Vigenin welcomes the pardon decree by the President of Azerbaijan

STATEMENT by Mr Kristian VIGENIN, Co-President of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly on the pardon decree signed on 22 June 2012 by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev


I welcome the pardon decree signed by the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, releasing 66 prisoners. President Aliyev has taken into account the repeated calls by the European Parliament and other European and international organisations with regard to the human rights situation in the country. The release of nine out of the eleven prisoners detained at the demonstrations in April 2011 is an important step in improving the level of respect for human and citizens' rights. This will remove shadows in the EU-Azerbaijan relations and help develop further our cooperation.

I also call upon the Azerbaijani authorities to consider releasing the remaining two activists, imprisoned after the April 2011 demonstrations in Baku. There should be constant efforts to improve the system, so that political activity is encouraged and all rights of the citizens of Azerbaijan are duly guaranteed. Freedom of expression, information and assembly are important cornerstones of citizenship and the law should be used to guarantee them. President Aliyev has done a bold move to answer the concerns of the EU, which now has to find its continuation in an enhanced dialogue between the EU and Azerbaijan.



Brussels; 26 June 2012

OSCE media freedom representative offers assistance to improve media freedom in Azerbaijan

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatović,concluded a four-day visit to Baku during which she called on authorities to improve media freedom in Azerbaijan and offered them her Office’s assistance in reforming media laws.

The visit, which took place following an invitation from President Ilham Aliyev, was Mijatović's first to Baku.

“I had open and frank discussions with Azerbaijani authorities about the legal media framework and the latest developments in the media-freedom field. The concerns I raised were taken seriously” Mijatović said.

“We agreed that the media-freedom situation needs further improvement so that Azerbaijan can fully meet its OSCE media commitments. President Aliyev assured me that reform of the media environment will continue as part of Azerbaijan’s modernization plans. He also assured me that the Internet will remain free.”

Mijatović urged the authorities to ensure that the perpetrators and masterminds of all attacks on journalists, including the 2005 assassination of the Monitor editor Elmar Huseynov, are brought to justice. She also called on the authorities to prevent violence against the media and to ensure that journalists and social media activists can perform their work in a free and safe environment. In addition, she raised with the authorities the recent harassment of two journalists from Azadliq newspaper, and voiced her concerns about restrictions on the work of journalists during recent demonstrations.

“The authorities should allow for more pluralism, especially in the broadcast media. Access to information for the media should be granted to all media. Restrictive changes brought to the media legislation in recent years should be reversed, the transparency of the activities and accountability of the country’s media regulator must be guaranteed and the political independence of the Public Broadcaster should be ensured,” she said.

Mijatović offered her Office’s assistance in reforming media legislation. During her visit, she participated in a Conference on 11 May organised by the OSCE Office in Baku and the Press Council. At the conference Mijatovic expressed hope that a law decriminalizing defamation in line with international standards would be adopted soon.

In addition to President Aliyev, Mijatović held talks with Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov; Interior Minister Ramil Usubov; Ali Hasanov, the head of the Presidential Administration’s Social and Political Department; Human Rights Commissioner Elmira Suleymanova, Aflatun Amashov, Head of the Press Council and Nushiravan Maharramli, the chair of the National Television and Radio Council. She also met with journalists and representatives of media nongovernmental organizations.

On 10 May Mijatović visited newspaper editor Eynulla Fatullayev in prison.

Source: OSCE. Published in Baku, 13 May 2011.

OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs issue statement

The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, Ambassadors Bernard Fassier of France, Robert Bradtke of the United States, and Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, released the following statement:

"The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Ambassadors Bernard Fassier of France, Robert Bradtke of the United States, and Igor Popov of the Russian Federation) traveled April 11-14 to Yerevan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Baku. Joined by Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson in Office (PRCiO), the Co-Chairs met separately with Armenian President Serge Sargsian, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and the de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh. In their meetings, the Co-Chairs discussed next steps for reaching agreement on the Basic Principles. It is the strong view of the Co-Chairs that the time has arrived to finalize and endorse the Basic Principles and move to the drafting of a peace agreement.

On April 13, the Co-Chairs crossed the Line of Contact (LOC) by foot, before continuing to Baku. As with their crossing of the LOC in September 2010, this was intended to demonstrate the importance of maintaining and strengthening the 1994 ceasefire and that the LOC should not become a permanent barrier to contacts among neighboring peoples, as well as to reaffirm the Co-Chairs' need to visit any areas affected by the conflict. In conjunction with the crossing of the LOC, the Co-Chairs also visited part of the region southwest of the city of Terter. In addition, the Co-Chairs visited the village of Orta Karvend, accompanying the PRCiO in monitoring the area where the reported March 8 incident occurred.

Building on the March 5 joint statement made in Sochi by the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Russian Federation, the Co-Chairs also presented to the sides a draft mechanism for investigation of incidents along the front lines with the participation of all sides. The Co-Chairs will continue to work with the parties to create as soon as possible a transparent and objective investigation process, with the goal of enhancing confidence, decreasing the risk of miscalculation, and saving lives.

The Co-Chairs expressed their concern that the planned opening of an airport in Nagorno-Karabakh could lead to further increased tensions. They cautioned that the operation of flights to and from this airport could not be used to support any claim of a change in the current status of Nagorno-Karabakh under international law. The Co-Chairs urged the sides to reach an understanding in keeping with international conventions and agreements, as well as current practice between Armenia and Azerbaijan for flights over their territory. The Co-Chairs welcomed assurances from the sides that they will reject any threat or attack against civil aircraft, pursue the matter through diplomatic steps, and refrain from politicizing the issue.

The Co-Chairs will travel to Washington in late April for consultations with senior United States government officials, and to discuss the status of progress towards a peace settlement."


Source: OSCE. Published on 14 April 2011

Nagorno-Karabakh Tries To Make A Mark In Washington

From the outside, it looks more like a dentist's office than an embassy. In reality, it is neither.

But a glance at the website of Nagorno-Karabakh's office in Washington, D.C., would suggest that inside this unremarkable, flagless building a few blocks from the White House exists something that at least resembles an embassy.

The website includes a "country profile," a list of "national holidays," information on the region's government and economics, and a section with instructions on how to obtain a visa.

Robert Avetisyan, whose styles himself the permanent representative of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic to the United States, explains, "We implement all the procedures and we render the same assistance and render the same services as an embassy does."

Avetisyan, however, does not hold a diplomatic passport. And Nagorno-Karabakh is not a country.

Indeed, with a largely Armenian population on the one hand, and legal ties to Azerbaijan on the other, the region's long-term status is far from settled.

Unrecognized, But With An Office

Nagorno-Karabakh was the site of a bitter six-year war between Armenia and Azerbaijan from 1988-94 that saw tens of thousands killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. The mountainous territory unilaterally declared independence in 1991 and has enjoyed de facto autonomy since a cease-fire was declared in 1994.

But landlocked and isolated, it remains largely dependent on Armenia. Nagorno-Karabakh is even represented by Armenia in the Minsk Process, the international -- and largely inert -- attempt to resolve the dispute.

But the de facto government in Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh's capital, has established its Washington office in an effort to raise its profile in the hope that proximity to levers of power might sway the debate on the territory's status.

"In the views of major actors and in the eyes of the international community, 'territorial dispute' is a negative thing," Avetisyan says. "And there could be more or less a negative stance towards this issue. But if it's people who are fighting for their freedom and trying to finalize the decolonization process of the Soviet Union, it's an absolutely different story."

Avetisyan says one of his office's primary duties is to maintain the website, which along with embassy-like sections also contains detailed accounts -- from his side's perspective -- of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

'Misleading The U.S. Public'

Yerevan claims that Nagorno-Karabakh is a historically Armenian territory called Artsakh. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, when both Armenia and Azerbaijan gained independence, Yerevan and Stepanakert have argued that the territory has a right to self-determination.

Baku, on the other hand, claims that the territory is historically Azerbaijani and maintains that any attempt to detach Nagorno-Karbakh violates its territorial integrity.

Azerbaijan's embassy in Washington says that the office is "misleading the U.S. public" by spreading Armenian "propaganda" and presenting itself as an official representative of a territory that has no sovereignty.

The office's website directs would-be visitors to the territory to contact the Nagorno-Karabakh office in Armenia, which it says issues visas.

Nasimi Aghayev, a spokesman for the Azerbaijani Embassy, says that in the eyes of Baku, that direction amounts to promoting illegal activity.

"Because the Nagorno-Karabakh region is an internationally recognized part of Azerbaijan, those who want to travel there should respect the laws of Azerbaijan," Aghayev says. "And Azerbaijan has made it clear that traveling to Nagorno-Karabakh without permission by the authorities of the Republic of Azerbaijan is illegal and inadmissible."

