Ashton: Negotiations on Association Agreements are progressing well

          

Remarks by High Representative Catherine Ashton following the Eastern Partnership Ministerial Meeting

We had a good meeting that gave us an opportunity to have thorough discussion between 27 member states and 6 partners on our ambitious agenda of political association and economic integration.

Negotiations on Association Agreements - including in most cases Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas - are progressing well. We are also advancing on our visa liberalization agenda where we have now started a dialogue with Georgia to develop a Visa Liberalisation Action Plan, similar to those with Moldova and Ukraine.

There was frank and open discussion on the progress made so far and the remaining challenges. It has helped us better understand problems our partners are facing.

Obviously, partners are at very different level in terms of establishing sustainable democracy. Today’s discussions will enable us to better tailor our policy toward partner countries so that we can keep the Partnership as inclusive as possible. This will also help us to accommodate specific needs and ambitions of those who are the most advanced on the implementation of the agreed goals.

Reforms and genuine commitment to common values of freedom, democracy and human rights remain the underpinning elements of the Partnership. I welcome the good progress achieved by some partners in this area. More work however is still needed.

The presence of FM Martynov has allowed us to convey the EU’s deep concern as regards the lack of respect for human rights, the rule of law and independent media in Belarus. We stressed the importance of the immediate release and rehabilitation of all political prisoners, of reversing the current repressive policies and of free and fair parliamentary elections in September.

Our message to Belarus was clear: there is no place for political prisoners at the heart of Europe. At the same time we remain attached to a policy of critical engagement with Belarus. The Eastern Partnership provides an important platform to expose Belarus to democratic values and the virtues of European cooperation. For the people of Belarus we are ready to deepen cooperation once the political situation has changed.

The Eastern Partnership remains a priority for the EU and for me personally, working very closely with my colleague and friend Stefan Füle. We are determined to support on going transformation of partners toward sustainable democracies. We will pursue vigorously our agenda of political association and economic integration, based on common values of democracy and human rights.

The next time we will meet in 2013 we will be able to assess the progress on reforms and achievement of joint objectives and we look forward to the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius next autumn.

Source: Council of the European Union, Brussels, 23 July 2012

Ashton Chairs meeting of Foreign Minister of the Eastern Partnership

Chair's conclusions: Eastern Partnership

Foreign Ministers Meeting


1. On 23 July 2012 the third meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Eastern Partnership was held in Brussels.

2. The meeting was chaired by the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, and attended by representatives from the EU Member States, the European Commission, the six Eastern European Partner countries (hereinafter the Partner countries), the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The European Commission was represented by the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle. The Partner countries were represented by Deputy Prime Minister Iurie Leanca of the Republic of Moldova, Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze of Georgia, Foreign Ministers Edward Nalbandian of Armenia, Sergei Martynov of Belarus and Konstantin Gryshchenko of Ukraine and Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Mammad-Guliyev of Azerbaijan. The EU acceding state Croatia also attended as an observer.

3. Representatives of the Civil Society Forum presented to Ministers the views of the Forum on the implementation of the Eastern Partnership.

4. Participants discussed the Eastern Partnership Roadmap to the autumn 2013 Summit released on May 15 by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and adopted a joint statement on the subject.

5. Participants discussed a range of concerns about the situation in certain partner countries related to the values and principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law on which the Eastern Partnership is based.

6. Participants discussed the progress achieved so far in the bilateral track of the Eastern Partnership. As regards political association and economic integration, the EU Ukraine Association Agreement has been finalised, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. Negotiations on similar agreements with the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Armenia are well advanced, while negotiations on an Association Agreement with Azerbaijan are also under way. As regards mobility of citizens, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine are already implementing Visa Liberalisation Action Plans. A dialogue with Georgia to draw up a similar Action Plan has recently been launched. Negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission agreements are under way with Armenia and Azerbaijan, and a similar offer has been extended by the EU to Belarus. Amendments to the Visa Facilitation Agreements with the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine have been negotiated and signed in view of further facilitating the issuance of visas to their citizens.

7. Participants also discussed the development of the multilateral track of the Eastern Partnership. They noted the work done under the guidance of four thematic Platforms, in particular the launching of cooperation in new areas such as: public administration reform, transport and migration and asylum. They also reviewed the ongoing Flagship Initiatives.

8. Participants highlighted the recent adoption of the Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation Programme (EaPIC) which offers additional financial support amounting to €130 million for the years 2012-13 to countries that make significant progress in reforms for democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

9. Participants welcomed the first meeting of the new informal Eastern Partnership dialogues, which took place in Chisinau on 5th June 2012 and laid the foundations for a new format of consultations for the further development of political and sector cooperation between the EU and partners, in the spirit of the Warsaw Summit.


Source:Council of the European Union, Brussels, 23 July 2012

Commissioner Štefan Füle on the European Neighbourhood Policy Review

Štefan Füle European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Address to the European Parliament on the European Neighbourhood Policy Review European Parliament Plenary Session Strasbourg, 6 April 2011


European Parliament Plenary Session

Strasbourg, 6 April 2011

President, Honourable Members,

I am delighted to have this opportunity for an exchange of views with you on the European Neighbourhood Policy. In the context of the current events in the southern Mediterranean, redeveloping this policy could not be more important.

In fact over the past nine months the Commission has undertaken a review of the Policy, and I want to take this chance also to thank you for your input to the consultation – which took responses from partner countries, EU Member States, academics and civil society groups.

I have read both the Mário David report on the South and the Marek Siwiec report on the East, and find them each significant and useful. I am pleased that our thoughts are along the same lines.

You will have noticed that the results of our previous discussions on Neighbourhood Policy are already reflected in the Communication on a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity of 8 March. Now we are preparing for the wider Communication on the results of the Review, which is due to be published in May.

A key outcome of the Review is a new emphasis on differentiation of the Neighbourhood Policy according to the needs and wishes of each partner country. While the Policy will continue to offer engagement to all partners, every neighbour is different and has different aspirations.

Some partner countries want to progress as far as they can towards the European Union – indeed as far as accession. But others prefer to make the most of other benefits of the Neighbourhood Policy. So it will deliver "more for more" in a specific and differentiated way – alongside stronger political steering of our relationships with our partners.

Nevertheless, as both Mr. David and Mr. Siwiec recommend in their reports, our shared values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights will be at the heart of the revised Neighbourhood Policy for all partner countries.

They should find their expression in stronger joint commitments to elements indispensable to democratisation: I am thinking in particular of free and fair elections, freedom of expression and association, judicial independence, the fight against corruption, and security sector reform.

Also as highlighted in both reports, the revised Neighbourhood Policy will recognise and act on the importance of civil society. Non-governmental organisations have the expertise and experience to deliver democratic and market-oriented reforms from the bottom up, based on shared values.

A thriving civil society gets citizens involved and helps to hold governments to account. So the European Union will complement its relations with governments with much closer engagement with civil society. This is also important at a regional and sub-regional level – where, for example, the Eastern Partnership's Civil Society Forum has been making good progress.

The forthcoming Communication will offer more detail on the approach towards the two sub-regions of our Neighbourhood. It will spell out how we see the Eastern Partnership developing further in the wake of the Summit under the Polish Presidency.

In the South, the Union for the Mediterranean has the potential to make a real difference – but frankly it has not yet done so and must be revitalised. Its promise lies in developing concrete economic projects with a focus on employment, innovation and growth. The UfM’s Secretariat is best placed to act as a catalyst and bring together states, International Financial Institutions and private companies to work on such economic projects.

I would like to mention briefly three other elements brought to light by the Review, which will be key to the revised Neighbourhood Policy.

First, the role of trade and economic integration to help advance stability and prosperity in partner countries. The most significant vehicle to achieve this is the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.

A successful DCFTA has transformative power – regulatory reforms made by a partner country are anchored through trade.

Next, the need for improved mobility between partner countries and the European Union – since there is no better way to promote European values than through sharing experiences person to person. The Neighbourhood Policy will seek improvements to mobility, without losing sight of security.

