Council of Europe legal specialists condemn Belarus on NGO freedom

The Council of Europe's advisory body on constitutional matters – better known as the Venice Commission – strongly criticised Belarus for its treatment of non-government organisations (NGOs).

During its plenary session in Venice on 14-15 October, the Commission noted that in the last ten years, almost all human rights NGOs were stripped of their status.

The Venice Commission also deplored a recent modification of Article 193-1 of the Belarus criminal code that represses freedom of association, with the threat of two years incarceration.

Belarusian legislators had approved a package of amendments that significantly expand KGB powers – including the right to enter homes – in addition to banning foreign financing of NGOs. Once the bill is signed into law, security officers will be authorised to break into organisations, as well as residential homes, if they believe a crime was or is being committed or a criminal suspect is hiding inside.

Belarus has been criticised often by the Council of Europe as the only European country which still uses the death penalty.


Source: Council of Europe. Published in strasbourg on 17 October 2011

With Economy In Free Fall, Belarusian President Running Out Of Options

Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka seems to be running out of options. Rapidly.

Minsk applied to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bailout of up to $8 billion, that on top of the $3.5 billion the fund provided following the 2008 global financial crisis and the $3.5 billion package that the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Community pledged last month. China has also provided about $1 billion in trade credits.

The latest request to the IMF comes as the country scrapes the bottom of its hard-currency reserves, experiences growing double-digit inflation, and watches the national currency lose value by the day.

The meltdown was sparked largely by increases in the rates Minsk must pay for Russian energy and a lavish, populist campaign of public spending that Lukashenka rolled out in the run-up to the December 2010 presidential election.

The IMF might offer Belarus a lifeline, but the conditions will be harsh, says Matthew Rojansky, the deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program of the Carnegie Endowment.

"A bailout should be possible, as long as the necessary nonpolitical conditions can be imposed. But I think the IMF would take in some ways a similar approach as the Eurasian Economic Community in demanding that there is proof of action before the money gets released," Rojansky says. "It would be foolish for them to do otherwise, to give Lukashenka even the first tranche, which he would use to prolong his short-term survival and then probably maneuver for some other alternative without undertaking the necessary reforms."

Bitter Medicine

An IMF team wound up a visit to Minsk on June 13, warning Lukashenka that "structural reforms" must be implemented if Belarus hoped to receive further assistance. Such reforms would break his vise grip on the Belarusian economy. The Bloomberg news agency ran a stark headline on June 14 that encapsulates the situation: "Lukashenka Must Choose Between Belarus Control or IMF Aid."

The head of the IMF team in Belarus, Chris Jarvis, told reporters in Minsk that any new assistance would be contingent upon "a strong program" that addressed the deficiencies of Belarus's state-dominated economy. "We would also have to be sure that all actors -- the president, government, and national bank -- are committed to that program," Jarvis said.

And that has long been a problem in a country that has been autocratically ruled by Lukashenka for 17 years. Yury Shautsou, director of the Minsk-based Center for Problems of European Integration, says the economists in the National Bank have trouble implementing their policy suggestions.

Shautsou says that while there are "some very good people" in the National Bank and Finance Ministry, he has "spoken to many of them and they say, 'We prepare good documents but then the presidential administration issues instructions or orders that say the exact opposite thing.' This raises the question of who is making decisions about the Belarusian economy."

A Threat To Lukashenka?

The economic situation in Belarus -- which is a relatively small and isolated economy -- is increasingly presenting political challenges to the Lukashenka government. In addition to a sweeping crackdown since December against the political opposition that has provoked the ire of the West, Belarusian security forces have put down numerous protests sparked by the crisis.

On June 12, police in Hrodna forcibly dispersed a demonstration of drivers who were protesting draconian new rules imposing customs fees on cars leaving the country with more than 5 liters of gasoline more than once every five days. On June 14, Lukashenka vowed to "strike hard" against any further public protests in the country.

Economist Anders Aslund of the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, said in an interview posted on the institute's website that the Belarusian meltdown presents more of a political problem than an economic one for the country's neighbors.

Aslund said that while Belarus was "not sufficiently important" to threaten a regional economic contagion and the country that most concerned is Russia, which "can easily take it. So, if there would be a contagion, it would be political. It would be like the Arab Spring, and it could go to Ukraine and to Russia, because Lukashenka can not take this politically."

Aslund sees the crisis as similar to the collapse of the state-centered economic model of the Soviet Union.

Analyst Rojansky agrees that the economic meltdown is likely the beginning of the end of Lukashenka's rule in Belarus, although he avoids saying the president's departure is imminent. Nonetheless he urges the West and Russia to begin planning for a post-Lukashenka Belarus.

He says that although Russia's oligarchs are pushing hard for the opportunity to buy up Belarusian state assets at fire-sale prices, Moscow's long-term interests in the country are similar to the West's.

Rojansky says Russia and the West "can agree that we don't want a humanitarian crisis. We can agree that if there is real political instability in Belarus -- even if we don't agree on what the outcome should be -- that we don't want violence and we don't want to be reacting to one another in the kind of hostile way that you saw around the Georgia crisis in 2008."




By Robert Coalson. Published on 14 June 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/economy_in_crisis_belarus_president_running_out_of_options/24234827.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

For Journalists In Belarus, One Of World's Least-Free Countries, Things Only Getting Worse

Sandwiched between Cuba and Myanmar on Freedom House's annual Freedom of the Press listing, Belarus has little to celebrate on World Press Freedom Day on May 3. And the already dismal situation in the authoritarian country is definitely taking a turn for the worse.

The New York-based NGO Freedom House this year lists Belarus among the 10 worst-rated countries on its index, states where "independent media are either nonexistent or barely able to operate, the press acts as a mouthpiece for the regime, citizens' access to unbiased information is severely limited, and dissent is crushed through imprisonment, torture, and other forms of repression." Those 10 states are Belarus, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Myanmar, North Korea, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

And the Freedom House report was written before authorities in Minsk began court proceedings to shut down the country's two main remaining independent media outlets -- the newspapers "Nasha niva" and "Narodnaya volya." The Information Ministry has issued each of the newspapers three official warnings in recent months over "wrong coverage of events."

'Who Will Hear Us?'

The stepped-up pressure on the independent media in Belarus is part of a general crackdown on political dissent following the disputed reelection in December of longtime President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The repression only got worse following the April 11 terrorist bombing in the Minsk subway system, which left 14 dead and scores injured.

Renowned actress Zinaida Bandarenka published an open appeal to Lukashenka urging him to end the persecution of the two papers.

"I think he is acting as if he hasn't noticed our appeal," she says. "There is still a small hope, but then, when they really do shut down these papers…This is our last chance to address him. There is no other opportunity. If they close these papers, who will hear us? Will the official media publish our pain and our cries? Of course not."

The government's steps against the two papers provoked criticism from the media freedom representative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Dunja Mijatovic says the move will "further diminish media pluralism in the country."

Minsk ordered the OSCE to close down its Belarus office at the beginning of the year, following OSCE criticism of the December 2010 presidential election.

'They Will Close, Of Course'

Opinions about what will happen next are divided on the streets of Minsk.

"A lot of people read these newspapers. Everyone buys them. They are quite popular," one man says. "And they really write about what people want to hear, what they want to know. Apparently someone doesn't like that, and so they will close the papers, of course."

"I don't think they will be shut down," another man says. "It would just give another reason to argue that the principles of democracy are violated in Belarus, that we have here the last dictatorship in Europe."

The Belarusian Association of Journalists is calling on ordinary citizens to appeal to the Information Ministry and ask officials to withdraw their case against the newspapers. Association lawyer Andrey Bastunets tells RFE/RL's Belarus Service that the goal is to keep the case from making it to court.

"If the case goes to court then, most likely, the verdict will not be in favor of the independent media," Bastunets says. "Therefore, it is important to morally sway the representatives of the organ that filed the case -- the Information Ministry -- so that they feel that we aren't talking about two independent publications, but about their readers, people who are being deprived of their chosen publications."