Avetisyan also sends a monthly newsletter to influential Washington think tanks and produces a bimonthly general newsletter, which he says is read by "thousands" in the Armenian diaspora.

Front For Armenian Lobby?

Together with the Embassy of Armenia, his office helped organize an event last September at the U.S. Capitol commemorating of the 19th anniversary of Nagorno-Karabakh's self-proclaimed independence. The Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues co-sponsored the event, which was attended by Senator Mark Kirk (Republican-Illinois), the caucus's co-chair.

Due to its strong ties to Armenian-American organizations, however, Avetisyan must regularly counter those who say that his office is simply a front for Washington's influential Armenian lobby.

Indeed, his two rooms are provided free of charge by the Armenian Assembly of America, a lobbying group that shares a floor of the building. The office appears among a long list of lobbying groups registered under the Justice Department's Foreign Agents Registration Act.

Until recently, the cost of running the office was defrayed by Armenian-American groups, although Avetisyan says expenses are now completely covered by Nagorno-Karabakh's de facto government.

But Avetisyan, who freely admits that the support he receives from Armenian groups is "priceless," remains reluctant to accept the "lobby" description.

"It depends on what we call [a] 'lobby.' If we promote the interests of a state, if we promote the interests of ordinary people, if we promote peace, then yes," he says, "if that can be considered a lobby."

Abkhazia 'More Of A Player'

Whatever it's called, analysts say the clout the Armenian lobby enjoys in Washington has been indispensible for Nagorno-Karabakh's representative office.

Thomas de Waal, an expert on the Caucasus at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Washington think tank, notes that there might be better arguments to justify an office representing Abkhazia, a breakaway region in Georgia, than Nagorno-Karabakh.

"If you compare Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, Abkhazia is larger, it has stronger institutions, it has an opposition, it has a media, and a stronger civil society than Nagorno-Karabakh," de Waal says. "So objectively speaking, Abkhazia is more of a player in the region than Karabakh. So there's an inconsistency there when you compare the two on the ground, [but] it all really comes down to Washington politics rather than local realities."

Georgia, of course, is one of the United States' staunchest allies.

De Waal says, however, that Nagorno-Karabakh remains largely isolated from the outside world and struggles to have its voice heard "thanks to the efforts of Azerbaijan."

What he calls the office's "positive role" is that it represents the voice of "a rather ignored party in a very important regional conflict."

Whether a distinct voice, a proxy for Yerevan's interests, or something in between, Avetisyan admits that he is not getting the attention he envisioned for his office.

His contacts are mainly with lawmakers already attuned to Armenian interests, and chances to speak with State Department officials are few and far between. But he says his office will continue on its mission.

Avetisyan is also not the only Nagorno-Karabakh representative abroad. The territory's government has offices in Australia, France, Germany, Lebanon, and Russia, as well as in Armenia.


By Richard Solash. Published on 29 March 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/nagorno-karabakh_armenia_azerbaijan_embassy/3540574.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Azerbaijan And The West: Beyond Interest, Toward Commitment

A friend in need is a friend indeed. I couldn’t agree more. Yet, it is the times when we are savoring our success or trying ever harder to reach our goals that we appreciate a friend’s supportive smile or pat on the back. Whether we get it or not does not affect our success, but it does ease our way and make it more pleasant.

The greatness of success has always depended not just on how it is achieved, but on being able to share it with those who have accompanied you throughout the sweet and bitter journey.

The cooperation Azerbaijan forged with the West, especially with the United States, has over the years been characterized as strategic by many, short-term by some, and untruthful by others. However, even when relations reached an all-time low, Azerbaijan never wavered in its commitment to its partnership with the West. Time and again, when buffeted by strong winds, Azerbaijan has needed understanding and a firm stance from the United States, while the United States has expected the same from us, however strange it might seem given Azerbaijan’s size on a global scale.

When Azerbaijan was forced into full-scale war with its neighbor in the early 1990s, it expected no less than a balanced approach from the West. Instead, all it got was Section 907, banning any direct U.S. aid to the Azerbaijani government. History might not repeat itself, but it does rhyme. Ten years later, the United States’ government was in need of friends, big and small, to support the war on terror. In the blink of an eye, while most of the region’s countries were still hemming and hawing, Azerbaijan contributed peacekeeping troops to the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq and served shoulder-to shoulder with a U.S. Marine battalion, providing security for the Haditha Dam, a vital infrastructure in Al Anbar Province that produced one-quarter of Iraq’s electricity. With 11 rotations and more than 1,000 troops, Azerbaijan underscored its loyalty to the United States.

The same year, 2002, Azerbaijani troops also joined the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, becoming the first CIS member to contribute troops. Six years later, in 2008, when many allies were pulling out of Afghanistan in despair, President Ilham Aliyev submitted a bill “on the status of Azerbaijani troops carrying out peacemaking operations abroad” to the Azerbaijani parliament, which envisaged doubling the peacekeeping troops in Afghanistan.

In yet another gesture, the Azerbaijani government demonstrated an unfeigned faithfulness to its friendship. More than NATO 100,000 troops flew through Azerbaijani airspace in 2009 alone. Approximately 25 percent of the coalition’s supplies going to Afghanistan pass through Azerbaijan. NATO member states transport 1,500 containers every month to the war-torn country through the territory of Azerbaijan. The growing size of Azerbaijan’s military contingent, the open airspace, and Baku’s full cooperation on the battlefield says a lot more than mere words can express.

Facing pressure from the Armenian diaspora, the United States Congress fell flat with a biased approach to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. It used the role of lobby groups as an excuse for a lopsided approach. Azerbaijan, on the contrary, in its commitment to its promise on the war on terror, successfully prevented and dealt with terrorist threats, including those from Iran, despite constant pressure from the latter. Numerous plots were intercepted, criminals detained, potentially tragic scenarios avoided.

Because of its continuous good terms with the United States, Azerbaijan was accused of “cooperating with the Great Satan” on Iran’s Sahar-2 television channel -- which is broadcast in the territory of Azerbaijan without authorization -- and threatened by the Iranian authorities. It is not difficult to appreciate that pressure from 71 million Iranians is a much greater problem than pressure from 1.5 million Armenian-Americans.

Favoring Western Companies

Azerbaijan stands for and does many things that, for some reason, go unnoticed around the world. Astonishingly, Azerbaijan is one of the only major Caspian hydrocarbon-producing countries that has exported almost exclusively to the West. The biggest oil-and-gas contracts signed since 1994 -- including Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) and Shah Deniz -- favored Western companies over Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and other options.

As for the pipelines, construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector (AGRI), and Azerbaijan’s repeatedly positive attitude toward the Nabucco pipeline are clear evidence of Azerbaijan’s willingness to forge effective energy cooperation with the West. Despite Russia’s evident disapproval of such cooperation, Azerbaijan stays true to Euro-Atlantic projects. Azerbaijan took great steps to secure its oil revenues for future generations by creating the State Oil Fund, the transparency of which is maintained internationally by Western experts.

Azerbaijan has proven itself as the world’s fastest-growing trade route and a telecommunications hub in Eurasia. Azerbaijan, almost solely, is financing the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars-Istanbul railroad, one that will connect Central Asia with Europe along the shortest route. The country took gigantic steps to contribute to the improvement of the East-West corridor. The question is not whether the source of these projects is in Azerbaijani oil revenues, but whether the outcome is worth the input. For everyone should know that Azerbaijan’s vibrant growing economy and regional power are strengths, not weaknesses to be ashamed of.

Taking into account the complexity of U.S. involvement in the region and the juxtaposition of its foes and allies, Azerbaijan automatically becomes a country best suited for cooperation and partnership. Azerbaijan is one of the very few secular Muslim states of the region that has displayed a model of religious tolerance throughout its history. The cultural links that Azerbaijani people share with Americans might have been limited in the early 1990s, but following countless education and cultural-exchange programs, promoted both by the U.S. and Azerbaijani governments (such as FLEX, IREX, Muskie, Fulbright, State Oil Company (SOCAR), Azerbaijan State Scholarship and U.S. Peace Corps programs), understanding between the two states has grown immensely.

When U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was on an official visit to Baku, aside from all other official meetings, she requested a special gathering with a group of young Azerbaijani leaders. She got to meet 10, five of whom were graduates and alumni of U.S. high schools, universities, and other educational-exchange programs. Nothing could embody the spirit of Azerbaijan’s Western stance more than this outcome of cooperation over the years -- Azerbaijan’s outstanding young people.

