a unilateral proclamation of independence cannot be viewed as unlawful. For this, of course, there should be prerequisites, and Karabakh has at least the same prerequisites as Kosovo, if not more," Hovhannisian said.
"It means that now we get a new instrument, a new opportunity to struggle for the international recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh republic."
But Baku says it does not consider the Kosovo ruling pertinent to the Karabakh conflict.
Foreign Ministry spokesman Elxan Poluxov told RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service that Azerbaijan believed the ICJ's decision applied "only to Kosovo."
"Conflicts differ and there is no single solution for all conflicts," Poluxov added. "We don't see that the decision may somehow affect the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and negotiations on this conflict should have their own format."
Ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh fought a war of secession from Azerbaijan in 1991-94, backed by Yerevan.
Most of the region of Nagorno Karabakh today is governed by the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh republic, while the territory remains internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan.
By Charles Recknagel. Published on 23 July 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Eastern_Europes_Frozen_Conflicts_Look_To_Kosovo_Ruling/2108088.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.
Thursday, July 22, 2010
Ukraine An 'Example Of Democratization' To Region, But 'Threats To Progress Emerging'
The Washington-based organization Freedom House, which measures the degree of liberty in countries around the world, says Ukraine is setting an example for its region in the progress it is making in democratization.
But Freedom House's director of studies, Christopher Walker, warns of possible dangers ahead in an interview with RFE/RL.
RFE/RL: You have said that the success or failure of democratization and the development of civil society in Ukraine has a significance that goes beyond its own borders. Please explain this potential to influence the region.
Christopher Walker: The success or failure of Ukraine as a democratic state in a region which is more defined by a scarcity rather than an abundance of such states is important because demonstration effects can matter, and Ukraine has managed -- certainly in the context of the non-Baltic former Soviet Union -- to make some very important headway in a number of key areas, to the extent that if we start to see reversals or erosion of some of the institutions we have seen [emerge] over the past decade or in particular over the past half-decade, this would be a damaging signal to other countries in the region that may look to Ukraine as an example in a very difficult environment.
RFE/RL: How do you rate Ukraine's efforts at democratization over the past decade? Have they managed to build stable institutions and a degree of accountability into their system?
Walker: If you look at the post-Soviet period, there were hopes certainly that in the immediate aftermath of that time that things would move forward swiftly. [But the situation] became in the end -- certainly in the period of [President Leonid] Kuchma -- it became rather difficult on a number of counts, including press freedom. This was exemplified to the outside world by the murder of the [investigative journalist] Heorhiy Gongadze, and those events about a decade ago led many to believe that meaningful reform would be extremely difficult.
But then the events of the Orange Revolution opened the door to a different way of doing things, and I think what has been notable since that time has been the institutionalization of open, competitive elections, the ability of civil society to function and play a meaningful role, and the news media. In a wilderness of unfreedom, Ukraine's news media has been a very notable exception, one which now needs to be safeguarded.
RFE/RL: Is the progress in democratization and civil society now under threat from the government of Moscow-leaning President Viktor Yanukovych? In what ways?
Walker: We've been hearing from colleagues and our analysts that a number of developments in the early months of this year, since the government took over, create some causes for concern, and our feeling is that to the extent there has been progress in a number of areas, that threats in those areas would be rather damaging to Ukraine's longer-term prospects for building a rules-based and open state.
In particular, pressures on civil society and news media which we gather have started -- they may not have reached full force, but the indicators are that there have been some growing pressures in those areas.
RFE/RL: How can the Western democracies help Ukraine?
Walker: The key steps which can be taken are first, to help safeguard the progress which has been made in recent years. This, I think, will be important for European and U.S. officials to consistently raise; it was very valuable for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to raise these issues during her visit to the community of democracies meeting in Krakow.
At the same time, its important to ensure that the sort of support that Ukraine has gotten more broadly is not cut off too quickly, because it's clear that there are a set of emerging challenges that may argue for assistance for a variety of sorts, political and otherwise, for the foreseeable future.
By RFE/RL. Published on 13 July 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Ukraine_An_Example_Of_Democratization_To_Region_But_Threats_To_Progress_Emerging/2104238.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.