The case is scheduled to begin on May 11.

For now, journalists at the two newspapers are impressed with the support they have received from readers and the general public. "Narodnaya volya" Deputy Editor Marina Koktysh says the paper has been targeted by officials before, when they barred the state newspaper-kiosk system from selling it and when their printer suddenly refused to print it.

As a result, the paper's staff remains defiant and is preparing contingency plans to move underground or to publish from abroad. For now, Koktysh says, the paper is actively working the system.

"You know, as they say, hope dies last," she says. "We don't plan to get on our knees before anyone, not before Lukashenka, not before any of his bureaucrats. But we think that now we need to knock on every door. Even if they are closed. And if there is even the smallest chance to save the newspaper, we have to grab it."



By RFE/RL. Published on 3 May 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/belarus_press_freedom_least_free_countries/24089877.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Minsk Bombing Has Everyone Asking: Who Could Benefit?

With the investigation of Belarus's deadly subway tragedy still in the early stages, it is impossible to say who might have been responsible for the rush-hour attack that left 12 dead and more than 200 injured.

But everyone is asking the question that Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka posed to his security advisers at an emergency meeting hours after the blast: Who stands to gain from the terrorism and bloodshed?

Lukashenka said he wouldn't "rule out that this 'gift' was from abroad," but added, "we must also look inside."

Meanwhile, the Belarusian Internet and blogosphere are nearly unanimous in their opinion: the main beneficiary of this tragedy is likely to be Lukashenka himself, who can use the security crisis as a pretext for any number of political moves.

In recent weeks, the government has been shaken by a profound economic crisis and forced to ask Russia for up to $3 billion in emergency stabilization funding as the public has been queuing to buy up hard currency and durable goods. The latest security crisis could be used -- as similar ones in the past have -- to crack down on the opposition or to justify austerity measures.

Investigators have confirmed that the explosive packed the force of 5 to 7 kilograms of TNT and was detonated by remote control, indicating a fairly high level of preparation and sophistication.

Vladimir Lutsenko, a colonel with Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), is certain -- "100 percent" -- that the Minsk bombing was the work of international Islamist terrorism targeting peaceful civilians.

"When they murder innocent women and children on the streets of a peaceful city, everyone is terrified and everyone is hurt," Lutsenko says. "They blow up mosques in Iraq and Pakistan. They blow up apartment blocks in Moscow. They blow up skyscrapers in America."

Lutsenko adds that speculation that the explosion was organized either by the Belarusian authorities or by the country's weak and fragmented political opposition is "stupid."

"They said the same thing about Moscow -- that the FSB is blowing up Russia, that Putin blew up the homes of civilians in order to come to power," Lutsenko says. "We've heard this nonsense before and I won't be surprised if we hear it now, too."

The Official Response

But despite Lutsenko's certitude, Belarus has no history of Islamist terrorism. In 2005, a bomb in Vitebsk injured 40 people. An unknown anti-Lukashenka group reportedly claimed responsibility for the attack, but no one has been convicted. In July 2008, an explosion injured about 50 people at an Independence Day concert attended by Lukashenka. That attack was never solved either, despite a massive investigation led by a high-profile investigator.

Belarusian political scientist Yury Chavusau recalls those incidents and predicts a familiar response this time from authorities.

"I still remember the explosion in Vitebsk in 2005," Chavusau says. "Like the July 3 [2008] explosion, it was accompanied by, you might say, thorough, mass arrests of representatives of the opposition. Therefore you can suppose that -- regardless of the strength or weakness of the security structures -- the reaction to this terrorist act and the activities of the investigation will be similar -- irrationally massive. They simply don't know any other way, our security forces."

In fact, police have announced the detention of "several" people in connection with the latest attack. In addition, police press secretary Alyaksandr Lastovsky warned the media not to spread "stupid rumors" or foment panic in society. He warned that the police have the power to "make the strictest warnings to those who make up rumors or spread them."

Redistributing Influence?

Belarusian state media have given the incident blanket coverage, focusing on the solidarity being shown by the nation and showing images of ordinary citizens helping one another in the time of crisis.

In addition to using the security crisis to defuse discontent prompted by Belarus's fiercely disputed presidential election in December 2010 or the current economic panic, Lukashenka could use the opportunity -- as he did following the 2008 bombings -- to reorganize his security team.

"I think there could be a redistribution of influence within the ruling elite, and it isn't certain that this redistribution will be to the advantage of the security structures," analyst Chavusov says. "They have become too strong in recent times and the regime is too dependent on them."

Removing key security officials who carried out the postelection crackdown on the opposition could even help Lukashenka mend his fences somewhat with the West, which has imposed sanctions on Belarus over this issue.



By RFE/RL. Published on 12 April 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/minsk_bombing_everyone_asking_who_benefits/3555193.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Crackdown on independent media in Belarus

Statement by the spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the crackdown on independent media in Belarus


The spokesperson of Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission, issued the following statement today:

“The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is deeply concerned by news of the detention of Mr. Andrzej Poczobut, a correspondent for the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, during his journey to the EU Delegation to Belarus in Minsk.

This is yet another example of ongoing human rights violations conducted by the authorities in Belarus since the presidential elections on 19 December 2010. The EU strongly condemns all harassment, arrests, and intimidation of representatives of the Belarusian independent media as well as violations of the fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the media.

The EU calls upon the Belarusian authorities to end at once the prosecution of independent journalists for slander or other politically-motivated charges. The EU also urges the Belarusian authorities to cooperate fully with the OSCE representative on Freedom of the Media.”

Press release: Brussels, 10 April 2011

On The Verge Of Economic Disaster, Minsk Turns To Moscow

With an economy teetering on the brink of collapse and a nervous population standing in hours-long lines to buy foreign currency or gold, Minsk is going hat in hand to Moscow seeking relief.

The open question is: What price will Russia demand for bailing out Belarus and its authoritarian leader, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka?

Russia has long been pushing Minsk to sell off key state assets including oil refineries, chemical plants, oil and gas pipelines, and machinery plants. In addition, Moscow has been calling for Belarus to open its markets to Russian goods, tearing down barriers that exist despite the fact that the two countries are members of a unified customs zone.

"It is a matter of the privatization of shares, the entrance of Russian capital into Belarus, and the opening of markets to Russian products," notes Yevgeny Minchenko, director of Russia's International Institute of Political Expertise.

Belarus has run through 20 percent of its hard-currency reserves since the beginning of the year and implemented a partial currency devaluation at the end of March. Long lines are forming at exchange booths that are rapidly running out of dollars and euros.

Panicky Belarusians are meanwhile buying up cars, gold, and nonperishable staples like sugar, tea, and coffee as they desperately seek to retain the value of their savings as fears of further devaluations mount.

Moscow's Terms

On March 31, Belarus presented Moscow a plan to stabilize the economy that envisions $2 billion in credits from the Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic Community (Eurasec) and $1 billion from Russia. It also proposes a tightened monetary policy, structural and tax reforms, and reduced state spending.

However, Moscow has been slow to react. Deputy Finance Minister Dmitry Pankin told Interfax on April 5 that Russia had made "no promises" and that Moscow was studying the proposed macroeconomic reforms.

Belarusian economist Syarhey Chaly tells RFE/RL's Belarus Service that no serious restructuring can be carried out so quickly and the talks must really be focused on other matters.

"It's obvious that there are conditions, but they aren't being publicly discussed. Most likely, the conditions are very concrete," Chaly says. "Because we are in a very bad situation and have painted ourselves into a corner, Russia can demand practically anything it wants."

Russia's hand is further strengthened because Lukashenka may have miscalculated in his normally wily geopolitical balancing act, political scientist Minchenko says. "There is no possibility to play the game that Lukashenka loves to play," he says, "weaving between Russia, the West, China, and Latin America."