Finally, the desire expressed in the consultation by many partner countries for greater political engagement with the European Union. Closer and more substantial political dialogue across all areas of our relationships will help us resolve difficult issues in a spirit of mutual confidence.

Thank you for your time. I look forward very much to the coming debate and will take on board your views.

Source: Press Release RAPID

East-Invest programme aimed towards Eastern Partnership countries to be launched in Brussels

East-Invest programme, the new regional tool for the economic development of the Eastern Partnership region, will be launched on March 31st 2011 by the 85 partners of this EU-funded project during a conference in Brussels.

The Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan Füle describes this programme as “one of several concrete programs that will accompany and support the Eastern Partnership Countries on the road of economic transformation towards economic integration with the EU".

85 partners of the project, including business support organisation from EU and Eastern Partnership Countries will adopt the work plan of activities that will be presented during the conference.

The main objective of this meeting is to promote and offer the audience an insight into the overall working background, the different project activities that will be implemented and the provisional time frame.

East-Invest, a € 8.75 million project, is a new regional investment and trade facilitation initiative for the economic development focussing on support to small and medium size enterprises from Eastern Partnership region.

The main objectives of the East-Invest are to develop business networking and multiply exchanges between public and private organisations from European Union and Eastern Partnership region through:

•Encouraging public-private dialogue and promoting consultation of private sector in decision making;

•Facilitating exchange of best-practices and supporting creation of partnerships between EU and Eastern Partnership companies;

•Developing the capacity of Eastern Partnership SME support organisations.

More information:

http://www.enpi-info.eu/eastportal/events/1767/Launching-conference-of-the-East-Invest-Programme


Press Release: RAPID. Brussels, 31 March 2011

EU Set To Retool Policy Toward Neighbors

The European Union is overhauling its policy toward its eastern and southern neighbors as the 27-nation bloc seeks a fresh approach to integrate post-Soviet countries.

Since 2004, the EU's Neighborhood Policy has sought to court those same 16 countries with offers of financial assistance in exchange for progress on political and economic reform.

A more targeted program, the Eastern Partnership, was established in 2008 and aims to strengthen political and economic relations between the EU and six former Soviet states -- Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine -- through visa agreements, free-trade deals and strategic partnership pacts.

Stefan Fuele, the EU's Enlargement Commissioner, said on March 27 that a revised version of the Neighborhood Policy will be rolled out in May. Speaking at the Brussels Forum, an annual meeting focusing on EU policy, Fuele said the revised approach will include stricter conditions for aid.

"As a result of this review process, you are going to have still one neighborhood policy covering both dimensions, east and south," Fuele said. "But you will have a much bigger differentiations not only between the south and the east but also within the south and within the east, with minimum of benchmarks and with individual programs for each and every of our partners."

Fuele added that the EU's new diplomatic corps, the External Action Service, would be deeply involved in the new policy and several EU embassies in target countries would be upgraded.

Pushing For More

The new catchphrase European officials are using to describe the policy change, "more for more," stresses that both expectations and rewards will be greater for participants in the Neighborhood Policy.

"A reformed European neighborhood policy should reward real progress. We want more for more," Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, whose country is due to take over the rotating six-month EU Presidency in July, said. "The faster the reforms, the greater the openness to European processes in the countries concerned, the faster the EU should respond."

Sikorski also stressed that the methods that had brought in the 10 countries from Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland, into the EU from 2004-07 are no longer applicable.

"I believe that we have run out of steam on the model that brought us, in central Europe, into the EU, and the model was this," Sikorski said. "We give you a very large carrot; membership after a grueling period of reform that requires a sort of national obsession on the part of the candidate countries. Since we are not prepared to give that big promise to the Eastern partnership countries, we should create a system of small carrots spaced out in sync with their political calendars so that particular government incentives to make reforms which they themselves would benefit."

The flip side of "more for more," of course, is that countries who fail to reform can expect "less for less," officials say.

Tough Postelection Tack

The policy changes come amid an ongoing crackdown on opposition activists in Belarus, a participant in both the Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership program, following a presidential election in December that critics say was marred by fraud.

Brussels had recently been courting Belarus with offers of better relations in exchange for political and economic reform.

Since the crackdown, the EU has imposed travel bans and asset freezes on Belarus's authoritarian President Alyaksandr Lukashenska and 157 of his associates. Brussels added an additional 19 names to the sanctions list last week.

Both Fuele and Sikorski said the EU was monitoring the situation in Belarus closely and did not rule out more sanctions in the future.

In an interview with RFE/RL, Slovak Foreign Minister Mikulas Dzurinda, said he plans to push for a new round of economic sanctions at an EU foreign ministers' meeting on April 18.

"I am feeling from the beginning that only strong, tough economic sanctions can help," Dzurinda said, "especially to people detained in prisons on political grounds."

Likewise, Sikorski says Belarus's continued participation in the Eastern Partnership will be contingent on Minsk's behavior in the months prior to the program's upcoming summit in Warsaw in September.

Being Jaruzelski?

Due to the visa ban, Lukashenka will not be allowed to attend the Warsaw event. Sikorski says the Belarusian leader now has a choice: emulate Poland's last Communist ruler, Wojciech Jaruzelski, who negotiated a transition to democracy, or share the fate of deposed leaders in Egypt and Tunisia who were forced out of power in disgrace.

"It is still president Lukashenka's choice whether he wants to, metaphorically speaking, become General Jaruzelski," Sikorski said. "In other words, [become] a dictator who represses his people but then starts transition his country towards democracy, or whether he want to end up like the gentlemen in our southern neighborhood."

Meanwhile, several southern EU member states, most notably Spain, have argued that given the dramatic transition taking place in North Africa and the Middle East, the EU should divert more money to that region at the expense of Eastern Europe.

But Salome Samadashvili, Georgia's ambassador to the EU, told RFE/RL that Brussels should continue to reward the progress that has been made in her country and several others in the east.

"I am sure it is in the interests of the EU to continue to helping us to succeed because we also create a very good example to the southern neighbors," Samadashvili said.


By Rikard Jozwiak. Published on 28 March 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/eu_to_retool_policy_toward_eastern_neighbors/3539603.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Commissioner Füle encourgaes full engagement with Belarus

Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle stressed that full engagement with Belarus within the framework of the Eastern Partnership is important to promote democracy and the rule of law in the country. He said this during the delegation meeting of Euronest Parliamentary Assembly which took place in the European Parliament on Thursday.

Füle gave an overview of the positive achievements of the Eastern Partnership during the past year, adding that Belarus was the most active country in terms of seeking funding from this project.

Referring to the bilateral relations with Belarus, he stressed that while Belarus will still be obliged to meet certain political conditions in line with other democratic country, the policy of isolation did not achieve any results and therefore supports the policy of rapprochement towards Belarus. He referred to the Action Plan as a means of finding a way of how the two sides can move forward towards deeper engagement.

Despite that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Belarus has been frozen since 1998, the European Commission is committed to continue dialogue on the visa facilitation agreement and on European Investment Bank lending to Belarus amongst other issues.

Füle said that he will soon be visiting Belarus and stressed that free and fair election will be on top on his agenda during his talks with the authorities in Belarus.

EP Chair for Euronest Parliamentary Assembly Kristian Vigenin proposed to organise a high level conference to discuss a joint strategy towards Belarus.

In Georgia and Moldova, Worries That EU Special Reps -- And Their Protection -- May Vanish

Officials in Moldova and Georgia are reacting with concern to speculation that the EU is poised to remove special representatives appointed to their regions.

If confirmed, the change would signal a major downgrading in the EU's strategic interest in both Chisinau and the countries of the South Caucasus.

EU foreign policy officials gave no hint of change on the horizon when they met with the six post-Soviet countries that make up its Eastern Partnership community last week.

Instead, officials from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus were assured that the EU's eastern neighbors remain "main priorities" for the European Union.

So it was with a mix of surprise and anger when those countries learned May 31 that the EU is looking to abolish two of its key posts in the region.

Ashton's Bombshell

An assistant to EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton told EU ambassadors on May 28 that she was looking to eliminate the EU's special representatives to Moldova and the South Caucasus.

Such a move would significantly downgrade the EU's presence on the ground in two regions seen as politically unstable and vulnerable to creeping Russian influence.

