EuroNest

Council of Europe legal specialists condemn Belarus on NGO freedom

2011-10-20T10:45:00.001+02:00

The Council of Europe's advisory body on constitutional matters – better known as the Venice Commission – strongly criticised Belarus for its treatment of non-government organisations (NGOs).

During its plenary session in Venice on 14-15 October, the Commission noted that in the last ten years, almost all human rights NGOs were stripped of their status.

The Venice Commission also deplored a recent modification of Article 193-1 of the Belarus criminal code that represses freedom of association, with the threat of two years incarceration.

Belarusian legislators had approved a package of amendments that significantly expand KGB powers – including the right to enter homes – in addition to banning foreign financing of NGOs. Once the bill is signed into law, security officers will be authorised to break into organisations, as well as residential homes, if they believe a crime was or is being committed or a criminal suspect is hiding inside.

Belarus has been criticised often by the Council of Europe as the only European country which still uses the death penalty.

Source: Council of Europe. Published in strasbourg on 17 October 2011

The first Ordinary Session of the Euronest PA in September

2011-09-08T15:29:00.001+02:00

FIRST ORDINARY SESSION

Thursday 15 September 2011
9:00 - 11:50 hrs
Strasbourg

DRAFT AGENDA

Formal opening by Mr Jerzy BUZEK, President of the European Parliament,with an address by Mr Štefan FÜLE, Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy

1. Adoption of draft agenda

2. Approval of minutes of the constituent session of 3 May 2011 in Brussels

3. Exchange of views with Mr Janusz LEWANDOWSKI, Commissioner on Budget and with Mrs Cecilia MALMSTRÖM, Commissioner on Justice, Liberty and Security

4. Discussion and adoption of a Resolution with recommendations to the EaP Summit meeting on 29-30 September 2011 in Warsaw

5. Discussion and adoption of a Declaration on Belarus

6. Discussion and adoption of the Euronest Work Plan for 2011-2012, including the activities of the Standing Committees and the Working Groups

'Stop The Dictatorship' -- An Interview With Georgian Opposition Figure Nino Burjanadze

2011-07-11T10:48:00.001+02:00

With her perfectly coiffed hair, controlled manners, and impeccable clothes, Nino Burjanadze has the appearance of a stern yet kindly schoolteacher.

But the 47-year old lawyer and former parliamentary speaker is actually one of the most controversial opposition figures in Georgia at the moment. And she does not blush about it for a second.

Rather than presenting a mea culpa for all of the questionable moves she has made in recent years, she instead wants to tell what she calls "the truth" about her political foe -- Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili -- and the political climate he has created in her country.

Speaking to RFE/RL during a recent visit to Brussels, Burjanadze didn't mince her words, describing the Georgian president as "Europe's new dictator" who is in total control of the media, the judiciary, and the police.

"I think Georgia is not a reliable partner of the European Union right now," she said. "And even worse, the situation in Georgia is getting worse every day."

Relationship Deteriorated

But Burjanadze was not always this critical of the current political elite. Promoted to the role of speaker of the Georgian parliament in 2001 by the previous Georgian leader, Eduard Shevardnadze, she was instrumental in paving the way for the Rose Revolution that swept away her former patron two years later and ushered Saakashvili into power.

She stayed on as speaker until 2008, embracing Saakashvili's reforms and his desire to integrate the country with NATO and the European Union.

Her close affiliation with the president deteriorated in 2008 after what she claimed was the stalled democratization process in the country, as well as what she believes was Saakashvili's mishandling of the August war with Russia over South Ossetia the same year.

But critics allege that Burjanadze really quit because her allies did not get as many places on the ruling United National Movement's party list in the May 2008 parliamentary elections.

Burjanadze resigned shortly after those elections and formed her own party, Democratic Movement-United Georgia, turning into a vociferous critic of the government. Despite polling at only 2 percent, Burjanadze is still making headlines in Georgia with periodic noisy street protests. The government has countered her activities with what she described as a "campaign of terror."

"Everybody knows that all telephones are [being listened to]," she said. "Everybody knows that if you express different views from the government you might lose your job. If you are an active member of the opposition you may find in your pocket drugs or a gun and you might be in jail for many months or even years because there is no independent judiciary in the country."