No Room To Maneuver

Prior to Belarus's December presidential election, the European Union offered Lukashenka a $4.2 billion aid package if the poll was conducted fairly. Not only was the election held in poor esteem by outside monitors, but Lukashenka also launched a brutal crackdown on the political opposition in the wake of the poll. The EU aid offer was withdrawn and the West began imposing fresh sanctions.

In addition, the bad economic situation was brought to the current crisis by populist measures Lukashenka adopted in the run-up to the vote. In particular, he raised salaries in the country's enormous public sector at a time when Russia was raising the rates it charges Belarus for oil and gas.

The current crisis will likely force Lukashenka to roll back those promises and could prompt a devaluation of the national currency by as much as 40 percent.

After years of oppression and marginalization -- as well as the postelection crackdown -- the political opposition in Belarus is hobbled and in a poor position to capitalize on the growing public discontent. But the panic puts additional pressure on Lukashenka to come to terms with Moscow quickly.


By RFE/RL. Published on 6 April 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/belarus_turns_to_russia_on_verge_of_ecenomic_collapse/3549085.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Restrictive measures against certain officials of Belarus

Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with the Council implementing Decision 2011/174/CFSP implementing Decision 2010/639/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against certain officials of Belarus


On 21 March 2011, the Council adopted Council Decision 2011/174/CFSP1. The Council Decision amends the list of individuals subject to restrictive measures in Belarus. This declaration is made to announce that the following countries have declared that they share the objectives of Council Decision 2011/174/CFSP: The Candidate Countries Croatia*, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro* and Iceland+, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania,Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway,members of the European Economic Area.

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision.

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.


Published on 22.03.2011 in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L 76, p. 72

Exiled Belarusian Presidential Candidate Senses Opposition's Moment To Unify

Ales Mikhalevich woke up on Belarus's election day -- December 19, 2010 -- as one of nine candidates vying to replace President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the man known as "Europe's last dictator."

Some 24 hours later, after a violent crackdown by the authorities on citizen protests against election fraud, Mikhalevich began the day in jail -- along with other top candidates and some 700 supporters.

The crackdown generated international condemnation and a fresh round of sanctions on Minsk by Brussels and Washington.

Now, the 35-year-old Mikhalevich is hundreds of kilometers from home, in the Czech Republic, which granted him political asylum on March 24. He told RFE/RL that from the safety of the European Union, he will devote his energy to activism and work to hold the Lukashenka regime's accountable.

"For the moment, I'm working more as a political activist," he says. "As a lawyer, I would like to make use of all international legal mechanisms -- and I've discovered that there are many of them -- because this isn't just about political prisoners; it's about torture in Europe on the borders of the European Union.

"I want to use my experience and knowledge in order to stop torture and ensure that there are no longer political prisoners in Belarus. I'm not thinking so much about my future political career."

Concentration Camp Conditions

Mikhalevich was discharged from a Minsk detention center on February 19, but only after he agreed to sign an agreement to collaborate with Belarus's State Security Committee (KGB).

In actuality, he said he never has -- and never would -- work with the security forces.

"I would be afraid above all of not being able to look my friends in the eyes if I became an agent of the KGB," he told RFE/RL. "I signed that document on cooperation knowing that I would immediately call a press conference and explain that I was in investigative custody and signed such a document."

Mikhalevich told reporters after his release that the conditions in jail were like a concentration camp. He said guards made him stand naked outdoors in freezing temperatures, deprived him of sleep, dragged him across the floor while handcuffed, kept him in an overcrowded cell, and interrogated him without a lawyer.

Recalling the experience, Mikhalevich said he knew that lesser-known prisoners probably experience even worse conditions.

"It's possible to survive under any circumstances. I calmed myself by thinking about the people imprisoned in secret camps -- in the gulag -- who were in much worse conditions and went through things that were much worse," he says.

"One of the main conclusions I reached was that, if they're going to publicly torture and mistreat former presidential candidates and public figures, understanding full well that sooner or later those people are going to talk about it, I could only imagine what would happen with former customs officials or law enforcement officers they're mistreating, understanding full well that no one is going to intercede on their behalf. Because who in our society is going to say, 'Oh, what a pity, they're mistreating customs officials.' "

Thorn In The Side

Mikhalevich said he also knew that regardless of what happened to him while he was in custody, he had already become a thorn in the side of the Lukashenka regime -- a role he says he now plans to expand by working closely with international rights groups.

"The authorities were in a situation where anything that they did with me would be bad. If they put me in jail, that would have created some bad publicity. If I stayed in Belarus, that would have been bad because they would have had to conduct a serious investigation into the acts of torture I talked about at [my postrelease] press conference." he says.

"The fact that I left is also bad because I'm now working with international organizations, with lawyers, with the United Nations commissioners on questions of torture."

Mikhalevich told RFE/RL that because the authorities had prohibited him from leaving Belarus, when he decided to leave the country he left his mobile phone in Minsk, suspecting that the KGB uses people's phone signals to track them.

He said a friend drove him into Russian territory and then into Ukraine. With his current passport in police custody, he used an old passport at the border crossings. In Kyiv, Mikhalevich got in touch with several embassies, but the Czechs agreed "pretty quickly," he said, to issue him an entry visa.

The former presidential candidate said he intends to return to Minsk "as soon as possible, as soon as such an opportunity presents itself," but doesn't rule out trying to have his family -- he has a wife and two daughters -- join him abroad.

According to the Belarusian news agency BelaPAN, the country's top prosecutor is likely to ask the Czech Republic to extradite Mikhalevich.

Still In Prison

Meanwhile in Minsk, fellow former presidential candidates Andrey Sannikau and Mikalay Statkevich remain in prison. Another ex-candidate, Uladzimer Nyaklyaeu, remains under house arrest.

More than 40 protesters have been charged with instigating mass disorder and several have already been jailed for up to four years.

Mikhalevich said as the repression continues, Lukashenka is unwittingly helping the opposition.

"I think that Lukashenka is now doing a lot to help the opposition unify. It's always easier to unify against someone," he says. "I was a very soft candidate. I didn't criticize Lukashenka. I simply said that I had a different program, that the present government doesn't have answers to most of the questions, but that the government undoubtedly had done some good things in the past.

"Even people like me, who are ready to work with the government, are being driven by it into open, radical opposition. So I think that precisely after December 19, after that night of mass arrests and cracked heads, unifying will be much more likely."


By RFE/RL. Published on 29 March 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/belarus_mikhalevich_lukashenka_asylum_czech_republic/3540152.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

International Donors’ Conference “Solidarity with Belarus”

Štefan Füle European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy International Donors’ Conference “Solidarity with Belarus” International Donors’ Conference Warsaw, 2 February 2011


Ministers, Ambassadors, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I welcome the opportunity to address you today. This conference is an occasion to send a strong sign of support from the EU to Belarusian civil society during this difficult period.

As outlined by Minister Sikorski, the EU took an important decision on Belarus on Monday. The most visible part of our decision was to put nearly 160 people under sanctions. This includes some of Belarus’ leadership and those close to the post-election repression, including President Lukashenko. This was a decisive step to mark our disapproval, and this is what the press has focused on. The US also followed suit by adopting similar sanctions on Monday evening.

High Representative/Vice President Cathy Ashton and I have clearly deplored the violence. We have demanded the immediate and unconditional release of all detainees. And we have called for an end to the ongoing persecution of civil society.

We were left with no alternative but to apply sanctions. They could only be reviewed if Belarus took real and convincing steps towards the release and rehabilitation of all detainees, as well as ending the repression of democratic forces.

While the sanctions have attracted a great deal of political and media attention, we must not lose sight of the other, equally important component of our decision. I refer to our decision to reinforce our links with, and support for, civil society. With these measures, we are seeking to avoid isolating the Belarusian population. I believe we have an important responsibility in this regard.

The European External Action Service and the Commission have been working closely in recent weeks to identify ways that we can intensify our support to the people of Belarus.

Our first step was to develop measures designed to provide urgent support to the victims of repression and to increase assistance to civil society. Our indicative budget for this activity – financed through the Instrument for Stability – is €1.7 million. This includes urgent support to the families of those who have been detained on political grounds, as well as to civil society, including students and independent media. Such support includes legal and social assistance, as well as counseling.