There has been no official statement from either the EU or the two affected officials -- Kalman Mizsei, the special representative to Moldova, or Peter Semneby, who holds the post for the South Caucasus.

Iulian Fruntashu, an adviser to Moldovan Prime Minister Vlad Filat, told RFE/RL's Moldovan Service he was concerned about what the move might mean for Moldova's progress toward EU integration as one of the Eastern Partners.

"The circumstances, I think, weren't the best for the work of Kalman Mizsei. But I think the position itself shouldn't be abandoned just because Catherine Ashton wants to simplify the stucture of the EU's diplomatic service," Fruntashu said. "I think that a high representative nominated by the European Council shows that the EU is making a priority of Moldova, Georgia, and other countries in the region. We are interested first and foremost in the Eastern Partnership and Moldova's place in it, and I think that it would have been useful for us to keep a special EU representive in Moldova."

The move -- which will also affect other of the EU's 11 special representatives -- has been defended as an attempt to streamline the EU's diplomatic corps. But a letter from Ashton outlining the plan also offers rationales that have struck some observers as flawed.

Ashton's letter, for one, suggests that the bloc should scrap geographically distant posts. But Moldova and the South Caucasus are both closer than Central Asia or Africa's Great Lakes region, both of which will retain their special representatives.

The letter also suggests the bloc should retain only those seen as most important for the EU -- an alarming wake-up call for countries hosting no fewer than four post-Soviet "frozen conflicts."

Labor Pains

News of the proposed change came as EU officials were gathering in Rostov-for-Donu for a summit with their Russian counterparts seen as ushering in less tempestuous relations between Moscow and Brussels.

According to the Ashton plan, Mizsei's current post would be merged with that of the European Commission's representative and eventually brought within the External Action Service, the consolidated diplomatic corps Ashton is laboring to introduce.

Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia would see a similar shift. In addition to losing the oversight of Semneby, who has held the post for more than four years and is widely respected in the region, the change would mean the end of the EU's unified approach to the South Caucasus.

Such a move could be advantageous to Moscow, which has been accused of using regional rivalries to destabilize the strategically important area.

Temur Iakobashvili, Georgia's state minister for reintegration, is a key figure in Tbilisi's battle to regain control of its pro-Moscow breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Speaking to RFE/RL's Georgian Service, he said he believed the decision was not "final," but expressed concern that a change in posts would have a negative effect on conflict resolution in the area.

"The important thing is not what the new position would be called," Iakobashvili said. "It's what would happen to [the distribution of] functions, and I think the Caucasus-wide element of Mr. Semneby's post is an important one."

He added: "Conflicts haven't vanished anywhere. In the case of Georgia, moreover, we're even facing the occupation [of our territory]. Therefore, it's an important to consider the question of how these functions will be distributed."


By Valentina Ursu, Marina Vashakmadze. Published on 1 June 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/In_Georgia_and_Moldova_Worries_That_EU_Special_Reps__And_Their_Protection_May_Vanish/2059233.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Štefan Füle Opening address to the Plenary Session Eastern Partnership Informal Foreign Ministers Meeting Sopot (Poland), 24 May 2010

Dear Ministers,

Thank you for inviting me to this informal Foreign Ministers meeting here in Sopot. I am sure that the beauty of this seaside resort will inspire us. I would like to thank in particular Minister Sikorski and Minister Moratinos for their unwavering support for the Eastern Partnership.

I am glad that we have this opportunity - one year on from the Prague summit - informally to discuss what we have achieved and where we want to go with the Eastern Partnership. I am convinced the ambitious agenda we agreed in Prague remains the right one: by seeking the political association and economic integration of our six partner countries with the EU, we will strengthen the capacity of our partner countries to make their own sovereign choices about the political and economic challenges that confront them. The development of vibrant democracies and economies able to compete in a globalised marketplace is in all our interests. Let me underline the staunch commitment of the Commission to support our partners in this process.

Mr Chairman,

Let me briefly make a few comments on what we have achieved over the past year and outline a few pointers for the future.

I believe we have got off to a flying start over the past year. I know that some of you have wanted us to go faster and further. But, if I can be frank, I know that others have been surprised at what we have achieved in such a short time.

We have made good on our offer of new contractual relations. Negotiations with Ukraine are well advanced. The negotiations of an Association Agreement with Moldova have been launched. And negotiations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia will start soon. We are engaging with Belarus on the path of an open and constructive dialogue on all fronts but, if we are to go as far as we would wish, we will need to see further progress in the field of democracy and respect for human rights. The ball is now in Minsk’s court.

We have also established the multilateral dimension of the Eastern Partnership. The four Platforms and the panels they have created are now starting to implement their 2 year work programmes. More than 70 activities are already planned for the next twelve months. Their importance should not be underestimated: they allow for sharing experiences and best practices in order to accelerate progress towards the overall objectives of political association and economic integration. The flagship initiatives which have now been launched have the same goal and are focusing on such crucial fields as border management, development of small and medium sized enterprises, and energy market integration.

Now, with the Lisbon Treaty in force and the External Action Service in sight, offering us the prospect of more joined-up EU foreign policy-making, the Eastern Partnership can give us the possibility to discuss issues of security and stability.

So what are the challenges for the future as we move towards the second Eastern Partnership Summit in the first half of next year during the Hungarian Presidency of the EU?

First, we must redouble our efforts to advance towards two of our most ambitious objectives – visa liberalisation and free trade areas. This is not easy and requires considerable homework on all sides. Let us intensify our dialogue so that we are absolutely clear about the steps that each of us needs to take to move forward. Let us also look for short term steps which can bring immediate, tangible benefits. One such could be the swift and effective implementation of the new EU visa code in all six partner countries in order to ensure uniform and decent treatment.

Let me stress in this context the importance of the Comprehensive Institution Building Programmes in the Eastern Partnership. Once in place – which should be the case next year - these programmes will provide tangible support to partner countries towards achieving the goals of new contractual relations, deep and comprehensive free trade agreements and visa liberalisation.

My second point is to ensure we make the best use of our scarce financial resources. We welcome the considerable interest shown in the Eastern Partnership from the numerous project proposals that have been presented. However, all of us must bear in mind that the bulk of EU financial support to the partner countries is devoted to bilateral programmes. This is, after all, as it should be given the bilateral focus of our policy objectives under the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership. And not all of the additional EaP funding has come on stream yet in 2010. Nevertheless from 2011, the annual EU resources designed to support reform in the 6 Eastern Partnership countries and regional co-operation will increase on average by more than half compared with the period 2007-10 . I will therefore redouble my efforts to ensure that our resources are targeted on achieving our key policy objectives and to look for new ways to improve donor coordination.

In this regard, I believe we should seek to enhance cooperation with the International Financial Institutions, notably the EIB and EBRD, to support more visible investment projects. Already we are doing a lot in this respect. The projects which have been developed under the Neighbourhood Investment Facility amount to €4 billion and are in such crucial areas as electricity networks, energy efficiency, SME financing, airport modernisation or road rehabilitation.

Increased funding, effectively used, as well as progress in the fields of mobility and trade will certainly improve the visibility of the Eastern Partnership. But I believe there is more we can do. I hope that we can start holding Eastern Partnership events in partner countries. I will make sure that the recently increased EU delegations take a leading role in projecting the Partnership in our partner countries. I believe the work of the Civil Society Forum can also play a role here.

Finally I believe third countries outside our circle of 33 can also make valuable contributions to the implementation of Eastern Partnership objectives. We should therefore consider carefully the idea of setting up a “Group of Friends” – something originally proposed by Minister Sikorski in Madrid.

Mr Chairman,

I believe we have made a good start but that we now must keep up the momentum as the Eastern Partnership moves into its second year. For this, I believe we will need robust administrative structures within the External Action Service - something I am discussing with the High Representative.

Let us ensure we all now play our part in moving forward our ambitious agenda – we will be judged by our record on implementing our commitments. Let us give greater visibility to what we have already achieved and to our ongoing activities. And let us work to make the best possible use of the financial resources we are dedicating to this enterprise.

