'Stop The Dictatorship' -- An Interview With Georgian Opposition Figure Nino Burjanadze

With her perfectly coiffed hair, controlled manners, and impeccable clothes, Nino Burjanadze has the appearance of a stern yet kindly schoolteacher.

But the 47-year old lawyer and former parliamentary speaker is actually one of the most controversial opposition figures in Georgia at the moment. And she does not blush about it for a second.

Rather than presenting a mea culpa for all of the questionable moves she has made in recent years, she instead wants to tell what she calls "the truth" about her political foe -- Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili -- and the political climate he has created in her country.

Speaking to RFE/RL during a recent visit to Brussels, Burjanadze didn't mince her words, describing the Georgian president as "Europe's new dictator" who is in total control of the media, the judiciary, and the police.

"I think Georgia is not a reliable partner of the European Union right now," she said. "And even worse, the situation in Georgia is getting worse every day."

Relationship Deteriorated

But Burjanadze was not always this critical of the current political elite. Promoted to the role of speaker of the Georgian parliament in 2001 by the previous Georgian leader, Eduard Shevardnadze, she was instrumental in paving the way for the Rose Revolution that swept away her former patron two years later and ushered Saakashvili into power.

She stayed on as speaker until 2008, embracing Saakashvili's reforms and his desire to integrate the country with NATO and the European Union.

Her close affiliation with the president deteriorated in 2008 after what she claimed was the stalled democratization process in the country, as well as what she believes was Saakashvili's mishandling of the August war with Russia over South Ossetia the same year.

But critics allege that Burjanadze really quit because her allies did not get as many places on the ruling United National Movement's party list in the May 2008 parliamentary elections.

Burjanadze resigned shortly after those elections and formed her own party, Democratic Movement-United Georgia, turning into a vociferous critic of the government. Despite polling at only 2 percent, Burjanadze is still making headlines in Georgia with periodic noisy street protests. The government has countered her activities with what she described as a "campaign of terror."

"Everybody knows that all telephones are [being listened to]," she said. "Everybody knows that if you express different views from the government you might lose your job. If you are an active member of the opposition you may find in your pocket drugs or a gun and you might be in jail for many months or even years because there is no independent judiciary in the country."

Numerous Scandals

Her clean-cut image has also been tarnished by numerous scandals in recent years.

Several members of her party have been arrested for attempting to overthrow the government, and her husband Badri Bitsadze recently fled the country after being accused of employing paramilitary troops in an antigovernment rebellion. There are also persistent rumors of her being a Russian quisling, receiving indirect money from Moscow.

The biggest controversy occurred in May when Burjanadze organized street protests with the stated aim of removing Saakashvili from power. The demonstrators were given a permit to hold rallies in downtown Tbilisi from May 21 until midnight on May 25. A military parade to mark Georgia's Independence Day was scheduled for May 26.

But Burjanadze and her allies refused to disperse, even when the authorities offered them an alternative venue in the center of the city, saying they intended to prevent the military parade from taking place.

The police began to suppress the protests with tear gas and rubber bullets after midnight on May 25. Some of the demonstrators appeared intent on provoking violence, attacking police with sticks and metal pipes.

Two people were killed in the subsequent chaos. The government quickly pointed the finger at Burjanadze, claiming that the deaths occurred when a car in which she was traveling sped through a group of people -- a story she dismissed with a wave of the hand.

"Without any proof and without any evidence the government immediately [said] that my son was driving the car and that this was my car," she said. "I am calling [for] an international investigation. I am ready to give any information to an independent investigation committee."

Eerie Similarities

The events of May 2011 are eerily similar to a crackdown on protesters that occurred in November 2007. The difference is that she, as the speaker of parliament and a Saakashvili ally then, endorsed the government's violent response. She strongly condemned the authorities' handling of the recent protests.

Burjanadze is keen to dispel the similarities and her apparent flip-flopping on the issue. Armed with maps, photos, and videos showing the police breaking up the demonstration, she explained how protesters were surrounded on all sides by riot police. She said the government simply wanted to "punish the people."

She also defended her actions as speaker in 2007.

"First of all, when I was a speaker of the parliament and there was a crackdown of the demonstrators, I opened the door to the parliament and gave the possibility for people to enter in the parliament building to survive from the gas and police," she said. "I supported at that time investigation about excessive force and I signed a special decree in the parliament that the investigation commission should be established and investigate excessive force."

In the same fashion, she defended herself against other accusations leveled against her.

She brushed off her alleged Russian connection, despite the fact that she has traveled to Moscow to meet with President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, both of whom have expressed a desire to see Saakashvili overthrown.

'This Is Bringing Nothing'

Claiming that Saakashvili's policies toward Tbilisi's mighty neighbor to the north has only brought about the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Burjanadze said she favors closer ties with both Russia and other allies in the West.

"Ignorance of Russia did not bring anything good for my country," she said. "One thing is that you have to try to find a right language to protect your country's interest. Another thing is not to speak with the people whom you don't want to speak. This is bringing nothing."

When it came to her husband, who is allegedly hiding from the Georgian justice system abroad, she was equally combative.

"They want to keep my husband as a hostage in jail to push me to change my political motivation or not to continue my struggle," she said.

She also suggested that Georgia risks descending into the same type of bloodshed witnessed during uprisings across North Africa and the Middle East.

"One day in Georgia if things will continue like that in any case there will be an explosion," she said, "but it will be similar to the Middle East right now. It is dangerous for the country's stability and this might bring bloodshed. So we have to stop the dictatorship right now."

By Rikard Jozwiak. Published on 7 July 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/georgia_nino_burjanadze_/24258110.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

As Corruption Rises Worldwide, Georgia Proves The Exception

It wasn't too long ago that the sight of police inspired anxiety among residents in Georgia, where encounters often ended -- as they do in many parts of the former Soviet Union -- with the extraction of a small bribe.

But after an intensive drive to purge the country of petty corruption, many ordinary Georgians say they actually welcome the sight of police.

"Everything has really improved," says Shalva, an elderly car owner in the capital, Tbilisi. "There is no way the patrol officers are taking bribes. They even changed my flat tire for free so that I could keep on driving. What could be better than this?"

Anecdotal evidence like Shalva's may only go so far. But in its 2010 Global Corruption Barometer, the corruption watchdog Transparency International (TI) says statistical data also attests to the fact that a remarkable transformation has taken place over the past several years in Georgia as the government of Mikheil Saakashvili has pursued aggressive anticorruption reforms in the public service sector.

"There is no other country at the moment where more people see a decrease in corruption in their country, and where more people say the government is effective in fighting corruption," says Mathias Huter, a senior analyst with TI's Georgia office. "I think this is an indication that the Georgian government's efforts to fight petty corruption have been very successful."

Besting The Neighbors

Worldwide, TI reports that corruption trends have been on the rise, with even Western and other developed countries reporting an increase in perceived corruption as the global economic crisis has eroded trust in public institutions.

In Georgia, by contrast, an astonishing 78 percent of people surveyed say they have seen a decrease in corruption in their country. Seventy-seven percent of respondents evaluate the government's efforts in fighting corruption as "effective."

Such numbers not only put Georgia in good stead internationally. They also present a sharp contrast to other newly independent states in their post-Soviet neighborhood, where corruption remains endemic. In Russia, for example, only 26 percent of people surveyed say the state has been effective in battling corruption; in Ukraine, that figure drops to 16 percent.

And in Georgia's South Caucasus neighbors, Armenia and Azerbaijan, half of respondents say they have seen an increase in corruption, with only a handful reporting a decrease and the rest saying the situation remains unchanged.

"What is outstanding in Georgia compared to the other newly independent states is the amount of people who say that they have paid a bribe in the past 12 months," Huter says. "In Georgia, this number is very, very low -- it's only 3 percent of the people surveyed. So this is definitely a number that is remarkable for the region."

Higher Up, Problems Remain

The Georgian leadership is likely to celebrate the new findings as proof of the country's resilience in a near-constant climate of adversity. Saakashvili's government has seen its early aspirations of NATO and EU membership dim significantly in recent years under hostile pressure from Moscow and growing doubts about Tbilisi's democratic credentials.

Georgia has recently received a number of accolades, including plaudits from the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for ease of doing business and anticorruption efforts.

The new TI report will only contribute to Georgia's emerging reputation as a place where business, rather than democracy, has become a priority. (Another watchdog, Freedom House, in recent years has relegated Georgia to its lower, pre-Rose Revolution democracy ranking after several years of improvement on political rights and civil liberties.)

Even Georgia-watchers who applaud the achievements in battling petty corruption say the country is far from corruption-free. Political parties and the judiciary, in particular, remain largely unreformed.

Observers also point to the trend of crony capitalism, also called "elite" or "grand" corruption, that continues to flourish unchecked in government inner circles, out of view of the general public -- whether it's the awarding of a national lottery contract or handing near-monopoly control to Georgia's dominant Internet service provider, Caucasus Online.