We will also make financial support available for Belarusian NGOs and independent media outlets willing to organize awareness and advocacy campaigns in Belarus and in the EU, such as conferences and workshops. This support should be available in the next few weeks.

As regards medium-term support, we are currently reviewing our funding support for the period 2011 – 2013. In light of recent events, I am pleased to announce today that the Commission intends to increase its funds and support for civil society fourfold.

As a clear demonstration of our unequivocal support to civil society in these difficult times, we will increase our funding from the currently available €4 million to €15.6 million. Our support will target primarily Belarusian NGOs, independent media and students who are subject to the regime’s repression.

We will provide support in three main ways:

First, we will provide increased funding under the Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the Non State Actors programme. Our goal here is to strengthen civil society’s capacity to promote democratic reform and small-scale local development activities.

Second, we will maintain our annual one million euro funding to the European Humanities University in exile in Vilnius for the young generation in Belarus to pursue high quality, free education.

Third, we will provide scholarships and promote student mobility and exchanges between education institutions from Belarus and the EU more generally. We intend to draw on our experience from the Erasmus Mundus and Tempus programmes. I would like to take this opportunity to invite you all to pool efforts and increase your own assistance to students. Students are a particularly vulnerable group but they have a crucial role to play in the future development of their country.

In addition, it is important that we work together to reinforce links between civil society in EU Member States and civil society in Belarus. This can be done by facilitating travel to the EU for Belarusian people through visa facilitation agreement. In the meantime, we need to better coordinate the possibilities that Member States already have to waive or reduce visa fees for certain categories of citizens. The Commission is ready to assist in this process by sending an expert mission to Minsk to coordinate Member States' actions.

We also intend to make the best use of the Eastern Partnership multilateral track, and in particular the Civil Society Forum to strengthen and empower Belarus’ civil society. We will shortly be making proposals in this regard. As a regional forum, the Eastern Partnership multilateral track provides a unique vehicle to strengthen our civil society contacts with partner countries - particularly in such difficult times, as witnessed in Belarus.

Our success in facing challenges that lie ahead will rest to a large extent on the level of coordination between the Member States of the European Union and other international donors. As a family of democratic countries, we interact on both policy and funding priorities. Accordingly, we strengthen our original individual contributions. For maximum impact, it is also necessary to co-operate with some of the most engaged stakeholders such as the Nordic Council of Ministers and the community of non-governmental organizations.

Before we begin our detailed discussions on how to support civil society, let me conclude with a proposal. I believe that we should follow this meeting with one of our regular EU-led informal Donors' Coordination Meetings on Belarus. We have successfully used this platform several times a year since 2006. Indeed, most of you have been regularly represented there and provided valuable input.

Drawing on the expertise of this well-established forum, we can prepare the implementation and coordination of the planned contributions announced today. I propose that this follow up meeting take place in late February / early March, when most assistance policies are ready for implementation.

I believe that providing increased funding to support civil society is of vital importance. And it's even more important to create the conditions and environment to allow this funding to bring real change for those working and struggling in Belarus. Let's use this Donor's Conference and the follow-up meetings as an ongoing dialogue to explore the best ways for us to support Civil Society in Belarus.

'Troubled' By Minsk Visit, U.S. Senator Urges Coordinated Moves To Counter Belarus Abuses

A group of prominent U.S. senators has called for a strong and coordinated response by the United States and European Union to the crackdown on democracy activists following the December reelection of Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka.

Six U.S. senators signed the letter, to EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton, urging targeted sanctions against Lukashenka and other officials and a ban on business with Belneftekhim, Belarus's state oil company.

Among the signatories is Senator Richard Durbin (Democrat-Illinois), who just returned from a trip to Minsk. He spoke to RFE/RL correspondent Heather Maher on the eve of Lukashenka's inauguration on January 21, which was boycotted by world leaders.

RFE/RL: Senator Durbin, why did you decide to sign the letter to EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton calling for joint U.S.-EU sanctions against Belarus?

Richard Durbin: I was so troubled by what I found in Minsk. Being with the families of those political candidates who are now languishing in prison -- it just struck me as an outrage that [President Alyaksandr] Lukashenka would do this.

When I met with his foreign minister and asked for an explanation, he asked me to be more forgiving of Belarus because they were, in his words, "a new democracy." And I found that to be totally unacceptable. To think that you would systematically arrest and imprison political prisoners tells me that Belarus is not even close to the democratic values that we want to see.

RFE/RL: Tell me how you came to be in Minsk to meet with these families?

Durbin: I'd just been in Lithuania -- they were observing the 20th anniversary of Bloody Sunday, when 14 just common people in Vilnius were killed by Soviet tankers and paratroopers and 1,000 were injured. I drove over to Minsk and sat down with other families fighting for freedom in that country. You couldn't escape the historic parallel.

RFE/RL: You said you met with government officials, among them the foreign minister. Was it just yourself in the meetings and did the officials know that you were meeting with families of the detained?

Durbin: I doubt if there were many things about my trip that they didn't know or monitor. But I met personally with [Sergei] Martynov, who is the foreign minister in Belarus, and told him about the disappointment we felt over the actions of Lukashenka.

RFE/RL: And in response, he asked you to be more understanding?

Durbin: Yes. And of course they are trumping up these charges that this was a conspiracy inspired by Poland and Germany, and I'm not sure who else, to overthrow the government of Belarus. It is an outlandish charge, as extreme as the actions that they took against their political opponents.

RFE/RL: How would you characterize the meeting after you expressed your concern and the minister responded by saying the West needs to show more understanding? Did the mood become hostile? How did it end, diplomatically speaking?

Durbin: Well, diplomatically [speaking], they called it "frank and candid." And I would say it ended with Martynov and the Lukashenka government totally unrepentant. In fact, he turned around and flew into Europe to meet with some representatives of the EU to charge that Poland and Germany were involved in some conspiracy against Belarus. I mean, it was unfortunately a very extreme comment by someone who has little or no defense to offer.

RFE/RL: The letter that you signed asks the EU to join the United States in speaking with one voice on Belarus and impose sanctions that carry "very real and significant consequences" for Lukashenka and other Belarusian officials responsible for human rights abuses, vote fraud, and the continued detention of opposition presidential candidates and party leaders following the December 19 presidential election. If that doesn't happen, are there any steps you plan to take in the U.S. Congress to keep the pressure on Belarus?

Durbin: I have tried to work with the [Obama] administration to make sure we did things in concert with the European Union, and my feeling is that [White House] is going to move forward. I've spoken to some of their representatives. I think we ought to work with [the EU]. My impression is that sanctions, whatever they might be, are not very effective unless they're coordinated by many nations. So unilateral efforts have very little impact; I think we will have much greater impact if we work together.


By RFE/RL. Published on 21 January 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/us_senator_troubled_minsk_visit_urges_coordination_counter_belarus_abuses/2282810.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Has Moscow Had Enough Of Belarus's Lukashenka?

Has the Kremlin finally had enough of Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka? The past two months have featured a gas war between Moscow and Minsk and a televised mudslinging match between Lukashenka and the Kremlin.

Lukashenka had long been one of Moscow's most reliable partners in the former Soviet space. But in recent years he has increasingly become an irritant, cozying up to the West, refusing to recognize the independence of Georgia's pro-Moscow separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and demanding cut-rate prices for Russian natural gas.

And now there are increasing signs that the Kremlin has had enough.

'The Godfather'

On July 4, the Gazprom-owned television station NTV broadcast the first installment of an unflattering documentary about Lukashenka titled "The Belarusian Godfather."

"Until recently, the Western press referred to Lukashenka as 'Europe's last dictator,'" the narrator says as the documentary begins. "He has compared himself both with Hitler and Stalin, and considers himself the godfather of all Belarusians."