However, as much as the Azerbaijani government can do to maintain its friendship with the United States, it is ultimately the determination of the United States upon which this partnership will rely. The famous business speaker Art Turock once said: “There's a difference between interest and commitment. When you are interested in doing something, you do it only when circumstances permit. When you're committed to something, you accept no excuses, only results.”

Circumstances did not permit Azerbaijan to send its troops to Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Iraq when there were young soldiers dying from Armenian bullets every day on the front line. The circumstances were not in our favor when we were resolute in our attempts to thwart Russian pressure against engaging in full-fledged energy cooperation with the West. Nor were they positive when we had to face Iran numerous times to support the United States. Interest is what government officials and decision makers rely on; commitment is what the ordinary people expect.

All in all, it is not promises we need from time to time from our great ally across the ocean, but a little genuine understanding and appreciation of who we are and what we stand for.


By Elnur Baimov. Published on 29 September 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Azerbaijan_And_The_West_Beyond_Interest_Toward_Commitment/2171638.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

What Does ‘Confederation’ Mean In The South Caucasus?

On July 18, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili met with his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, in Batumi and mentioned the idea of a “confederation” between the two countries. The phrase quickly got people wondering what exactly the president had in mind. Analysts have been raising questions and offering ideas ever since.

Journalists and political commentators from the countries of the South Caucasus have examined the idea (whether they endorse it or not) in the context of confrontational geopolitics. In August, Russia and Armenia agreed to extend the pact on the presence of Russian military bases in Armenia until 2044. At the same time, they expanded the format of bilateral military cooperation: henceforth Russia is obliged to defend Armenia from any external threat, which Yerevan expects primarily from Azerbaijan. In short, Armenia has become an even closer Russian ally than it was previously.

The discussion of a possible Georgia-Azerbaijan confederation was immediately placed in the traditional context of the “vertical” axis of Russia-Armenia (and, possibly, Iran) and the “horizontal” axis of Georgia and Azerbaijan (and, possibly, Turkey). And they don’t forget overseas allies, asserting that, of course, the idea of a confederation comes from Washington and is aimed at containing Russia. In a nutshell, after the failed Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, everything has come back to its place: we loved to talk about all these things back in the 1990s.

But what concrete political and legal steps would be necessary to realize this “confederation” project? I haven’t heard anything specific about this yet.

First, let’s take a look at exactly what Saakashvili said, some two months ago. “A few years back I said that we must form confederative relations,” Saakashvili said. “In fact, relations between our countries are far beyond the relations that two countries ordinarily have. We are a continuation of one another.”

In short, the Georgia-Azerbaijan confederation, according to the president, is not a project for the future, but a description of the present. That is, the term shouldn’t be viewed in strictly legalistic terms, but as a rhetorical figure of speech that signifies “particularly close relations between countries.”

What’s more, people in the president’s entourage insist that the same could be said of Georgia-Armenia relations: there as well, the level of closeness is very high. Of course, the Armenian side welcomes the use of this term (even rhetorically) considerably less.

To be sure, it would be hypocritical to speak about an equivalence between Georgia-Azerbaijan and Georgia-Armenia relations. Under the circumstances of the cold war with Russia, Georgia can’t be pleased by the intensification of Russia-Armenia military cooperation. There’s no getting around that.

Enemies And Friends

Nonetheless, neither Georgia nor Armenia would benefit from drawing strict geopolitical conclusions from the two clear facts that Russia and Georgia are enemies, while Russia and Armenia are allies. Likewise, Russia and Azerbaijan do not intend to become enemies just because Azerbaijan and Armenia are enemies and Armenia and Russia are allies. The geopolitical formula that the “friend of my enemy is my enemy” does not apply in the Caucasus today. And thank God.

Since the August 2008 war with Russia, Georgia has placed more significance on regional relations and has actively sought to intensify ties with all the countries of the region without regard for their relations with one another. There is an element of competition with Russia in this. Russia’s policy of not recognizing the Saakashvili government is an effort to isolate Georgia internationally. Moscow wants not only to undermine Tbilisi’s support in the West, but also to exclude Georgia from regional connections.

Saakashvili is taking countermeasures, so far generally with success. Of course, one can always argue about what “success” means, but under the present circumstances Georgia views any sign of warming relations with the countries of the region as a success - and, at the same time, as a failure for Russia.

Russia is actively working to draw Azerbaijan into its sphere of influence with various economic projects. While Turkey and Armenia were flirting under Western patronage and Azerbaijan felt forgotten and rejected by its closest friends -- Ankara and Washington -- it seemed that some sort of geopolitical shift was possible. But the accelerated construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad and new steps toward realizing the Nabucco pipeline project show that the Georgia-Azerbaijan-Turkey axis of cooperation is still functioning. It is such projects most of all that are the real content of the rhetorical term “confederation.”

But, on the other hand, the opening in March of the Russia-Georgia border crossing at Verkhny Lars is not a sign of the warming of Russian-Georgian relations (as Western experts want to believe). It is an expression of Armenia-Georgia cooperation, since that road is needed most of all by Armenia. What difference does it make whether such a friendship is or is not called a “confederation”?


By Ghia Nodia. Published on 17 September 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/What_Does_Confederation_Mean_In_The_South_Caucasus/2160662.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Waving The Banner Of Azerbaijan's New Oil Boom

Winston Churchill once said that "If oil is a queen, then Baku is her throne." Azerbaijan's oil wealth has a long and storied history. But its oil industry was born in the late 19th century. Initially dominated by British, Dutch, Swedish, and Russian companies, it later became a center of Soviet might. Azerbaijani oil fuelled Soviet tanks and aircraft during World War II and sated the domestic needs of the Soviet Union for decades.

Today, however, 20 years after Azerbaijan gained its independence, the country is experiencing a second oil boom. Only this time, Azerbaijan is in charge of its natural resources, and Azerbaijani citizens are reaping the benefits.

Oil To Education

The foundation of this boom was laid in 1994 when, despite resistance from many quarters Azerbaijan, managed to sign the "contract of the century" with leading oil companies. This document enabled the start of construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline in 2000.

This second oil boom has changed the geopolitical and geoeconomic situation in the South Caucasus. After the (BTC) oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline was laid. Now the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, which will link China and Paris, is under construction. In terms of geopolitics, these projects open new opportunities for Euro-Atlantic integration. In terms of geoeconomics, they strengthen globalization, bringing continents closer and improving Europe's energy security.

The South Caucasus region has been engulfed in the flames of ethno-political confrontation and interstate conflict for the past 20 years. Foreign-policy clashes can easily sink economic stability. Development policies in such a complex geopolitical situation, even with the help of petrodollars, do not always yield positive results.

It is important for Azerbaijan to transform its "black gold" into intellectual potential. Therefore, 5,000 young Azerbaijanis will be sent to study abroad between now and 2015 under a decree by President Ilham Aliyev. Public democratization and economic transformation begin with public awareness, and this understanding shapes the agenda of Azerbaijan's government.

Building democracy is a gradual process, and it must be considered in parallel with political and economic reforms. Former U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt's statement that "misery and freedom are incompatible" sums up the challenge that Azerbaijan faced a decade ago. Over recent years, a great deal of effort and energy has gone into making the Azerbaijani citizen financially independent.

'Neo-Azerbaijanism'

The country has been strengthened economically. In the past six to seven years, the poverty rate has been brought down from 49 percent to 11 percent. More than 900,000 new jobs have been created, 600,000 of them permanent. And some 5,000 new enterprises have started up.

Azerbaijan does not spend its petrodollars on increasing wages or social benefits that could lead to serious inflationary consequences. In the nearest future, Azerbaijan will become an international aid donor.

This is just a short list of the prospects that have been opened up by the second oil boom. These are not just words, but a record of real action.

Recently, the world's biggest flag (70 by 35 meters) was raised on the world's tallest unsupported flagpole (162 meters) in Baku. This is not only a sign of our economic strength, which allows us to implement such projects. This is neo-Azerbaijanism, which is present in the country's new politics, economy, and socio-cultural life. The world's tallest flagpole symbolizes a new understanding of the inner spirit and power of our national identity and a reassessment of Azerbaijan's place in the global context. Today it is clear that we are no longer just a bridge. From now on, we are a center of regional politics -- and this will form the basis of Azerbaijan's foreign policy for the coming decades.



By Elnur Aslanov. Published on 16 September 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Commentary_Waving_The_Banner_Of_Azerbaijans_New_Oil_Boom/2159588.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Eastern Europe's Frozen Conflicts Look To Kosovo Ruling

The International Court of Justice's (ICJ) ruling that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia was legal is of direct interest to other countries with secession crises or frozen conflicts.

