OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs issue statement

The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, Ambassadors Bernard Fassier of France, Robert Bradtke of the United States, and Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, released the following statement:

"The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Ambassadors Bernard Fassier of France, Robert Bradtke of the United States, and Igor Popov of the Russian Federation) traveled April 11-14 to Yerevan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Baku. Joined by Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson in Office (PRCiO), the Co-Chairs met separately with Armenian President Serge Sargsian, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and the de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh. In their meetings, the Co-Chairs discussed next steps for reaching agreement on the Basic Principles. It is the strong view of the Co-Chairs that the time has arrived to finalize and endorse the Basic Principles and move to the drafting of a peace agreement.

On April 13, the Co-Chairs crossed the Line of Contact (LOC) by foot, before continuing to Baku. As with their crossing of the LOC in September 2010, this was intended to demonstrate the importance of maintaining and strengthening the 1994 ceasefire and that the LOC should not become a permanent barrier to contacts among neighboring peoples, as well as to reaffirm the Co-Chairs' need to visit any areas affected by the conflict. In conjunction with the crossing of the LOC, the Co-Chairs also visited part of the region southwest of the city of Terter. In addition, the Co-Chairs visited the village of Orta Karvend, accompanying the PRCiO in monitoring the area where the reported March 8 incident occurred.

Building on the March 5 joint statement made in Sochi by the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Russian Federation, the Co-Chairs also presented to the sides a draft mechanism for investigation of incidents along the front lines with the participation of all sides. The Co-Chairs will continue to work with the parties to create as soon as possible a transparent and objective investigation process, with the goal of enhancing confidence, decreasing the risk of miscalculation, and saving lives.

The Co-Chairs expressed their concern that the planned opening of an airport in Nagorno-Karabakh could lead to further increased tensions. They cautioned that the operation of flights to and from this airport could not be used to support any claim of a change in the current status of Nagorno-Karabakh under international law. The Co-Chairs urged the sides to reach an understanding in keeping with international conventions and agreements, as well as current practice between Armenia and Azerbaijan for flights over their territory. The Co-Chairs welcomed assurances from the sides that they will reject any threat or attack against civil aircraft, pursue the matter through diplomatic steps, and refrain from politicizing the issue.

The Co-Chairs will travel to Washington in late April for consultations with senior United States government officials, and to discuss the status of progress towards a peace settlement."


Source: OSCE. Published on 14 April 2011

Group of States against Corruption publishes report on Armenia

The Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) today published its Third Round Evaluation Report on Armenia in which it finds that further amendments to the Criminal Code are necessary to comply with Council of Europe standards. GRECO also calls for a strengthening of the supervision over the funding of political parties and election campaigns.

Regarding the criminalisation of corruption [theme I], GRECO welcomes the 2008 amendments to the Criminal Code, but finds that in order to fully comply with the standards of the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption the legal provisions need to be further amended to ensure – among other things – that the mere request for a bribe can be prosecuted, that all persons who work in the private sector are covered and that Armenia can prosecute all corruption offences committed by its citizens abroad. The main challenge lies with the effective application of legislation. In this context, Armenia is strongly urged to take further measures to increase understanding amongst practitioners of the legal provisions and of the level of proof required in bribery cases.

Concerning transparency of party funding [theme II], GRECO acknowledges that a reform process aimed at improving accountability and transparency of political finances is currently underway. Armenia is encouraged to address in this context the various deficiencies identified in the Law on Political Parties and Election Code, such as the fact that caps on private donations and expenses only apply during election campaigns, the lack of regulation of donations in kind and the lack of transparency of the funding of election campaigns at local level. In addition, it must be ensured that all violations of the rules can be punished and that the sanctions foreseen for these violations are proportionate. Above all, it is of pivotal importance to strengthen supervision over the funding of political parties and election campaigns: it should be ensured that an independent monitoring mechanism is in place and that it has the authority and financial and human resources to investigate infringements of the rules on political financing.

In the report GRECO addresses 19 recommendations to Armenia. The implementation of these will be assessed by GRECO in the second half of 2012, through its specific compliance procedure.


Source: Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 11 April 2011

In Wake Of Japan Disaster, Safety Of Armenian Nuclear Plant Questioned

Just a half-hour drive from the Armenian capital, Yerevan, a Soviet-era nuclear power plant sits precariously on an earthquake fault line.

Environmentalists have long said the Ararat Valley, located just 16 kilometers from the Turkish border city of Igdir, is an extremely dangerous place to house the Metsamor nuclear power plant. And those concerns have only become more urgent amid the ongoing crisis at Japan's crippled Fukushima plant.

"There are five earthquake tectonic breaks [near the plant] -- one is 34 kilometers [away], another is 16 kilometers away, and one is at a distance of only 500 meters," explains Hakob Sanasarian, chairman of Yerevan's Greens' Union environmental group. "And [yet] today they say it is safe. The one who controls such a facility would, of course, praise it."

Armenian government officials have until now insisted that their country is immune to the kind of nuclear emergency Japan now faces.

They say the Metsamor power plant's reactors could withstand up to a magnitude-8 quake, and that such a powerful earthquake is highly unlikely to hit the country anyway.

But amid fresh questions about the safety of the plant in the wake of Japan's crisis, Armenian Prime Minister Tigran Sarkisian announced that a safety review would be conducted.

"We will once again discuss this question and invite international experts to get their assessment of what measures we must take in order to raise the safety standards at our nuclear power plant," Sarkisian told a cabinet meeting on March 18.

Vahram Petrosian, director of the government's research institute on nuclear power plant operation, defends the plant's safety standards. "Not only our experts, but also international seismologists" say the plant could withstand an earthquake of magnitude 8.

Petrosian and others have made this claim, despite the fact that a devastating 6.9-magnitude quake hit the area just over two decades ago.

Nevertheless, Ashot Martirosian, the head of the State Committee on Nuclear Safety Regulation, says Metsamor's cooling system is more reliable than that of Japan's Fukushima plant.

"The Metsamor reactor is cooled by a second contour, which is a separate system, a separate barrier," Martirosian says. "Theoretically, such an emergency situation cannot arise here."

Critics Doubt Reliability

Gia Arabidze, a dean at Georgia Technical University in Tbilisi and a specialist on nuclear issues, takes issue with such claims.

Arabidze says that while Metsamor's normal operations pose no threat to Armenia or bordering countries such as Georgia and Turkey, if an earthquake the size of Japan's were to hit Armenia the results could be devastating.

"The probability for the plant to be damaged in the case of a powerful earthquake is high," Arabidze says. "The nuclear power plants in Japan are far more earthquake-resistant than those which were built in the former Soviet Union, and if we see these problems at the Japanese plant today, you can imagine what problems could occur in the case of a similar disaster in Armenia."

Karine Danielyan, a Yerevan-based environmentalist, says that seismically, the Ararat Valley is "the worst place for a nuclear power plant. The example of Japan shows how unpredictable [the reliability of safety features] is."

Likewise, Frank Barnaby, a U.K.-based nuclear physicist, says that based on the design and age of the station it is unlikely to maintain safety standards during a powerful earthquake.

"Nuclear power plants that are that old have very old-fashioned safety features. I mean, modern power plants are much safer, and even those are not safe enough to withstand a Japanese type of earthquake followed by a tsunami," Barnaby says. "So I think that story is probably incorrect; I would think the Armenian plant is certainly not safe."

Working To Meet Standards

Metsamor, which currently supplies 40 percent of Armenia's nuclear power, was shut down for seven years after a massive 6.9-magnitude earthquake in 1988 that left 25,000 dead. The epicenter of the 1988 earthquake was 75 kilometers from Metsamor.

The Soviet government, which then ruled Armenia, cited security concerns in closing it. But a crippling energy crisis in newly independent Armenia in the mid-1990's led the government to reopen the plant's second reactor amid strong international criticism.

The European Union has classified the plant's light-water reactor as one of the "oldest and least reliable" of 66 such facilities built in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Since 1995 both the EU and United States have spent tens of millions of dollars to improve safety standards at Metsamor.

Moreover, Suren Azatian, Metsamor's former director-general, cautions that the plant is "not that protected" against radioactive leaks. He says that unlike Metsamor, Fukushima has concrete containment vessels around its reactors that appear not to have been breached after the tsunami.

Azatian adds that Armenia should continue to rely on nuclear power, although the country's safety standards must be revised after the Japanese emergency, just as they were after the devastating 1986 Chornobyl disaster.