The program covered the suspicious deaths and disappearances of Belarusian opposition figures in the late 1990s, suggesting that they were victims of a government-run death squad. It delved into Lukashenka's private life. It reminded viewers of the billions of dollars in support Russia has given to Belarus:

On July 15, Lukashenka hit back, airing an interview on state-controlled television with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, a bitter foe of the Kremlin.

Saakashvili thanked Lukashenka for not recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia and accused the Russian authorities of waging a "propaganda war" against Belarus.

Citing the still-unsolved killings of journalist Anna Politkovskaya and human rights activist Natalya Estemirova, the Georgian leader said Russia was in no position to criticize any country's human rights record.

The tit-for-tat continued on July 16, when NTV aired the second installment of "The Belarusian Godfather," which linked Lukashenka to self-exiled Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky and ousted former Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev.

Backing The Opposition

The mudslinging follows a nasty dispute over gas prices in June. It also comes as Lukashenka prepares to seek a fourth term as president in elections slated for early next year.

Alyaksey Yanukevich, leader of the opposition Belarusian Popular Front, says the documentaries are a clear sign that Moscow is considering forcing Lukashenka from power.

And he believe that "in any case it benefits Russia for Lukashenka to be weak. This policy the Kremlin is carrying out is to weaken and personally humiliate Lukashenka." Yanukevich says the "Godfather" is only the first "of what will be regular information attacks."

Some analysts note how opposition leader Alyaksandr Kazulin -- a former political prisoner who ran against Lukashenka for president in 2006 -- was quoted heavily in the documentary. Andrey Dynko, editor in chief of the Minsk-based Belarusian-language weekly "Nasha Niva," says this may be a sign that Moscow may look kindly on a fresh bid by Kazulin to oust Lukashenka in the 2011 election.

"In general, I think these two films have strongly cheered the opposition political forces up, because they have seen a new field for activity," Dynko says. "They have been given new hope."

Or Just A Warning?

Leonid Zaika, director of the Minsk-based think tank Strategia, says it appears that the Kremlin has prepared a "fine-tuned operation" to oust Lukashenka by depriving him of the economic aid and cheap energy that keeps the Belarusian economy afloat and by stealthily backing an alternative candidate for president.

The coup de grace, Zaika predicts, will come if Lukashenka fixes the vote and Moscow joins the West in refusing to recognize Lukashenka's reelection as legitimate.

"If Washington, Brussels, and Moscow all don't recognize the election results, then the situation changes completely," Zaika says. "They don't need to do anything else. They don't need any conspiracies. The Kremlin can act legitimately and lawfully."

Analysts caution, however, that Moscow would not make a serious move to oust Lukashenka unless they were certain they could control the transition and install a pliant president in his place.

Pavel Sheremet, a political analyst for the Russian daily "Kommersant," says a more plausible scenario is that Russia is attempting to frighten Lukashenka into being more obedient and deferential to the Kremlin.

"I would be wary to make the far-reaching conclusions that Moscow has a plan for a regime change in Belarus. It is quite possible, and we have already seen it many times, that it may be a pressure campaign not to oust Lukashenka but to make him take some actions in his presidential post," Sheremet says.

"He will keep his post, he will not be prevented from winning triumphant victories, but he will have to pay for this by making concessions in the customs union or the political union with Russia."


By RFE/RL. Published on 19 July 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Has_Moscow_Had_Enough_Of_Belaruss_Lukashenka/2104099.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

MOSCOW BLOG: Belarus backs down on gas bill as Russia gets its energy PR right

That was quick. Russia's state-owned gas monopoly began to cut off Belarus' gas supplies at 10:00am on the morning of June 21 over $200m in unpaid energy bills, but by 4:00pm that same day Minsk had backed down and promised to cough up "within two weeks."

Not that Moscow was even going to accept this promise and actually went through with a 15% reduction in gas deliveries, saying it wasn't prepared to wait even two weeks.

And on Tuesday Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko lashed out at the Kremlin calling the row over unpaid bills that saw Russia reduce gas deliveries as the start of a "gas war" and ordered a halt to gas transit through the republic to Europe -- not that anyone in Europe reported any change in volumes arriving through there pipes. Clearly there is going to be some haggling before this dispute is over.

Still, as the news broke about the gas cut-off, journalists scrambled to cover the latest instalment of Russia's so-called "gas wars." However, the thing that sticks out from this story - apart from Minsk totally misjudging the situation - is that Russia finally appears to "get it" when it comes to international PR over energy issues.

On the face of it, Moscow has acted very aggressively in order to force Belarus to pay. This seems to jibe with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's promise in a leaked policy paper that Russia was putting its foreign policy on a pragmatic basis where there would be no more "gnashing of teeth."

There was gnashing aplenty on June 21, but the key is that Moscow forced the issue now when the minimum damage would be done, rather than in the middle of winter, as in previous episodes, when the maximum damage would happen. I suspect it's no coincidence that the deadline for the payment was set for June 21 - which happens to be the official first day of summer. In other words, the demand for gas in Europe is at its absolute nadir for the year and so even if Moscow followed through on its threat to cut 85% of Belarus' supplies, it would make no noticeable difference to Gazprom's clients in Western Europe. TV station Russia Today interviewed the head of one of Germany's gas company who said the gas in storage was more than enough to cover any shortfall.

And then there was the amount cut. In the energy showdowns with Ukraine in 2006 and Belarus in 2007, Gazprom simply turned off the taps completely from one minute to the next. This time, from the very start the maximum that would be cut was 85%. Moreover, the plan was to cut gas progressively in chunks of 15% over a period of weeks. Even more surprising was how careful the Kremlin was to flag the cut-offs in advance as the tension built over several weeks and went as far as informing its western partners before the gas volumes were reduced - something it pointedly forgot to do in previous rows.

Taken all together, this is the clearest demonstration yet of the President Dmitry Medvedev-sponsored "business orientated foreign policy" and is a major improvement in the Kremlin's efforts to bolster its reputation as a reliable energy partner.

If you were going to characterise the issue in terms of personalities, then this gas showdown is marked by Medvedev's liberal outward-looking, sophisticated approach to dealing with foreign investors, as opposed to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's inward-looking, strong-arm tactics typical of his "vertical power" way of doing things - not that it's likely policy is actually driven by either man in isolation of the other. But still, this is another piece of evidence of the "new look" that Medvedev was trying to sell at the St Petersburg investment forum at the weekend.

Not-so-special relationships

Finally, the gas issue highlights another trend that has been in place since Putin was president: Russia has conceded any attempt at forging "special relationships" with its former Soviet vassal states.

There is no reason - economically speaking - why Russia should subsidise the Belarusian economy (or any other country's economy for that matter) and it is remarkable that Gazprom has increased the prices for all its customers.

Having said that, there are still marked differences in the price that Gazprom asks for its gas, which is presumably based on the customer's ability to pay. Belarus has the cash to pay off its $200m bill - Minsk reported this week that it has just under $6bn in foreign currency reserves - however, it needs to spend heavily on investment and with presidential elections looming this winter, the government clearly wants to keep as much in reserve as it can to lavish on voters before they go to the polls.

If Gazprom insisted on the roughly $380 per 1,000 cubic meters (cm) it currently charges Western European countries, then it would precipitate a financial crisis in Belarus. The same is true in Ukraine where former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko did a deal in January 2009 to pay over $300 per 1'000 cm for gas, which very nearly did precipitate a crisis - the state had to be bailed out by the IMF and the government started drawing down its special drawing rights to meet the monthly bill, only just squeaking through the year.

Indeed, the new gas deal that Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych cut with Gazprom a few months ago is highly significant, as he managed to get a discount - the same discount Minsk is asking for - and reduced the price to about $250 per 1,000 cm. In this sense, Ukraine is now the only former Soviet state where the Kremlin has entered into a "special relationship" where it is prepared to subsidise a foreign economy with lower gas prices. Yanukovych clearly would prefer to have a special relationship with the EU, but Brussels, despite the friendly rhetoric, has failed to come up with any practical support whatsoever, driving Yanukovych into Putin's arms as a result.