As Commissioner for the whole of the EU’s Neighbourhood, I will continue to strive to advance our relations with all our neighbours East and South. Based on the stock-taking in the Commission’s recent Communication, I hope all of us in the coming months can reflect on how to develop our policy further.

Beyond our immediate priorities for the year ahead, we must also keep in mind the longer term horizon. Making political association and economic integration a reality, will bring our partner countries into an ever closer relationship with the EU: a community of shared values; a network of free trade areas which could in the long run lead to a Neighbourhood Economic Community; a liberalized visa area. I believe it is not too early to start reflecting on what such a relationship will mean for all of us and how we could, in due course, cement it further.

You can rest assured that, working in close coordination with Cathy Ashton and my fellow Commissioners, I will remain firmly committed to advancing the Partnership.

Thank you


Source: European Commission

Interview: After Just One Year, Are The Wheels Coming Off The EU's Eastern Partnership?

A year after its celebrated inception, the European Union's Eastern Partnership for Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan has sunk into the kind of obscurity that tends to envelop unloved EU projects.

The inaugural summit was held in Prague on May 7, 2009, amid fanfare, promises, and high expectations. A follow-up meeting of EU and partner-country foreign ministers was held in December.

But since then, the bloc's deepening economic malaise now appears to have suffocated whatever impetus the process had left. Intended to provide a regional, multilateral dimension to the longer-established European Neighborhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership has not delivered any visible added value for either the EU or the countries themselves.

The main avenue for contacts and cooperation is still provided via another channel -- association agreement talks between each of the countries and the EU. The association agreement sets the bar at nothing more than "political association," while it does hold out the long-term prospects of visa-free travel and free trade.

Meanwhile, the wheels have literally starting to come off the EU's entire approach to the western post-Soviet neighborhood, with even favorites like Ukraine and Georgia becoming increasingly wayward in their respective courses. The long-held silent assumption that most, if not all, countries in the region want to eventually join the EU can no longer be taken for granted.

Under its new president, Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine is forging links with Russia that appear to preclude a further rapprochement with the West. In Tbilisi, President Mikheil Saakashvili seems to be calculating that he no longer has anything useful to gain from subjecting himself to EU tutelage -- with senior Georgian officials telling their EU counterparts at a recent meeting that Georgia is a "value-based state, but not necessarily an EU state."

Taking a look at the prospects of the Eastern Partnership, RFE/RL Brussels correspondent Ahto Lobjakas spoke with Andrew Wilson, senior policy fellow in London at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

RFE/RL: One year on, has the Eastern Partnership achieved anything of note?

Andrew Wilson: Well, in itself it was a worthwhile policy, and it was having some marginal impact. But it has been kind of overtaken by events. You have the global economic crisis, which has hit the region particularly hard. Russia is perceived to be providing some financial help. The EU provides some help, but there the Eastern Partnership is kind of invisible. I mean [the EU's] bigger role is in leveraging IMF [International Monetary Fund] funds to the region, where that was also pretty invisible to the local publics.

America has, if not completely withdrawn from the region, [then] certainly de-prioritized it. China is a major player in the region there. So, within that kind of changed environment, the partnership isn't having the kind of impact its founders had hoped it would have back in 2009.

RFE/RL: Can we expect a revival of the Eastern Partnership in the foreseeable future?

Wilson: None is planned, but I certainly think it's necessary. Some kind of "Partnership Plus" revival, a relaunch, extra momentum -- I mean, call it what you will, it's certainly needed. There were fears that the Spanish and Belgian [rotating EU] presidencies [in 2010] would completely neglect the initiative. To be fair, they've kept it ticking over, but no more than that. Obviously, many people hope that the Hungarian and Polish presidencies [in 2011] will give it some more oomph in time for its second anniversary -- but the time to start planning that is now.

Choosing Between East And West

RFE/RL: In the EU's search for regional stability, it has tried to foster reforms in its eastern neighbors that can only take root when a deeper kind of stability exists -- one that would require more direct EU political involvement. But the bloc has refused to provide that. Isn't this a contradiction at the very heart of the EU's engagement with the Eastern Partnership countries?

Wilson: Yes, the word "stability" may be in the documents -- maybe it's the wrong word. What we're talking about is Europeanization. Often, that required a lot of destabilizing short-term action.

Look at Ukraine, for example, at the moment. A lot of Western European governments, after the chaos of the last three or four years, seemed to perhaps be willing to over-accept the prioritization of stability -- which for Yanukovych means a euphemism for strengthened central political control. That type of stability isn't necessarily a good thing. Nor is stable nonaction a good thing. Sometimes a flurry of reforms is precisely what is required.

But I think your general question is more: "Does the Eastern Partnership help the EU to get leverage on these political systems in order for them to make the necessary reforms?" And I think there you could have a problem. Particularly if you go back to the changing international context that I mentioned at the start.

It is not at all clear that we do have the means to persuade reluctant and often authoritarian leaderships in these six states to make the kinds of reforms that we'd like to see. The carrots aren't juicy enough and the sticks aren't big and threatening enough.

RFE/RL: Is it realistic to tell these countries that they do not need to choose between the EU and Russia -- as, for example, EU Enlargement and Neighborhood Commissioner Stefan Fuele does?

Wilson: We would like them to not necessarily choose [between the two] in terms of foreign policy, or cultural affinity, or whatever. But clearly we want them to choose our model, the European model. That's what the Copenhagen criteria [of EU accession] mean, after all.

But I've sometimes called the leaders of Eastern Europe a "collective Tito." They don't necessarily want to choose. They are playing a game of balance between East and West to extract resources from both sides, and it is in their interest to prolong that balancing game as long as they can.

European Catch-22

RFE/RL: Is it ultimately in the EU's own interest to limit cooperation to "deep and comprehensive free trade" and visa liberalization -- as it now does?

Wilson: Well, we're not even there yet. Again, to take the example of Ukraine, the most important state of the six, it is not at all clear yet that [an agreement permitting] "deep" free trade is within their grasp -- certainly not this year. Though the Ukrainians are trying to push on that one.

I think if those two things were achieved, then a lot would have been achieved. Deep free trade will make a considerable difference to the economies in the region. Visa liberalization, of course, makes the biggest difference to local public opinions, it would help swing that in favor of the EU. So the two things you mentioned aren't marginal, but we may not even be able to get there without being first able to [deploy] our levers of engagement for these six states.

RFE/RL: Do you think the EU may come to regret its lack of ambition if it fails to win the region for itself?

Wilson: Clearly, we're talking about a 20-year period when relatively little has been done -- which is in very sharp contrast to the kind of quick-accession politics for the likes of Poland and the Czech Republic in the 1990s. And 19 -- almost 20 -- years is a long time to spend in the waiting room of European integration.

Both sides have lost patience to a degree. But both sides are to blame. It's the standard catch-22 question -- if the EU had given a clearer perspective, then perhaps these societies would have reformed more. But the EU was never prepared to give that indication until there was more evidence of reform on the ground.

You can talk about specific historical periods when opportunities were missed -- the most important of which is the six months after the Orange Revolution and before the referenda in Holland and France in the summer of 2005 on the [EU] constitution. That was a window of opportunity that was clearly missed to make good the conditionality principle, if you like. Clearly, the environment had changed enormously and the EU did not recognize that. And the window of opportunity soon shut.