"One must not panic and say that this is terrible technology that must be abandoned. That's wrong," Azatian says. "Such an approach would be unjustified. After all, our nuclear power plant continued to operate during the [1988] earthquake, which was no less devastating."

According to Petrosian, more than 1,200 measures have been taken to enhance the safety of the facility at the demand of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency since the plant was relaunched in 1995. He says the implementation of such measures was continuous.

By 2016 the Armenian government intends to replace the old Soviet-era-built station with a new one that would meet Western safety standards. Efforts on construction of the new plant are behind schedule, and the Energy Ministry is considering extending the existing plant's term of operation.


By Astghik Bedevian, Ruben Meloyan, Courtney Brooks. Published on 19 March 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/armenian_nuclear_plant_safety_questioned/2343485.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Armenian-Turkish Relations Depend On People, Not Protocols

Most historical anniversaries are marked by either solemn commemorations or festive celebrations. Others, despite their initial significance, quickly fade from the public mind. The first anniversary of the historic "protocols" between Armenia and Turkey resembles the latter -- with little discussion and even less fanfare in either country.

The October 10, 2009, Armenian-Turkish protocols sought to chart a course toward a "normalization" of relations, but the initial optimism of opening long-closed borders and establishing diplomatic relations has now been proven premature, if not unfounded.

The breakdown of the Armenian-Turkish normalization process was largely due to two factors. First, Turkey made a strategic mistake in underestimating Azerbaijan's vehement opposition to the protocols. For Turkey, the protocols represented an important effort to correct a failed policy, as well as a bid to regain more options for Turkish policy, which had become subservient to Azerbaijan's interests.

Turkish policy in the region had become narrowly defined by the parameters of maintaining closed borders with Armenia and withholding diplomatic relations. Such a policy is not a policy, and it clearly failed to force any concessions from Armenia. Rather, it tended to be counterproductive, serving to unite Armenians and encouraging Armenia to adopt tactical responses to overcome its isolation.

The second factor that abruptly ended the process was the fact that the protocols themselves shifted from being a diplomatic effort to normalize relations with Armenia to become a domestic political issue within Turkey. The protocols became hostage to domestic Turkish politics, taking on a new context of accusation and insinuation, whereby Turkey's ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party was attacked by the opposition for supposedly betraying Turkey's traditional ally, Azerbaijan. Turkish-Azerbaijani relations were transformed from an important element of Turkish foreign policy to an essential component of domestic Turkish politics.

Informal Starts

Nonetheless, beyond the doomed protocols, a process of engagement has emerged between Armenia and Turkey. This engagement has taken place on several tracks, including expanding people-to-people contacts and cooperation between civil-society organizations, as well as more limited efforts in the cultural field.

Civil-society and people-to-people contacts have become quite dynamic, with regular exchanges and visits on both sides of the closed border. Within this context, although Turkey has yet to open the closed physical border, the mental border between Armenia and Turkey has opened, at least partially.

This opening can be seen in this week's (October 14-17) visit to Armenia of over two dozen Turkish civil-society activists and leaders, participating in the so-called Ani Dialogue, featuring several days of events with their Armenian counterparts. Organized by the Istanbul-based Hrant Dink Foundation (named in memory of the slain Turkish-Armenian journalist) and implemented by the Caucasus Institute in Yerevan with the support of the Heinrich Boell Foundation, the Ani Dialogue represents an important form of engagement, despite the lack of formal diplomatic progress.

Moreover, in terms of facing the legacy of the genocide issue, the 1915-16 mass killing of Armenians by Turkish forces, Turkish society has also been moving, albeit too slowly at times. On April 24, when Armenians mark the anniversary of what they believe should be officially recognized as genocide, one of the most significant commemorative events was held not in Armenia, but in Istanbul itself, with Turkish participants.

Mixed Result

But there have also been missed opportunities -- especially in the cultural area, most recently involving the Turkish government's planned reopening of an Armenian church in Van. After many months of expectation and preparation, several thousand people attended a special ceremony marking the restoration of the historical Armenian Holy Cross Church on the island of Aghtamar at Lake Van. Most notably, Armenian priests were able to conduct services in the ancient church for the first time in 95 years.

Yet despite the emotional buildup to the ceremony, the long-awaited event turned out quite differently than expected. In many ways, the ceremony was a disappointment. It was also a missed opportunity. Only about 50 guests were able to attend the service in the small church, and about 1,500 Armenians, including 700 from Istanbul and about 200 from outside Turkey, watched nearby.

But many more were expected. And perhaps many more would have come, but things went wrong. Despite promises by various Turkish officials, the ceremony was held in a church with no cross. The cross itself was not the only problem, but the failure to erect it was seen by Armenians as a test of Turkish sincerity and goodwill. And, unfortunately, the way the event transpired meant the Turkish side failed that test.

The selection of this particular Armenian church by the Turkish officials was no accident. It has a special place in Armenian history, both as a religious symbol and because of its architecture. It was also the subject of an emotional appeal by the late Hrant Dink, who argued in 2005 that the church should be used "to restore our spent souls."

All this suggests that the best hope for real normalization is on the lowest level, people-to-people exchanges instead of state-to-state negotiations. But it also requires a reaffirmation of sincerity and commitment from the Turkish side. Otherwise, the October anniversary of the Armenian-Turkish protocols will remain nothing more than a footnote to a shared history whose interpretation remains anything but shared.


By Richard Giragosian. Published on 11 October 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Armenian_Turkish_Relations_Depend_On_People_Not_Protocols/2187064.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

One Year On, Turkey-Armenia Rapprochement Stalled

One year ago, on October 10, 2009, Armenia and Turkey signed two protocols aimed at normalizing relations.

The signing of what many political pundits termed a “historic” deal took place in Zurich, the culmination of painstaking diplomatic efforts by the two countries’ presidents and by international mediators, primarily Switzerland and the United States.

The Western-backed process began with Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s historic September 2008 visit to Yerevan, following an invitation by his Armenian counterpart, Serzh Sarkisian, to attend a soccer World Cup qualifier between the national teams of the two neighbors.

The two leaders watched the return leg of the match in the Turkish city of Bursa a year later, just four days after their foreign ministers, Edward Nalbandian and Ahmet Davutoglu, inked two protocols committing to the establishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of their borders soon after the documents were ratified in both countries’ parliaments.

But a year on, the future of the protocols remains unclear, as no parliamentary ratification of the documents has taken place in either country.

Meanwhile, the cautious optimism surrounding the future of the deal, which faced domestic opposition in both countries, has fizzled out.

Links To Nagorno-Karabakh

Official Yerevan and political majority leaders in Armenia had repeatedly stated the country’s strong readiness to complete the ratification of the protocols in the Armenian legislature, but only after Turkey made that step first.

But since the signing ceremony, senior officials in Turkey have sought to link ratification of the protocols with progress in a separate dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Yerevan responded by saying the protocols contained no conditions regarding that issue and that Ankara should, therefore, proceed with the ratification of the agreements unconditionally.

The diplomatic bickering eventually led to Sarkisian suspending the ratification process in the Armenian parliament last April. But he indicated that Yerevan was not, for now, withdrawing its signature from the documents – a statement welcomed by the international community, in particular by the United States and the European Union.

Turkey Gets Its Way

Views on the future of the protocols remain largely pessimistic at this moment – at least on the Armenian side.

Alexander Arzumanian, a senior member of the opposition Pan-Armenian National Movement (HHSh), believes true normalization is not a priority for Turkey.

"Turkey used the protocols to solve its most important issue, as [due to these protocols] it has become a full player in this region and has gotten its own place in the negotiating format for a Karabakh settlement,” he says.

The opposition member, who served as Armenia’s foreign minister from 1996 to 1998, argues that Armenian authorities should not have launched the process the way they did, since Turkey, he claims, views all things within one package -- that is, to make Armenia abandon its long-standing effort to gain international recognition of the World War I-era mass killings and deportations of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as genocide, as well as to persuade Armenia to make concessions over Karabakh in favor of Turkey’s regional ally Azerbaijan.

The announcement of a road map for a Turkey-Armenia rapprochement in April 2009 made the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun) quit the governing coalition.

'Failed To Show Goodwill'

Giro Manoyan, a foreign policy spokesman for the now opposition party, insists that Yerevan must move further toward withdrawing its signature, as the current process only benefits Turkey.

"I think the first anniversary [of the signing of the protocols] is a good occasion for Armenian authorities to withdraw their signature from the protocols," Manoyan says, "considering the fact that Turkey has failed to show goodwill, and in reality is currently using the protocols for a different purpose than what they were meant for."