The ICJ has said its ruling approving Kosovo's declaration of independence is unique to Kosovo.

That essentially means the justices do not want it to stand as a precedent for the world's many other places where regions have seceded or want to secede from their home countries.

But as the instant reaction of many governments to the July 22 decision makes clear, the court's ruling is being regarded -- rightly or wrongly -- in more universal terms. And nowhere more so than by parties involved in secession crises or frozen conflicts themselves.

'Guidance' For Bosnia's Serbs

Among the first to react to the court's ruling affirming Kosovo's 2008 unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia was the leader of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Serbian entity, the Republika Srpska.
Prime Minister Milorad Dodik suggested that if Kosovo's secession from Serbia did not violate international law, then the same standard should be applied to the Bosnian Serb entity's long-standing desire to leave Bosnia.

"For a long time, we in the Republika Srpska have not been happy in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Dodik told reporters in Banja Luka late on July 22.

"We respect the Dayton agreement [that ended the war in Bosnia], but the ICJ decision can serve us as guidance for our continuing fight over our status and our future."

Haris Silajdzic, a Bosniak who is the chairman of Bosnia's tripartite presidency, immediately responded that the country's borders were immutable.

"Any attempt at disintegration will be prevented, as it was the last time," he added.

The Serbian entity has never made a secret of its aspiration to join Serbia proper, a desire that directly contributed to the four-year war in Bosnia. The war ended after the intervention of NATO with the Dayton peace agreement in 1995 creating Bosnia as a federation of Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats.

Legal Limbo

Dodik's regarding the ICJ ruling as "guidance" for the future may be a measure of how much secessionist movements will regard the ruling as vindicating their efforts -- despite the court's own deliberately narrow interpretation.

The ICJ ruled that international law contained no "prohibition on declarations of independence" and so Kosovo's declaration "did not violate international law."

But the court avoided ruling on whether Kosovo's statehood was legal under international law, leaving the decision on whether to recognize the territory's independence to individual countries.

Thus far, 69 countries have recognized Kosovo's independence, including the United States and many European Union members.

Several major powers -- including Russia, China, and Spain -- concerned about secessionist regions of their own, have not recognized Kosovo.

No Change In Transdniester

In Moldova, officials of the breakaway Transdniester region have yet to comment publicly on the ICJ's decision.

But top advisers to Moldova's government say the ruling will not change any of the main players' views of the crisis, including those of Transdniester's main backer, Russia.

"On the Transdniester side, we all know what their statements over the last 18 years have been [demanding full independence], so I don't see how the ICJ decision could change that," says Nicu Popescu, a foreign-policy adviser to Moldova's Prime Minister Vlad Filat.

"As for Russia's statements and policies, Russia has constantly supported Moldova's territorial integrity and I'm absolutely sure that this stance will continue, and there's no reason at all why Russia's support for Moldova's territorial integrity should change."

The predominantly Russian-speaking population of Transdniester attempted in 1990 to secede from Moldova and since then has maintained a separate but unrecognized government with Moscow's support.

Georgian Stalemate

The Georgian government, which has lost two regions to secessionist movements backed by Moscow, also sees the court decision as doing little to change the status of its frozen conflicts.

"I think the decision probably will be used by regimes that are encouraging such kinds of small separatist regions," explains Kote Kublashvili, the chairman of Georgia's Supreme Court.

"Because prior to the decision, those regimes already used the situation very well and officially declared that [the Kosovo] case will affect other would-be-recognized separatist regions. Today's decision and those which have been made before [regarding recognition of Kosovo] will be widely debated first in terms the legal but also the political point of view."

South Ossetia fought a war of secession from Georgia in 1991-92, and Abkhazia did the same in 1992-93. Both have been recognized as independent by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru -- but no other countries -- in the wake of the 2008 Russia-Georgia war.

Leading figures in the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia say they are encouraged by the court's ruling.

"The fact that Kosovo has been recognized in accordance with international law can be seen as a definitive precedent for Abkhazia, and I think it will serve as an important precedent for Abkhazia," says Irakly Khintba, a Sukhumi-based political analyst.

"I'm not saying that Abkhazia will be recognized simply because it recognized Kosovo. But it is a serious political and historic step [for Abkhazia], that demonstrates that, in the current political environment, it is possible to recognize a state in spite of the will of the 'master state' that it is trying to separate from."

The deputy speaker of South Ossetia's parliament, Valery Dzitsoity, says he regards Pristina's situation as directly comparable to Tskhinvali's. "And moreover, I believe that South Ossetia has more of a foundation to expect recognition of its independence from the West than Kosovo," he adds.

Dzitsoity says that this is because "South Ossetia declared its independence at a time [September 1990] when Georgia was only recognized by Ukraine and was not a member of the UN. And Kosovo is separating from an internationally recognized state and a member of the UN."

No Agreement In Nagorno-Karabakh

Yet another frozen conflict whose parties may look to the ruling is Nagorno-Karabakh, the predominantly ethnic Armenian region that broke away from Azerbaijan following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The head of the opposition Armenian Revolutionary Federation parliamentary faction, Vahan Hovhannisian, hailed the ICJ ruling.

"The judgment clearly states that a unilateral proclamation of independence cannot be viewed as unlawful. For this, of course, there should be prerequisites, and Karabakh has at least the same prerequisites as Kosovo, if not more," Hovhannisian said.

"It means that now we get a new instrument, a new opportunity to struggle for the international recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh republic."

But Baku says it does not consider the Kosovo ruling pertinent to the Karabakh conflict.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Elxan Poluxov told RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service that Azerbaijan believed the ICJ's decision applied "only to Kosovo."

"Conflicts differ and there is no single solution for all conflicts," Poluxov added. "We don't see that the decision may somehow affect the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and negotiations on this conflict should have their own format."

Ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh fought a war of secession from Azerbaijan in 1991-94, backed by Yerevan.

Most of the region of Nagorno Karabakh today is governed by the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh republic, while the territory remains internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan.



By Charles Recknagel. Published on 23 July 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Eastern_Europes_Frozen_Conflicts_Look_To_Kosovo_Ruling/2108088.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs issue statement

The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, Ambassador Igor Popov of Russia, Bernard Fassier of France, and Robert Bradtke of the United States, released the following statement:

The Minsk Group Co-Chairs (Ambassador Bernard Fassier, France; Ambassador Robert Bradtke, United States; and Ambassador Igor Popov, Russia) visited Yerevan and Baku July 3-5. Ambassador Bradtke and Ambassador Popov also visited Nagorno-Karabakh July 2.

In Nagorno-Karabakh, Ambassador Bradtke and Ambassador Popov briefed the de facto authorities on the latest developments in the peace process, including the June 26, 2010 statement of Presidents Dmitry Medvedev, Barack Obama, and Nicolas Sarkozy. They also discussed the June 18-19 incident along the Line of Contact. They deplored this incident as an unacceptable violation of the ceasefire, and reiterated their regret over the senseless loss of life and their strong condemnation of the use of force. In Yerevan, the three Co-Chairs met President Serzh Sargsian, Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian, and Minister of Defense Seyran Ohanyan. In Baku, they met with President Ilham Aliyev, Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, Defense Minister Safar Abiyev, and representatives of Azerbaijani internally displaced persons from the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

In their meetings in both Yerevan and Baku, the Co-Chairs stressed the commitment of their three countries to support a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karbakh conflict, based upon the Helsinki principles of non-use of force or the threat of force, territorial integrity, and the equal rights and self-determination of peoples. In that respect, they noted the progress that has been made and the recognition by both sides that the elements articulated by their three Presidents in L'Aquila and repeated in their June 26, 2010 statement must be the basis of a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. They urged the parties, in a spirit of constructive compromise, to take the next step and move towards completing work on the Basic Principles to enable the drafting of a peace agreement to begin. They called upon the sides to strictly observe the 1994 ceasefire and exercise restraint along the Line of Contact. During their visit, the Co-chairs also presented to the parties their plan to undertake a mission to the occupied territories in this fall, which was accepted in principle.

The Co-Chairs expect that a meeting will take place between the heads of their delegations and the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the margins of the OSCE Informal Ministerial in Almaty July 16-17.

Azerbaijan: the forthcoming parliamentary elections must be in full compliance with European standards

Ahead of the parliamentary elections in November 2010, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) called on the Azerbaijani authorities “to ensure the necessary conditions for the full compliance of the forthcoming elections with the European standards”. In line with the conclusions of the monitoring co-rapporteurs, Andres Herkel (Estonia, EPP/CD) and Joseph Debono Grech (Malta, SOC), it encouraged the authorities to co-operate with the Venice Commission in order to continue with the revision of the electoral code and to “generate conditions for a fair electoral campaign” by fully implementing the law on the freedom of assembly and by ensuring the freedom of the media.