Numerous Scandals

Her clean-cut image has also been tarnished by numerous scandals in recent years.

Several members of her party have been arrested for attempting to overthrow the government, and her husband Badri Bitsadze recently fled the country after being accused of employing paramilitary troops in an antigovernment rebellion. There are also persistent rumors of her being a Russian quisling, receiving indirect money from Moscow.

The biggest controversy occurred in May when Burjanadze organized street protests with the stated aim of removing Saakashvili from power. The demonstrators were given a permit to hold rallies in downtown Tbilisi from May 21 until midnight on May 25. A military parade to mark Georgia's Independence Day was scheduled for May 26.

But Burjanadze and her allies refused to disperse, even when the authorities offered them an alternative venue in the center of the city, saying they intended to prevent the military parade from taking place.

The police began to suppress the protests with tear gas and rubber bullets after midnight on May 25. Some of the demonstrators appeared intent on provoking violence, attacking police with sticks and metal pipes.

Two people were killed in the subsequent chaos. The government quickly pointed the finger at Burjanadze, claiming that the deaths occurred when a car in which she was traveling sped through a group of people -- a story she dismissed with a wave of the hand.

"Without any proof and without any evidence the government immediately [said] that my son was driving the car and that this was my car," she said. "I am calling [for] an international investigation. I am ready to give any information to an independent investigation committee."

Eerie Similarities

The events of May 2011 are eerily similar to a crackdown on protesters that occurred in November 2007. The difference is that she, as the speaker of parliament and a Saakashvili ally then, endorsed the government's violent response. She strongly condemned the authorities' handling of the recent protests.

Burjanadze is keen to dispel the similarities and her apparent flip-flopping on the issue. Armed with maps, photos, and videos showing the police breaking up the demonstration, she explained how protesters were surrounded on all sides by riot police. She said the government simply wanted to "punish the people."

She also defended her actions as speaker in 2007.

"First of all, when I was a speaker of the parliament and there was a crackdown of the demonstrators, I opened the door to the parliament and gave the possibility for people to enter in the parliament building to survive from the gas and police," she said. "I supported at that time investigation about excessive force and I signed a special decree in the parliament that the investigation commission should be established and investigate excessive force."

In the same fashion, she defended herself against other accusations leveled against her.

She brushed off her alleged Russian connection, despite the fact that she has traveled to Moscow to meet with President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, both of whom have expressed a desire to see Saakashvili overthrown.

'This Is Bringing Nothing'

Claiming that Saakashvili's policies toward Tbilisi's mighty neighbor to the north has only brought about the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Burjanadze said she favors closer ties with both Russia and other allies in the West.

"Ignorance of Russia did not bring anything good for my country," she said. "One thing is that you have to try to find a right language to protect your country's interest. Another thing is not to speak with the people whom you don't want to speak. This is bringing nothing."

When it came to her husband, who is allegedly hiding from the Georgian justice system abroad, she was equally combative.

"They want to keep my husband as a hostage in jail to push me to change my political motivation or not to continue my struggle," she said.

She also suggested that Georgia risks descending into the same type of bloodshed witnessed during uprisings across North Africa and the Middle East.

"One day in Georgia if things will continue like that in any case there will be an explosion," she said, "but it will be similar to the Middle East right now. It is dangerous for the country's stability and this might bring bloodshed. So we have to stop the dictatorship right now."

By Rikard Jozwiak. Published on 7 July 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/georgia_nino_burjanadze_/24258110.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

With Economy In Free Fall, Belarusian President Running Out Of Options

2011-06-20T11:33:00.002+02:00

Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka seems to be running out of options. Rapidly.

Minsk applied to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bailout of up to $8 billion, that on top of the $3.5 billion the fund provided following the 2008 global financial crisis and the $3.5 billion package that the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Community pledged last month. China has also provided about $1 billion in trade credits.

The latest request to the IMF comes as the country scrapes the bottom of its hard-currency reserves, experiences growing double-digit inflation, and watches the national currency lose value by the day.

The meltdown was sparked largely by increases in the rates Minsk must pay for Russian energy and a lavish, populist campaign of public spending that Lukashenka rolled out in the run-up to the December 2010 presidential election.