Another opposition party, Heritage, which vehemently opposed the protocols from the outset, shares Dashnaktsutyun’s position. The leader of the Heritage party’s parliamentary faction, Stepan Safarian, says Armenia must withdraw its signature from the document considering the “constant speculations” from Turkey.

'Good Partner'

Armenia’s ruling party, meanwhile, thinks Armenia has benefited from the process in terms of “showing itself as a good partner” to the world.

"Armenia may consider the problems it has raised before itself in connection with the protocols solved, in the sense that the Armenian side has proved to the entire world that it is a good and constructive partner, that it seeks to solve problems with all neighbors peacefully, through negotiations, and is ready to start certain relations unconditionally," says Republican Party of Armenia (HHK) lawmaker Karen Avakian. "This process needed to be started, and I think it was necessary to once again unmask Turkey, to make Turkey show its [true] face to the world."

Avakian does not exclude that dialogue between Yerevan and Ankara may still continue “if Turkey shows constructive behavior.”

“I think sooner or later Turkey will realize the gravity of these issues and will not take into consideration the Karabakh process,” Avakian added.

In a recent interview with the Austrian news magazine "Profil," Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian also gave an indication that Armenia does not consider the process of normalization with Turkey as having completely failed.

“We hope that the process is not dead, but suspended,” he said.


By Tigran Avetisian, Suren Musayelyan. Published on 10 October 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/One_Year_On_TurkeyArmenia_Rapprochement_Stalled/2186246.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

What Does ‘Confederation’ Mean In The South Caucasus?

On July 18, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili met with his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, in Batumi and mentioned the idea of a “confederation” between the two countries. The phrase quickly got people wondering what exactly the president had in mind. Analysts have been raising questions and offering ideas ever since.

Journalists and political commentators from the countries of the South Caucasus have examined the idea (whether they endorse it or not) in the context of confrontational geopolitics. In August, Russia and Armenia agreed to extend the pact on the presence of Russian military bases in Armenia until 2044. At the same time, they expanded the format of bilateral military cooperation: henceforth Russia is obliged to defend Armenia from any external threat, which Yerevan expects primarily from Azerbaijan. In short, Armenia has become an even closer Russian ally than it was previously.

The discussion of a possible Georgia-Azerbaijan confederation was immediately placed in the traditional context of the “vertical” axis of Russia-Armenia (and, possibly, Iran) and the “horizontal” axis of Georgia and Azerbaijan (and, possibly, Turkey). And they don’t forget overseas allies, asserting that, of course, the idea of a confederation comes from Washington and is aimed at containing Russia. In a nutshell, after the failed Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, everything has come back to its place: we loved to talk about all these things back in the 1990s.

But what concrete political and legal steps would be necessary to realize this “confederation” project? I haven’t heard anything specific about this yet.

First, let’s take a look at exactly what Saakashvili said, some two months ago. “A few years back I said that we must form confederative relations,” Saakashvili said. “In fact, relations between our countries are far beyond the relations that two countries ordinarily have. We are a continuation of one another.”

In short, the Georgia-Azerbaijan confederation, according to the president, is not a project for the future, but a description of the present. That is, the term shouldn’t be viewed in strictly legalistic terms, but as a rhetorical figure of speech that signifies “particularly close relations between countries.”

What’s more, people in the president’s entourage insist that the same could be said of Georgia-Armenia relations: there as well, the level of closeness is very high. Of course, the Armenian side welcomes the use of this term (even rhetorically) considerably less.

To be sure, it would be hypocritical to speak about an equivalence between Georgia-Azerbaijan and Georgia-Armenia relations. Under the circumstances of the cold war with Russia, Georgia can’t be pleased by the intensification of Russia-Armenia military cooperation. There’s no getting around that.

Enemies And Friends

Nonetheless, neither Georgia nor Armenia would benefit from drawing strict geopolitical conclusions from the two clear facts that Russia and Georgia are enemies, while Russia and Armenia are allies. Likewise, Russia and Azerbaijan do not intend to become enemies just because Azerbaijan and Armenia are enemies and Armenia and Russia are allies. The geopolitical formula that the “friend of my enemy is my enemy” does not apply in the Caucasus today. And thank God.

Since the August 2008 war with Russia, Georgia has placed more significance on regional relations and has actively sought to intensify ties with all the countries of the region without regard for their relations with one another. There is an element of competition with Russia in this. Russia’s policy of not recognizing the Saakashvili government is an effort to isolate Georgia internationally. Moscow wants not only to undermine Tbilisi’s support in the West, but also to exclude Georgia from regional connections.

Saakashvili is taking countermeasures, so far generally with success. Of course, one can always argue about what “success” means, but under the present circumstances Georgia views any sign of warming relations with the countries of the region as a success - and, at the same time, as a failure for Russia.

Russia is actively working to draw Azerbaijan into its sphere of influence with various economic projects. While Turkey and Armenia were flirting under Western patronage and Azerbaijan felt forgotten and rejected by its closest friends -- Ankara and Washington -- it seemed that some sort of geopolitical shift was possible. But the accelerated construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad and new steps toward realizing the Nabucco pipeline project show that the Georgia-Azerbaijan-Turkey axis of cooperation is still functioning. It is such projects most of all that are the real content of the rhetorical term “confederation.”

But, on the other hand, the opening in March of the Russia-Georgia border crossing at Verkhny Lars is not a sign of the warming of Russian-Georgian relations (as Western experts want to believe). It is an expression of Armenia-Georgia cooperation, since that road is needed most of all by Armenia. What difference does it make whether such a friendship is or is not called a “confederation”?


By Ghia Nodia. Published on 17 September 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/What_Does_Confederation_Mean_In_The_South_Caucasus/2160662.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Armenian Opposition Tells Election Experts It's Dissatisfied With Reforms

Armenia's leading opposition forces told European election experts that they remain adamant in dismissing electoral reforms promised by President Serzh Sarkisian's governing coalition, RFE/RL's Armenian Service reports.

Representatives from the opposition Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun), the Armenian National Congress (HAK), and Heritage Party (Zharangutyun) told officials from the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in separate meetings on September 14 that the government draft on reforming elections would not address chronic vote-rigging in Armenia.

The election experts were on the first day of a fact-finding visit to Yerevan. The visit is aimed at assessing the Armenian authorities' stated efforts to improve the conduct of elections in the country.

Armen Martirosian of the Heritage Party told RFE/RL that the authorities would retain "numerous opportunities for carrying out vote falsifications."

"This gives us no hope that the authorities are preparing to hold normal elections," he said.

Armenian authorities have pledged to improve the conduct of elections in the country, along with other political reforms, under pressure from the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly (PACE).

The pro-government majority in the Armenian parliament has already drafted fresh amendments to the electoral code and submitted them to another Council of Europe institution, the Venice Commission, for examination.

Dashnaktsutyun's Artyusha Shahbazian said he and other deputies from his party urged the two European bodies to help ensure that an alternative electoral reform package jointly drafted by Dashnaktsutyun is not being ignored by the ruling coalition.

The opposition package was sent to the Venice Commission this summer. "They have received our proposals and said they are still looking into them," Martirosian said.

The HAK, which is not in parliament, presented the visiting experts with a separate seven-point plan of electoral reform, according to Vladimir Karapetian, a senior member of the opposition alliance. Karapetian declined to disclose changes sought by the HAK, saying only that they are "mainly of a technical nature."

"We believe that by accepting the proposals made by the opposition and international organizations, the authorities will show whether they have the political will to change the conduct of elections," Karapetian told RFE/RL.


By RFE/RL. Published on 16 September 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Armenian_Opposition_Tells_Election_Experts_Its_Dissatisfied_With_Reforms/2159516.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Is Armenia Russia's Partner Or Pawn?

Two years after the brief but destructive war between Russia and Georgia, Moscow has further consolidated its power and influence in the South Caucasus by concluding a modified defense agreement with Armenia that significantly extends the lease for Russia's largest military base in the region.

Most small states are compelled to look to large powers for security, and Armenia is no exception. For a small country like Armenia, which is doubly landlocked -- with no outlet to the sea and with two of its four borders closed -- security concerns are paramount to national survival.

In large part reflecting this reality, Armenia has been driven ever closer to Russia. In the broader context, Armenia's embrace of Russia comes as no real surprise. But the Armenian-Russian "strategic partnership," as hailed by Armenian officials, has become defined more by a dangerous degree of Armenian overdependence than by an equitable alliance. And Russian dominance over Armenia has only increased in recent years, as Moscow has acquired outright control over many strategic sectors of the Armenian economy, from energy to transport.