Monday, June 7, 2010
PACE co-rapporteurs welcome Ukrainian authorities’ pledge to honour remaining Council of Europe commitments
Renate Wohlwend and Mailis Reps, monitoring co-rapporteurs for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), have welcomed the clearly-stated objective of Ukraine’s authorities and ruling coalition to implement remaining commitments to the Council of Europe in the near future. “The request of the President of Ukraine to his government and the Verkhovna Rada to adopt a reform package that would honour the country’s remaining commitments to the Council of Europe is an ambitious project that deserves the support of the Council of Europe and its Assembly,” said the co-rapporteurs at the end of a fact-finding visit to the country.
However, they also noted that several interlocutors from the opposition, but also from the ruling coalition, had indicated that the eagerness of the authorities to implement these reforms with the shortest possible delay had limited the possibility for proper reflection and consultation between all political forces. “The reforms needed to meet the remaining commitments, due to their importance, should necessarily be based on a consensus between the different political forces that is as wide as possible,” stressed the co-rapporteurs. “We therefore urge the relevant authorities to ensure that parliamentary procedures are fully respected, that the Venice Commission is properly consulted before legislation is adopted, and that the elaboration and adoption of any legislative reforms are made in an open and inclusive manner.”
In addition, they underscored that a number of reforms depended on a long-overdue reform of the Constitution, but that the President’s plans did not yet include such a constitutional reform project, which was much needed.
The co-rapporteurs noted with concern the increasing number of allegations that democratic freedoms such as freedom of assembly, freedom of expression and freedom of the media had come under stress in recent months. “A clear and unwavering respect for democratic freedoms and rights has been one of the main achievements in Ukraine’s democratic development in recent years. Any regress in respecting and protecting these rights would be unacceptable for the Assembly,” the co-rapporteurs said. They therefore noted with satisfaction that the President had stressed there would be zero tolerance for such behaviour, and that all allegations would be fully investigated, and perpetrators punished.
“Ukraine’s European orientation was highlighted over and again by all the interlocutors we spoke to. The road to European integration goes through the Council of Europe and the fulfilment of Ukraine’s commitments to it. We pledge to spare no effort to help the country in doing so,” concluded Ms Wohlwend and Ms Reps.
Source: PACE. Published in Strasbourg on 4 June 2010
Wednesday, June 2, 2010
In Georgia and Moldova, Worries That EU Special Reps -- And Their Protection -- May Vanish
Officials in Moldova and Georgia are reacting with concern to speculation that the EU is poised to remove special representatives appointed to their regions.
If confirmed, the change would signal a major downgrading in the EU's strategic interest in both Chisinau and the countries of the South Caucasus.
EU foreign policy officials gave no hint of change on the horizon when they met with the six post-Soviet countries that make up its Eastern Partnership community last week.
Instead, officials from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus were assured that the EU's eastern neighbors remain "main priorities" for the European Union.
So it was with a mix of surprise and anger when those countries learned May 31 that the EU is looking to abolish two of its key posts in the region.
Ashton's Bombshell
An assistant to EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton told EU ambassadors on May 28 that she was looking to eliminate the EU's special representatives to Moldova and the South Caucasus.
Such a move would significantly downgrade the EU's presence on the ground in two regions seen as politically unstable and vulnerable to creeping Russian influence.
There has been no official statement from either the EU or the two affected officials -- Kalman Mizsei, the special representative to Moldova, or Peter Semneby, who holds the post for the South Caucasus.
Iulian Fruntashu, an adviser to Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat, told RFE/RL's Moldovan Service he was concerned about what the move might mean for Moldova's progress toward EU integration as one of the Eastern Partners.
"The circumstances, I think, weren't the best for the work of Kalman Mizsei. But I think the position itself shouldn't be abandoned just because Catherine Ashton wants to simplify the stucture of the EU's diplomatic service," Fruntashu said. "I think that a high representative nominated by the European Council shows that the EU is making a priority of Moldova, Georgia, and other countries in the region. We are interested first and foremost in the Eastern Partnership and Moldova's place in it, and I think that it would have been useful for us to keep a special EU representive in Moldova."
The move -- which will also affect other of the EU's 11 special representatives -- has been defended as an attempt to streamline the EU's diplomatic corps. But a letter from Ashton outlining the plan also offers rationales that have struck some observers as flawed.
Ashton's letter, for one, suggests that the bloc should scrap geographically distant posts. But Moldova and the South Caucasus are both closer than Central Asia or Africa's Great Lakes region, both of which will retain their special representatives.
The letter also suggests the bloc should retain only those seen as most important for the EU -- an alarming wake-up call for countries hosting no fewer than four post-Soviet "frozen conflicts."
Labor Pains
News of the proposed change came as EU officials were gathering in Rostov-for-Donu for a summit with their Russian counterparts seen as ushering in less tempestuous relations between Moscow and Brussels.