In this context, the PACE called on the Azerbaijani authorities “to pass on a clear message, at the highest political level, that electoral fraud will not be tolerated” and urged all political parties to take part in the forthcoming elections. The Assembly stressed that these elections were all the more important given that “it was necessary to reinforce the application of the constitutionally-guaranteed principle of the separation of powers” and, especially, to strengthen the parliament’s role vis-à-vis the executive.

Lastly, with regard to the media situation, the Assembly condemned the arrests, intimidation, harassment, and physical threats of journalists, reiterated its position that defamation should be decriminalised and called on the authorities to release Eynulla Fatullayev as ordered by the European Court of Human Rights.

Source: PACE. Published on 24 June 2010.

Semneby Downplays Fears EU Is Reducing Presence In South Caucasus

Peter Semneby, who has served as the European Union's special representative to the South Caucasus since February 2006, is seeking to downplay fears in the region that the EU is looking to reduce its diplomatic presence in the region.

Speaking to RFE/RL's Armenian Service in Yerevan, where he is currently completing a two-day tour, Semneby played down rumors of an EU initiative to reduce its embassies to a single European regional headquarters in Tbilisi.

"The European Union has just upgraded the commission delegations in all three capitals to full European Union representations," Semneby said. "All three countries are important partner countries of ours, in particular in a situation when we are taking a new and important step with the launching of negotiations of association agreements, and this clearly requires a presence in each country that is tailor-made to the needs and the situation of each individual country."

Semneby declined to comment on another proposal that likewise aims to scale back the EU's presence in the strategically important and politically volatile South Caucasus region -- the suggestion floated last month by EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton to abolish a number of EU special representative posts, including Semneby's.

The proposal, which is reportedly still being discussed, would significantly downgrade the EU's presence on the ground in the South Caucasus. Ashton's plan has raised alarm bells in the region, particularly in Georgia, which is still recovering from its 2008 war with Russia and sees the EU as a protective firewall between Tbilisi and Moscow.

Another EU special representative post marked for closure is that in Moldova, currently held by Kalman Mizsei. Semneby said he did not want to comment on "ongoing discussions about what the future European diplomatic representation will look like."

Semneby's visit to Yerevan comes just two days after the Armenian Defense Ministry said four Armenian soldiers were killed in fighting in Azerbaijan's breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Reports said one Azerbaijani fighter was also killed in the fighting, which reportedly broke out near the Line of Contact that separates Azerbaijan proper from the ethnic Armenian territories of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The skirmish came the same day as the presidents of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan met on the sidelines of a St. Petersburg economic forum to discuss Nagorno-Karabakh, one of the South Caucasus three "frozen conflicts."

Semneby called the situation "deplorable" and said tensions must be reduced in order for all sides to come to a negotiated solution on the issue.

"It's not really acceptable that events like this take place," Semneby said. "And in addition here we have the unnecessary tragic loss of human lives. This incident demonstrates that there is a tense situation along the Line of Contact, that it can easily get out of hand, and that it's necessary to take whatever measures are available in order to lower tension and to build confidence."


By RFE/RL. Published on 21 June 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Semneby_Downplays_Fears_EU_Is_Reducing_Presence_In_South_Caucasus/2078379.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Azerbaijan Belongs On Obama's List Of Violators Of Press Freedom

It was encouraging to see U.S. President Barack Obama sign on May 17 the Daniel Pearl Act, which requires the U.S. State Department to compile a public list of governments that violate the rights of journalists. There is no guarantee, however, that this measure will not be perceived as a mere PR tactic or just another tool designed to intimidate countries already blacklisted by the United States due to other foreign policy concerns.

To preclude that, it is important that the list objectively name the regimes with the worst records on press freedom, including the so-called "friendly dictatorships" in the Middle East and beyond.

To that end, I nominate the first candidate – the leadership of the Azerbaijan Republic.

Azerbaijan's petro-dictatorship not only qualifies as a gross violator of press freedom by any reasonable criteria, it also often uses its energy and geopolitical cooperation with the West to deflect criticism on human rights and democracy. Thus, the inclusion of this regime would send a strong message about the list's impartiality and credibility.

Let's consider the basic "credentials" of this contender for a place on the list.

The government's most vocal critic, Elmar Huseynov, an opposition journalist and the editor of the popular magazine "Monitor," was murdered in 2005 in front of his apartment building. His killers are still at large, and many observers accuse the authorities of deliberately stonewalling the investigation and failing to bring them to justice. Some even identify powerful figures within the government as the real force behind the crime.

Huseynov's former colleague, dissident journalist Eynulla Fatullayev, has been behind bars for several years on fabricated "terrorism" and "drug possession" charges, and the Azerbaijani leadership has ignored the recent ruling by the European Court of Human Rights ordering his release, which is mandatory for Azerbaijan as a member of Council of Europe.

Last year, two young bloggers, Adnan Hajizada and Emin Milli, were severely beaten and then arrested on absurd charges of "hooliganism." Despite numerous protests and condemnations from international rights groups, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, European governments, and the U.S. State Department, a court in Baku sentenced them to 2 1/2 years in jail. Many other independent journalists have been imprisoned, physically attacked, blackmailed, or forced into exile.

Under President Ilham Aliyev, who inherited the post from his late father in 2003, all local TV and radio stations have been brought under government control. The broadcasting of Western radio stations, including the U.S. Congress-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America, has been banned from the local airwaves.

The remaining few opposition newspapers are deprived of revenue as the authorities target any businesses that advertise in their pages. They are also subject to bogus "defamation" lawsuits resulting in large fines and in some cases the paper's mandatory closure.

Not surprisingly, Azerbaijan has already been named as one of the top violators of press freedom by leading international organizations. Aliyev has been repeatedly included in the "Predator of the Press" list compiled by the international media watchdog Reporters Without Borders. The U.S. State Department's own annual report on human rights also lists numerous instances of the suppression of free media and reprisals against journalists critical of the government's policies.

Therefore, not only would it be illogical to exclude Azerbaijan from the new list mandated by the Daniel Pearl Act, such an omission would give credence to the supposition that American policy-makers readily sacrifice democracy and human rights on the altar of lucrative energy contracts.

On the other hand, the inclusion of Azerbaijan in this list would show consistency and the principled nature of the U.S. stance and provide moral support for those forces that struggle for free speech in Azerbaijan and around the world.


By Elmar Chakhtakhtinski. Published on 8 June 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Azerbaijan_Belongs_On_Obamas_List_Of_Violators_Of_Press_Freedom/2065364.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

In Georgia and Moldova, Worries That EU Special Reps -- And Their Protection -- May Vanish

Officials in Moldova and Georgia are reacting with concern to speculation that the EU is poised to remove special representatives appointed to their regions.

If confirmed, the change would signal a major downgrading in the EU's strategic interest in both Chisinau and the countries of the South Caucasus.

EU foreign policy officials gave no hint of change on the horizon when they met with the six post-Soviet countries that make up its Eastern Partnership community last week.

Instead, officials from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus were assured that the EU's eastern neighbors remain "main priorities" for the European Union.

So it was with a mix of surprise and anger when those countries learned May 31 that the EU is looking to abolish two of its key posts in the region.

Ashton's Bombshell

An assistant to EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton told EU ambassadors on May 28 that she was looking to eliminate the EU's special representatives to Moldova and the South Caucasus.

Such a move would significantly downgrade the EU's presence on the ground in two regions seen as politically unstable and vulnerable to creeping Russian influence.

There has been no official statement from either the EU or the two affected officials -- Kalman Mizsei, the special representative to Moldova, or Peter Semneby, who holds the post for the South Caucasus.

Iulian Fruntashu, an adviser to Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat, told RFE/RL's Moldovan Service he was concerned about what the move might mean for Moldova's progress toward EU integration as one of the Eastern Partners.

"The circumstances, I think, weren't the best for the work of Kalman Mizsei. But I think the position itself shouldn't be abandoned just because Catherine Ashton wants to simplify the stucture of the EU's diplomatic service," Fruntashu said. "I think that a high representative nominated by the European Council shows that the EU is making a priority of Moldova, Georgia, and other countries in the region. We are interested first and foremost in the Eastern Partnership and Moldova's place in it, and I think that it would have been useful for us to keep a special EU representive in Moldova."

The move -- which will also affect other of the EU's 11 special representatives -- has been defended as an attempt to streamline the EU's diplomatic corps. But a letter from Ashton outlining the plan also offers rationales that have struck some observers as flawed.