"A government contract is being awarded and it's pretty clear who's going to get it in advance. If you don't know somebody, you're not going to get it," says Lincoln Mitchell, a Georgia expert and associate research scholar at the Harriman Institute at New York's Columbia University. "Businesses who want to, say, support candidates from other than the government party are going to encounter trouble running their businesses. I think a lot of businesses are aware of the possibility of shakedowns for taxes or bribes, depending on how you see it. So that higher level does still exist."

Cultural Change

Other critics note that the government, with its considerable influence over the country's television media, has been able to trumpet its corruption-reform achievements in a nonstop PR blitz.

Shorena Shaverdashvili, the publisher and editor in chief of the Georgian magazine "Liberali," says with some 85 percent of Georgians receiving their news via television, Saakashvili's administration has been hugely successful in shaping its own public image.

Still, she and others cannot dismiss the importance of the government reforms. The culture of corruption has been so effectively eradicated from day-to-day life, she says, that it's highly unlikely that Georgia will backslide anytime soon, even under different leadership.

"Before, you really had to pay bribes to get your passport in time, and it was actually a hellish procedure to go through," she says. "It was driving time, and you had to go to 10 different people, and the bureaucracy behind it was horrible. There's definitely less corruption in public offices."



By Daisy Sindelar. Published on 9 December 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/georgia_corruption/2243593.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Georgia Offers North Caucasus Residents Visa-Free Travel As Kremlin Cries Foul

Lali Pitskhelauri lives just a short drive away from her sister. But the two women haven't seen each other for more than a decade.

Pitskhelauri runs a small guest house and a roadside kiosk in the Georgian town of Stepantsminda, not far from the Russian border. Her sister lives on the Russian side of the frontier in the North Ossetian capital of Vladikavkaz.

Between them stands the Zemo Larsi (Verkhny Lars in Russian) checkpoint -- the only land border crossing between Russia and Georgia that does not pass through Georgia's Russian-backed separatist regions of South Ossetia or Abkhazia.

Pitskhelauri says she hasn't been able to visit her sister for 11 years.

"How do you think it feels? And it is all because of politicians. It is politicians who closed the road and cut us off from each other."

She asks, distraught, "Why shouldn't we be able to visit each other?"

Victims Of A Decade-Long Struggle

Pitskhelauri and her sister are unintentional victims of a long-standing struggle between Tbilisi and Moscow, which has escalated markedly during the past decade as Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has sought to steer his country into NATO and out of Russia's sphere of influence.

Russia closed the Zemo Larsi crossing in 2006, as relations between Moscow and Tbilisi deteriorated following the arrest of four alleged Russian spies by Georgian authorities. Diplomatic relations were ultimately severed following the five-day war in August 2008.

The two countries agreed to reopen Zemo Larsi in March. But in the absence of diplomatic relations, it remains difficult -- often prohibitively so -- for Russians or Georgians to cross it.

That, however, is about to change -- at least for those on the Russian side of the border. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has signed a decree allowing residents of Russia's seven North Caucasus republics to visit Georgia for up to 90 days without a visa.

Manana Manjgaladze, a spokeswoman for Saakashvili, says it was the lack of formal diplomatic relations between Tbilisi and Moscow that made it extremely difficult for Russians, who live only two to three hours from the Zemo Larsi, to get a Georgian visa.

"The people who live in these republics of the North Caucasus had to go all the way to Moscow to the Swiss Embassy [which handles Georgian interests in Russia] to receive a Georgian visa," Manjgaladze says.

Restricted Visas

To be sure, the decree does not signal improved relations between Tbilisi and the Kremlin. A statement from the Georgian Interior Ministry about the lifting of visa requirements reflects ongoing tensions between the two countries. It says residents of the North Caucasus can now travel to Georgia "to do business, receive an education, and to rest and enjoy all the good things that they are deprived of in their own country -- which is run by a corrupt and repressive federal regime."

Nugzar Tsiklauri, chairman of the Georgian Parliament's Committee on Relations With Compatriots Residing Abroad, says the decree was necessary because of Russia's record on human rights in North Caucasus republics like North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya, and Daghestan.

"There are massive violations of human rights and there are killings of journalists [in the North Caucasus]," Tsiklauri says. "Human rights activists have gone missing or are being killed."

Tsiklauri adds, "In this situation, the historical obligation of Georgia is to focus on the North Caucasus and help in all ways possible the people with whom we have lived alongside for centuries."

Unclear Limits On Both Sides

Kremlin officials have responded angrily to Saakashvili's decree -- describing the move as a "provocation" and an "attempt to divide Russia's population into different categories."

Andrei Nesterenko, a spokesman for Russia's Foreign Ministry, says the decree will "create obstacles to contacts between our citizens."

"Russia consistently stands for improving neighborly relations in the Caucasus and building a normal, calm life, which Mr. Saakashvili tried to disrupt by unleashing war in August 2008," Nesterenko adds.

Nesterenko says Russia has no problem with Georgia or the Georgian people. He says poor relations between the two countries are the result of "a problem with the regime" of Saakashvili, adding, "Mr. Saakashvili tried to disrupt [neighborly relations] by unleashing war in August 2008."

He also describes Saakashvili's actions as "spastic" and "aimed to cause more annoyances" that "only cause more problems for Georgian citizens.

Some Georgian opposition politicians are also questioning the wisdom of the move.

Levan Vepkhvadze, deputy chairman of the Georgian parliament, has said the free movement of Ossetians across the border could facilitate the "creeping annexation" of Georgian territory that is claimed by some North Ossetian groups.

Former Georgian parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze has warned that abolishing the visa requirement could have disastrous consequences for Georgia. She says Russian border guards may not permit Russian citizens without a valid Georgian visa to leave the Russian Federation through the Zemo Larsi checkpoint. She also wonders if the decree will give Moscow an additional pretext to accuse Georgia of harboring "terrorist groups" from the North Caucasus.

Some North Caucasus political figures also are questioning the political implications of Saakashvili's decree, suggesting it is an attempt to exploit anti-Russian sentiments in the North Caucasus.

Boris Ebzeyev, president of Karachay-Cherkessia since 2008, says Saakashvili's decree reflects "the death throes of a regime trying at all costs to restore its irrevocably tarnished luster."

Colonel-General Arkady Yedelev, deputy head of the North Caucasus Federal District, says Saakashvili should have discussed the lifting of visa requirements with Moscow instead of issuing a decree "on a whim."

A Trickle Of Traffic

But that's not how Georgian residents near the border crossing feel.

Dodo Gomiashvili, an elderly Georgian woman who operates a kiosk close to the Zemo Larsi crossing, says Moscow should respond by also lifting visa requirements for Georgians so that she can visit her relatives in North Ossetia.

"There are many of us here who have sisters, brothers and cousins on the other side," Gomiashvili explains.

RFE/RL correspondents have visited the Zemo Larsi crossing since the decree took effect a week ago. They report only a trickle of traffic passing through the border.

That's not enough to bring the new jobs desired by unemployed Georgians in the region.

"This measure isn't bringing us anything good," 31-year-old Giorgi Khutsishvili attests. "I'm working in my garden doing whatever I can to help my family survive so we don't starve this winter."

Khutsishvili says he would be happy if Russia would lift his visa requirements so he can cross into neighboring North Ossetia to sell his vegetables and other products from Georgia.


By Ron Synovitz. Published on 20 October 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgia_Offers_North_Caucasus_Residents_VisaFree_Travel_As_Kremlin_Cries_Foul/2196150.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Kremlin's Ruling Party Boosts Ties Across The Former Soviet Union

As Kyrgyzstan gears up for crucial parliamentary elections on October 10, former Prime Minister Felix Kulov's Ar-Namys party has picked up a key endorsement from Russia's ruling United Russia party.

Ar-Namys on September 22 signed a cooperation agreement with United Russia, the colossus that controls executive and legislative branches across the Russian Federation and is headed by Russia's most powerful politician, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

Following a model that seems to have worked in Ukraine, where a pro-Western president was replaced earlier this year by a pro-Russian one, United Russia is also now working actively with friendly parties in Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia -- all countries whose political vector is up for grabs in the next 18 months.

According to a United Russia press release, the Kyrgyzstan agreement includes not only political cooperation, but also calls for the development of "equal and mutually beneficial cooperation between Russia and Kyrgyzstan in the economic sphere, the creation of beneficial conditions for the development of entrepreneurial, investment, and scientific activity."

Further blurring the lines between party activity and national policy, the cooperation agreement was signed on United Russia's behalf by the head of the party's Supreme Council, Boris Gryzlov, who is also speaker of the Russian State Duma.

Deepening Ties

The Ar-Namys agreement is just the latest in a series of such pacts United Russia has signed with parties throughout the former Soviet space. Earlier this month, United Russia signed a similar pact with Moldova's Democratic Party, headed by former Communist Marian Lupu.

Lupu told a press conference after returning from Russia that the agreement with United Russia is part of his party's "pragmatic" view of relations with Russia.