By RFE/RL. Published on 7 May 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Interview_After_Just_One_Year_Are_The_Wheels_Coming_Off_The_EUs_Eastern_Partnership/2035235.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

VADEMECUM ON FINANCING IN THE FRAME OF THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP

Table of Contents

PART I An Overview of the Eastern Partnership

1. Introduction
2. What will be financed?
3. Who will benefit?
4. Who will implement?
5. Timing

PART II Frequently asked questions

6.1 How will the EaP funding be allocated to the six eastern countries?
6.2 How will the Commission programme these funds?
6.3 How will the Commission define in details the specific measures that will be financed each year?
6.4 How will EaP funds be implemented?
6.5 How can beneficiaries access funding under the Eastern Partnership?
6.6 How can prospective recipients apply for funding under EaP?
6.7 Where can I find information on Call for proposals & Procurement notices?
6.8 Can other donors co-finance Eastern Partnership activities?
6.9 How can MS and other donors contribute to the implementation of the Comprehensive Institution Building programmes?
6.10 How can MS and other donors contribute to the implementation of the Flagship
initiatives?
6.11 Where can more details on the Flagship Initiatives be found?
6.12 Can new initiatives be proposed in the context of the work of the Platforms?
6.13 Can partner countries co-finance the Eastern Partnership?
6.14 How are the EIB and EBRD involved?
6.15 Does the Commission envisage creating a fast-track procedure for Flagship
Initiatives?
6.16 When will draft project fiches be available?
6.17 When can draft projects be sent to the Commission for review and possible approval?
6.18 Will any additional funds be available for the Eastern Partnership from the
European Investment Bank or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ? If so, how will they be allocated?
6.19 Will the funds dedicated to the EaP benefit only the Flagship Initiatives?
6.20 When will the rules guiding the implementation of projects under the EaP be known?
6.21 Are TAIEX and Twinning / Twinning Light the only tools to implement project under the Eastern Partnership?
6.22 Can the Partners countries’ regions and local authorities participate in projects implemented under the EaP?
6.23 How can I obtain further information?

Source: European Commission.
To read this document log on
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/docs/eap_vademecum_14122009_en.pdf

Eastern Partnership Glossary - An A to Z of 27 commonly used terms

A glossary comprising 27 terms commonly used in the framework of the EU’s Eastern Partnership has been produced by the ENPI Info Centre, with the support of DG RELEX and EuropeAid. The six-page ‘Eastern Partnership glossary’ is available in English and Russian, as well as in the official languages of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. All the translations have been approved by the European Commission.

The aim of this unique publication - handbook is to assist people understand the terms and expressions used when referring to the Eastern Partnership, a policy that seeks to bring closer the EU and its six neighbours in the East, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

The publication, laid out in A to Z format and easy to print, covers a variety of terms and expressions, ranging from “approximation to the EU acquis” and “bilateral track” to “conditionality”, “enhanced cooperation”, “flagship initiatives” and “panels to support the work of thematic platforms”. It also explains numerous policies, like the Black Sea Synergy, cooperation programmes like TRACECA and INOGATE, and includes some of the financial instruments available to the partner states such as SIGMA and TAIEX.

The ‘Eastern Partnership Glossary’ is available in electronic version and can be found on the ENPI Info Centre’s website, at: http://enpi-info.eu/files/interview/glossary_en.pdf.

It comes to supplement another glossary covering general terms related to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and its financial mechanism, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), also prepared by the ENPI Info Centre and available from: http://www.enpi-info.eu/main.php?id=403&id_type=2. Furthermore, a number of thematic glossaries, jargon guides and acronyms have been collected by the Info Centre and can be found under the “Resources” section of its website: www.enpi-info.eu.

Since the EU’s enlargement in 2004 an ever deeper relationship is being built between the Union and the countries on its eastern borders. One of the EU’s newest external relations policies, the Eastern Partnership, seeks to bring them closer, support their efforts for economic, social and political reform and facilitate their approximation and convergence towards the EU. The Eastern Partnership is explained on the ENPI Info Centre website and the “EU and Eastern Neighbours” section on: http://www.enpi-info.eu/maineast.php?id=506&id_type=2.

Press Release: European Commission. Published on 8 April 2010

EU Enlargement Chief Tackles Balkans, Moldova, Eastern Neighbors, And 'Elephant In The Room'

Stefan Fule, the new EU commissioner for enlargement and the European Neighborhood Policy, says the European Union is looking to keep its relations with neighbors on a pragmatic footing. Fule also recommends pragmatism to the EU's neighbors in their relations with Russia, but says the countries must remain free in choosing their own future. In an interview with RFE/RL's Brussels correspondent, Ahto Lobjakas, the commissioner also said the EU would not accept the emergence of any new states in the Balkans.

RFE/RL: Let's start with your job. As commissioner responsible for enlargement and the Neighborhood Policy, you function as part of a new setup put in place under the EU's Lisbon Treaty, which includes the high representative for foreign policy, Catherine Ashton. So what's the difference between what you do and what Ashton does?

Stefan Fule: What's new is that we [that is, the European Commission and the EU member states] coordinate much more. You could take as an example the Western Balkans, but as far as the Neighborhood Policy [goes], Ukraine, for example -- we have prepared a table in which, for the first time, we have combined what we require from Ukraine in terms of homework and incentives, the offers we can [make], and make a horizontal comparison of these two lists.

If it were only up to the commission, it would not work because you need the support of the member states and this is where [Ashton] comes on the scene -- the member states' input. My input was to take into account the current state of the EU-Ukraine, where we stand on the [Association] Treaty [talks], where we stand on the visa dialogue, where we stand on this deep and comprehensive free-trade [accord].

We combined this community approach with a political approach, and, as a result, we traveled together to Kyiv at the time of the inauguration of President [Viktor] Yanukovych, and we were able to offer him as a basis for future cooperation a rather coherent policy which reflects, again as I said, the full spectrum of what the EU could offer -- which is a combination of the community approach with a political context, political framework [provided by] the [European] Council."

RFE/RL: But that doesn't really represent a radical departure from the way things were done before...

Stefan Fule: The radical departure is that it is [Ashton's] responsibility to make sure that at the end of the day the policy towards Ukraine is coordinated, that at the end of the day both the commission and the council, in their messages to Ukraine, speak in one voice. It is her responsibility -- and that of her team -- to make sure that the EU, by talking in one voice, is actually stronger in [its] foreign [policy].

RFE/RL: However, would it be fair to say that under the old system of rotating six-month presidencies you sometimes had presidencies which took a very close interest in the Eastern neighborhood -- Sweden, for example -- and then you had presidencies which would be less focused on this -- like Portugal, or Ireland. Isn't there a danger that what you now have is a more indifferent approach, because Catherine Ashton has no particular attachment as such to Eastern Europe?

Fule: It's not indifferent. It's interesting your saying that, because if you listen to [Ashton], she's saying quite clearly that she has three priorities. The first one is to build up an external [diplomatic] service; the second one is the neighborhood, the neighborhood in its entirety. As Cathy is saying, we cannot be a global player, play a more important role, unless we show in the neighborhood in particular the effects of our [foreign] policy. And the third priority is the relationship with the strategic partners.

And I'm helping her from the side of the commission to keep the focus actually not only on the Eastern dimension of the neighborhood but also on the South, because both of these dimensions are important to us. You are absolutely right in saying that at a certain moment in time you had a six-month presidency which was more interested in the Eastern dimension of the neighborhood, [and at other times] in the South. But [this way] the message was not always coherent. I mean, if you're changing your priorities every six months -- "so what's new?" responding to your first question, is that we now have the possibility to have a medium term more coherent policy vis-a-vis our neighbors.

RFE/RL: Moving on to the specifics. The two major goals -- let's call them shared goals -- of the EU for the Eastern neighbors are free trade and the eventual lifting of visa restrictions. Do you have a clear idea when either of these objectives might actually materialize?

Fule: You are right in that these are the two basic pillars. There is another one, which is [concluding] association treaties, because at the end of the day it is all about deeper political association and economic integration. I think it is important to say two things. Talking in rather technical terms [about] a deep and comprehensive free-trade area, what we are talking about is not just another free-trade area. What we are talking about is actually trade and economic integration. This kind of agreement opens the road to the acquis [communautaire -- that is, EU legislation] related to the internal market. This is actually how these countries could make significant progress towards then later, eventually becoming members of the European Economic Area. This is the way how [while] not being an EU member you are still able to align yourself, your economy, your finances, your administration with most of the acquis we have -- as most of the [EU] acquis is related to the internal market [sector]. So, it is a rather complex exercise.