The IMF might offer Belarus a lifeline, but the conditions will be harsh, says Matthew Rojansky, the deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program of the Carnegie Endowment.

"A bailout should be possible, as long as the necessary nonpolitical conditions can be imposed. But I think the IMF would take in some ways a similar approach as the Eurasian Economic Community in demanding that there is proof of action before the money gets released," Rojansky says. "It would be foolish for them to do otherwise, to give Lukashenka even the first tranche, which he would use to prolong his short-term survival and then probably maneuver for some other alternative without undertaking the necessary reforms."

Bitter Medicine

An IMF team wound up a visit to Minsk on June 13, warning Lukashenka that "structural reforms" must be implemented if Belarus hoped to receive further assistance. Such reforms would break his vise grip on the Belarusian economy. The Bloomberg news agency ran a stark headline on June 14 that encapsulates the situation: "Lukashenka Must Choose Between Belarus Control or IMF Aid."

The head of the IMF team in Belarus, Chris Jarvis, told reporters in Minsk that any new assistance would be contingent upon "a strong program" that addressed the deficiencies of Belarus's state-dominated economy. "We would also have to be sure that all actors -- the president, government, and national bank -- are committed to that program," Jarvis said.

And that has long been a problem in a country that has been autocratically ruled by Lukashenka for 17 years. Yury Shautsou, director of the Minsk-based Center for Problems of European Integration, says the economists in the National Bank have trouble implementing their policy suggestions.

Shautsou says that while there are "some very good people" in the National Bank and Finance Ministry, he has "spoken to many of them and they say, 'We prepare good documents but then the presidential administration issues instructions or orders that say the exact opposite thing.' This raises the question of who is making decisions about the Belarusian economy."

A Threat To Lukashenka?

The economic situation in Belarus -- which is a relatively small and isolated economy -- is increasingly presenting political challenges to the Lukashenka government. In addition to a sweeping crackdown since December against the political opposition that has provoked the ire of the West, Belarusian security forces have put down numerous protests sparked by the crisis.

On June 12, police in Hrodna forcibly dispersed a demonstration of drivers who were protesting draconian new rules imposing customs fees on cars leaving the country with more than 5 liters of gasoline more than once every five days. On June 14, Lukashenka vowed to "strike hard" against any further public protests in the country.

Economist Anders Aslund of the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, said in an interview posted on the institute's website that the Belarusian meltdown presents more of a political problem than an economic one for the country's neighbors.

Aslund said that while Belarus was "not sufficiently important" to threaten a regional economic contagion and the country that most concerned is Russia, which "can easily take it. So, if there would be a contagion, it would be political. It would be like the Arab Spring, and it could go to Ukraine and to Russia, because Lukashenka can not take this politically."

Aslund sees the crisis as similar to the collapse of the state-centered economic model of the Soviet Union.

Analyst Rojansky agrees that the economic meltdown is likely the beginning of the end of Lukashenka's rule in Belarus, although he avoids saying the president's departure is imminent. Nonetheless he urges the West and Russia to begin planning for a post-Lukashenka Belarus.

He says that although Russia's oligarchs are pushing hard for the opportunity to buy up Belarusian state assets at fire-sale prices, Moscow's long-term interests in the country are similar to the West's.

Rojansky says Russia and the West "can agree that we don't want a humanitarian crisis. We can agree that if there is real political instability in Belarus -- even if we don't agree on what the outcome should be -- that we don't want violence and we don't want to be reacting to one another in the kind of hostile way that you saw around the Georgia crisis in 2008."

By Robert Coalson. Published on 14 June 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/economy_in_crisis_belarus_president_running_out_of_options/24234827.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Viktor Yanukovych and Serzh Sargsyan among leading figures to address PACE summer session

2011-06-14T17:07:00.000+02:00

Strasbourg, 10.06.2011 – Addresses by Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych (Tuesday 21) and Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan (Wednesday 22) will be among highlights of the summer plenary session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in Strasbourg on 20-24 June 2011.