"We need relations of cooperation, not confrontation with Russia. This is the message of the political agreement we signed. Second, Moldova cannot ignore and will not ignore the Russian Federation. Third, we have to be pragmatic and constructive if we want the best for the citizens of Moldova," Lupu said.

Moldova is expected to hold parliamentary elections in November, and analysts say Moscow hopes to split Lupu away from the pro-Western, four-party ruling coalition.

United Russia also has a cooperation agreement with the Renewal party in Moldova's breakaway Transdniester region.

In Georgia, United Russia works with the opposition For A Just Georgia movement of former Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli, which describes itself as "having a classic right opposition orientation."

Sergei Markov, a Russian Duma deputy and United Russia official, told RFE/RL's Georgian Service that the key issue is improving relations between the two countries.

"United Russia's main goal is to support those political forces that are in favor of better relations between Georgia and Russia. Noghaideli is among them," Markov said.

"But he is not the only one coming out for such a position. Some lawmakers even from [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili's party in private conversations acknowledge the insanity of his policies."

United Russia also has cooperation agreements and provides direct financial assistance to the ruling parties in the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

In 2005, United Russia signed a cooperation agreement with the Party of Regions in Ukraine. Earlier this year, Party of Regions head Viktor Yanukovych became president of Ukraine, embarking on a noticeably more pro-Russia course than his predecessor.

Konstanin Kosachyov, who is chairman of the Russian State Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee and heads United Russia's Commission on Interparty and International Ties, told RFE/RL's Russian Service that working with Yanukovych is "simple."

"For us any president of Ukraine is absolutely fine who is realistically oriented toward the interests of Ukraine. [Former President Viktor] Yushchenko interpreted those interests in a false way. Yushchenko thought they consisted of getting as far from Russia as possible and quickly moving toward the West," Kosachyov said. "That is precisely why we had such a hard time with him. But with Viktor Yanukovych, it is simple for us. He has a significantly more precise and adequate understanding of Ukraine's interests."

United Russia's overriding concern in all of these alliances is advancing Russia's political and economic interests in the region. That is why the party, which proclaims itself in Russia as right-of-center, is comfortable working with left-leaning parties in Moldova and Ukraine, a right-leaning ally in Georgia, and parties of indeterminate ideology in Kyrgyzstan, South Ossetia, and Transdniester.

'Pragmatic Line'

The key factor in United Russia's alliances is the willingness of partner parties to adopt what it calls a "pragmatic" line in relations with Moscow.

Petre Mamradze, a spokesman for Noghaideli's For A Just Georgia party, lays out a position typical of United Russia's partners.

"We are doing everything we can to improve relations with Russia. Being realists, we see this is the ruling party of Russia. According to all opinion polls, the overwhelming majority of this enormous country supports Vladimir Putin and the party that he heads. For Georgia, this is a fact; it is reality. And if we ignore it, we will disappear," Mamradze said.

United Russia's aggressive alliance-making seems to fit into the larger pattern of Moscow's evolving foreign policy. A Foreign Ministry working paper that was leaked to the Russian version of "Newsweek" magazine earlier this month emphasizes that Russia no longer views the world in terms of "friends" and "enemies," but exclusively in the framework of "interests." It urges Moscow to create a range of formal and informal tools for advancing Russia's modernization agenda through foreign ties.

In the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the concept paper emphasizes "supporting the activity of Russian economic operators in the CIS space." It sets the goal of "actively attracting Ukraine into the orbit of economic cooperation with Russia" and "facilitating the expansion of the activity of Russian business in Kyrgyzstan."

The paper does not list promoting stable democratic development in the CIS as a national interest for Russia, and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev told a conference in Yaroslavl this month that parliamentary democracy has been "a disaster" for Kyrgyzstan.

United Russia's position at the nexus of politics and business in Russia means that parties allying themselves with United Russia can expect significant material support in their election campaigns. Noghiedeli's For A Just Georgia and Lupu's Democratic Party both have slick, multimedia websites, for example.

Alexander Rondeli of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) says Moscow is "acting now often not through state channels, but through the party United Russia, which can also hardly be considered a political party."

"But if you take this as an attempt to influence the political situation inside Georgia and set up some sort of pro-Russian opposition against the current authorities, you can also assume that definitely without financial contributions this won't work," Rondeli said.


By Robert Coalson. Published on 29 September 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Kremlins_Ruling_Party_Boosts_Ties_Across_The_Former_Soviet_Union/2171505.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

What Does ‘Confederation’ Mean In The South Caucasus?

On July 18, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili met with his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, in Batumi and mentioned the idea of a “confederation” between the two countries. The phrase quickly got people wondering what exactly the president had in mind. Analysts have been raising questions and offering ideas ever since.

Journalists and political commentators from the countries of the South Caucasus have examined the idea (whether they endorse it or not) in the context of confrontational geopolitics. In August, Russia and Armenia agreed to extend the pact on the presence of Russian military bases in Armenia until 2044. At the same time, they expanded the format of bilateral military cooperation: henceforth Russia is obliged to defend Armenia from any external threat, which Yerevan expects primarily from Azerbaijan. In short, Armenia has become an even closer Russian ally than it was previously.

The discussion of a possible Georgia-Azerbaijan confederation was immediately placed in the traditional context of the “vertical” axis of Russia-Armenia (and, possibly, Iran) and the “horizontal” axis of Georgia and Azerbaijan (and, possibly, Turkey). And they don’t forget overseas allies, asserting that, of course, the idea of a confederation comes from Washington and is aimed at containing Russia. In a nutshell, after the failed Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, everything has come back to its place: we loved to talk about all these things back in the 1990s.

But what concrete political and legal steps would be necessary to realize this “confederation” project? I haven’t heard anything specific about this yet.

First, let’s take a look at exactly what Saakashvili said, some two months ago. “A few years back I said that we must form confederative relations,” Saakashvili said. “In fact, relations between our countries are far beyond the relations that two countries ordinarily have. We are a continuation of one another.”

In short, the Georgia-Azerbaijan confederation, according to the president, is not a project for the future, but a description of the present. That is, the term shouldn’t be viewed in strictly legalistic terms, but as a rhetorical figure of speech that signifies “particularly close relations between countries.”

What’s more, people in the president’s entourage insist that the same could be said of Georgia-Armenia relations: there as well, the level of closeness is very high. Of course, the Armenian side welcomes the use of this term (even rhetorically) considerably less.

To be sure, it would be hypocritical to speak about an equivalence between Georgia-Azerbaijan and Georgia-Armenia relations. Under the circumstances of the cold war with Russia, Georgia can’t be pleased by the intensification of Russia-Armenia military cooperation. There’s no getting around that.

Enemies And Friends

Nonetheless, neither Georgia nor Armenia would benefit from drawing strict geopolitical conclusions from the two clear facts that Russia and Georgia are enemies, while Russia and Armenia are allies. Likewise, Russia and Azerbaijan do not intend to become enemies just because Azerbaijan and Armenia are enemies and Armenia and Russia are allies. The geopolitical formula that the “friend of my enemy is my enemy” does not apply in the Caucasus today. And thank God.

Since the August 2008 war with Russia, Georgia has placed more significance on regional relations and has actively sought to intensify ties with all the countries of the region without regard for their relations with one another. There is an element of competition with Russia in this. Russia’s policy of not recognizing the Saakashvili government is an effort to isolate Georgia internationally. Moscow wants not only to undermine Tbilisi’s support in the West, but also to exclude Georgia from regional connections.

Saakashvili is taking countermeasures, so far generally with success. Of course, one can always argue about what “success” means, but under the present circumstances Georgia views any sign of warming relations with the countries of the region as a success - and, at the same time, as a failure for Russia.

Russia is actively working to draw Azerbaijan into its sphere of influence with various economic projects. While Turkey and Armenia were flirting under Western patronage and Azerbaijan felt forgotten and rejected by its closest friends -- Ankara and Washington -- it seemed that some sort of geopolitical shift was possible. But the accelerated construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad and new steps toward realizing the Nabucco pipeline project show that the Georgia-Azerbaijan-Turkey axis of cooperation is still functioning. It is such projects most of all that are the real content of the rhetorical term “confederation.”

But, on the other hand, the opening in March of the Russia-Georgia border crossing at Verkhny Lars is not a sign of the warming of Russian-Georgian relations (as Western experts want to believe). It is an expression of Armenia-Georgia cooperation, since that road is needed most of all by Armenia. What difference does it make whether such a friendship is or is not called a “confederation”?


By Ghia Nodia. Published on 17 September 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/What_Does_Confederation_Mean_In_The_South_Caucasus/2160662.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Is There A Foundation For Peace Between Russia And Georgia?

The director of the Moscow Carnegie Center, Dmitri Trenin, recently published his proposal for a peace agreement between Russia and Georgia. According to his article, a logical (and possible) solution to the standoff consists of two parts.

First, Georgia should recognize Abkhazia's independence in exchange for the return of the Gali district (which is almost entirely populated by ethnic Georgians).