We hope that in the case of Ukraine [with which] we have already entered discussion on this deep and comprehensive free-trade agreement, we think that it is possible within a year to conclude this agreement. We are now in the process of establishing the state-of-play with Moldova -- we sent very recently almost 250 questions to our partners in Moldova and are determined to start the discussions as soon as possible. In the Caucasus, the situation is a little different because you need to be a part of the WTO [World Trade Organization], [and] one country in the region is not yet [there] -- and with the rest of the countries in the region we hope that sooner or later we will start that process. And Belarus is a little bit different player, so we will come back to this issue later on.

Then once you conclude this treaty, it takes years for the country to do the work of aligning itself to the acquis. So we have a certain [idea] of the timeframe when we will be able to negotiate such an agreement, but then it will very much depend on the speed and the commitment of that country to reforms, the commitment of that country to adopting various [bits of] legislation. [There], it's very difficult to talk about a timeline.

The visas. There are two issues. Visa facilitation -- there are countries [with which] we have concluded the technical discussions, Georgia is a very good example. We hope to very soon to send both the readmission and visa facilitation agreements to the council and the European Parliament [for approval]. There are discussions with Ukraine, and we're starting the discussion with Moldova on this issue. For the first time, we're talking with the new Ukrainian president of the road-map approach -- and, who knows, vis-a-vis other countries, too -- taking our best experiences from the Western Balkans where we have three countries benefiting [from visa-free travel to the EU].

RFE/RL: In the Western Balkans, the most pressing problem is Bosnia. Is the EU prepared to see the country break apart, as seems increasingly likely? What would the EU do should that happen?

Fule: I think what we are now preparing [for] is not that scenario. What we are now doing is focusing on how we could help Bosnia-Herzegovina at this point in time to actually avoid such a scenario. It is true that we need to do a lot of things to put this country on a much more stable basis.

RFE/RL: Such as?

Fule: I think the key is the follow-up to [the 1995] Dayton [accord]. The key is in constitutional changes. The key is to come to the end of the OHR [Office of the High Representative] chapter and through the constitutional changes open the way for the country to run itself [with] a stable, effective administration, where the European aspirations are shared by, if not all, then most [participants]. In that environment, the community approach, the accession process, would hopefully anchor Bosnia-Herzegovina firmly in the European Union.

RFE/RL: Can you definitively rule out the possibility that the EU will accept the emergence of any further countries in the region?

Fule: No, we are not ready to accept increasing the number of countries in that region, and we are doing everything with the [existing] countries to avoid that situation.

RFE/RL: Switching to Moldova, which is in a strange situation of being a small country right on the border of the EU, very close to one of its member states, yet it remains one of the poorest countries in Europe. What can the EU do to make a difference to the lives of the people in the streets?

Fule: The Eastern Partnership [contains] a very structured "menu" which we are offering to our Eastern partners in the bilateral and multilateral sphere. What it offers in practical terms in addition to the macrofinancial assistance we are now finalizing [with Moldova] is as follows. We have started the discussion on the visa dialogue with Moldova. This is after Ukraine, [which is] actually the second country to start the discussion, which we started on January 12, on an association treaty. It is a country which we hope very soon to start [talks] on a deep and comprehensive free-trade agreement.

Moldova is very active in the program of institution building, where we are offering experience and expertise on how to build the institutions the country needs for getting closer to the European Union. We are just finalizing putting together a group of experts which will be assigned to the government of Moldova. We're talking about nine experts who will help Moldova with all these processes we're talking about in general -- getting the country closer to the European Union. Which, by the way, is fantastic, because we got more than 250 requests from various member states to have their experts helping Moldova.

Moldova is also very active in all the multilateral formats of the Eastern Partnership with its concrete flagship projects like the integrated border management, like the governance in the [area] of protection of the environment, like better governance of the energy [sector].

RFE/RL: So this is where the extra money allocated to the Eastern Partnership last year will go?

Fule: Yes, exactly. we're talking about 350 million euros for the period 2011-2013 for the Eastern Neighborhood, for the six countries. There are those saying it's a decent sum of money [while], of course, for some it is not enough. But I think it is a substantial contribution of the European Union to support this very extensive structure of the Eastern Partnership. Moldova is actually a very good country to show that if you have a pro-European government, [that] if you're active enough, you could actually get a lot [out] of the Eastern Partnership offer.

RFE/RL: I know that Russia is not part of your portfolio...

Fule: But still...

RFE/RL: It is the elephant in the corner when you're dealing with the Eastern Neighborhood. During the hearings in the European Parliament in January, you said the Eastern neighbors must build up good relations with both the EU and Russia. Do you think it is fair to ask the EU's Eastern neighbors to improve relations with a Russia where -- on the European Commission's own admission -- reforms have stalled over the past eight years, which invaded Georgia in 2008, and has troubled relations with more than one Eastern EU member state?

Fule: I think it is fair for us to say that we would like to deepen our relationship with that part of Europe not at the expense of the relationships that part of Europe has with third countries. So, I think it is fair to say that no third country should feel threatened, for whatever reason, by the European Union's trying to upgrade its relations with these countries...

RFE/RL: But if Russia objects to the spread of democracy and reforms in these countries?

Fule: The relationship with Russia is not only focused on how, for example, the Russians see human rights. It is multifaceted, with energy playing a big role, for example. There [I have some] personal experience, because at one time, when the Czech Republic was about to join NATO and also, later on, the European Union, there were those telling us, "You have to choose between Moscow and Brussels." And we were saying, "Actually no, we don't want to be pushed into that decision." We were saying that actually, through joining NATO and the European Union, we could strengthen to a certain extent our relationship with Russia. And I think it is actually exactly what has happened. The relationship between the Czech Republic and Russia is not full of emotions as it was before. We feel more on an equal footing when talking to Russia. It's actually improved the relations because they are now more pragmatic. And this is also what we seek vis-a-vis the countries of the Eastern Partnership.

RFE/RL: So improving relations with Russia is fully compatible with seeking full membership in the EU and NATO?

Fule: I see absolutely no problems here. Of course, where I see a problem, is if someone at the beginning of the 21st century tries to change borders by military force. Then [there] is a problem. That is not compatible with our policy; it is not compatible with what we are offering to that part of Europe.


By RFE/RL. Published on 9 March 2010
Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/EUs_New_Enlargement_Chief_Balkans_Moldova_Russia_Fule/1978674.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Support for increased cooperation across the EU's eastern borders

The Eastern Partnership, launched in Prague in May this year, can be described as a great success. In a series of areas, the relationship between the EU and six countries along the Union’s eastern border – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus – have deepened. This was made clear when the EU’s foreign ministers met with the six countries’ foreign ministers in Brussels on 8 December.

“We are very satisfied with today’s meeting. Our discussions today show that the Eastern Partnership has gained a solid footing and is moving ahead”, says Minister for Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt.

Both the relationship with the countries as a group and bilateral relations with the individual countries have progressed. In the case of Ukraine, negotiations on an Association Treaty with the EU have progressed and are expected to conclude in 2010. Negotiations on a Moldovan Association Treaty with the EU have not commenced but are expected to take place in January. In the EU Council of Ministers, discussions on a draft mandate ahead of negotiations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are ongoing.

Progress in the areas of democracy and human rights required
Belarus is a separate case. Due to the political situation in the country, it has no partnership or cooperation agreements with the EU. The EU has however clearly stated that the Union is ready to upgrade relations with Belarus, provided that there is progress made in Belarus in the areas of democracy, human rights and rule of law.

“It has been asked whether the Eastern Partnership can be seen as a conflict resolution mechanism for certain countries. I would like to point out that this is not the case. The Eastern Partnership is a cooperation between the EU and the countries on the Union’s eastern border and its objective is social and economic development in the countries.

On the multilateral side, in the cooperation with the countries as a group, four thematic platforms – forums – have been established. Since May this year, two meetings have taken place in each of the areas. They have focused on democracy, good management and stability, economic integration and closer ties to EU policy; energy issues in a broad perspective and education, research, culture and youth issues. The meeting formally approved the work programmes for the continued work in the four areas.

Concrete examples

Through the work in the four platforms, a number of flag ship initiatives have been launched. These are concrete examples of the work in the Eastern Partnership and include integrated border control, regional energy markets, improved energy efficiency and use of renewable resources.