By BNE. Published on 23 June 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. BNE. Reprinted with the permission of Business New Europe
http://businessneweurope.eu/storyf2163/MOSCOW_BLOG_Belarus_backs_down_on_gas_bill_as_Russia_gets_its_energy_PR_right
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Commissioner Füle encourgaes full engagement with Belarus

Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle stressed that full engagement with Belarus within the framework of the Eastern Partnership is important to promote democracy and the rule of law in the country. He said this during the delegation meeting of Euronest Parliamentary Assembly which took place in the European Parliament on Thursday.

Füle gave an overview of the positive achievements of the Eastern Partnership during the past year, adding that Belarus was the most active country in terms of seeking funding from this project.

Referring to the bilateral relations with Belarus, he stressed that while Belarus will still be obliged to meet certain political conditions in line with other democratic country, the policy of isolation did not achieve any results and therefore supports the policy of rapprochement towards Belarus. He referred to the Action Plan as a means of finding a way of how the two sides can move forward towards deeper engagement.

Despite that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Belarus has been frozen since 1998, the European Commission is committed to continue dialogue on the visa facilitation agreement and on European Investment Bank lending to Belarus amongst other issues.

Füle said that he will soon be visiting Belarus and stressed that free and fair election will be on top on his agenda during his talks with the authorities in Belarus.

EP Chair for Euronest Parliamentary Assembly Kristian Vigenin proposed to organise a high level conference to discuss a joint strategy towards Belarus.

OSCE/ODIHR, Venice Commission say amendments to Belarusian election law provide 'mixed response'

The amendments to the Belarusian election code provide a mixed response to the recommendations made by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Council of Europe's Venice Commission, the two institutions concluded in a joint legal opinion.

The amendments introduced in January represent a step towards removing some flaws in the country's election legislation, but they are unlikely to resolve the underlying concern that the legislative framework for elections in Belarus continues to fall short of providing a basis for genuinely democratic elections, the document says.

"The amendments include a number of significant improvements which respond to some of the recommendations we made in previous election observation reports and during the recent process of open and constructive consultations with the Belarusian authorities," said Ambassador Janez Lenarcic, Director of ODIHR.

But several areas need further elaboration or are not yet addressed at all, he added: "For example, the potential positive impact of some of the amendments risks being undermined by flaws in the counting and tabulation process which remained unchanged."

Thomas Markert, the Secretary of the Venice Commission, stressed that no legislation, however good it may be, can alone guarantee elections in line with international standards: "The quality of future elections in Belarus will depend not only on the quality of the legislation. Equally important is its implementation in good faith."

The legal opinion identifies a number of new provisions that could lead to improvements in electoral practice. These include the easing of restrictions on candidate registration and campaigning, new safeguards for early voting and the possibility of appealing certain Central Election Commission decisions to the Supreme Court.

The opinion raises concerns related to appointment procedures for election commission members, including the absence of selection criteria. It also notes the lack of safeguards ensuring the integrity and transparency of the vote count and results tabulation. For example, there have been no amendments to ensure that precinct commission members count the ballots in a transparent manner and that observers are given direct and effective opportunities to monitor the voting, counting and tabulation process. In addition, there are no provisions mandating the election commissions at various levels to publish detailed preliminary and final results of the vote, by polling stations, without undue delay.

ODIHR and the Venice Commission stand ready to assist the authorities of Belarus with the continuation of the electoral reform process. ODIHR is looking forward to monitoring the impact of the amendments during the upcoming presidential elections.

Source: OSCE. Published on 4 June 2010

In Georgia and Moldova, Worries That EU Special Reps -- And Their Protection -- May Vanish

Officials in Moldova and Georgia are reacting with concern to speculation that the EU is poised to remove special representatives appointed to their regions.

If confirmed, the change would signal a major downgrading in the EU's strategic interest in both Chisinau and the countries of the South Caucasus.

EU foreign policy officials gave no hint of change on the horizon when they met with the six post-Soviet countries that make up its Eastern Partnership community last week.

Instead, officials from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus were assured that the EU's eastern neighbors remain "main priorities" for the European Union.

So it was with a mix of surprise and anger when those countries learned May 31 that the EU is looking to abolish two of its key posts in the region.

Ashton's Bombshell

An assistant to EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton told EU ambassadors on May 28 that she was looking to eliminate the EU's special representatives to Moldova and the South Caucasus.

Such a move would significantly downgrade the EU's presence on the ground in two regions seen as politically unstable and vulnerable to creeping Russian influence.

There has been no official statement from either the EU or the two affected officials -- Kalman Mizsei, the special representative to Moldova, or Peter Semneby, who holds the post for the South Caucasus.

Iulian Fruntashu, an adviser to Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat, told RFE/RL's Moldovan Service he was concerned about what the move might mean for Moldova's progress toward EU integration as one of the Eastern Partners.

"The circumstances, I think, weren't the best for the work of Kalman Mizsei. But I think the position itself shouldn't be abandoned just because Catherine Ashton wants to simplify the stucture of the EU's diplomatic service," Fruntashu said. "I think that a high representative nominated by the European Council shows that the EU is making a priority of Moldova, Georgia, and other countries in the region. We are interested first and foremost in the Eastern Partnership and Moldova's place in it, and I think that it would have been useful for us to keep a special EU representive in Moldova."

The move -- which will also affect other of the EU's 11 special representatives -- has been defended as an attempt to streamline the EU's diplomatic corps. But a letter from Ashton outlining the plan also offers rationales that have struck some observers as flawed.

Ashton's letter, for one, suggests that the bloc should scrap geographically distant posts. But Moldova and the South Caucasus are both closer than Central Asia or Africa's Great Lakes region, both of which will retain their special representatives.

The letter also suggests the bloc should retain only those seen as most important for the EU -- an alarming wake-up call for countries hosting no fewer than four post-Soviet "frozen conflicts."

Labor Pains

News of the proposed change came as EU officials were gathering in Rostov-for-Donu for a summit with their Russian counterparts seen as ushering in less tempestuous relations between Moscow and Brussels.

According to the Ashton plan, Mizsei's current post would be merged with that of the European Commission's representative and eventually brought within the External Action Service, the consolidated diplomatic corps Ashton is laboring to introduce.

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia would see a similar shift. In addition to losing the oversight of Semneby, who has held the post for more than four years and is widely respected in the region, the change would mean the end of the EU's unified approach to the South Caucasus.

Such a move could be advantageous to Moscow, which has been accused of using regional rivalries to destabilize the strategically important area.

Temur Iakobashvili, Georgia's state minister for reintegration, is a key figure in Tbilisi's battle to regain control of its pro-Moscow breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Speaking to RFE/RL's Georgian Service, he said he believed the decision was not "final," but expressed concern that a change in posts would have a negative effect on conflict resolution in the area.

"The important thing is not what the new position would be called," Iakobashvili said. "It's what would happen to [the distribution of] functions, and I think the Caucasus-wide element of Mr. Semneby's post is an important one."

He added: "Conflicts haven't vanished anywhere. In the case of Georgia, moreover, we're even facing the occupation [of our territory]. Therefore, it's an important to consider the question of how these functions will be distributed."


By Valentina Ursu, Marina Vashakmadze. Published on 1 June 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/In_Georgia_and_Moldova_Worries_That_EU_Special_Reps__And_Their_Protection_May_Vanish/2059233.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Štefan Füle Opening address to the Plenary Session Eastern Partnership Informal Foreign Ministers Meeting Sopot (Poland), 24 May 2010

Dear Ministers,

Thank you for inviting me to this informal Foreign Ministers meeting here in Sopot. I am sure that the beauty of this seaside resort will inspire us. I would like to thank in particular Minister Sikorski and Minister Moratinos for their unwavering support for the Eastern Partnership.