Second, Russia should withdraw from South Ossetia in exchange for some sort of intermediate status for that region between independence and Georgian control, with a special security role for Russia.

The obstacle to this plan, according to Trenin, is Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili -- first, because he is bad and, second, because Russian leaders Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev have sworn not to negotiate with him and they are not going to go back on their word. But if Saakashvili leaves office in 2013 and does not become prime minister, then such a solution could be possible.

Theoretically, all this is possible. If one proceeds from the idea that returning Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgia is impossible (because Russia will never allow it and because the people who live there don't want it), then compared to the present situation, such a solution would be better for Georgia. It is all quite rational.

So what's the problem? Is it just Saakashvili?

It is obvious, but true, that in order to reach a peace settlement, all sides have to really want to. It has to be the top priority for everyone, particularly if reaching an agreement means makes painful concessions. It is hard for me to imagine any Georgian leader who could survive politically after making such a decision. The alternative would have to be very bad and the dividends would have to be enormous.

Under what circumstances would the parties want to make such serious concessions?

An anonymous commentator posting a comment on Trenin's "The Moscow Times" article asked a good question: "What do we need peace with Georgia for anyway? Why should we give South Ossetia back?"

And it's true that it would be extremely illogical for the Russia that invaded Georgia in August 2008 to endorse Trenin's plan. The basic idea of the war was the conviction that the West is Russia's enemy and Georgia is a Trojan horse in Russia's backyard. Georgia and its foreign protectors had to be taught a lesson and shown who is the boss in the "near abroad."

Two Russias

They didn't quite manage to get this lesson across, since Saakashvili is still in power and continues to stubbornly pursue his policies. So what is the point of making life easier for him by normalizing relations? The worse things are for (a pro-Western) Georgia, the better they are for Russia.

Trenin, working for an American center in Moscow and writing in an English-language newspaper in the capital, is proceeding from a different view of Russia. The Russia that Trenin imagines (as do some Western analysts and politicians) might be provisionally called "Medvedev's Russia" (as opposed to the real "Putin's Russia"). This Russia, on the one hand, has not rejected its claims to great-power status (which in practice means demanding a privileged role in, at the least, the "near abroad").

But, on the other hand, this Russia has ceased to consider the West an enemy and, on the contrary, wants to establish a "modernization alliance" with it. No one knows exactly what this means, but the practical implication for the West is clear: It must strengthen Medvedev -- or, at the least, it must not do anything to weaken him. This Russia won't become a democracy but at least it will be more rational and predictable. It will be a Russia one can do business with. Such a Russia really does need to improve relations with Georgia (of course, after "Crazy Misha" leaves office) in order to remove the most serious source of disagreement with the West.

As far as Georgia is concerned, of course it is better to have good relations with Russia than bad ones. But the practical question is this: What concrete concessions would have to be made in order to "buy" better relations with Russia (the Russia that really exists, not the one that is imagined by Russian and Western Medvedevites), and what concrete dividends can Tbilisi hope to receive?

In order even to begin thinking about possible solutions, one must first imagine a Russia that is capable of genuinely recognizing Georgia's right to choose its own government and its own political course. But no such Russia is anywhere in sight. The very fact that Moscow refuses to talk to Saakashvili proves that Moscow believes Georgians do not have the right to choose their own government.

That is why projects like Trenin's are only theoretically interesting. Today's Russia and today's Georgia have no need for them.


By Ghia Nodia. Published on 31 August 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Is_There_A_Foundation_For_Peace_Between_Russia_And_Georgia/2144230.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Georgia: PACE rapporteurs welcome democratic developments but stress need for continued efforts to maintain public trust

Kastriot Islami (Albania, SOC) and Michael Aastrup Jensen (Denmark, ALDE), co-rapporteurs for the monitoring of Georgia by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), have expressed their satisfaction with the positive political developments that have taken place following the recent local elections in Georgia.

At the end of a five-day visit to Tbilisi (12-16 July 2010), the co-rapporteurs said: “The efforts of both authorities and part of the opposition to maintain a constructive dialogue and to secure the opposition’s rightful place in the governance of the country are an important step for the consolidation of democracy in Georgia.” They underscored that the planned electoral and constitutional reforms should be based on an all-inclusive process: “A wide political consensus and solid public consultation process on the direction of these reforms are essential to ensure public trust, not only in the electoral process, but in the political system as such.”

On human rights in Georgia, the co-rapporteurs welcomed the overall improvements with regard to the judiciary and judicial system. However, they expressed concern about problems brought to their attention regarding the administration of justice and guarantee of a fair trial: “Further efforts by the authorities in this field are necessary as even the perception that justice is selective, or that obstacles to the right of a fair trial could exist in this country, undermine public trust in the justice system and ultimately in the authorities themselves.” They highlighted the positive role played by the Public Defender in this field and urged the authorities to swiftly address the concerns expressed in his forthcoming report to the Parliament of Georgia.

They also extensively discussed the reforms in the penitentiary system and welcomed the overall direction of these reforms. However, they cautioned that the continuing increase in the number of prisoners in Georgia, already high, could undermine these reforms. In addition, they noted that concerns with regard to the treatment of prisoners as well as their healthcare remain, and encouraged the authorities to address these areas as a priority.

During their visit the co-rapporteurs also visited the Kaheti region to familiarise themselves with the impact of reforms regarding local self-government as well as minority populations. “During our visit to an ethnic Ossetian village in Kaheti, all ethnic Ossetians we met stressed the improvements made with regard to the living conditions of the minority population since 2003, as well as minority relations in general,” said the co-rapporteurs. “The fact that they feel fully integrated into Georgian society is especially important in the light of some questions raised recently with regard to the multi-ethic character of Georgia,” they added.

The co-rapporteurs will present an information note on this visit to the Monitoring Committee during its meeting in Paris on 9 September 2010.

Source: PACE. Published in Strasbourg on 27 July 2010.

Eastern Europe's Frozen Conflicts Look To Kosovo Ruling

The International Court of Justice's (ICJ) ruling that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia was legal is of direct interest to other countries with secession crises or frozen conflicts.

The ICJ has said its ruling approving Kosovo's declaration of independence is unique to Kosovo.

That essentially means the justices do not want it to stand as a precedent for the world's many other places where regions have seceded or want to secede from their home countries.

But as the instant reaction of many governments to the July 22 decision makes clear, the court's ruling is being regarded -- rightly or wrongly -- in more universal terms. And nowhere more so than by parties involved in secession crises or frozen conflicts themselves.

'Guidance' For Bosnia's Serbs

Among the first to react to the court's ruling affirming Kosovo's 2008 unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia was the leader of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Serbian entity, the Republika Srpska.
Prime Minister Milorad Dodik suggested that if Kosovo's secession from Serbia did not violate international law, then the same standard should be applied to the Bosnian Serb entity's long-standing desire to leave Bosnia.

"For a long time, we in the Republika Srpska have not been happy in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Dodik told reporters in Banja Luka late on July 22.

"We respect the Dayton agreement [that ended the war in Bosnia], but the ICJ decision can serve us as guidance for our continuing fight over our status and our future."

Haris Silajdzic, a Bosniak who is the chairman of Bosnia's tripartite presidency, immediately responded that the country's borders were immutable.

"Any attempt at disintegration will be prevented, as it was the last time," he added.

The Serbian entity has never made a secret of its aspiration to join Serbia proper, a desire that directly contributed to the four-year war in Bosnia. The war ended after the intervention of NATO with the Dayton peace agreement in 1995 creating Bosnia as a federation of Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats.

Legal Limbo

Dodik's regarding the ICJ ruling as "guidance" for the future may be a measure of how much secessionist movements will regard the ruling as vindicating their efforts -- despite the court's own deliberately narrow interpretation.

The ICJ ruled that international law contained no "prohibition on declarations of independence" and so Kosovo's declaration "did not violate international law."

But the court avoided ruling on whether Kosovo's statehood was legal under international law, leaving the decision on whether to recognize the territory's independence to individual countries.

Thus far, 69 countries have recognized Kosovo's independence, including the United States and many European Union members.

Several major powers -- including Russia, China, and Spain -- concerned about secessionist regions of their own, have not recognized Kosovo.

No Change In Transdniester

In Moldova, officials of the breakaway Transdniester region have yet to comment publicly on the ICJ's decision.

But top advisers to Moldova's government say the ruling will not change any of the main players' views of the crisis, including those of Transdniester's main backer, Russia.

"On the Transdniester side, we all know what their statements over the last 18 years have been [demanding full independence], so I don't see how the ICJ decision could change that," says Nicu Popescu, a foreign-policy adviser to Moldova's Prime Minister Vlad Filat.

"As for Russia's statements and policies, Russia has constantly supported Moldova's territorial integrity and I'm absolutely sure that this stance will continue, and there's no reason at all why Russia's support for Moldova's territorial integrity should change."

The predominantly Russian-speaking population of Transdniester attempted in 1990 to secede from Moldova and since then has maintained a separate but unrecognized government with Moscow's support.