The asymmetry of the Armenian-Russian relationship was most recently evident in the signing of a modified security accord during a visit to Armenia by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Signed on August 20, the agreement is seriously flawed, however, and has sparked criticism within Armenia for four main reasons.

First, the terms of the newly modified basing agreement are both unusual and questionable. The agreement resulted in the extension of Russia's sole military base in the region by another 24 years, to 2044.

The initial agreement, signed in 1995, granted Russia the right to maintain its military base at Armenia's second-largest city, Gyumri, along the Armenian-Turkish border, and was not due to expire until 2020. Despite the stationing of a small squadron of MiG-29 aircraft and S-300 missile-defense systems at the base, the facility is rather insignificant in purely military terms, with its roughly 3,000 Russian personnel mainly serving as a "trip-wire" to any attack from NATO-member Turkey.

Moreover, both the military posture of the Russian presence and the mission and mandate of the base are based on "threat misperception," reflecting an outdated and now inappropriate Soviet-era doctrine.

Nevertheless, the Russian base in Armenia provides a firm foothold for the Russian presence and offers Moscow an attractive potential platform for power projection. But it satisfies Russian interests that only happen to coincide with Armenia's perception of insecurity.

But perhaps most insulting for Armenia, the base is the only such facility where the host country not only foregoes any form of rent or payment but has agreed also to pay all operational costs and expenses of the facility. While other countries, such as Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan, receive lucrative annual payments in return for hosting Russian military facilities, Armenia is a clear loser.

Second, the modified Armenian-Russian defense accord offers Armenia little in the way of any clear military advantage. Despite the agreement's formal declaration to "ensure the security" of Armenia and promises to provide "modern compatible weaponry and special military hardware" in the future, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov openly admitted there would be "no real or functional change" to the mission or mandate for the Russian base.

Speaking in an interview on Armenian television prior to the signing of the agreement, Lavrov also dismissed Armenian concerns over the pending sale of S-300 air-defense systems to Azerbaijan by noting that they are "defensive weapons designed to protect a territory from external missiles," adding that Moscow would "never supply arms to regions where such supplies may destabilize the region."

Beyond such vague pledges of support in the event of attack, this Russian security pledge does not bolster Armenian security in any concrete sense. If anything, it only reinforces the impression that Armenia has been steadily mortgaging its own national security in return for short-term and meager returns.

The agreement has been defended by Armenian officials as providing an important deterrent to Azerbaijan, which Armenia accuses of launching two military attacks in recent months, beginning with a successful probe of Armenian defensive positions along the Line of Contact separating Nagorno-Karabakh from the rest of Azerbaijan. The most recent skirmish, an August 31 assault by Azerbaijani forces that was successfully repelled, demonstrates that the accord does little to deter Azerbaijan from considering the use of military force to "resolve" the Karabakh issue. In fact, this third problem with the Armenian-Russian security agreement centers on a flawed premise -- that it provides greater security for Armenia.

A fourth shortcoming in the agreement stems from its broader implications for Armenian statehood. The agreement is widely seen as yet another dilution of Armenian independence and sovereignty, especially as the accord may also expand the role of the approximately 2,000 Russian border troops in Armenia. Since the onset of independence, it has actually been Russian border troops that have secured Armenia's border with Turkey.

And this latest agreement may deal a further blow to Armenian sovereignty by deploying additional Russian border guards to Armenia's other borders, with Iran and Georgia, if not Azerbaijan. A Soviet-era legacy, yes, but it is clearly also a liability for any independent state.


By Richard Giragosian. Published on 3 September 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Commentary_Is_Armenia_Russias_Partner_Or_Pawn/2147689.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs issue statement

The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, Ambassador Igor Popov of Russia, Bernard Fassier of France, and Robert Bradtke of the United States, released the following statement:

The Minsk Group Co-Chairs (Ambassador Bernard Fassier, France; Ambassador Robert Bradtke, United States; and Ambassador Igor Popov, Russia) visited Yerevan and Baku July 3-5. Ambassador Bradtke and Ambassador Popov also visited Nagorno-Karabakh July 2.

In Nagorno-Karabakh, Ambassador Bradtke and Ambassador Popov briefed the de facto authorities on the latest developments in the peace process, including the June 26, 2010 statement of Presidents Dmitry Medvedev, Barack Obama, and Nicolas Sarkozy. They also discussed the June 18-19 incident along the Line of Contact. They deplored this incident as an unacceptable violation of the ceasefire, and reiterated their regret over the senseless loss of life and their strong condemnation of the use of force. In Yerevan, the three Co-Chairs met President Serzh Sargsian, Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian, and Minister of Defense Seyran Ohanyan. In Baku, they met with President Ilham Aliyev, Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, Defense Minister Safar Abiyev, and representatives of Azerbaijani internally displaced persons from the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

In their meetings in both Yerevan and Baku, the Co-Chairs stressed the commitment of their three countries to support a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karbakh conflict, based upon the Helsinki principles of non-use of force or the threat of force, territorial integrity, and the equal rights and self-determination of peoples. In that respect, they noted the progress that has been made and the recognition by both sides that the elements articulated by their three Presidents in L'Aquila and repeated in their June 26, 2010 statement must be the basis of a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. They urged the parties, in a spirit of constructive compromise, to take the next step and move towards completing work on the Basic Principles to enable the drafting of a peace agreement to begin. They called upon the sides to strictly observe the 1994 ceasefire and exercise restraint along the Line of Contact. During their visit, the Co-chairs also presented to the parties their plan to undertake a mission to the occupied territories in this fall, which was accepted in principle.

The Co-Chairs expect that a meeting will take place between the heads of their delegations and the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the margins of the OSCE Informal Ministerial in Almaty July 16-17.

Semneby Downplays Fears EU Is Reducing Presence In South Caucasus

Peter Semneby, who has served as the European Union's special representative to the South Caucasus since February 2006, is seeking to downplay fears in the region that the EU is looking to reduce its diplomatic presence in the region.

Speaking to RFE/RL's Armenian Service in Yerevan, where he is currently completing a two-day tour, Semneby played down rumors of an EU initiative to reduce its embassies to a single European regional headquarters in Tbilisi.

"The European Union has just upgraded the commission delegations in all three capitals to full European Union representations," Semneby said. "All three countries are important partner countries of ours, in particular in a situation when we are taking a new and important step with the launching of negotiations of association agreements, and this clearly requires a presence in each country that is tailor-made to the needs and the situation of each individual country."

Semneby declined to comment on another proposal that likewise aims to scale back the EU's presence in the strategically important and politically volatile South Caucasus region -- the suggestion floated last month by EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton to abolish a number of EU special representative posts, including Semneby's.

The proposal, which is reportedly still being discussed, would significantly downgrade the EU's presence on the ground in the South Caucasus. Ashton's plan has raised alarm bells in the region, particularly in Georgia, which is still recovering from its 2008 war with Russia and sees the EU as a protective firewall between Tbilisi and Moscow.

Another EU special representative post marked for closure is that in Moldova, currently held by Kalman Mizsei. Semneby said he did not want to comment on "ongoing discussions about what the future European diplomatic representation will look like."

Semneby's visit to Yerevan comes just two days after the Armenian Defense Ministry said four Armenian soldiers were killed in fighting in Azerbaijan's breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Reports said one Azerbaijani fighter was also killed in the fighting, which reportedly broke out near the Line of Contact that separates Azerbaijan proper from the ethnic Armenian territories of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The skirmish came the same day as the presidents of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan met on the sidelines of a St. Petersburg economic forum to discuss Nagorno-Karabakh, one of the South Caucasus three "frozen conflicts."

Semneby called the situation "deplorable" and said tensions must be reduced in order for all sides to come to a negotiated solution on the issue.

"It's not really acceptable that events like this take place," Semneby said. "And in addition here we have the unnecessary tragic loss of human lives. This incident demonstrates that there is a tense situation along the Line of Contact, that it can easily get out of hand, and that it's necessary to take whatever measures are available in order to lower tension and to build confidence."


By RFE/RL. Published on 21 June 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Semneby_Downplays_Fears_EU_Is_Reducing_Presence_In_South_Caucasus/2078379.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Armenian broadcasting law fails to guarantee media pluralism, says OSCE media freedom representative

Despite amendments, Armenia's new Law on Television and Radio fails to promote broadcast pluralism in the digital era, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatovic, said.