Ashton's letter, for one, suggests that the bloc should scrap geographically distant posts. But Moldova and the South Caucasus are both closer than Central Asia or Africa's Great Lakes region, both of which will retain their special representatives.

The letter also suggests the bloc should retain only those seen as most important for the EU -- an alarming wake-up call for countries hosting no fewer than four post-Soviet "frozen conflicts."

Labor Pains

News of the proposed change came as EU officials were gathering in Rostov-for-Donu for a summit with their Russian counterparts seen as ushering in less tempestuous relations between Moscow and Brussels.

According to the Ashton plan, Mizsei's current post would be merged with that of the European Commission's representative and eventually brought within the External Action Service, the consolidated diplomatic corps Ashton is laboring to introduce.

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia would see a similar shift. In addition to losing the oversight of Semneby, who has held the post for more than four years and is widely respected in the region, the change would mean the end of the EU's unified approach to the South Caucasus.

Such a move could be advantageous to Moscow, which has been accused of using regional rivalries to destabilize the strategically important area.

Temur Iakobashvili, Georgia's state minister for reintegration, is a key figure in Tbilisi's battle to regain control of its pro-Moscow breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Speaking to RFE/RL's Georgian Service, he said he believed the decision was not "final," but expressed concern that a change in posts would have a negative effect on conflict resolution in the area.

"The important thing is not what the new position would be called," Iakobashvili said. "It's what would happen to [the distribution of] functions, and I think the Caucasus-wide element of Mr. Semneby's post is an important one."

He added: "Conflicts haven't vanished anywhere. In the case of Georgia, moreover, we're even facing the occupation [of our territory]. Therefore, it's an important to consider the question of how these functions will be distributed."


By Valentina Ursu, Marina Vashakmadze. Published on 1 June 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/In_Georgia_and_Moldova_Worries_That_EU_Special_Reps__And_Their_Protection_May_Vanish/2059233.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

OSCE assists in strengthening role of Azerbaijan's Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) to prevent torture

A series of events to strengthen the role of Azerbaijan's Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) in the prevention of torture and ill treatment began Monday with a conference organized by the OSCE Office in Baku and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Commissioner's Office and the Parliament of Azerbaijan.

According to the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, each State Party is responsible for developing a National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) to regularly monitor places where people are deprived of liberty, such as prisons, detention centres and psychiatric facilities, to ensure reasonable conditions and treatment. Following the ratification of the Optional Protocol by Azerbaijan in January 2009, President Ilham Aliyev signed a decree assigning the responsibility for Azerbaijan's NPM to the Commissioner for Human Rights.

"We believe that an independent and strong National Preventive Mechanism can serve as an effective domestic tool to ensure the prevention of torture and ill-treatment in places of detention. Azerbaijan is to be applauded for ratifying the Optional Protocol and designating the Commissioner for Human Rights as the National Preventive Mechanism," said Ambassador Bilge Cankorel, the Head of the OSCE Office in Baku.

Liane Adler, ODIHR's representative at the conference, stressed the importance of strengthening the legislative framework for the National Preventive Mechanism and securing sufficient financial and human resources for its activities.

The conference brings together representatives of the Commissioner's Office, state justice and law enforcement authorities, international organizations and civil society to discuss ways to strengthen the Commissioner's capacity to assume its NPM role. Representatives of the UN Sub-Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the Association for the Prevention of Torture, as well as an expert from the Human Rights Implementation Centre at Bristol University are also taking part.

Following the conference, the OSCE Office in Baku and ODIHR will hold two additional events - the launch of the new Azerbaijani translation of the Guide on Monitoring Places of Detention prepared by the Geneva-based Association for the Prevention of Torture, and a workshop to strengthen the operational capacity of the Commissioner's staff and other stakeholders to perform their respective functions as part of the National Preventive Mechanism.


Source: OSCE. Published in Baku on 24 May 2010

Štefan Füle Opening address to the Plenary Session Eastern Partnership Informal Foreign Ministers Meeting Sopot (Poland), 24 May 2010

Dear Ministers,

Thank you for inviting me to this informal Foreign Ministers meeting here in Sopot. I am sure that the beauty of this seaside resort will inspire us. I would like to thank in particular Minister Sikorski and Minister Moratinos for their unwavering support for the Eastern Partnership.

I am glad that we have this opportunity - one year on from the Prague summit - informally to discuss what we have achieved and where we want to go with the Eastern Partnership. I am convinced the ambitious agenda we agreed in Prague remains the right one: by seeking the political association and economic integration of our six partner countries with the EU, we will strengthen the capacity of our partner countries to make their own sovereign choices about the political and economic challenges that confront them. The development of vibrant democracies and economies able to compete in a globalised marketplace is in all our interests. Let me underline the staunch commitment of the Commission to support our partners in this process.

Mr Chairman,

Let me briefly make a few comments on what we have achieved over the past year and outline a few pointers for the future.

I believe we have got off to a flying start over the past year. I know that some of you have wanted us to go faster and further. But, if I can be frank, I know that others have been surprised at what we have achieved in such a short time.

We have made good on our offer of new contractual relations. Negotiations with Ukraine are well advanced. The negotiations of an Association Agreement with Moldova have been launched. And negotiations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia will start soon. We are engaging with Belarus on the path of an open and constructive dialogue on all fronts but, if we are to go as far as we would wish, we will need to see further progress in the field of democracy and respect for human rights. The ball is now in Minsk’s court.

We have also established the multilateral dimension of the Eastern Partnership. The four Platforms and the panels they have created are now starting to implement their 2 year work programmes. More than 70 activities are already planned for the next twelve months. Their importance should not be underestimated: they allow for sharing experiences and best practices in order to accelerate progress towards the overall objectives of political association and economic integration. The flagship initiatives which have now been launched have the same goal and are focusing on such crucial fields as border management, development of small and medium sized enterprises, and energy market integration.

Now, with the Lisbon Treaty in force and the External Action Service in sight, offering us the prospect of more joined-up EU foreign policy-making, the Eastern Partnership can give us the possibility to discuss issues of security and stability.

So what are the challenges for the future as we move towards the second Eastern Partnership Summit in the first half of next year during the Hungarian Presidency of the EU?

First, we must redouble our efforts to advance towards two of our most ambitious objectives – visa liberalisation and free trade areas. This is not easy and requires considerable homework on all sides. Let us intensify our dialogue so that we are absolutely clear about the steps that each of us needs to take to move forward. Let us also look for short term steps which can bring immediate, tangible benefits. One such could be the swift and effective implementation of the new EU visa code in all six partner countries in order to ensure uniform and decent treatment.

Let me stress in this context the importance of the Comprehensive Institution Building Programmes in the Eastern Partnership. Once in place – which should be the case next year - these programmes will provide tangible support to partner countries towards achieving the goals of new contractual relations, deep and comprehensive free trade agreements and visa liberalisation.

My second point is to ensure we make the best use of our scarce financial resources. We welcome the considerable interest shown in the Eastern Partnership from the numerous project proposals that have been presented. However, all of us must bear in mind that the bulk of EU financial support to the partner countries is devoted to bilateral programmes. This is, after all, as it should be given the bilateral focus of our policy objectives under the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership. And not all of the additional EaP funding has come on stream yet in 2010. Nevertheless from 2011, the annual EU resources designed to support reform in the 6 Eastern Partnership countries and regional co-operation will increase on average by more than half compared with the period 2007-10 . I will therefore redouble my efforts to ensure that our resources are targeted on achieving our key policy objectives and to look for new ways to improve donor coordination.

In this regard, I believe we should seek to enhance cooperation with the International Financial Institutions, notably the EIB and EBRD, to support more visible investment projects. Already we are doing a lot in this respect. The projects which have been developed under the Neighbourhood Investment Facility amount to €4 billion and are in such crucial areas as electricity networks, energy efficiency, SME financing, airport modernisation or road rehabilitation.

Increased funding, effectively used, as well as progress in the fields of mobility and trade will certainly improve the visibility of the Eastern Partnership. But I believe there is more we can do. I hope that we can start holding Eastern Partnership events in partner countries. I will make sure that the recently increased EU delegations take a leading role in projecting the Partnership in our partner countries. I believe the work of the Civil Society Forum can also play a role here.

Finally I believe third countries outside our circle of 33 can also make valuable contributions to the implementation of Eastern Partnership objectives. We should therefore consider carefully the idea of setting up a “Group of Friends” – something originally proposed by Minister Sikorski in Madrid.

Mr Chairman,

I believe we have made a good start but that we now must keep up the momentum as the Eastern Partnership moves into its second year. For this, I believe we will need robust administrative structures within the External Action Service - something I am discussing with the High Representative.