Georgian Stalemate

The Georgian government, which has lost two regions to secessionist movements backed by Moscow, also sees the court decision as doing little to change the status of its frozen conflicts.

"I think the decision probably will be used by regimes that are encouraging such kinds of small separatist regions," explains Kote Kublashvili, the chairman of Georgia's Supreme Court.

"Because prior to the decision, those regimes already used the situation very well and officially declared that [the Kosovo] case will affect other would-be-recognized separatist regions. Today's decision and those which have been made before [regarding recognition of Kosovo] will be widely debated first in terms the legal but also the political point of view."

South Ossetia fought a war of secession from Georgia in 1991-92, and Abkhazia did the same in 1992-93. Both have been recognized as independent by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru -- but no other countries -- in the wake of the 2008 Russia-Georgia war.

Leading figures in the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia say they are encouraged by the court's ruling.

"The fact that Kosovo has been recognized in accordance with international law can be seen as a definitive precedent for Abkhazia, and I think it will serve as an important precedent for Abkhazia," says Irakly Khintba, a Sukhumi-based political analyst.

"I'm not saying that Abkhazia will be recognized simply because it recognized Kosovo. But it is a serious political and historic step [for Abkhazia], that demonstrates that, in the current political environment, it is possible to recognize a state in spite of the will of the 'master state' that it is trying to separate from."

The deputy speaker of South Ossetia's parliament, Valery Dzitsoity, says he regards Pristina's situation as directly comparable to Tskhinvali's. "And moreover, I believe that South Ossetia has more of a foundation to expect recognition of its independence from the West than Kosovo," he adds.

Dzitsoity says that this is because "South Ossetia declared its independence at a time [September 1990] when Georgia was only recognized by Ukraine and was not a member of the UN. And Kosovo is separating from an internationally recognized state and a member of the UN."

No Agreement In Nagorno-Karabakh

Yet another frozen conflict whose parties may look to the ruling is Nagorno-Karabakh, the predominantly ethnic Armenian region that broke away from Azerbaijan following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The head of the opposition Armenian Revolutionary Federation parliamentary faction, Vahan Hovhannisian, hailed the ICJ ruling.

"The judgment clearly states that a unilateral proclamation of independence cannot be viewed as unlawful. For this, of course, there should be prerequisites, and Karabakh has at least the same prerequisites as Kosovo, if not more," Hovhannisian said.

"It means that now we get a new instrument, a new opportunity to struggle for the international recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh republic."

But Baku says it does not consider the Kosovo ruling pertinent to the Karabakh conflict.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Elxan Poluxov told RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service that Azerbaijan believed the ICJ's decision applied "only to Kosovo."

"Conflicts differ and there is no single solution for all conflicts," Poluxov added. "We don't see that the decision may somehow affect the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and negotiations on this conflict should have their own format."

Ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh fought a war of secession from Azerbaijan in 1991-94, backed by Yerevan.

Most of the region of Nagorno Karabakh today is governed by the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh republic, while the territory remains internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan.



By Charles Recknagel. Published on 23 July 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Eastern_Europes_Frozen_Conflicts_Look_To_Kosovo_Ruling/2108088.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Georgia’s Long Farewell To Stalin

On the night of June 25, the monument to Josef Stalin in the city of Gori was removed. It will be moved some 100 meters to the museum that was built around the house where he was born. And on the place in the city’s main square where the statue previously stood, the authorities will erect a memorial to the victims of Russian aggression and Soviet repression.

The symbolism of these actions is completely obvious. On the spot where the dictator and occupier once stood there will be a memorial to his victims – and to the victims of those who continue to follow his line today. But if this is all there is to it, then why has the statue not been taken down earlier? Why was the operation carried out at night amid heightened security?

The symbolism of changing monuments is an important part of any radical political change. In Georgia, this change has been characterized, on one hand, by the rejection of the communist regime and, on the other, by the assertion of its national independence. And the second factor is more important emotionally.

The first victim, more than 20 years ago, was the monument to Sergo Ordzhonikidze, an early Soviet Politburo member and close comrade of Stalin’s who was born in Georgia and played a role in the Sovietization of the country in 1921. For most Georgians, Ordzhonikidze is a traitor who helped the enemy conquer his own homeland.

Soon after, the monuments to Soviet founder Vladimir Lenin were swept from their pedestals. This marked the symbolic end of Soviet power.

But Stalin continued to stand in Gori, although his sins against Georgia were certainly no less than Ordzhonikidze’s. Why?

National Pride

The lingering cult of Stalin in Georgia does not symbolize adherence to the communist system but rather national pride. He was the most powerful Georgian in history, the main victor of the main war of the 20th century. The whole world trembled before him, particularly the nation that had ruled Georgia for the previous two centuries. In the absence of Georgian statehood, his power was psychological compensation for the country’s weakness.

As paradoxical as it may seem, the history of the mass national-liberation movement in Georgia dates back to March 9, 1956, when the people spontaneously protested against the policy of de-Stalinization that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev announced at the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress. The demonstration was violently put down, but Stalin – rejected in Russia – became a symbol of the rejection of the official Soviet line. In the late Soviet period, his portrait could be found decorating the shops of Georgian cobblers and barbers; it became the sign of mass dissent.

But as soon as it became possible to be a genuine nationalist – that is, someone devoted to the idea of an independent Georgia – Stalin began to fade as a national symbol. More and more people came to understand that Stalin was a hero of the communist system and of Russian imperialism, not of Georgia.

But symbolic connections are living things. For many people, particularly the older generation, Stalin remained a revered figure. What’s more, when he ceased being a symbol of Georgian nationalism, Stalin became a symbol of local patriotism in Gori. At least, the loyalty of locals to their idol was the main justification for why even the new revolutionary reformist government of President Mikheil Saakashvili declined to touch the statue. What is the point in upsetting people for nothing, they said.

Of course, there was another opinion as well. Some wondered whether Georgia could really become a European democracy while at the same time continuing to glorify Stalin – even if only in one particular city. Could anyone imagine a democratic Germany that was home to even one monument to Adolf Hitler? The monument could not be reconciled with the image of a country that was trying to become part of the democratic West.

But the struggle against stone idols was not a priority for the Saakashvili government. It was too busy arresting corrupt officials and trying to build an army. So local guides on the state payroll continued to explain to astonished Western tourists what a great democrat Stalin was.

Game-Changer

The August 2008 war with Russia changed everything. For the occupying army from the north, the statue of Stalin was a symbol of something important. If the Leader is still standing here, they thought, that means all is not lost. That means Georgia can still be saved from the NATO-Judeo-Masonic disaster. The monument became a sort of fifth column of the enemy.

Despite growing calls to tear it down, the government moved slowly. After all, there were people on the streets calling for Saakashvili’s resignation and the authorities did not want to see them joined by legions from Gori. Then, in late May, there were local elections and the authorities did not want to lose them in this strategically important region. After the ruling party’s convincing victory in those elections, the excuses started to dry up. Summer, the heat, the World Cup…It was time.

And it turned out that the fears were exaggerated. Almost no one protested against the statue’s removal. The opposition didn’t even try to get the people to rise up. Georgia is now without Stalin and all is calm.

So what does this mean?

Two things, at least. First, Saakashvili’s government made what it thought was a risky move. That means it has recovered its self-confidence and, perhaps, is again capable of doing unpopular but necessary things. And second, now that Georgia knows it doesn’t have to love Stalin anymore, maybe it will develop some respect for itself as a state.


By Ghia Nodia. Published on 1 July 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgias_Long_Farewell_To_Stalin_/2088243.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Despite Boost In U.S. Support, Russia's WTO Bid Still Faces Opposition In Georgia

Addressing reporters eager to hear what came out of a meeting between two of the world's most powerful men, U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev spoke of beef and chicken.

Beef because Obama, in a show of U.S. hospitality, had taken Medvedev to his favorite burger joint for lunch that day. And chicken because the package of agreements struck by the two leaders included a pledge by Medvedev to allow U.S. poultry imports back into Russia after they were banned due to what Russia said were safety concerns.

That agreement brought the United States one step closer to fully backing Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose members conduct 95 percent of world commerce. Russian accession, Obama said, would benefit all involved.

"I emphasized to President Medvedev, I emphasized to his entire delegation, and I now want to emphasize to the Russian people: We think it is not only in the interests of the Russian Federation, but in the interests of the United States, and in the interests of the world, that Russian joins the WTO. So this is something that we want to get resolved," Obama said.

Concerns about agricultural subsidies, insufficient regulation of state-run companies, and lax intellectual property laws have all been part of U.S. reluctance to support Russia's WTO bid -- even after the countries signed a bilateral WTO agreement in 2006.

Obama said his economic negotiators were working hard with the Russians on tackling the "difficult issues" that remain, saying that they require "significant work." Their resolution, he suggested, "may be in the hands of the Russian government."

Medvedev himself described the outstanding issues as "minor problems" and said negotiators were expected to complete their work by the end of September.