According to the Ashton plan, Mizsei's current post would be merged with that of the European Commission's representative and eventually brought within the External Action Service, the consolidated diplomatic corps Ashton is laboring to introduce.
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia would see a similar shift. In addition to losing the oversight of Semneby, who has held the post for more than four years and is widely respected in the region, the change would mean the end of the EU's unified approach to the South Caucasus.
Such a move could be advantageous to Moscow, which has been accused of using regional rivalries to destabilize the strategically important area.
Temur Iakobashvili, Georgia's state minister for reintegration, is a key figure in Tbilisi's battle to regain control of its pro-Moscow breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Speaking to RFE/RL's Georgian Service, he said he believed the decision was not "final," but expressed concern that a change in posts would have a negative effect on conflict resolution in the area.
"The important thing is not what the new position would be called," Iakobashvili said. "It's what would happen to [the distribution of] functions, and I think the Caucasus-wide element of Mr. Semneby's post is an important one."
He added: "Conflicts haven't vanished anywhere. In the case of Georgia, moreover, we're even facing the occupation [of our territory]. Therefore, it's an important to consider the question of how these functions will be distributed."
By Valentina Ursu, Marina Vashakmadze. Published on 1 June 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/In_Georgia_and_Moldova_Worries_That_EU_Special_Reps__And_Their_Protection_May_Vanish/2059233.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.
Monday, May 31, 2010
OSCE hosts forum on women's participation in political life in Ukraine
A forum on promoting the participation and representation of women in the political life of Ukraine was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine.
The meeting, which is part of a joint ODIHR-European Commission project, brought together members of parliament, political party representatives, district and local councilors, civil society activists and representatives of international organizations as well as academia.
"This forum was part of a series of meetings aimed at sharing experiences and identifying ways forward for increasing the participation of women in politics, and in particular the representation of women in parliaments at all levels," said Marcin Walecki, Chief of the ODIHR's Democratic Governance and Participation Unit.
Participants discussed the development of effective gender equality and anti-discrimination laws and the introduction of electoral legislation that ensures that men and women enjoy equal rights and opportunities to participate in political life and run for elected offices. Discussions also focused on developing policies aimed at mobilizing broader public support and political will crucial for reforms in this area.
"It is high time that political leaders, women and men, join forces with other public stakeholders and pass legislation that will allow for greater opportunities for women to pursue political careers and address gender-based stereotypes that keep women away from leadership positions," said Olexandra Kuzhel, an experienced politician who is a senior official in the political party Strong Ukraine.
Members of parliament and representatives of political parties and women's rights organizations from several OSCE participating States shared their experiences in promoting gender-sensitive policies.
An earlier forum held in 2008 in Ukraine focused on raising the awareness of gender-equality issues in local policy making processes.
Source: OSCE. Published in Kiev on 28 May 2010.
Thursday, May 27, 2010
Štefan Füle Opening address to the Plenary Session Eastern Partnership Informal Foreign Ministers Meeting Sopot (Poland), 24 May 2010
Dear Ministers,
Thank you for inviting me to this informal Foreign Ministers meeting here in Sopot. I am sure that the beauty of this seaside resort will inspire us. I would like to thank in particular Minister Sikorski and Minister Moratinos for their unwavering support for the Eastern Partnership.
I am glad that we have this opportunity - one year on from the Prague summit - informally to discuss what we have achieved and where we want to go with the Eastern Partnership. I am convinced the ambitious agenda we agreed in Prague remains the right one: by seeking the political association and economic integration of our six partner countries with the EU, we will strengthen the capacity of our partner countries to make their own sovereign choices about the political and economic challenges that confront them. The development of vibrant democracies and economies able to compete in a globalised marketplace is in all our interests. Let me underline the staunch commitment of the Commission to support our partners in this process.
Mr Chairman,
Let me briefly make a few comments on what we have achieved over the past year and outline a few pointers for the future.
I believe we have got off to a flying start over the past year. I know that some of you have wanted us to go faster and further. But, if I can be frank, I know that others have been surprised at what we have achieved in such a short time.
We have made good on our offer of new contractual relations. Negotiations with Ukraine are well advanced. The negotiations of an Association Agreement with Moldova have been launched. And negotiations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia will start soon. We are engaging with Belarus on the path of an open and constructive dialogue on all fronts but, if we are to go as far as we would wish, we will need to see further progress in the field of democracy and respect for human rights. The ball is now in Minsk’s court.