On 9 December, there will be further initiatives taken in connection with a meeting for the EU’s Directors-General for Civil Protection which is to take place on 10–11 December in Göteborg. The meeting will adress prevention, preparedness and measures taken in the event of natural and man-made disasters. Further initiatives are expected in early 2010.

At the meeting, strong support for developing and implementing the Eastern Partnership over the coming years was expressed.


Source: Swedish Presidency of the EU. Published on 8 December 2009

Eastern Partnership: Frequently Asked Questions

Eastern Partnership

Why are the EU and partner countries launching the Eastern Partnership?

Because the time is ripe to step up EU’s relations with its Eastern neighbours. Events in the countries in Eastern Europe and in the Southern Caucasus affect the EU. Successive EU enlargements have brought these countries closer to the EU and their security, stability and prosperity increasingly impacts on the EU’s. All these countries, to varying degrees, are implementing political, social and economic reforms, and have stated their wish to come closer to the EU.

The policy towards these countries has to be strong, proactive and unequivocal: with the Eastern Partnership the EU offers its Eastern partners concrete, far-reaching support for democratic and market-oriented reforms and thus contribute to the their political and economic stability. The multilateral component of the Eastern Partnership gives the EU an additional instrument to foster reforms, by providing a forum for the six partner countries to exchange experience and information in the framework of four platforms.

Which countries participate in the Eastern Partnership?

All 27 EU Member States and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.

Why have such different countries decided to cooperate with the EU within one multilateral framework?

While the Eastern partners may not have identical objectives in their relationship with the EU they all seek to intensify their relations with the EU. The Eastern Partnership is the reply of the EU to the challenges and aspirations of the partner countries as the EU has a vital interest in seeing further economic development, greater democratic governance and increased stability in the Eastern neighbourhood. Based on the progress made in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Eastern Partnership offers both bilateral and multilateral measures for enhanced cooperation. The partner countries will come closer to the EU depending on their individual capabilities and timeframe and together Eastern partners will cooperate more on issues related to the EU, share their experience and best practices among themselves.

What about conditionality – is the offer the same for each partner country despite different level of engagements with the EU?

No, the principle of the ENP will be maintained: how far we go in relations with each country will continue to depend on the progress made by the partners in their reform and modernization efforts. The Eastern Partnership is clearly about both – common interests and shared values.

Why was Belarus invited to be a member of the Eastern Partnership while Belarus does not participate in the ENP?

Belarus is an important Eastern neighbour of the EU, interested in developing its relations with us. Depending on its own choices and decisions, Belarus will be able to benefit from the Eastern Partnership to intensify bilateral relations with the EU. Belarus has a real opportunity to become an active partner of the EU in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy provided that the country embarks further on fundamental democratic and economic reforms and brings itself closer to common values. Initially, Belarus could participate in the activities of the multilateral platforms.

What about the Russian Federation? Is this proposal anti-Russian?

This is not at all an anti-Russian initiative. We are responding to a desire expressed throughout the countries in our Eastern neighbourhood who want to substantially deepen and widen their relations with the EU. Russia remains a crucial partner for the EU, with whom we are currently negotiating a new comprehensive agreement. We always stress that the members of the EaP will need good working relations with all their neighbours, including the Russian Federation.

What are the main new points in this initiative?

* New association agreements including deep and comprehensive free trade agreements, for those willing and ready to take on the far-reaching commitments with the EU that these entail;

* Comprehensive programmes funded by the EU to improve partners’ administrative capacity in order to be able to take up our offer;

* A conclusion of “mobility and security pacts”, allowing for easier legitimate travel to the EU while at the same time stepping up efforts to combat corruption, organized crime and illegal migration. These pacts would also cover the upgrading asylum systems to EU standards and the establishment of integrated border management structures, etc. The ultimate long term goal would be full visa liberalization, on a case by case basis, provided that conditions for well-managed and secure mobility are in place;

* The Commission will study possibilities for labour mobility with aim of further opening of the EU labour market;

* Enhanced energy security in the partner countries themselves and with the European Union, including through support to investment in infrastructure, better regulation, energy efficiency and more efficient early warning systems to prevent disruption of supply;

* Multilateral track – platforms - will support individual countries' efforts by providing a framework in which common challenges can be addressed. It will include seminars to improve understanding of EU legislation and standards, sharing of experience, and where appropriate development of joint activities. Four policy platforms are proposed: on Democracy, good governance and stability; Economic integration and convergence with EU policies, Energy security; and Contacts between people;

* Enhanced cooperation on environment and climate issues;

* Increased people-to-people contacts and greater involvement of civil society and other stakeholders.

* Additional financial support of € 350 million for the period till 2013.
Within the framework of the multilateral track, five high profile initiatives (flagship initiatives) will serve the countries' interests and at the same time our own:

* border management programme,

* integration of electricity markets, energy efficiency and renewables,

* an SME facility,

* Southern corridor and

* response to disasters.

What is the current EU financial funding for the Eastern partner countries?

The European Union already provides funding to the Eastern Partner countries for bilateral programmes under the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI). Between 2007 and 2010 spending is as follows:

* Armenia € 98.4 million;
* Azerbaijan € 92 million;
* Georgia €120.4 million (additional funding up to € 500 million will be available to cope with the consequences of the war in Georgia in August 2008),
* Moldova € 209.7 million;
* Ukraine € 494 million

In addition to the ENPI partner countries can profit from the funds from:

* the Governance Facility (maximum € 50 million annually for all ENP countries);

* the Cross Border Cooperation that brings together regions of EU Member States and ENPI partner countries sharing a common land or sea border. In 2008 the CBC East adds up to approximately € 25,6 million;

* the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF) that operates with pooled grant resources of the Community and Member States, which are used to leverage International Financial Institutions loan financing. NIF focuses on the priority sectors Energy, Environment and Transport, but support may also be provided for SMEs and Social Sector development. There are projects ongoing ranging from Energy Transmission System, Technical assistance for Improvement of Water and Sanitation Systems, to the Modernisation Project at Chisinau Airport. In 2008 the NIF has allocated almost €70 million to projects in the East.

Is there new financing involved?

Total assistance for the six Eastern neighbours will gradually grow from € 450 million in 2008 to € 785 million in 2013, an increase of nearly 75%. This will mean allocating a supplementary envelope of € 350 million in addition to the planned resources for the period 2010-2013. Moreover we will refocus €250 million that was already allocated to the ENP regional east programme to initiatives relevant for the implementation of the Eastern Partnership, bringing the total for implementing this new initiative to €600 million,

How will the Eastern Partnership address security issues?

By effectively bringing Eastern partners closer to the EU, like the ENP, the Eastern Partnership will contribute to the stability and security on the EU’s borders while enhancing good neighbourly relations and effective cooperation among partners. The Eastern Partnership will also seek to promote confidence in the region by increasing political contacts between partners (including among administrations, members of parliaments, NGOs and citizens) as well as reducing trade barriers. The Eastern Partnership foresees in addition more cooperation on specific issues within the EU’s Common Foreign Security Policy and European Security Defense Policy, including the participation of partner countries in EU missions and exercises and the coordination of diplomatic activities. Security-related early-warning systems will be enhanced, with particular focus on conflict areas. Closer cooperation on arms-export practices and non-proliferation is also envisaged.

What is the Eastern Partnership offering to the civil society organizations in partner countries?

The development and involvement of the civil society is a key factor for the success of the democratic and market-oriented reforms. The Commission proposes to support civil society actors and to engage them in the initiative through the establishment of an Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum on which consultations have already been held. The forum will promote contacts between civil society actors as well as facilitate their dialogue with public authorities.

Does the Eastern Partnership mean that the EU will offer an enlargement perspective to all/some of its Eastern neighbours?

The participation in the Eastern Partnership does not contain an accession perspective but it will go ahead without prejudice to individual participating countries' aspirations for their future relationship with the European Union.

How will the Eastern Partnership work in practice?

The success of this initiative will depend on strong political will of EU Member States and partner countries alike – joint ownership is essential in this.

The Commission will play a crucial role in making the multilateral framework an effective tool for cooperation and in developing the Comprehensive Institution Building Programmes with individual countries to offer more intensive support for reforms.