Tbilisi Two-Step

But overcoming longstanding U.S. objections may not necessarily guarantee smooth sailing for Russia. The WTO, which oversees trade treaties and facilitates access to export markets, has 153 member states -- all of which are involved in the decision to admit new countries. Among those members is Georgia, which has long been at odds with its aggressive neighbor to the north.

Tbilisi, long angered by Russian support for its breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as a Russian embargo of Georgian wine and mineral water, for years threatened to use its WTO membership to block Russia's bid. A Georgia-Russia WTO working group was established but has so far failed to reach any agreements.

In recent months, opposition to Russia's WTO bid appeared to die down in Tbilisi, prompting speculation the government, chastened by the August 2008 war between the two countries, had changed its position.

But Niko Mchedlishvili, head of the Georgian prime minister's press office, told RFE/RL's Georgian Service there has been no such switch.

"The government's position remains unchanged. It stays the same as it was several years ago," Mchedlishvili said. "Not a single point has been changed in the document which resulted from the negotiations between Georgia and Russia. Therefore, all talk about a possible concession from Georgia's side during the negotiations with the World Trade Organization is an absolute lie."

Obama and Medvedev, during their Washington press conference, mentioned Georgia only once -- in connection to U.S.-Russian disagreement over Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- with no mention of Tbilisi's potential role in the WTO process.

Multiple Obstacles

Russian officials have made it clear that they consider full U.S. support the true necessity for gaining membership, which, according to a study commissioned by the World Bank, would encourage foreign investment and, by one measure, would mean Russia could annually gain about 3.3 percent of its GDP, or about $53 billion a year.

Last year, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov said Russia's accession depended almost entirely on the United States. Indeed, Russian officials and others have held the U.S. largely responsible for prolonging Russia's 17-year accession process. Ahead of his U.S. visit, Medvedev said pointedly that "the ball is in the U.S. court."

Many experts agree.

"This [Georgia's objection] is not the first issue. This will be left until later," Anders Aslund, senior fellow at the U.S.-based Peterson Institute for International Economics, said. "The main issues now are between the U.S. and Russia. One just needs to clean the table and [decide] how it should be done, and that's a couple of months of negotiations to sort out the technical things. But the important thing is that the U.S. and Russia trust one another."

With the success of the U.S.-Russian "reset" being hailed in both Washington and Moscow, trust indeed appears to be at its highest in years.

Gone is the plan -- put forward by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin -- to enter the WTO in a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, a move that clashed with WTO protocol and befuddled the United States. And with Medvedev tour of the U.S. tech hub Silicon Valley, which preceded his trip to Washington, the Russian leader is sending the message that his country is serious about changing and modernizing its economy.

'Every Opportunity'

Up next is the G20 summit in Canada, to which Medvedev and Obama were traveling together. Russia is the only G20 country that is not a member of the WTO, and after Medvedev's U.S. trip, that looks increasingly likely to change.

And yet, the Georgian problem remains. Matthew Rojansky, deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said Medvedev may be looking to Obama to eliminate that hurdle.

"Barring, potentially, a new [Georgian] government which has a different attitude about how you do conflict resolution with your enormous northern neighbor," said Rojansky, "the question is what influence the United States can have vis-a-vis Georgia if we [the United States] are set on paving the way to Russian accession."

The Russian news agency RIA-Novosti quoted Medvedev at Stanford University as saying, "As soon as Georgia gets a new leader we will have every opportunity to restore ties."

Until then, the United States may be looked to help bridge the impasse. Whether it's willing to do so, however, may be influenced by the state of Washington's evolving relations with Georgia.

Lincoln Mitchell, professor of international politics at Columbia University, said the United States, if it wanted to, could offer Georgia economic or other benefits as incentives to sway the Georgian stance, but is unlikely to use threats to strong-arm its Caucasian ally.

"My sense of things is that the U.S. isn't in a place right now where it is going to pressure Georgia to do this, particularly given the way Georgia -- I would say with some success -- has created this narrative of 'the U.S. is selling us out over Russia,'" Mitchell said. "I don't think [the United States] would then go in that context and ask [Georgia] to do something like this."

Aslund said that ultimately, a loophole in the accession process could allow Russia to join the WTO in spite of Georgian disapproval. WTO members must reach a general agreement, or "consensus" of potential members, which is technically not the same as a unanimous vote.

According to a spokesperson from the WTO, however, an applicant country doesn't come up for general WTO review unless disputes with individual members have been previously resolved.


By Richard Solash. Published on 25 June 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Despite_Boost_US_Support_Russia_WTO_Bid_Opposition_Georgia/2082635.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Semneby Downplays Fears EU Is Reducing Presence In South Caucasus

Peter Semneby, who has served as the European Union's special representative to the South Caucasus since February 2006, is seeking to downplay fears in the region that the EU is looking to reduce its diplomatic presence in the region.

Speaking to RFE/RL's Armenian Service in Yerevan, where he is currently completing a two-day tour, Semneby played down rumors of an EU initiative to reduce its embassies to a single European regional headquarters in Tbilisi.

"The European Union has just upgraded the commission delegations in all three capitals to full European Union representations," Semneby said. "All three countries are important partner countries of ours, in particular in a situation when we are taking a new and important step with the launching of negotiations of association agreements, and this clearly requires a presence in each country that is tailor-made to the needs and the situation of each individual country."

Semneby declined to comment on another proposal that likewise aims to scale back the EU's presence in the strategically important and politically volatile South Caucasus region -- the suggestion floated last month by EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton to abolish a number of EU special representative posts, including Semneby's.

The proposal, which is reportedly still being discussed, would significantly downgrade the EU's presence on the ground in the South Caucasus. Ashton's plan has raised alarm bells in the region, particularly in Georgia, which is still recovering from its 2008 war with Russia and sees the EU as a protective firewall between Tbilisi and Moscow.

Another EU special representative post marked for closure is that in Moldova, currently held by Kalman Mizsei. Semneby said he did not want to comment on "ongoing discussions about what the future European diplomatic representation will look like."

Semneby's visit to Yerevan comes just two days after the Armenian Defense Ministry said four Armenian soldiers were killed in fighting in Azerbaijan's breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Reports said one Azerbaijani fighter was also killed in the fighting, which reportedly broke out near the Line of Contact that separates Azerbaijan proper from the ethnic Armenian territories of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The skirmish came the same day as the presidents of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan met on the sidelines of a St. Petersburg economic forum to discuss Nagorno-Karabakh, one of the South Caucasus three "frozen conflicts."

Semneby called the situation "deplorable" and said tensions must be reduced in order for all sides to come to a negotiated solution on the issue.

"It's not really acceptable that events like this take place," Semneby said. "And in addition here we have the unnecessary tragic loss of human lives. This incident demonstrates that there is a tense situation along the Line of Contact, that it can easily get out of hand, and that it's necessary to take whatever measures are available in order to lower tension and to build confidence."


By RFE/RL. Published on 21 June 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Semneby_Downplays_Fears_EU_Is_Reducing_Presence_In_South_Caucasus/2078379.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

European Union signs visa facilitation agreement with Georgia

The European Union and Georgia signed a visa facilitation agreement with Georgia, opening the way for easier travel and people-to-people contact across Europe. The signature of the readmission agreement negotiated between the European Union and Georgia in parallel will be organised very soon.

"The conclusion of a visa facilitation agreement is a concrete step forward in EU-Georgia relations. It is EU's message of openness to the Georgian citizens." said Cecilia Malmström, Commissioner for Home Affairs. "The visa facilitation and readmission agreements are very tangible result of the Eastern partnership and will promote interaction between citizens of the EU and Georgia and strengthen our cooperation in the fight against irregular immigration."

Štefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, stated: ''This is part of our commitment to bring Georgia closer to the EU, not only at institutional level but also at peoples' level''.

The visa facilitation agreement aims at making it easier for Georgian citizens, in particular those who travel most, to acquire short term visas for the EU1. It provides a reduced visa fee of 35€ instead of 60 € for all Georgian citizens and a total exemption from the visa fee for certain categories of applicants (e.g. children below the age of 12, pensioners, disabled persons, students, close relatives and representatives of civil society organisations). Furthermore for certain persons (e.g. businesspeople, students and journalists) the necessary documents requested for supporting a visa application are simplified. Bona fide frequent travellers will be issued multi-entry visas with long periods of validity. Finally, the holders of diplomatic passports are exempt from the visa obligation. The agreement also obliges the Consulates to take a decision within 10 days on whether or not to issue a visa.

The negotiations of the readmission agreement have been finalised and the text was initialled between the negotiators on the same day as the visa facilitation agreement. The formal signature of the readmission agreement will be organised once the Council finalises the necessary procedures. Both visa facilitation and readmission agreements will enter into force on the same day.

The agreement on readmission sets out clear obligations and procedures for the authorities of both Georgia and EU Member States as to when and how to take back people who are illegally residing on their territories. The draft agreement covers not only the illegally staying nationals of both parties but also third country nationals and stateless persons being in an irregular situation provided they have a clear link with the requested Party (e.g. visa or resident permit).