Let us ensure we all now play our part in moving forward our ambitious agenda – we will be judged by our record on implementing our commitments. Let us give greater visibility to what we have already achieved and to our ongoing activities. And let us work to make the best possible use of the financial resources we are dedicating to this enterprise.

As Commissioner for the whole of the EU’s Neighbourhood, I will continue to strive to advance our relations with all our neighbours East and South. Based on the stock-taking in the Commission’s recent Communication, I hope all of us in the coming months can reflect on how to develop our policy further.

Beyond our immediate priorities for the year ahead, we must also keep in mind the longer term horizon. Making political association and economic integration a reality, will bring our partner countries into an ever closer relationship with the EU: a community of shared values; a network of free trade areas which could in the long run lead to a Neighbourhood Economic Community; a liberalized visa area. I believe it is not too early to start reflecting on what such a relationship will mean for all of us and how we could, in due course, cement it further.

You can rest assured that, working in close coordination with Cathy Ashton and my fellow Commissioners, I will remain firmly committed to advancing the Partnership.

Thank you


Source: European Commission

Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on Nagorno Karabakh

Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has made the following statement:

"I would like to recall that the European Union does not recognise the constitutional and legal framework within which the "parliamentary elections" in Nagorno Karabakh will be held this Sunday. This event should not prejudice the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

I reiterate our firm support to the OSCE Minsk-Group, and the work of the three Co-chairs and their efforts towards a settlement of the conflict, and call on the parties to redouble their efforts to find a negotiated solution to the conflict. I recall the EU's readiness to offer further support to this
end. "

Published in Brussels on 21 May 2010.


Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton, on Moldova/Transnistria

Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, made the following statement:

"I very much welcome the aide memoire presented by the Moldovan Government, in which it confirms its readiness to further engage with all its partners in order to find a viable and sustainable solution to the Transnistrian issue, including with the help of the EU.

We will consider this constructive proposal with due attention and in close consultation with our partners in the 5+2 format.

We remain fully committed to the resumption of negotiations in the 5+2 format, without any preconditions or delay, and in full respect of the fundamental principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova.

We invite all sides to support the efforts of the Republic of Moldova in implementing confidence building measures, for the benefit of the people living in the Transnistrian region."

Published in Brussels on 17 May 2010.

OSCE Office hosts meeting on election administration in Azerbaijan

Representatives from Azerbaijan's 17 political parties and other stakeholders discussed election administration matters during a meeting organized and chaired by the OSCE Office in Baku as a follow-up to recommendations from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

The meeting, the second of its kind, focuses on election administration issues, including the composition of election commissions, fair registration of candidates and effective processing of election complaints. Azerbaijan will hold parliamentary elections in November.

"The OSCE supports Azerbaijan's efforts to improve the electoral framework in the run-up to the November elections," said Ambassador Bilge Cankorel, the Head of the OSCE Office in Baku.

He stressed that an inclusive candidate registration process is a precondition for a broad participation of all political parties in the elections.

Cankorel also recalled that ODIHR in its final report on the 2008 presidential election recommended that election commissions be reconfigured in a manner that would ensure public confidence, including confidence of those running for office.

Representatives from the Presidential Administration, the Central Election Commission, civil society and the international community also took part in the roundtable discussion.

The previous election meeting organized by the OSCE Office focused on matters related to the election campaign, in particular the implementation of the Law on Freedom of Assembly and illegal interference in the election process. A third meeting, scheduled for June 2010, will be dedicated to the role of media in elections.

Source: OSCE. Published in Baku on 18 May 2010.

Five years of European Neighbourhood Policy: more trade, more aid, more people-to-people contacts

The annual European Neighbourhood Policy reports once again demonstrate the clear benefits that the European Union brings to its neighbours. For five years, the European Union has been delivering more trade, more aid, more people-to-people contacts and far deeper co-operation between the EU and its neighbours on the whole range of their economic, political and sectoral reforms. Our partnership has significantly developed in areas like transport, energy, environment and climate change, research, health and education. This has been backed up with an increase in the current Financial Framework by 32% and will reach over EUR 2 billion annually in 2013.

"The European Neighbourhood Policy is a success story with many examples of concrete achievements on the ground,” commented Catherine Ashton, Vice-President of the Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. "But there is a lot more we can and should do to make our part of the world more secure, more stable and more prosperous. In a globalised world, as European and Mediterranean countries, we need to help each other face the economic crisis. We need to work together to confront the new threats and challenges of our time, such as international terrorism, human trafficking and cross-border organised crime. We need to co-operate to solve the disputes and conflicts that still hold parts of our region back, and deny many ordinary people the benefits of globalisation. We want our neighbours to join our efforts to bring peace and security to other parts of the world who are less fortunate than we are. And as a Union built on shared values, we want our neighbours to benefit from the stability and prosperity that come with open and democratic society and the rule of law. This ambitious agenda is a key priority for me as we press ahead with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the External Action Service. Our friends in our European and Mediterranean neighbourhood will be among the first to benefit from a more active, more coherent and more effective European foreign policy."

Štefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, added: “Further strengthening the ENP is no less than an investment in the EU’s own stability and prosperity — and this must be reflected in our offer to our partners. The ENP is a win-win game: the higher our partners’ reform ambitions, the stronger our response. Economic reforms have progressed remarkably across our neighbourhood, both East and South. What is essential for the future is to go up a gear on democratic and political reforms, where progress has been real but generally slower.”

Achievements of the European Neighbourhood Policy 2004-2009

Bilateral Association Agreements were concluded by 2004 with most Southern ENP partners, while enhancement of the relations with most advanced partners is currently ongoing (for example, the advanced status - statut avancé – has been implemented with Morocco since 2008). In the East, in line with objectives of the Eastern Partnership, current Partnership and Cooperation Agreements are being replaced by far-reaching Association Agreements.

The ENP aims also at improving governance. The recent presidential elections in Ukraine, the second round of parliamentary elections in Moldova, as well as improvements in quality of elections in Morocco or Lebanon show some progress in democratic process. On freedom of association, death penalty, media freedom, minority rights and other human rights and fundamental freedoms, there have been improvements in several ENP countries but progress has generally not matched the ambitions expressed jointly in the ENP and in the Action Plans. Much remains to be done too in terms of judicial and public administration reforms and effectively tackling corruption.

Regarding mobility more than 2 million EU Schengen visas were issued in our neighbourhood in 2008. Visa facilitation and readmission agreements are in place with Ukraine and Moldova and negotiations have been concluded with Georgia. Mobility Partnerships to promote legal migration have been agreed with Moldova and Georgia. Nevertheless more needs to be done to use the full potential of the ENP, including road-maps to a visa-free regime for short stays with Ukraine and Moldova.

EU’s trade with the ENP region grew during 2004-2008, with EU’s exports rising by 63% and imports by 91% (2009 brought some slowdown, due to the global economic and financial crisis). The EU is ready to negotiate Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with all its neighbours as soon as they are ready and prepared for them. Other steps towards deeper economic integration have also been taken, including negotiation of a number of sectoral agreements from agricultural and fishery products to common aviation area.

Energy cooperation was strengthened with Memoranda of Understanding or Declarations with Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. In 2009 Ukraine and Moldova were admitted, subject to conditions, to accede the Energy Community Treaty,and Georgia became an observer.

The EU has provided nearly EUR 12 billion in 2007-2013 for the implementation of its ENP policy. In addition, the EU’s Neighbourhood Investment Facility, supported by EU budget and those of Member States, provides grant support to leverage loans (over EUR 4,7 billion in 2007-2009) for concrete investments in transport, environment, energy, private and social sectors.

Background

The European Neighbourhood Policy aims at increasing common stability, prosperity and security. On the basis of a joint Action Plan, the EU supports partner countries in implementing their reforms to improve their standards of democracy and human rights, to increase their access to the EU's single market, to improve the environment and to step up their co-operation with the EU on issues like climate change, energy, transport or migration.

Today, the Commission has published its annual “ENP Package”, consisting of: a Communication taking stock of the policy achievements since its launch in 2004, 12 reports on progress achieved in 2009 by the 12 countries who have agreed ENP Action Plans with the EU, as well as a sectoral progress report.