The law, adopted by Parliament on 10 June, would need a presidential signature to take effect.

Mijatovic said Armenian authorities had discussed the law draft with civil society and the international community, and that her Office had provided a legal review of the draft.

"Although some recommendations from the legal review have been addressed, other recommendations that are of crucial importance for a smooth transition from analogue to digital broadcasting have not been taken into account," she said.

Mijatovic said that the law's shortcomings included a limit to the number of broadcast channels; a lack of clear rules for the licensing of satellite, mobile telephone and online broadcasting; the placement of all forms of broadcasting under a regime of licensing or permission by the Regulator; the granting of authority to the courts to terminate broadcast licences based on provisions in the law that contain undue limitations on freedom of the media; and a lack of procedures and terms for the establishment of private digital channels.

"Armenia should not lose the opportunity to adopt forward-looking media legislation. New technologies, including digital broadcasting, should be used by governments to strengthen media pluralism. These technologies can improve access to information and enable the public to seek, access and impart information," she said.

Mijatovic emphasized that her office is ready to continue its support to the authorities in all legislative reforms related to media freedom.

The full text of the OSCE review and a recent addendum, in English and in Armenian, are available at: www.osce.org/fom

Source: OSCE. Published in Vienna on 15 June 2010

In Georgia and Moldova, Worries That EU Special Reps -- And Their Protection -- May Vanish

Officials in Moldova and Georgia are reacting with concern to speculation that the EU is poised to remove special representatives appointed to their regions.

If confirmed, the change would signal a major downgrading in the EU's strategic interest in both Chisinau and the countries of the South Caucasus.

EU foreign policy officials gave no hint of change on the horizon when they met with the six post-Soviet countries that make up its Eastern Partnership community last week.

Instead, officials from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus were assured that the EU's eastern neighbors remain "main priorities" for the European Union.

So it was with a mix of surprise and anger when those countries learned May 31 that the EU is looking to abolish two of its key posts in the region.

Ashton's Bombshell

An assistant to EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton told EU ambassadors on May 28 that she was looking to eliminate the EU's special representatives to Moldova and the South Caucasus.

Such a move would significantly downgrade the EU's presence on the ground in two regions seen as politically unstable and vulnerable to creeping Russian influence.

There has been no official statement from either the EU or the two affected officials -- Kalman Mizsei, the special representative to Moldova, or Peter Semneby, who holds the post for the South Caucasus.

Iulian Fruntashu, an adviser to Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat, told RFE/RL's Moldovan Service he was concerned about what the move might mean for Moldova's progress toward EU integration as one of the Eastern Partners.

"The circumstances, I think, weren't the best for the work of Kalman Mizsei. But I think the position itself shouldn't be abandoned just because Catherine Ashton wants to simplify the stucture of the EU's diplomatic service," Fruntashu said. "I think that a high representative nominated by the European Council shows that the EU is making a priority of Moldova, Georgia, and other countries in the region. We are interested first and foremost in the Eastern Partnership and Moldova's place in it, and I think that it would have been useful for us to keep a special EU representive in Moldova."

The move -- which will also affect other of the EU's 11 special representatives -- has been defended as an attempt to streamline the EU's diplomatic corps. But a letter from Ashton outlining the plan also offers rationales that have struck some observers as flawed.

Ashton's letter, for one, suggests that the bloc should scrap geographically distant posts. But Moldova and the South Caucasus are both closer than Central Asia or Africa's Great Lakes region, both of which will retain their special representatives.

The letter also suggests the bloc should retain only those seen as most important for the EU -- an alarming wake-up call for countries hosting no fewer than four post-Soviet "frozen conflicts."

Labor Pains

News of the proposed change came as EU officials were gathering in Rostov-for-Donu for a summit with their Russian counterparts seen as ushering in less tempestuous relations between Moscow and Brussels.

According to the Ashton plan, Mizsei's current post would be merged with that of the European Commission's representative and eventually brought within the External Action Service, the consolidated diplomatic corps Ashton is laboring to introduce.

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia would see a similar shift. In addition to losing the oversight of Semneby, who has held the post for more than four years and is widely respected in the region, the change would mean the end of the EU's unified approach to the South Caucasus.

Such a move could be advantageous to Moscow, which has been accused of using regional rivalries to destabilize the strategically important area.

Temur Iakobashvili, Georgia's state minister for reintegration, is a key figure in Tbilisi's battle to regain control of its pro-Moscow breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Speaking to RFE/RL's Georgian Service, he said he believed the decision was not "final," but expressed concern that a change in posts would have a negative effect on conflict resolution in the area.

"The important thing is not what the new position would be called," Iakobashvili said. "It's what would happen to [the distribution of] functions, and I think the Caucasus-wide element of Mr. Semneby's post is an important one."

He added: "Conflicts haven't vanished anywhere. In the case of Georgia, moreover, we're even facing the occupation [of our territory]. Therefore, it's an important to consider the question of how these functions will be distributed."


By Valentina Ursu, Marina Vashakmadze. Published on 1 June 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/In_Georgia_and_Moldova_Worries_That_EU_Special_Reps__And_Their_Protection_May_Vanish/2059233.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

OSCE Office in Yerevan helps strengthen Ombudsman institution as National Preventive Mechanism

Representatives of Armenia's Human Rights Defender's Office concluded a three-day study visit to Slovenia organized by the OSCE Office in Yerevan to strengthen the institution's capacity to prevent torture and ill-treatment.

The Armenian experts met Slovenia's Deputy Ombudsman, Ivan Selih and colleagues, as well as representatives of non-governmental organizations, and visited a police station in Domzale and a prison in Ljubljana. They discussed the experiences of the Slovenian Human Rights Ombudsman as the country's designated National Preventive Mechanism (NPM).

According to the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, each State Party is responsible for developing a NPM to regularly monitor places where people are deprived of liberty, such as prisons, detention centres and psychiatric facilities, to ensure reasonable conditions and treatment. Armenia ratified the Optional Protocol in 2006.

"Our Office has supported Human Rights Defender's Office to advocate for more effective oversight of detention facilities. We believe that knowledge of the European experience in preventive strategies will enhance the role of the Ombudsman as an effective preventive mechanism," said Ambassador Sergey Kapinos, the Head of the OSCE Office in Yerevan.

"The Slovenian model for a National Preventive Mechanism is one of the most highly regarded by international experts, and learning about their experience will be useful in developing enhanced oversight of detention places in Armenia," said Arman Tatoyan, an Armenian NPM expert on the trip.

"We are happy to share our experience and practices with preventive visits and co-operation with non-governmental organizations," said Deputy Ombudsman Selih.

Source: OSCE. Published in Yerevan on 27 May 2010.

Štefan Füle Opening address to the Plenary Session Eastern Partnership Informal Foreign Ministers Meeting Sopot (Poland), 24 May 2010

Dear Ministers,

Thank you for inviting me to this informal Foreign Ministers meeting here in Sopot. I am sure that the beauty of this seaside resort will inspire us. I would like to thank in particular Minister Sikorski and Minister Moratinos for their unwavering support for the Eastern Partnership.

I am glad that we have this opportunity - one year on from the Prague summit - informally to discuss what we have achieved and where we want to go with the Eastern Partnership. I am convinced the ambitious agenda we agreed in Prague remains the right one: by seeking the political association and economic integration of our six partner countries with the EU, we will strengthen the capacity of our partner countries to make their own sovereign choices about the political and economic challenges that confront them. The development of vibrant democracies and economies able to compete in a globalised marketplace is in all our interests. Let me underline the staunch commitment of the Commission to support our partners in this process.

Mr Chairman,

Let me briefly make a few comments on what we have achieved over the past year and outline a few pointers for the future.

I believe we have got off to a flying start over the past year. I know that some of you have wanted us to go faster and further. But, if I can be frank, I know that others have been surprised at what we have achieved in such a short time.

We have made good on our offer of new contractual relations. Negotiations with Ukraine are well advanced. The negotiations of an Association Agreement with Moldova have been launched. And negotiations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia will start soon. We are engaging with Belarus on the path of an open and constructive dialogue on all fronts but, if we are to go as far as we would wish, we will need to see further progress in the field of democracy and respect for human rights. The ball is now in Minsk’s court.

We have also established the multilateral dimension of the Eastern Partnership. The four Platforms and the panels they have created are now starting to implement their 2 year work programmes. More than 70 activities are already planned for the next twelve months. Their importance should not be underestimated: they allow for sharing experiences and best practices in order to accelerate progress towards the overall objectives of political association and economic integration. The flagship initiatives which have now been launched have the same goal and are focusing on such crucial fields as border management, development of small and medium sized enterprises, and energy market integration.