Full respect of Human Rights as provided by the European Convention of Human Rights will also be guaranteed during the application of the readmission agreement.

EU citizens are already exempt from the visa obligation by Georgia.

Background

In June 2008, the Council invited the Commission to open a dialogue with Georgia to launch a discussion on a Mobility Partnership. The Extraordinary European Council of 1 September 2008 decided "to step up relations with Georgia, including visa facilitation measures". In November 2009, negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission agreements were concluded (IP/08/1406) and the EU and Georgia signed a mobility partnership aiming at promoting a better framework for cooperation on all aspects of migration policy (IP/09/1853).

Georgia is one of six countries within the European Partnership established by the EU in May 2009 (Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, 7 May 2009). The purpose of the Eastern Partnership is to deepen and strengthen relations between the EU and its neighbouring countries Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.

Since 2006, the EU has concluded visa facilitation agreements with Russia, Ukraine, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and the Republic of Moldova. Negotiations are ongoing with Cape Verde.


1 :
The visa facilitation agreement does not apply to UK and Ireland (which do not participate in the Schengen cooperation), and to Denmark. It is applicable towards the rest of the EU. Denmark, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland who participate in Schengen are invited to conclude similar visa facilitation agreements.




European Commission launches visa dialogue with Moldova

The European Commission launched a dialogue on visa-free travel with the Republic of Moldova. The aim of the dialogue is to examine the relevant conditions for visa-free travel of Moldovan citizens to the EU as a long-term goal.

"A future visa-free travel regime would further facilitate people-to-people contacts and strengthen economic, societal and cultural ties between the European Union and Moldova. Provided that the relevant conditions for well-managed and secure mobility are put in place, a visa-free regime can add a very tangible element to Moldova's closer relations with the EU", said Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs.

Štefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, stated: "This is a promise that we made last December to Moldova, and a sign of our commitment to the Moldovan people. I am happy to see that we are able to deliver it. This step towards visa-free regime with Moldova is the best proof that reforms at home can bring Moldovan citizens tangible benefits."

The visa dialogue, opened at the EU-Republic of Moldova Cooperation Council in Luxembourg today, will allow the EU and the Moldovan authorities to examine the technical preconditions for the establishment of a visa-free regime for Moldovan citizens. The dialogue will focus on key areas such as security of travel documents, border and migration management, as well as relevant public order and security and external relations issues.

As a first step towards the longer-term goal of visa-free travel, Moldovan citizens enjoy the benefits of a visa facilitation agreement with the EU since 1 January 2008. The Republic of Moldova lifted the visa obligation on EU citizens on 1 January 2007.

Background

At the previous EU-Republic of Moldova Cooperation Council on 21 December 2009 the parties agreed to launch during 2010 a dialogue examining the conditions for visa-free travel of Moldovan citizens to the EU as a long-term goal.

On 1 January 2008, a visa facilitation and readmission agreement between the EU and Moldova entered into force. The visa facilitation agreement sets a lower visa fee (€35 instead of €60) for all applicants, and waives fees for broad categories of citizens such as children, pensioners, students, people visiting family members living in the EU, people in need of medical treatment, economic operators working with EU companies, sportsmen and women, participants in cultural exchanges, journalists, etc. In 2009, more than half of Schengen visas issued in Moldova were issued free of charge. The visa facilitation agreement also simplifies and accelerates procedures and provides for easier access to multiple-entry visas of longer duration.

Source: European Commission

PACE President calls for full implementation of Resolution 1683

During a press conference organised at the end of his official visit to Georgia from 13 to 15 June, PACE President Mevlüt Çavusoglu stressed that by coming to Georgia early in his Presidency he wanted to show the importance he attached to the country, its ongoing democratic reforms as well as its plight after the August 2008 war.

He said his talks had focused on the consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia and the role that the Council of Europe, and especially PACE, could and should play in this respect as well as the ongoing democratic reforms and outstanding commitments of Georgia to the Council of Europe.

He stressed that with regard to the consequences of the war between Georgia and Russia, he had re-iterated PACE’s firm support for the territorial integrity of Georgia and called on all sides to fully implement the demands PACE had made, in particular in its Resolution1683, which addresses crucial humanitarian issues affecting the daily life of the inhabitants in this region.

“These demands focus on the freedom of movement of civilians over the administrative borders with the two regions; access, and more important, the presence of monitors as well as international and humanitarian organisations; the right to return of IDPs; a full and credible investigation into alleged violations of human rights and humanitarian law committed by any side, including Georgia, in relation to the war,“ he recalled.

With regard to ongoing democratic reforms, the PACE President welcomed that the last local elections were considered a big improvement by international monitors, whilst stressing the need to adress remaining important shortcomings. A new election code should be drafted with the help of the Venice Commission, and in dialogue and consultation with both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition, well before the next parliamentary elections, the President said.

He also called on the authorities to strengthen dialogue with all opposition forces on issues deemed important for the development of the country and welcomed reforms aimed at consolidating democracy and strengthening the role of the parliament.

He finally expressed his concern about complaints brought to his attention with regard to decreasing media pluralism and lack of transparency with regard to media ownership, the independence of the judiciary, especially in cases that have political implications, as well as allegations that political motives had affected the prosecution and sentencing of persons. “I met a woman on hunger strike in front of the Council of Europe office who claimed her brother was in prison for political reasons. If true, this would be unacceptable and I will ask the President to investigate,” he said.

“These are worrying issues that could directly affect the further European integration of Georgia. I will therefore ask the PACE co-rapporteurs for Georgia to organise a visit in the very near future, giving priority to these important human rights issues, he said.

The state of affairs with respect to the repatriation of the Meskhetian population had also been discussed, the President said, an issue of importance to PACE and close to his heart.

During his vist, the PACE President met the President of the Republic Mikhail Saakashvili, the Speaker of Parliament David Bakradze, the Vice-Prime Minister and State Minister for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili, the Foreign Minister Gregory Vashadze and the State Minister of Refugees and Accommodation Koba Subeliani. He also met the Chairman of the Constitutional Court George Papuashvili, representatives of the parliamentary and non-parliamentary opposition, the Governor of the Shida Kartli Region Lado Vardzelashvili and the Chairman of the Government of Adjara Levan Varshalomidze.


To download Resolution 1683 log on
http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta09/ERES1683.htm

Source: Council of Europe. Published in Strasbourg on 16 June 2010

European Union promotes regional development and Public Finance Management reform in Georgia

The European Commission adopted on 1 June 2010 the Annual Action Programme 2010 for Georgia, worth €37 million.

The EU support intends to contribute to the reduction in regional disparities within Georgia and to stimulate economic growth and regional development throughout the country. Deeper economic integration of Georgia with the EU internal market will be supported, as well as programmes to increase efficiency of social assistance for vulnerable social groups.

Moreover, the assistance programme will support the ongoing Public Finance Management Reform, among others through establishing a modern framework for debt management and supporting the establishment of evaluation systems of the spending of public finances.

Štefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, said: "We encourage the acceleration of the reform efforts in Georgia so that all citizens of Georgia draw concrete benefits from the process of getting closer to the EU, fully enjoying fundamental freedoms, human rights, economic growth and prosperity. I hope that the programme adopted today will contribute to this objective."

Background

The €37 million allocation is provided through the EU's European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which is the main source of EU assistance for Georgia and the other 16 partner states along the Eastern border of the EU and the Mediterranean. The aim of this assistance is to promote enhanced cooperation and progressive economic integration between the European Union and its partner countries. Furthermore, the assistance shall also encourage partner countries' efforts aimed at promoting good governance and equitable social and economic development. In addition to ENPI assistance funds, Georgia also receives further support from the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and other thematic programmes.

Download the Annual Action Programme 2010 for Georgia:

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/ap/aap/2010_en.htm

Additional information:

- On EU assistance to Georgia:

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/country-cooperation/georgia/georgia_en.htm

- On external relations EU-Georgia:

http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/georgia/index_en.htm

- On the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP):

http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm

- On the Eastern Partnership:

http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/index_en.htm


Source: European Commission

In Georgia and Moldova, Worries That EU Special Reps -- And Their Protection -- May Vanish

Officials in Moldova and Georgia are reacting with concern to speculation that the EU is poised to remove special representatives appointed to their regions.

If confirmed, the change would signal a major downgrading in the EU's strategic interest in both Chisinau and the countries of the South Caucasus.

EU foreign policy officials gave no hint of change on the horizon when they met with the six post-Soviet countries that make up its Eastern Partnership community last week.

Instead, officials from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus were assured that the EU's eastern neighbors remain "main priorities" for the European Union.

So it was with a mix of surprise and anger when those countries learned May 31 that the EU is looking to abolish two of its key posts in the region.

Ashton's Bombshell

An assistant to EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton told EU ambassadors on May 28 that she was looking to eliminate the EU's special representatives to Moldova and the South Caucasus.