I am glad that we have this opportunity - one year on from the Prague summit - informally to discuss what we have achieved and where we want to go with the Eastern Partnership. I am convinced the ambitious agenda we agreed in Prague remains the right one: by seeking the political association and economic integration of our six partner countries with the EU, we will strengthen the capacity of our partner countries to make their own sovereign choices about the political and economic challenges that confront them. The development of vibrant democracies and economies able to compete in a globalised marketplace is in all our interests. Let me underline the staunch commitment of the Commission to support our partners in this process.

Mr Chairman,

Let me briefly make a few comments on what we have achieved over the past year and outline a few pointers for the future.

I believe we have got off to a flying start over the past year. I know that some of you have wanted us to go faster and further. But, if I can be frank, I know that others have been surprised at what we have achieved in such a short time.

We have made good on our offer of new contractual relations. Negotiations with Ukraine are well advanced. The negotiations of an Association Agreement with Moldova have been launched. And negotiations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia will start soon. We are engaging with Belarus on the path of an open and constructive dialogue on all fronts but, if we are to go as far as we would wish, we will need to see further progress in the field of democracy and respect for human rights. The ball is now in Minsk’s court.

We have also established the multilateral dimension of the Eastern Partnership. The four Platforms and the panels they have created are now starting to implement their 2 year work programmes. More than 70 activities are already planned for the next twelve months. Their importance should not be underestimated: they allow for sharing experiences and best practices in order to accelerate progress towards the overall objectives of political association and economic integration. The flagship initiatives which have now been launched have the same goal and are focusing on such crucial fields as border management, development of small and medium sized enterprises, and energy market integration.

Now, with the Lisbon Treaty in force and the External Action Service in sight, offering us the prospect of more joined-up EU foreign policy-making, the Eastern Partnership can give us the possibility to discuss issues of security and stability.

So what are the challenges for the future as we move towards the second Eastern Partnership Summit in the first half of next year during the Hungarian Presidency of the EU?

First, we must redouble our efforts to advance towards two of our most ambitious objectives – visa liberalisation and free trade areas. This is not easy and requires considerable homework on all sides. Let us intensify our dialogue so that we are absolutely clear about the steps that each of us needs to take to move forward. Let us also look for short term steps which can bring immediate, tangible benefits. One such could be the swift and effective implementation of the new EU visa code in all six partner countries in order to ensure uniform and decent treatment.

Let me stress in this context the importance of the Comprehensive Institution Building Programmes in the Eastern Partnership. Once in place – which should be the case next year - these programmes will provide tangible support to partner countries towards achieving the goals of new contractual relations, deep and comprehensive free trade agreements and visa liberalisation.

My second point is to ensure we make the best use of our scarce financial resources. We welcome the considerable interest shown in the Eastern Partnership from the numerous project proposals that have been presented. However, all of us must bear in mind that the bulk of EU financial support to the partner countries is devoted to bilateral programmes. This is, after all, as it should be given the bilateral focus of our policy objectives under the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership. And not all of the additional EaP funding has come on stream yet in 2010. Nevertheless from 2011, the annual EU resources designed to support reform in the 6 Eastern Partnership countries and regional co-operation will increase on average by more than half compared with the period 2007-10 . I will therefore redouble my efforts to ensure that our resources are targeted on achieving our key policy objectives and to look for new ways to improve donor coordination.

In this regard, I believe we should seek to enhance cooperation with the International Financial Institutions, notably the EIB and EBRD, to support more visible investment projects. Already we are doing a lot in this respect. The projects which have been developed under the Neighbourhood Investment Facility amount to €4 billion and are in such crucial areas as electricity networks, energy efficiency, SME financing, airport modernisation or road rehabilitation.

Increased funding, effectively used, as well as progress in the fields of mobility and trade will certainly improve the visibility of the Eastern Partnership. But I believe there is more we can do. I hope that we can start holding Eastern Partnership events in partner countries. I will make sure that the recently increased EU delegations take a leading role in projecting the Partnership in our partner countries. I believe the work of the Civil Society Forum can also play a role here.

Finally I believe third countries outside our circle of 33 can also make valuable contributions to the implementation of Eastern Partnership objectives. We should therefore consider carefully the idea of setting up a “Group of Friends” – something originally proposed by Minister Sikorski in Madrid.

Mr Chairman,

I believe we have made a good start but that we now must keep up the momentum as the Eastern Partnership moves into its second year. For this, I believe we will need robust administrative structures within the External Action Service - something I am discussing with the High Representative.

Let us ensure we all now play our part in moving forward our ambitious agenda – we will be judged by our record on implementing our commitments. Let us give greater visibility to what we have already achieved and to our ongoing activities. And let us work to make the best possible use of the financial resources we are dedicating to this enterprise.

As Commissioner for the whole of the EU’s Neighbourhood, I will continue to strive to advance our relations with all our neighbours East and South. Based on the stock-taking in the Commission’s recent Communication, I hope all of us in the coming months can reflect on how to develop our policy further.

Beyond our immediate priorities for the year ahead, we must also keep in mind the longer term horizon. Making political association and economic integration a reality, will bring our partner countries into an ever closer relationship with the EU: a community of shared values; a network of free trade areas which could in the long run lead to a Neighbourhood Economic Community; a liberalized visa area. I believe it is not too early to start reflecting on what such a relationship will mean for all of us and how we could, in due course, cement it further.

You can rest assured that, working in close coordination with Cathy Ashton and my fellow Commissioners, I will remain firmly committed to advancing the Partnership.

Thank you


Source: European Commission

OSCE media freedom representative criticizes pressure against independent media in Belarus, offers to support discussion of new Internet legislation

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatovic, today expressed concern about recent reports of pressure against independent media in Belarus. She also expressed disappointment that Internet legislation was adopted without public consultation, and offered the assistance of her Office to review the new bylaws.

In a letter to the Foreign Minister of Belarus, Sergey Martynov, Mijatovic said: "Intimidation of journalists exerts a 'chilling' effect on already weakened investigative journalism in Belarus. The authorities should vigorously investigate cases of harassment and honour their OSCE commitments to protect the media."

Most recently, journalists who had reported on the so-called "hunters' case" were persecuted by law enforcement agencies. In March Natalia Radina, the editor of the Charter97 website, Irina Khalip, Minsk correspondent of the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta, and Svetlana Kalinkina and Marina Koktysh of daily Narodnaya Volya were interrogated, their apartments and offices raided and their equipment and materials confiscated, with Natalia Radina assaulted during the search. On 28 April, investigators informed the journalists that their computers would be examined further to obtain access to their e-mail and Skype accounts.

"I already brought the attention of the Belarusian authorities to these cases in March. I am concerned that the pressure on them has recently increased, even though the four media workers are not suspects but merely witnesses in the ongoing investigation," said Mijatovic.

In the letter to Minister Martynov, Mijatovic also criticized the recently launched criminal defamation investigation against the Charter97 website based on its users' comments to an article published last year in Sovetskaya Byelorussiya.

Regarding recently adopted bylaws on the implementation of the Presidential decree "On Measures to Improve the Use of the National Segment of the Internet", which her Office reviewed earlier this year, the Representative expressed disappointment that they had been adopted without public consultation.

Mijatovic also requested the texts of the bylaws. "I look forward to receiving the texts of the bylaws and hope that our recommendations were taken into account," she wrote in the letter.

The OSCE Representative offered to organize a roundtable meeting with the participation of governmental representatives, civil society and international experts to discuss the implementation of the newly adopted Internet legislation.

Source: OSCE. Published in Vienna on 10 May 2010

Five years of European Neighbourhood Policy: more trade, more aid, more people-to-people contacts

The annual European Neighbourhood Policy reports once again demonstrate the clear benefits that the European Union brings to its neighbours. For five years, the European Union has been delivering more trade, more aid, more people-to-people contacts and far deeper co-operation between the EU and its neighbours on the whole range of their economic, political and sectoral reforms. Our partnership has significantly developed in areas like transport, energy, environment and climate change, research, health and education. This has been backed up with an increase in the current Financial Framework by 32% and will reach over EUR 2 billion annually in 2013.