Now, with the Lisbon Treaty in force and the External Action Service in sight, offering us the prospect of more joined-up EU foreign policy-making, the Eastern Partnership can give us the possibility to discuss issues of security and stability.

So what are the challenges for the future as we move towards the second Eastern Partnership Summit in the first half of next year during the Hungarian Presidency of the EU?

First, we must redouble our efforts to advance towards two of our most ambitious objectives – visa liberalisation and free trade areas. This is not easy and requires considerable homework on all sides. Let us intensify our dialogue so that we are absolutely clear about the steps that each of us needs to take to move forward. Let us also look for short term steps which can bring immediate, tangible benefits. One such could be the swift and effective implementation of the new EU visa code in all six partner countries in order to ensure uniform and decent treatment.

Let me stress in this context the importance of the Comprehensive Institution Building Programmes in the Eastern Partnership. Once in place – which should be the case next year - these programmes will provide tangible support to partner countries towards achieving the goals of new contractual relations, deep and comprehensive free trade agreements and visa liberalisation.

My second point is to ensure we make the best use of our scarce financial resources. We welcome the considerable interest shown in the Eastern Partnership from the numerous project proposals that have been presented. However, all of us must bear in mind that the bulk of EU financial support to the partner countries is devoted to bilateral programmes. This is, after all, as it should be given the bilateral focus of our policy objectives under the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership. And not all of the additional EaP funding has come on stream yet in 2010. Nevertheless from 2011, the annual EU resources designed to support reform in the 6 Eastern Partnership countries and regional co-operation will increase on average by more than half compared with the period 2007-10 . I will therefore redouble my efforts to ensure that our resources are targeted on achieving our key policy objectives and to look for new ways to improve donor coordination.

In this regard, I believe we should seek to enhance cooperation with the International Financial Institutions, notably the EIB and EBRD, to support more visible investment projects. Already we are doing a lot in this respect. The projects which have been developed under the Neighbourhood Investment Facility amount to €4 billion and are in such crucial areas as electricity networks, energy efficiency, SME financing, airport modernisation or road rehabilitation.

Increased funding, effectively used, as well as progress in the fields of mobility and trade will certainly improve the visibility of the Eastern Partnership. But I believe there is more we can do. I hope that we can start holding Eastern Partnership events in partner countries. I will make sure that the recently increased EU delegations take a leading role in projecting the Partnership in our partner countries. I believe the work of the Civil Society Forum can also play a role here.

Finally I believe third countries outside our circle of 33 can also make valuable contributions to the implementation of Eastern Partnership objectives. We should therefore consider carefully the idea of setting up a “Group of Friends” – something originally proposed by Minister Sikorski in Madrid.

Mr Chairman,

I believe we have made a good start but that we now must keep up the momentum as the Eastern Partnership moves into its second year. For this, I believe we will need robust administrative structures within the External Action Service - something I am discussing with the High Representative.

Let us ensure we all now play our part in moving forward our ambitious agenda – we will be judged by our record on implementing our commitments. Let us give greater visibility to what we have already achieved and to our ongoing activities. And let us work to make the best possible use of the financial resources we are dedicating to this enterprise.

As Commissioner for the whole of the EU’s Neighbourhood, I will continue to strive to advance our relations with all our neighbours East and South. Based on the stock-taking in the Commission’s recent Communication, I hope all of us in the coming months can reflect on how to develop our policy further.

Beyond our immediate priorities for the year ahead, we must also keep in mind the longer term horizon. Making political association and economic integration a reality, will bring our partner countries into an ever closer relationship with the EU: a community of shared values; a network of free trade areas which could in the long run lead to a Neighbourhood Economic Community; a liberalized visa area. I believe it is not too early to start reflecting on what such a relationship will mean for all of us and how we could, in due course, cement it further.

You can rest assured that, working in close coordination with Cathy Ashton and my fellow Commissioners, I will remain firmly committed to advancing the Partnership.

Thank you


Source: European Commission

OSCE media freedom representative meets Armenian President, encourages public discussion and transparency in broadcast reform

Dunja Mijatovic, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, discussed Armenia's ongoing media reforms, including a transformation from an analogue to a digital broadcasting system in a meeting with Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan.

"It is essential that the digital switchover is carried out in a transparent manner and that the tendering procedures are made public well in advance to ensure broadcast pluralism," Mijatovic said. She asked the authorities to guarantee that the broadcast reform is carried out with the active involvement of the public.

"The digital strategy of Armenia will define the broadcasting landscape for many years to come. It is essential that the legislation to be adopted grants access to diverse information and high quality programmes," she said.

"I am pleased by the readiness of the authorities to consider the OSCE's assessment of the recently introduced amendments to the draft Law on TV and Radio Broadcasting before its final adoption. I encourage all stakeholders to use this opportunity to present their views and recommendations," she added.

Mijatovic also met National Assembly Deputy Chairman Samvel Nikoyan, Economy Minister Nerses Yeritsyan, Deputy Foreign Minister Arman Kirakosyan and the President of the National Commission for TV and Radio, Grigor Amalyan.

During the two-day visit, Mijatovic participated in a public discussion on Armenia's digital switchover, chaired by the Head of the OSCE Office in Yerevan, Ambassador Sergey Kapinos. The event brought together government officials, parliamentarians, as well as broadcasters, non-governmental organizations and international human rights organizations.

"Digital convergence is a major technological development that has a strong impact on the media in the country," Kapinos said. "Thus it is very important that the digital switchover policies to be adopted by the Government will promote and safeguard media pluralism in Armenia."

Regarding further media legislation developments, the Representative commended the Armenian authorities on their steps to decriminalize defamation, and expressed hope that the OSCE's recommendations will be reflected in the relevant legislation, to be adopted in the near future.

Mijatovic concluded her visit by offering her Office's assistance in providing further expertise on Armenia's legislation covering all areas of media reform, to bring it in line with international standards and good practices.

Source: OSCE. Published in Yerevan on 18 May 2010

Five years of European Neighbourhood Policy: more trade, more aid, more people-to-people contacts

The annual European Neighbourhood Policy reports once again demonstrate the clear benefits that the European Union brings to its neighbours. For five years, the European Union has been delivering more trade, more aid, more people-to-people contacts and far deeper co-operation between the EU and its neighbours on the whole range of their economic, political and sectoral reforms. Our partnership has significantly developed in areas like transport, energy, environment and climate change, research, health and education. This has been backed up with an increase in the current Financial Framework by 32% and will reach over EUR 2 billion annually in 2013.

"The European Neighbourhood Policy is a success story with many examples of concrete achievements on the ground,” commented Catherine Ashton, Vice-President of the Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. "But there is a lot more we can and should do to make our part of the world more secure, more stable and more prosperous. In a globalised world, as European and Mediterranean countries, we need to help each other face the economic crisis. We need to work together to confront the new threats and challenges of our time, such as international terrorism, human trafficking and cross-border organised crime. We need to co-operate to solve the disputes and conflicts that still hold parts of our region back, and deny many ordinary people the benefits of globalisation. We want our neighbours to join our efforts to bring peace and security to other parts of the world who are less fortunate than we are. And as a Union built on shared values, we want our neighbours to benefit from the stability and prosperity that come with open and democratic society and the rule of law. This ambitious agenda is a key priority for me as we press ahead with the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the External Action Service. Our friends in our European and Mediterranean neighbourhood will be among the first to benefit from a more active, more coherent and more effective European foreign policy."

Štefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, added: “Further strengthening the ENP is no less than an investment in the EU’s own stability and prosperity — and this must be reflected in our offer to our partners. The ENP is a win-win game: the higher our partners’ reform ambitions, the stronger our response. Economic reforms have progressed remarkably across our neighbourhood, both East and South. What is essential for the future is to go up a gear on democratic and political reforms, where progress has been real but generally slower.”

Achievements of the European Neighbourhood Policy 2004-2009

Bilateral Association Agreements were concluded by 2004 with most Southern ENP partners, while enhancement of the relations with most advanced partners is currently ongoing (for example, the advanced status - statut avancé – has been implemented with Morocco since 2008). In the East, in line with objectives of the Eastern Partnership, current Partnership and Cooperation Agreements are being replaced by far-reaching Association Agreements.