We have also established the multilateral dimension of the Eastern Partnership. The four Platforms and the panels they have created are now starting to implement their 2 year work programmes. More than 70 activities are already planned for the next twelve months. Their importance should not be underestimated: they allow for sharing experiences and best practices in order to accelerate progress towards the overall objectives of political association and economic integration. The flagship initiatives which have now been launched have the same goal and are focusing on such crucial fields as border management, development of small and medium sized enterprises, and energy market integration.
Now, with the Lisbon Treaty in force and the External Action Service in sight, offering us the prospect of more joined-up EU foreign policy-making, the Eastern Partnership can give us the possibility to discuss issues of security and stability.
So what are the challenges for the future as we move towards the second Eastern Partnership Summit in the first half of next year during the Hungarian Presidency of the EU?
First, we must redouble our efforts to advance towards two of our most ambitious objectives – visa liberalisation and free trade areas. This is not easy and requires considerable homework on all sides. Let us intensify our dialogue so that we are absolutely clear about the steps that each of us needs to take to move forward. Let us also look for short term steps which can bring immediate, tangible benefits. One such could be the swift and effective implementation of the new EU visa code in all six partner countries in order to ensure uniform and decent treatment.
Let me stress in this context the importance of the Comprehensive Institution Building Programmes in the Eastern Partnership. Once in place – which should be the case next year - these programmes will provide tangible support to partner countries towards achieving the goals of new contractual relations, deep and comprehensive free trade agreements and visa liberalisation.
My second point is to ensure we make the best use of our scarce financial resources. We welcome the considerable interest shown in the Eastern Partnership from the numerous project proposals that have been presented. However, all of us must bear in mind that the bulk of EU financial support to the partner countries is devoted to bilateral programmes. This is, after all, as it should be given the bilateral focus of our policy objectives under the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership. And not all of the additional EaP funding has come on stream yet in 2010. Nevertheless from 2011, the annual EU resources designed to support reform in the 6 Eastern Partnership countries and regional co-operation will increase on average by more than half compared with the period 2007-10 . I will therefore redouble my efforts to ensure that our resources are targeted on achieving our key policy objectives and to look for new ways to improve donor coordination.
In this regard, I believe we should seek to enhance cooperation with the International Financial Institutions, notably the EIB and EBRD, to support more visible investment projects. Already we are doing a lot in this respect. The projects which have been developed under the Neighbourhood Investment Facility amount to €4 billion and are in such crucial areas as electricity networks, energy efficiency, SME financing, airport modernisation or road rehabilitation.
Increased funding, effectively used, as well as progress in the fields of mobility and trade will certainly improve the visibility of the Eastern Partnership. But I believe there is more we can do. I hope that we can start holding Eastern Partnership events in partner countries. I will make sure that the recently increased EU delegations take a leading role in projecting the Partnership in our partner countries. I believe the work of the Civil Society Forum can also play a role here.
Finally I believe third countries outside our circle of 33 can also make valuable contributions to the implementation of Eastern Partnership objectives. We should therefore consider carefully the idea of setting up a “Group of Friends” – something originally proposed by Minister Sikorski in Madrid.
Mr Chairman,
I believe we have made a good start but that we now must keep up the momentum as the Eastern Partnership moves into its second year. For this, I believe we will need robust administrative structures within the External Action Service - something I am discussing with the High Representative.
Let us ensure we all now play our part in moving forward our ambitious agenda – we will be judged by our record on implementing our commitments. Let us give greater visibility to what we have already achieved and to our ongoing activities. And let us work to make the best possible use of the financial resources we are dedicating to this enterprise.
As Commissioner for the whole of the EU’s Neighbourhood, I will continue to strive to advance our relations with all our neighbours East and South. Based on the stock-taking in the Commission’s recent Communication, I hope all of us in the coming months can reflect on how to develop our policy further.
Beyond our immediate priorities for the year ahead, we must also keep in mind the longer term horizon. Making political association and economic integration a reality, will bring our partner countries into an ever closer relationship with the EU: a community of shared values; a network of free trade areas which could in the long run lead to a Neighbourhood Economic Community; a liberalized visa area. I believe it is not too early to start reflecting on what such a relationship will mean for all of us and how we could, in due course, cement it further.
You can rest assured that, working in close coordination with Cathy Ashton and my fellow Commissioners, I will remain firmly committed to advancing the Partnership.
Thank you
Source: European Commission
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