Such a move would significantly downgrade the EU's presence on the ground in two regions seen as politically unstable and vulnerable to creeping Russian influence.

There has been no official statement from either the EU or the two affected officials -- Kalman Mizsei, the special representative to Moldova, or Peter Semneby, who holds the post for the South Caucasus.

Iulian Fruntashu, an adviser to Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat, told RFE/RL's Moldovan Service he was concerned about what the move might mean for Moldova's progress toward EU integration as one of the Eastern Partners.

"The circumstances, I think, weren't the best for the work of Kalman Mizsei. But I think the position itself shouldn't be abandoned just because Catherine Ashton wants to simplify the stucture of the EU's diplomatic service," Fruntashu said. "I think that a high representative nominated by the European Council shows that the EU is making a priority of Moldova, Georgia, and other countries in the region. We are interested first and foremost in the Eastern Partnership and Moldova's place in it, and I think that it would have been useful for us to keep a special EU representive in Moldova."

The move -- which will also affect other of the EU's 11 special representatives -- has been defended as an attempt to streamline the EU's diplomatic corps. But a letter from Ashton outlining the plan also offers rationales that have struck some observers as flawed.

Ashton's letter, for one, suggests that the bloc should scrap geographically distant posts. But Moldova and the South Caucasus are both closer than Central Asia or Africa's Great Lakes region, both of which will retain their special representatives.

The letter also suggests the bloc should retain only those seen as most important for the EU -- an alarming wake-up call for countries hosting no fewer than four post-Soviet "frozen conflicts."

Labor Pains

News of the proposed change came as EU officials were gathering in Rostov-for-Donu for a summit with their Russian counterparts seen as ushering in less tempestuous relations between Moscow and Brussels.

According to the Ashton plan, Mizsei's current post would be merged with that of the European Commission's representative and eventually brought within the External Action Service, the consolidated diplomatic corps Ashton is laboring to introduce.

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia would see a similar shift. In addition to losing the oversight of Semneby, who has held the post for more than four years and is widely respected in the region, the change would mean the end of the EU's unified approach to the South Caucasus.

Such a move could be advantageous to Moscow, which has been accused of using regional rivalries to destabilize the strategically important area.

Temur Iakobashvili, Georgia's state minister for reintegration, is a key figure in Tbilisi's battle to regain control of its pro-Moscow breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Speaking to RFE/RL's Georgian Service, he said he believed the decision was not "final," but expressed concern that a change in posts would have a negative effect on conflict resolution in the area.

"The important thing is not what the new position would be called," Iakobashvili said. "It's what would happen to [the distribution of] functions, and I think the Caucasus-wide element of Mr. Semneby's post is an important one."

He added: "Conflicts haven't vanished anywhere. In the case of Georgia, moreover, we're even facing the occupation [of our territory]. Therefore, it's an important to consider the question of how these functions will be distributed."


By Valentina Ursu, Marina Vashakmadze. Published on 1 June 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/In_Georgia_and_Moldova_Worries_That_EU_Special_Reps__And_Their_Protection_May_Vanish/2059233.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Štefan Füle Opening address to the Plenary Session Eastern Partnership Informal Foreign Ministers Meeting Sopot (Poland), 24 May 2010

Dear Ministers,

Thank you for inviting me to this informal Foreign Ministers meeting here in Sopot. I am sure that the beauty of this seaside resort will inspire us. I would like to thank in particular Minister Sikorski and Minister Moratinos for their unwavering support for the Eastern Partnership.

I am glad that we have this opportunity - one year on from the Prague summit - informally to discuss what we have achieved and where we want to go with the Eastern Partnership. I am convinced the ambitious agenda we agreed in Prague remains the right one: by seeking the political association and economic integration of our six partner countries with the EU, we will strengthen the capacity of our partner countries to make their own sovereign choices about the political and economic challenges that confront them. The development of vibrant democracies and economies able to compete in a globalised marketplace is in all our interests. Let me underline the staunch commitment of the Commission to support our partners in this process.

Mr Chairman,

Let me briefly make a few comments on what we have achieved over the past year and outline a few pointers for the future.

I believe we have got off to a flying start over the past year. I know that some of you have wanted us to go faster and further. But, if I can be frank, I know that others have been surprised at what we have achieved in such a short time.

We have made good on our offer of new contractual relations. Negotiations with Ukraine are well advanced. The negotiations of an Association Agreement with Moldova have been launched. And negotiations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia will start soon. We are engaging with Belarus on the path of an open and constructive dialogue on all fronts but, if we are to go as far as we would wish, we will need to see further progress in the field of democracy and respect for human rights. The ball is now in Minsk’s court.

We have also established the multilateral dimension of the Eastern Partnership. The four Platforms and the panels they have created are now starting to implement their 2 year work programmes. More than 70 activities are already planned for the next twelve months. Their importance should not be underestimated: they allow for sharing experiences and best practices in order to accelerate progress towards the overall objectives of political association and economic integration. The flagship initiatives which have now been launched have the same goal and are focusing on such crucial fields as border management, development of small and medium sized enterprises, and energy market integration.

Now, with the Lisbon Treaty in force and the External Action Service in sight, offering us the prospect of more joined-up EU foreign policy-making, the Eastern Partnership can give us the possibility to discuss issues of security and stability.

So what are the challenges for the future as we move towards the second Eastern Partnership Summit in the first half of next year during the Hungarian Presidency of the EU?

First, we must redouble our efforts to advance towards two of our most ambitious objectives – visa liberalisation and free trade areas. This is not easy and requires considerable homework on all sides. Let us intensify our dialogue so that we are absolutely clear about the steps that each of us needs to take to move forward. Let us also look for short term steps which can bring immediate, tangible benefits. One such could be the swift and effective implementation of the new EU visa code in all six partner countries in order to ensure uniform and decent treatment.

Let me stress in this context the importance of the Comprehensive Institution Building Programmes in the Eastern Partnership. Once in place – which should be the case next year - these programmes will provide tangible support to partner countries towards achieving the goals of new contractual relations, deep and comprehensive free trade agreements and visa liberalisation.

My second point is to ensure we make the best use of our scarce financial resources. We welcome the considerable interest shown in the Eastern Partnership from the numerous project proposals that have been presented. However, all of us must bear in mind that the bulk of EU financial support to the partner countries is devoted to bilateral programmes. This is, after all, as it should be given the bilateral focus of our policy objectives under the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership. And not all of the additional EaP funding has come on stream yet in 2010. Nevertheless from 2011, the annual EU resources designed to support reform in the 6 Eastern Partnership countries and regional co-operation will increase on average by more than half compared with the period 2007-10 . I will therefore redouble my efforts to ensure that our resources are targeted on achieving our key policy objectives and to look for new ways to improve donor coordination.

In this regard, I believe we should seek to enhance cooperation with the International Financial Institutions, notably the EIB and EBRD, to support more visible investment projects. Already we are doing a lot in this respect. The projects which have been developed under the Neighbourhood Investment Facility amount to €4 billion and are in such crucial areas as electricity networks, energy efficiency, SME financing, airport modernisation or road rehabilitation.

Increased funding, effectively used, as well as progress in the fields of mobility and trade will certainly improve the visibility of the Eastern Partnership. But I believe there is more we can do. I hope that we can start holding Eastern Partnership events in partner countries. I will make sure that the recently increased EU delegations take a leading role in projecting the Partnership in our partner countries. I believe the work of the Civil Society Forum can also play a role here.

Finally I believe third countries outside our circle of 33 can also make valuable contributions to the implementation of Eastern Partnership objectives. We should therefore consider carefully the idea of setting up a “Group of Friends” – something originally proposed by Minister Sikorski in Madrid.

Mr Chairman,

I believe we have made a good start but that we now must keep up the momentum as the Eastern Partnership moves into its second year. For this, I believe we will need robust administrative structures within the External Action Service - something I am discussing with the High Representative.

Let us ensure we all now play our part in moving forward our ambitious agenda – we will be judged by our record on implementing our commitments. Let us give greater visibility to what we have already achieved and to our ongoing activities. And let us work to make the best possible use of the financial resources we are dedicating to this enterprise.

As Commissioner for the whole of the EU’s Neighbourhood, I will continue to strive to advance our relations with all our neighbours East and South. Based on the stock-taking in the Commission’s recent Communication, I hope all of us in the coming months can reflect on how to develop our policy further.

Beyond our immediate priorities for the year ahead, we must also keep in mind the longer term horizon. Making political association and economic integration a reality, will bring our partner countries into an ever closer relationship with the EU: a community of shared values; a network of free trade areas which could in the long run lead to a Neighbourhood Economic Community; a liberalized visa area. I believe it is not too early to start reflecting on what such a relationship will mean for all of us and how we could, in due course, cement it further.

You can rest assured that, working in close coordination with Cathy Ashton and my fellow Commissioners, I will remain firmly committed to advancing the Partnership.

Thank you


Source: European Commission