The ENP aims also at improving governance. The recent presidential elections in Ukraine, the second round of parliamentary elections in Moldova, as well as improvements in quality of elections in Morocco or Lebanon show some progress in democratic process. On freedom of association, death penalty, media freedom, minority rights and other human rights and fundamental freedoms, there have been improvements in several ENP countries but progress has generally not matched the ambitions expressed jointly in the ENP and in the Action Plans. Much remains to be done too in terms of judicial and public administration reforms and effectively tackling corruption.

Regarding mobility more than 2 million EU Schengen visas were issued in our neighbourhood in 2008. Visa facilitation and readmission agreements are in place with Ukraine and Moldova and negotiations have been concluded with Georgia. Mobility Partnerships to promote legal migration have been agreed with Moldova and Georgia. Nevertheless more needs to be done to use the full potential of the ENP, including road-maps to a visa-free regime for short stays with Ukraine and Moldova.

EU’s trade with the ENP region grew during 2004-2008, with EU’s exports rising by 63% and imports by 91% (2009 brought some slowdown, due to the global economic and financial crisis). The EU is ready to negotiate Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with all its neighbours as soon as they are ready and prepared for them. Other steps towards deeper economic integration have also been taken, including negotiation of a number of sectoral agreements from agricultural and fishery products to common aviation area.

Energy cooperation was strengthened with Memoranda of Understanding or Declarations with Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. In 2009 Ukraine and Moldova were admitted, subject to conditions, to accede the Energy Community Treaty,and Georgia became an observer.

The EU has provided nearly EUR 12 billion in 2007-2013 for the implementation of its ENP policy. In addition, the EU’s Neighbourhood Investment Facility, supported by EU budget and those of Member States, provides grant support to leverage loans (over EUR 4,7 billion in 2007-2009) for concrete investments in transport, environment, energy, private and social sectors.

Background

The European Neighbourhood Policy aims at increasing common stability, prosperity and security. On the basis of a joint Action Plan, the EU supports partner countries in implementing their reforms to improve their standards of democracy and human rights, to increase their access to the EU's single market, to improve the environment and to step up their co-operation with the EU on issues like climate change, energy, transport or migration.

Today, the Commission has published its annual “ENP Package”, consisting of: a Communication taking stock of the policy achievements since its launch in 2004, 12 reports on progress achieved in 2009 by the 12 countries who have agreed ENP Action Plans with the EU, as well as a sectoral progress report.

The documents available include:

The Communication “Taking stock of the European Neighbourhood Policy” (Brussels 12 May 2010),

Individual country reports for 2009 for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Republic of Moldova, the occupied Palestinian territory, Tunisia and Ukraine

Sectoral report: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm

For more on the ENP: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm

Armenia needs a clear roadmap of reforms in order to consolidate democracy

PACE President Mevlüt Çavusoglu has visited Armenia on 12-13 May and has met the President of the Republic Serzh Sargsyan, the Speaker of Parliament Hovik Abrahamyan, most political forces represented in Parliament, the PACE delegation, the Human Rights Defender, the National Commission for Radio and Television, NGOs and the extra-parliamentary opposition. He also met relatives of victims of the events of 1-2 March 2008.

Developing and strengthening the fundamental principles and values that unite the Council of Europe member states -democracy, human rights and the rule of law-, he said, was not only important for Armenia and for its citizens, but also for the peace and stability of the region and the whole of Europe.

The discussions with all Armenian interlocutors have concentrated on the most important reforms that are needed in the country and PACE President has called on the Armenian authorities to establish a roadmap for the implementation of the reforms recommended by the Assembly: electoral reform, reform of the police and in the justice sector, improvements in the field of freedom of assembly and freedom of the media, fight against corruption.

Another part of the discussions focused on the role that the Council of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly can play in preventing and overcoming conflicts within and between member states. Regarding the Nagorno Karabakh issue, President Çavusoglu said that both Armenia and Azerbaijan have a duty to comply with the recommendations made by the Parliamentary Assembly and to report to it on the progress made.

PACE President also insisted on two outstanding issues that have not yet received a satisfactory solution: individual justice being made for those held responsible for the March 2008 events and the issue of persons detained in relation to those events.

Finally, President Çavusoglu did congratulate Armenia for hosting this year's Forum for the Future of Democracy hoping to take part in the Forum in October 2010.

Source: PACE. Published on 14 May 2010

Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the adoption of negotiating directives for Association Agreements

Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the adoption of negotiating directives for Association Agreements between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia


Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, made today the following statement:

“I welcome the adoption by the General Affairs Council on 10 May of the negotiating directives for the future Association Agreements between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

The adoption of these negotiating directives is a clear sign of our strong commitment to further deepen the relationship between the EU and the countries of the South Caucasus, on the basis of shared values and principles, including democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

The Eastern Partnership, launched at the Prague Summit on 7 May 2009, provides an ambitious framework for taking the relationship with the countries of the South Caucasus to a new level. In this context, Association Agreements are an important instrument to upgrade our relations beyond existing commitments with a view of political association and gradual economic integration with the EU.

The negotiation process will be guided by the principles of inclusiveness and differentiation, as well as joint ownership. Successful implementation of the Eastern Partnership with the active engagement of the partner countries both in its multilateral and bilateral track will strengthen relations on the basis of shared values and will help advancing political and economic reforms, consolidate governance and foster regional stability, prosperity and confidence building.

I look forward to the launch of negotiations on these ambitious and comprehensive agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia."

Published on 11 May 2010.


Statement on the case of Awtukhowich, Asipenka and Kazlow in the Republic of Belarus

As acting local presidency of the EU in Minsk, the British Embassy is issuing the following Presidency statement.

On 6 May, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus delivered its verdict and sentenced Mikalay Awtukhowich and Uladzimir Asipenka (former prisoners of conscience) and Mikhail Kazlow to prison for the illegal handling of weapons, receiving sentences of five, three and two years respectively. Based on the observations of EU diplomats and local human rights defenders, the local Presidency is deeply concerned about the serious procedural flaws evident throughout the conduct of this trial. Of particular concern are the claims made in court by prosecution witnesses that their testimonies had been forced out of them through physical and psychological pressure.

Taking into account Mr Awtukhowich´s previous activism in promoting the rights of entrepreneurs and of Afghan war veterans, and for speaking publicly about alleged corruption, the trial can be seen as politically motivated.

The EU will further study the case and could consider further action.

Published on 12 May 2010.

U.S. Hopes To Keep Armenia-Turkey Reconciliation Process Alive

The latest U.S. call for continued progress in Turkish-Armenian normalization -- in this case by Washington's ambassador to Armenia, Marie Yovanovitch, in an RFE/RL interview -- comes at a difficult time.

Government opponents in both countries are becoming increasingly hostile to the Turkish-Armenian protocols, signed in October.

Moreover, the Turkish government is gearing up for a major challenge in national elections due to take place next year. The popularity of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) is declining and there's no sure sign that his majority in the parliament will survive another national poll.

In fact, there are some troubling signs pointing in the opposite direction. On May 4, Erdogan suffered one of his biggest defeats in a parliamentary vote on proposed amendments to the constitution. Some members reportedly broke party ranks to oppose one of the key articles in Erdogan's constitutional package, highlighting his inability to maintain party discipline when it comes to the nationalist agenda.

Speaking after Sweden's vote to recognize the Armenian genocide, Erdogan vowed that the Turkish parliament would reject the protocols if they went to the floor for a vote.

Rocky Road

It has been a bumpy ride since the Armenian and Turkish foreign ministers committed their countries to the process of diplomatic normalization in October.

The United States, Russia, and the European Union hailed the deal as a possible new beginning in those two countries' histories, but such euphoria was short-lived.

Renewed skepticism arose alongside rising bilateral tensions, driving home the reality that century-old animosity could not be transformed into normalcy in a matter of months, or even years.

Then, as the anniversary of the Ottoman-era mass killings of Armenians approached, the Armenian diaspora in the United States and elsewhere mobilized in an effort to push for resolutions recognizing the massacre as genocide.

Turkey angrily denounced resolutions in both the United States (specifically the House Foreign Relations Committee) and Sweden, withdrawing its ambassadors from both countries. Erdogan angrily hinted at the possible deportation of thousands of "illegal Armenian workers."

There's another irritant for Turkey, too. There is ample speculation that its closest regional ally, Azerbaijan, has opposed the protocols since they were conceived. Baku, that argument runs, believes that by opening its border with Armenia, Turkey would lose leverage that it might otherwise apply to force Yerevan into concessions over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Indeed, Turkish leaders have repeatedly suggested that the country's border with Armenia will not be opened in the absence of a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. For his part, Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian has suspended the parliamentary ratification process of the protocols.