The documents available include:

The Communication “Taking stock of the European Neighbourhood Policy” (Brussels 12 May 2010),

Individual country reports for 2009 for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Republic of Moldova, the occupied Palestinian territory, Tunisia and Ukraine

Sectoral report: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm

For more on the ENP: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm

Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the adoption of negotiating directives for Association Agreements

Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the adoption of negotiating directives for Association Agreements between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia


Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, made today the following statement:

“I welcome the adoption by the General Affairs Council on 10 May of the negotiating directives for the future Association Agreements between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

The adoption of these negotiating directives is a clear sign of our strong commitment to further deepen the relationship between the EU and the countries of the South Caucasus, on the basis of shared values and principles, including democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

The Eastern Partnership, launched at the Prague Summit on 7 May 2009, provides an ambitious framework for taking the relationship with the countries of the South Caucasus to a new level. In this context, Association Agreements are an important instrument to upgrade our relations beyond existing commitments with a view of political association and gradual economic integration with the EU.

The negotiation process will be guided by the principles of inclusiveness and differentiation, as well as joint ownership. Successful implementation of the Eastern Partnership with the active engagement of the partner countries both in its multilateral and bilateral track will strengthen relations on the basis of shared values and will help advancing political and economic reforms, consolidate governance and foster regional stability, prosperity and confidence building.

I look forward to the launch of negotiations on these ambitious and comprehensive agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia."

Published on 11 May 2010.


Statement on the case of Awtukhowich, Asipenka and Kazlow in the Republic of Belarus

As acting local presidency of the EU in Minsk, the British Embassy is issuing the following Presidency statement.

On 6 May, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus delivered its verdict and sentenced Mikalay Awtukhowich and Uladzimir Asipenka (former prisoners of conscience) and Mikhail Kazlow to prison for the illegal handling of weapons, receiving sentences of five, three and two years respectively. Based on the observations of EU diplomats and local human rights defenders, the local Presidency is deeply concerned about the serious procedural flaws evident throughout the conduct of this trial. Of particular concern are the claims made in court by prosecution witnesses that their testimonies had been forced out of them through physical and psychological pressure.

Taking into account Mr Awtukhowich´s previous activism in promoting the rights of entrepreneurs and of Afghan war veterans, and for speaking publicly about alleged corruption, the trial can be seen as politically motivated.

The EU will further study the case and could consider further action.

Published on 12 May 2010.

Interview: After Just One Year, Are The Wheels Coming Off The EU's Eastern Partnership?

A year after its celebrated inception, the European Union's Eastern Partnership for Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan has sunk into the kind of obscurity that tends to envelop unloved EU projects.

The inaugural summit was held in Prague on May 7, 2009, amid fanfare, promises, and high expectations. A follow-up meeting of EU and partner-country foreign ministers was held in December.

But since then, the bloc's deepening economic malaise now appears to have suffocated whatever impetus the process had left. Intended to provide a regional, multilateral dimension to the longer-established European Neighborhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership has not delivered any visible added value for either the EU or the countries themselves.

The main avenue for contacts and cooperation is still provided via another channel -- association agreement talks between each of the countries and the EU. The association agreement sets the bar at nothing more than "political association," while it does hold out the long-term prospects of visa-free travel and free trade.

Meanwhile, the wheels have literally starting to come off the EU's entire approach to the western post-Soviet neighborhood, with even favorites like Ukraine and Georgia becoming increasingly wayward in their respective courses. The long-held silent assumption that most, if not all, countries in the region want to eventually join the EU can no longer be taken for granted.

Under its new president, Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine is forging links with Russia that appear to preclude a further rapprochement with the West. In Tbilisi, President Mikheil Saakashvili seems to be calculating that he no longer has anything useful to gain from subjecting himself to EU tutelage -- with senior Georgian officials telling their EU counterparts at a recent meeting that Georgia is a "value-based state, but not necessarily an EU state."

Taking a look at the prospects of the Eastern Partnership, RFE/RL Brussels correspondent Ahto Lobjakas spoke with Andrew Wilson, senior policy fellow in London at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

RFE/RL: One year on, has the Eastern Partnership achieved anything of note?

Andrew Wilson: Well, in itself it was a worthwhile policy, and it was having some marginal impact. But it has been kind of overtaken by events. You have the global economic crisis, which has hit the region particularly hard. Russia is perceived to be providing some financial help. The EU provides some help, but there the Eastern Partnership is kind of invisible. I mean [the EU's] bigger role is in leveraging IMF [International Monetary Fund] funds to the region, where that was also pretty invisible to the local publics.

America has, if not completely withdrawn from the region, [then] certainly de-prioritized it. China is a major player in the region there. So, within that kind of changed environment, the partnership isn't having the kind of impact its founders had hoped it would have back in 2009.

RFE/RL: Can we expect a revival of the Eastern Partnership in the foreseeable future?

Wilson: None is planned, but I certainly think it's necessary. Some kind of "Partnership Plus" revival, a relaunch, extra momentum -- I mean, call it what you will, it's certainly needed. There were fears that the Spanish and Belgian [rotating EU] presidencies [in 2010] would completely neglect the initiative. To be fair, they've kept it ticking over, but no more than that. Obviously, many people hope that the Hungarian and Polish presidencies [in 2011] will give it some more oomph in time for its second anniversary -- but the time to start planning that is now.

Choosing Between East And West

RFE/RL: In the EU's search for regional stability, it has tried to foster reforms in its eastern neighbors that can only take root when a deeper kind of stability exists -- one that would require more direct EU political involvement. But the bloc has refused to provide that. Isn't this a contradiction at the very heart of the EU's engagement with the Eastern Partnership countries?

Wilson: Yes, the word "stability" may be in the documents -- maybe it's the wrong word. What we're talking about is Europeanization. Often, that required a lot of destabilizing short-term action.

Look at Ukraine, for example, at the moment. A lot of Western European governments, after the chaos of the last three or four years, seemed to perhaps be willing to over-accept the prioritization of stability -- which for Yanukovych means a euphemism for strengthened central political control. That type of stability isn't necessarily a good thing. Nor is stable nonaction a good thing. Sometimes a flurry of reforms is precisely what is required.

But I think your general question is more: "Does the Eastern Partnership help the EU to get leverage on these political systems in order for them to make the necessary reforms?" And I think there you could have a problem. Particularly if you go back to the changing international context that I mentioned at the start.

It is not at all clear that we do have the means to persuade reluctant and often authoritarian leaderships in these six states to make the kinds of reforms that we'd like to see. The carrots aren't juicy enough and the sticks aren't big and threatening enough.

RFE/RL: Is it realistic to tell these countries that they do not need to choose between the EU and Russia -- as, for example, EU Enlargement and Neighborhood Commissioner Stefan Fuele does?

Wilson: We would like them to not necessarily choose [between the two] in terms of foreign policy, or cultural affinity, or whatever. But clearly we want them to choose our model, the European model. That's what the Copenhagen criteria [of EU accession] mean, after all.

But I've sometimes called the leaders of Eastern Europe a "collective Tito." They don't necessarily want to choose. They are playing a game of balance between East and West to extract resources from both sides, and it is in their interest to prolong that balancing game as long as they can.

European Catch-22

RFE/RL: Is it ultimately in the EU's own interest to limit cooperation to "deep and comprehensive free trade" and visa liberalization -- as it now does?

Wilson: Well, we're not even there yet. Again, to take the example of Ukraine, the most important state of the six, it is not at all clear yet that [an agreement permitting] "deep" free trade is within their grasp -- certainly not this year. Though the Ukrainians are trying to push on that one.

I think if those two things were achieved, then a lot would have been achieved. Deep free trade will make a considerable difference to the economies in the region. Visa liberalization, of course, makes the biggest difference to local public opinions, it would help swing that in favor of the EU. So the two things you mentioned aren't marginal, but we may not even be able to get there without being first able to [deploy] our levers of engagement for these six states.

RFE/RL: Do you think the EU may come to regret its lack of ambition if it fails to win the region for itself?

Wilson: Clearly, we're talking about a 20-year period when relatively little has been done -- which is in very sharp contrast to the kind of quick-accession politics for the likes of Poland and the Czech Republic in the 1990s. And 19 -- almost 20 -- years is a long time to spend in the waiting room of European integration.

Both sides have lost patience to a degree. But both sides are to blame. It's the standard catch-22 question -- if the EU had given a clearer perspective, then perhaps these societies would have reformed more. But the EU was never prepared to give that indication until there was more evidence of reform on the ground.

You can talk about specific historical periods when opportunities were missed -- the most important of which is the six months after the Orange Revolution and before the referenda in Holland and France in the summer of 2005 on the [EU] constitution. That was a window of opportunity that was clearly missed to make good the conditionality principle, if you like. Clearly, the environment had changed enormously and the EU did not recognize that. And the window of opportunity soon shut.


By RFE/RL. Published on 7 May 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Interview_After_Just_One_Year_Are_The_Wheels_Coming_Off_The_EUs_Eastern_Partnership/2035235.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.