"The European Neighbourhood Policy is a success story with many examples of concrete achievements on the ground,” commented Catherine Ashton, Vice-President of the Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. "But there is a lot more we can and should do to make our part of the world more secure, more stable and more prosperous. In a globalised world, as European and Mediterranean countries, we need to help each other face the economic crisis. We need to work together to confront the new threats and challenges of our time, such as international terrorism, human trafficking and cross-border organised crime. We need to co-operate to solve the disputes and conflicts that still hold parts of our region back, and deny many ordinary people the benefits of globalisation. We want our neighbours to join our efforts to bring peace and security to other parts of the world who are less fortunate than we are. And as a Union built on shared values, we want our neighbours to benefit from the stability and prosperity that come with open and democratic society and the rule of law. This ambitious agenda is a key priority for me as we press ahead with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the External Action Service. Our friends in our European and Mediterranean neighbourhood will be among the first to benefit from a more active, more coherent and more effective European foreign policy."

Štefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, added: “Further strengthening the ENP is no less than an investment in the EU’s own stability and prosperity — and this must be reflected in our offer to our partners. The ENP is a win-win game: the higher our partners’ reform ambitions, the stronger our response. Economic reforms have progressed remarkably across our neighbourhood, both East and South. What is essential for the future is to go up a gear on democratic and political reforms, where progress has been real but generally slower.”

Achievements of the European Neighbourhood Policy 2004-2009

Bilateral Association Agreements were concluded by 2004 with most Southern ENP partners, while enhancement of the relations with most advanced partners is currently ongoing (for example, the advanced status - statut avancé – has been implemented with Morocco since 2008). In the East, in line with objectives of the Eastern Partnership, current Partnership and Cooperation Agreements are being replaced by far-reaching Association Agreements.

The ENP aims also at improving governance. The recent presidential elections in Ukraine, the second round of parliamentary elections in Moldova, as well as improvements in quality of elections in Morocco or Lebanon show some progress in democratic process. On freedom of association, death penalty, media freedom, minority rights and other human rights and fundamental freedoms, there have been improvements in several ENP countries but progress has generally not matched the ambitions expressed jointly in the ENP and in the Action Plans. Much remains to be done too in terms of judicial and public administration reforms and effectively tackling corruption.

Regarding mobility more than 2 million EU Schengen visas were issued in our neighbourhood in 2008. Visa facilitation and readmission agreements are in place with Ukraine and Moldova and negotiations have been concluded with Georgia. Mobility Partnerships to promote legal migration have been agreed with Moldova and Georgia. Nevertheless more needs to be done to use the full potential of the ENP, including road-maps to a visa-free regime for short stays with Ukraine and Moldova.

EU’s trade with the ENP region grew during 2004-2008, with EU’s exports rising by 63% and imports by 91% (2009 brought some slowdown, due to the global economic and financial crisis). The EU is ready to negotiate Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with all its neighbours as soon as they are ready and prepared for them. Other steps towards deeper economic integration have also been taken, including negotiation of a number of sectoral agreements from agricultural and fishery products to common aviation area.

Energy cooperation was strengthened with Memoranda of Understanding or Declarations with Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. In 2009 Ukraine and Moldova were admitted, subject to conditions, to accede the Energy Community Treaty,and Georgia became an observer.

The EU has provided nearly EUR 12 billion in 2007-2013 for the implementation of its ENP policy. In addition, the EU’s Neighbourhood Investment Facility, supported by EU budget and those of Member States, provides grant support to leverage loans (over EUR 4,7 billion in 2007-2009) for concrete investments in transport, environment, energy, private and social sectors.

Background

The European Neighbourhood Policy aims at increasing common stability, prosperity and security. On the basis of a joint Action Plan, the EU supports partner countries in implementing their reforms to improve their standards of democracy and human rights, to increase their access to the EU's single market, to improve the environment and to step up their co-operation with the EU on issues like climate change, energy, transport or migration.

Today, the Commission has published its annual “ENP Package”, consisting of: a Communication taking stock of the policy achievements since its launch in 2004, 12 reports on progress achieved in 2009 by the 12 countries who have agreed ENP Action Plans with the EU, as well as a sectoral progress report.

The documents available include:

The Communication “Taking stock of the European Neighbourhood Policy” (Brussels 12 May 2010),

Individual country reports for 2009 for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Republic of Moldova, the occupied Palestinian territory, Tunisia and Ukraine

Sectoral report: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm

For more on the ENP: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm

Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the adoption of negotiating directives for Association Agreements

Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the adoption of negotiating directives for Association Agreements between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia


Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, made today the following statement:

“I welcome the adoption by the General Affairs Council on 10 May of the negotiating directives for the future Association Agreements between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

The adoption of these negotiating directives is a clear sign of our strong commitment to further deepen the relationship between the EU and the countries of the South Caucasus, on the basis of shared values and principles, including democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

The Eastern Partnership, launched at the Prague Summit on 7 May 2009, provides an ambitious framework for taking the relationship with the countries of the South Caucasus to a new level. In this context, Association Agreements are an important instrument to upgrade our relations beyond existing commitments with a view of political association and gradual economic integration with the EU.

The negotiation process will be guided by the principles of inclusiveness and differentiation, as well as joint ownership. Successful implementation of the Eastern Partnership with the active engagement of the partner countries both in its multilateral and bilateral track will strengthen relations on the basis of shared values and will help advancing political and economic reforms, consolidate governance and foster regional stability, prosperity and confidence building.

I look forward to the launch of negotiations on these ambitious and comprehensive agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia."

Published on 11 May 2010.


Statement on the case of Awtukhowich, Asipenka and Kazlow in the Republic of Belarus

As acting local presidency of the EU in Minsk, the British Embassy is issuing the following Presidency statement.

On 6 May, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus delivered its verdict and sentenced Mikalay Awtukhowich and Uladzimir Asipenka (former prisoners of conscience) and Mikhail Kazlow to prison for the illegal handling of weapons, receiving sentences of five, three and two years respectively. Based on the observations of EU diplomats and local human rights defenders, the local Presidency is deeply concerned about the serious procedural flaws evident throughout the conduct of this trial. Of particular concern are the claims made in court by prosecution witnesses that their testimonies had been forced out of them through physical and psychological pressure.

Taking into account Mr Awtukhowich´s previous activism in promoting the rights of entrepreneurs and of Afghan war veterans, and for speaking publicly about alleged corruption, the trial can be seen as politically motivated.

The EU will further study the case and could consider further action.

Published on 12 May 2010.

Paleckis: There is no future for Belarus outside Europe

The discussions reviewed the post election situation and the European roadmap for Belarus.

Said Justas Paleckis, rapporteur on Belarus, vice-chair of the Delegation for Relations with Belarus and organiser of the seminar:

"We encourage Belarus to take further and bolder steps towards democracy, respect for human rights and rule of law, with a view of normalisation of relations between the EU and this country.

"Polls show that the majority of Belarusians favour integration into the EU rather than into the East. The European Union should welcome the strengthening of Belorusian relations towards both West and East. It is because of such connections to both sides that this country, situated in the centre of Europe, could become even more valuable to the EU.

"Concerning Belarus's direction and place in Europe: there is no future for Belarus outside Europe".

Kristian Vigenin, S&D Foreign Affairs Committee's coordinator, reminded that last year, the European Union approved the Eastern Partnership initiative, extending it to Belarus.

This has been one of Europe's gestures towards the country, reacting to a series of signals hinting at a possible readjustment in the Belarusian foreign policy.

Said Mr. Vigenin, who is also EURONEST chair:

" Further development in the EU- Belarus relations must be subject to a strict conditionality.

The EU should organise a conference with the participation of both the Belarusian authorities and the opposition to discuss the possibilities of creating a new legal basis on which EU-Belarusian relations can be based.

"The aim of our fact-finding mission to Minsk, last February, was to discuss the possibility of Belarus's participation in the EURONEST parliamentary assembly. The delegation looked also inter alia at human rights and ethnic minorities' issues in Belarus in the light of the EP debate".