* In principle there will be biannual meetings of Heads of States or Governments involving the 27 EU Member States and the partner countries of the Eastern Partnership.

* Annual meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs would review progress and provide more detailed political guidance.

* Senior officials engaged in reform work in the relevant policy areas would meet at least twice a year. These meetings, prepared and chaired by the Commission, would take place within the framework of four thematic platforms (Democracy, good governance and stability; Economic integration and convergence with EU policies, Energy security; and Contacts between people). First platform meetings in all four areas will take place already in June 2009.

* Panels to support the work of each of the platforms would meet as often as appropriate and in the format according to need.
Bilateral cooperation will continue through the structures of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

What about the Black Sea? Isn’t the Eastern Partnership duplicating existing cooperation?

NO. The EaP complements the Black Sea Synergy (covering five Eastern ENP countries, Russia and Turkey, but not Belarus) and other regional cooperation initiatives. The Black Sea Synergy aims to solve problems which require region-wide efforts and attention. Its centre of gravity is the Black Sea. The Eastern Partnership will pursue alignment of partner countries with the EU. Its center of gravity will be Brussels. The European Council in March 2009 underlined the EU's commitment to strengthen the Black Sea Synergy and to support its implementation, and the new Black Sea partnerships are being launched in the coming months (e.g. environment and transport but also a Black Sea Civil Society Forum).


Published by the European Commission on 5 May 2009.
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/217&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

Bildt named co-father of the new Partnership

Sweden, as well as Poland and, to a certain extent, the Czech Republic, was praised for the EU Eastern Partnership initiative at a seminar at the Brookings Institution in Washington on Monday, attended by Minister for Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt, European Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner and Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski.

"The Eastern Partnership is a very important institution of the European Neighbourhood Policy," said Brookings Institution President Strobe Talbott, formerly Deputy Secretary of State at the US Department of State. Mr Talbott named Mr Bildt and Mr Sikorski as co-fathers of the initiative, while Commissioner Ferrero-Walder proudly called herself the Partnership's mother.

The themes of the seminar were the EU Eastern Partnership, energy security and EU-US cooperation. The third panel, in which Mr Bildt took part, looked to the future, even if Mr Bildt started off by commemorating the anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall.
"Enlargement will continue, but it will be more difficult. We need new instruments, and one such instrument that is now available is the Eastern Partnership."

"The Partnership also needs new friends - we gladly turn to third countries, and I am thinking particularly of the US and Turkey," said Mr Bildt, and a similar appeal for support from other countries was expressed by Poland's foreign minister Mr Sikorski.

Participants on earlier panels included Peter Semneby, EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, and Mikael Eriksson, Energy Policy Coordinator at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.


Press Release: Swedish Presidency of the European Union. Published on 3 November 2009

The Parliamentary Dimension to the Eastern Partnership

Euronest co-President Kristian Vigenin will participate and address an Interparliamentary meeting on The Parliamentary Dimension to the Eastern Partnership organised by the Swedish Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs on Wednesday 21 October 2009 in Stockholm.



As stated in the Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit on 7 May 2009, parliamentarians from the European Union and the Partner Countries are encouraged to consider ways and means of shaping a parliamentary dimension to the Eastern Partnership.



The Parliamentary Dimension to the Eastern Partnership

Introduction

Contributions by the Partner Countries

Contribution by the European Parliament

Themes for discussion:

I. What should be achieved through the Eastern Partnership’s
parliamentary dimension?

II. How to work both bilaterally and multilaterally?

III. How should work within the dimension be organized?

IV. The future work.

EU's Eastern Partnership: Additional Possibilities for European Integration of Ukraine

The Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research supported by the International Renaissance Foundation conducted an analytical research within the Project "The Eastern Partnership’ Initiative of the EU: Evaluation and Perspectives of Development of Additional Integration Possibilities for Ukraine".



CONTENT

Introduction

The Eastern Partnership initiated by Poland and Sweden and officially approved by the European Council on March 19-20 this year, and that came into force in the Summit of the Eastern Partnership on May 7 in Prague, is directed at strengthening of the bilateral and multilateral cooperation of the European Union (the EU) and the Eastern European Partners and among themselves.

The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is designated to strengthen the democratization in the Eastern European and Southern Caucasus states, to provide assistance to them in the processes of European integration, modernization and the rule of law. Though, the Eastern Partnership as a continuation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has a series of drawbacks related to vague institutional structure and low level of financing for implementing such ambitious goals. Practically all of the Partner States and even some Member States expressed certain scepticism towards the new format of different EU policies. Though, this format has been proved and officially initiated, and the EU recurrently declares on the new additional values, which may receive both the EU and the Partner States from implementation of the Eastern Partnership.

Read more: http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua/files/books/EaP_2009e.pdf

Chapter І. Transformation of the EU Eastern Policy into the format of the Eastern Partnership Initiative
1.1. Development and selection of the European Neighbourhood Policy in the East
1.2. Polish-Swedish Initiative – concentration of the EU efforts in the Eastern Europe
1.3. Harmonization of the Initiative with other EU policies and interests of the Partner States in the Eastern Europe

Chapter ІІ. Additional integration values and opportunities of the Eastern Partnership
2.1. Eastern Partnership as a new tool of strengthening the integration processes
2.2. Resource base for implementing the Eastern Partnership Initiative
2.3. Political and legal framework of the Eastern Partnership Initiative for the European integration and reforms in Ukraine
2.3.1. Additional capabilities of the Eastern Partnership Initiative in the sphere of the EU and Ukraine cooperation o­n political and legal issues
2.3.2. Bilateral cooperation of Ukraine and the European Union in the Comprehensive Institution-Building Programme (CIB)
2.3.3. Multilateral Platform "Democracy, Good Governance and Stability"
2.4. Regional Development Program within the Eastern Partnership
2.5. Economic Vector in the Eastern Partnership and Additional Opportunities for Ukraine
2.5.1. New Opportunities of the Eastern Partnership for Developing the Economic Relations of Ukraine and the EU
2.5.2. Perspective Spheres and Formats for Cooperation of Ukraine and the EU within the Eastern Partnership framework
2.5.3. Recommendations for the Eastern Partnership economic projects
2.6. Additional values of the energy dimension of the Eastern Partnership for the integration of Ukraine
2.6.1. Energy cooperation within the framework of the Eastern Partnership
2.6.2. Integration of Ukraine into the EU energy space – a precondition for stability and development
2.6.3. Proposals o­n using the Eastern Partnership format for integrating Ukraine to the EU energy market
2.7. Migration, mobility and visa issues in the format of the Eastern Partnership
2.7.1. Cooperation within the Eastern Partnership – increase of migration regulations efficiency
2.7.2. Eastern Partnership Potential for Visa Regulations
2.7.3. To visa-free regime through regulation of justice, migration and border spheres
2.8. Security, Defence and Stability within the Eastern Partnership Initiative
2.8.1. Eastern Partnership and the Key Challenges for the European Security
2.8.2. ESDP Development Tendencies and the Eastern Partnership
2.8.3. Eastern Partnership and the ESDP Tools and Mechanisms for their Development

Chapter III. Eastern Partnership: Implementation and Monitoring
3.1. Evaluation of Perspectives for Implementing the Eastern Partnership Initiative
3.1.1. Is bilateral dimension of the Eastern Partnership a way to complete integration with the EU?
3.1.2. Perspectives of Implementing the Multilateral Dimension of the Eastern Partnership
3.2. Monitoring of the Initiative Implementation
3.3. Civil Society in the Eastern Partnership

Conclusion



This book is an analytical publication which highlights the analysis of a new format of the EU policy in the East (concerning Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Moldova) and views o­n possibilities of this policy application for further process of the European integration of Ukraine, that is in bilateral dimension – full integration of Ukraine to the EU structures, and in multilateral dimension – development and enhancement of regional cooperation between all the Eastern partners and the EU; as well as recommendations for using the Eastern Partnership possibilities.

This publication is supported by the International Renaissance Foundation. The views of the authors do not necessarily reflect the official position of the International Renaissance Foundation or the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats.

Download:http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua/files/books/EaP_2009e.pdf