Eyes On The Prize

From the early days of his presidency, Barack Obama has made it clear that a top priority in the region is to help Armenia and Turkey normalize their relations. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has brought an unprecedented level of intensity to the resulting diplomatic effort, and remains in constant contact with the Armenian and Turkish leaders.

Shortly before the ratification process was halted, Obama and Clinton each held lengthy talks with senior Armenian and Turkish officials. They knew that the Armenian president was prepared to halt the ratification process, but they were also assured that the protocols would remain intact.

"President Sarkisian's announcement makes clear that Armenia has not ended the process but has suspended it until the Turkish side is ready to move forward," U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon said in a statement.

Ambassador Yovanovitch expressed similar optimism in her RFE/RL interview, noting that there were three, not one, ceremonies in Turkey to mark Armenian Remembrance Day.

U.S. officials suggest there are encouraging signs that the reconciliation process is taking hold within civil society in both countries.

Armenia's leading business association and three local civic groups last month vowed that they would work together to deepen contacts between Armenians and Turks.

Yovanovitch went on to note that closed borders in 21st-century Europe are "not a phenomenon that can continue to exist."

So what can we expect next? Will the Armenian and Turkish leaders restart the process soon or wait until after Turkey's national elections? Will talks again take the form of the quiet diplomacy mediated by the Swiss?

"I'm not a fortune teller so I can't tell exactly what the future is going to bring. But I think that at the end of the day it's up to both sides to figure out how they want to move forward and when they want to move," Yovanovitch said.

But one thing's for sure. The Obama administration has not signaled any willingness to give up on the process, and some level of active engagement by U.S. officials is likely to continue.


By Harry Tamrazian. Published on 7 May 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/US_Hopes_To_Keep_ArmeniaTurkey_Reconciliation_Process_Alive/2035369.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Interview: After Just One Year, Are The Wheels Coming Off The EU's Eastern Partnership?

A year after its celebrated inception, the European Union's Eastern Partnership for Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan has sunk into the kind of obscurity that tends to envelop unloved EU projects.

The inaugural summit was held in Prague on May 7, 2009, amid fanfare, promises, and high expectations. A follow-up meeting of EU and partner-country foreign ministers was held in December.

But since then, the bloc's deepening economic malaise now appears to have suffocated whatever impetus the process had left. Intended to provide a regional, multilateral dimension to the longer-established European Neighborhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership has not delivered any visible added value for either the EU or the countries themselves.

The main avenue for contacts and cooperation is still provided via another channel -- association agreement talks between each of the countries and the EU. The association agreement sets the bar at nothing more than "political association," while it does hold out the long-term prospects of visa-free travel and free trade.

Meanwhile, the wheels have literally starting to come off the EU's entire approach to the western post-Soviet neighborhood, with even favorites like Ukraine and Georgia becoming increasingly wayward in their respective courses. The long-held silent assumption that most, if not all, countries in the region want to eventually join the EU can no longer be taken for granted.

Under its new president, Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine is forging links with Russia that appear to preclude a further rapprochement with the West. In Tbilisi, President Mikheil Saakashvili seems to be calculating that he no longer has anything useful to gain from subjecting himself to EU tutelage -- with senior Georgian officials telling their EU counterparts at a recent meeting that Georgia is a "value-based state, but not necessarily an EU state."

Taking a look at the prospects of the Eastern Partnership, RFE/RL Brussels correspondent Ahto Lobjakas spoke with Andrew Wilson, senior policy fellow in London at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

RFE/RL: One year on, has the Eastern Partnership achieved anything of note?

Andrew Wilson: Well, in itself it was a worthwhile policy, and it was having some marginal impact. But it has been kind of overtaken by events. You have the global economic crisis, which has hit the region particularly hard. Russia is perceived to be providing some financial help. The EU provides some help, but there the Eastern Partnership is kind of invisible. I mean [the EU's] bigger role is in leveraging IMF [International Monetary Fund] funds to the region, where that was also pretty invisible to the local publics.

America has, if not completely withdrawn from the region, [then] certainly de-prioritized it. China is a major player in the region there. So, within that kind of changed environment, the partnership isn't having the kind of impact its founders had hoped it would have back in 2009.

RFE/RL: Can we expect a revival of the Eastern Partnership in the foreseeable future?

Wilson: None is planned, but I certainly think it's necessary. Some kind of "Partnership Plus" revival, a relaunch, extra momentum -- I mean, call it what you will, it's certainly needed. There were fears that the Spanish and Belgian [rotating EU] presidencies [in 2010] would completely neglect the initiative. To be fair, they've kept it ticking over, but no more than that. Obviously, many people hope that the Hungarian and Polish presidencies [in 2011] will give it some more oomph in time for its second anniversary -- but the time to start planning that is now.

Choosing Between East And West

RFE/RL: In the EU's search for regional stability, it has tried to foster reforms in its eastern neighbors that can only take root when a deeper kind of stability exists -- one that would require more direct EU political involvement. But the bloc has refused to provide that. Isn't this a contradiction at the very heart of the EU's engagement with the Eastern Partnership countries?

Wilson: Yes, the word "stability" may be in the documents -- maybe it's the wrong word. What we're talking about is Europeanization. Often, that required a lot of destabilizing short-term action.

Look at Ukraine, for example, at the moment. A lot of Western European governments, after the chaos of the last three or four years, seemed to perhaps be willing to over-accept the prioritization of stability -- which for Yanukovych means a euphemism for strengthened central political control. That type of stability isn't necessarily a good thing. Nor is stable nonaction a good thing. Sometimes a flurry of reforms is precisely what is required.

But I think your general question is more: "Does the Eastern Partnership help the EU to get leverage on these political systems in order for them to make the necessary reforms?" And I think there you could have a problem. Particularly if you go back to the changing international context that I mentioned at the start.

It is not at all clear that we do have the means to persuade reluctant and often authoritarian leaderships in these six states to make the kinds of reforms that we'd like to see. The carrots aren't juicy enough and the sticks aren't big and threatening enough.

RFE/RL: Is it realistic to tell these countries that they do not need to choose between the EU and Russia -- as, for example, EU Enlargement and Neighborhood Commissioner Stefan Fuele does?

Wilson: We would like them to not necessarily choose [between the two] in terms of foreign policy, or cultural affinity, or whatever. But clearly we want them to choose our model, the European model. That's what the Copenhagen criteria [of EU accession] mean, after all.

But I've sometimes called the leaders of Eastern Europe a "collective Tito." They don't necessarily want to choose. They are playing a game of balance between East and West to extract resources from both sides, and it is in their interest to prolong that balancing game as long as they can.

European Catch-22

RFE/RL: Is it ultimately in the EU's own interest to limit cooperation to "deep and comprehensive free trade" and visa liberalization -- as it now does?

Wilson: Well, we're not even there yet. Again, to take the example of Ukraine, the most important state of the six, it is not at all clear yet that [an agreement permitting] "deep" free trade is within their grasp -- certainly not this year. Though the Ukrainians are trying to push on that one.

I think if those two things were achieved, then a lot would have been achieved. Deep free trade will make a considerable difference to the economies in the region. Visa liberalization, of course, makes the biggest difference to local public opinions, it would help swing that in favor of the EU. So the two things you mentioned aren't marginal, but we may not even be able to get there without being first able to [deploy] our levers of engagement for these six states.

RFE/RL: Do you think the EU may come to regret its lack of ambition if it fails to win the region for itself?

Wilson: Clearly, we're talking about a 20-year period when relatively little has been done -- which is in very sharp contrast to the kind of quick-accession politics for the likes of Poland and the Czech Republic in the 1990s. And 19 -- almost 20 -- years is a long time to spend in the waiting room of European integration.

Both sides have lost patience to a degree. But both sides are to blame. It's the standard catch-22 question -- if the EU had given a clearer perspective, then perhaps these societies would have reformed more. But the EU was never prepared to give that indication until there was more evidence of reform on the ground.

You can talk about specific historical periods when opportunities were missed -- the most important of which is the six months after the Orange Revolution and before the referenda in Holland and France in the summer of 2005 on the [EU] constitution. That was a window of opportunity that was clearly missed to make good the conditionality principle, if you like. Clearly, the environment had changed enormously and the EU did not recognize that. And the window of opportunity soon shut.


By RFE/RL. Published on 7 May 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Interview_After_Just_One_Year_Are_The_Wheels_Coming_Off_The_EUs_Eastern_Partnership/2035235.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.