Support for fledgling Arab democracies will be the main theme on Tuesday, when the parliamentarians will decide on the Moroccan Parliament’s request for “Partner for Democracy” status with the Assembly, followed by statements from the Speakers of both chambers of the Parliament, Abdelwahed Radi and Mohamed Cheikh Biadillah. Tunisian Foreign Affairs Minister Mohamed Mouldi Kefi will also take part in a debate on the situation in Tunisia.

This will be followed by a joint debate on sharing responsibilities for asylum seekers and refugees in Europe, and on the interception and rescue at sea of asylum seekers, refugees and irregular migrants. A number of refugees and asylum seekers who have come together to form a “living library” will be present during session week to share their personal experiences.

Wednesday sees a debate on follow-up to the report of the Council of Europe Group of Eminent Persons “Living together in 21st century Europe”. Bulgarian Foreign Minister Nikolay Mladenov will also address the Assembly on the same day.

On Thursday, the Assembly holds its biennial debate on the state of human rights in Europe. German Federal Justice Minister Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger and the Attorney General for England and Wales Dominic Grieve will take part in a joint debate on national parliaments as guarantors of human rights in Europe, and on the role of parliaments in the consolidation and development of social rights in Europe. This will be followed by the ceremony to award the Parliamentary Assembly’s Human Rights Prize for 2011 to the Russian NGO “Committee against Torture”.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Gryshchenko will present the Communication from the Committee of Ministers to the Assembly on Monday afternoon, and answer questions from parliamentarians. On Wednesday, there will also be a debate on reform of the Assembly.

Source:PACE. Published in Strasbourg on 10 June 2010

Ukraine - the case of YuliaTymoshenko

2011-06-10T09:29:00.001+02:00

The Group of the Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament announced that it will not support the proposed, EPP initiated joint resolution on the case of the former Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko later today.

Its Vice-President Hannes Swoboda stressed that the Ukrainian authorities must of course avoid any perception that judicial measures are used selectively, and confirmed that also the S&D Group insists that a maximum transparency of investigations, prosecutions and trials must be guaranteed; in particular where it concerns leading politicians who are in opposition to the government.

"The European integration process is of the greatest importance for the pursuance of economic, social and political reforms in Ukraine", said Mr. Swoboda, "and respect for the rule of law, incorporating fair, impartial and independent legal processes is for our Group a prerequisite for the further development of relations between the EU and Ukraine".

"But this also means that all political forces inside and outside Ukraine must refrain from any interference in the work of the country's judicial authorities", said Mr. Swoboda.

Mr. Swoboda welcomed the approval of the law against corruption by the Verkhovna Rada and stressed that all political forces in Ukraine should cooperate with the authorities to take care of its full and impartial implementation as from 1 July 2011.

"The European Union should assist the government of Ukraine in its further efforts to bring about the necessary reform of the judiciary system in the country. The resolution which is now presented to the European Parliament does, however, not reflect this willingness to make a joint effort to bring about the necessary reforms in Ukraine" said Mr. Swoboda.

The S&D Group in the European Parliament will continue to keep a critical eye on the internal developments in the country, but also wants to express its clear support for the Ukrainian decision to go the European way.

Source: S&D. Published on 9 June 2011.

Moldova’s local elections largely met international standards, but remaining legal and regulatory issues need to be considered, observers say

2011-06-07T11:04:00.000+02:00

Moldova’s local elections largely met OSCE and Council of Europe election-related commitments, in conditions conducive to a competitive campaign and offering voters a genuine choice, international observers from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Council of Europe's Congress of Local and Regional Authorities concluded in a statement issued today.

However, the observers noted that remaining legal, administrative and regulatory issues need to be further considered in order to ensure continued forward progress.

“Electoral participants noted much more equitable opportunities to reach voters as part of a competitive campaign, but improvements in the regulation of political financing would further benefit the electoral process,” said Gerald Mitchell, the Head of the OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission. “A more concerted effort to introduce a centralized electronic voter register would also further improve the process.”

“Voters in this election clearly benefitted from a wide range of options,” said Britt Marie Lövgren, the Head of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities delegation. “But the competencies of local authorities in election administration need to be clearer. If they are in charge of important aspects of election administration, this must be clear in law and they must be given the necessary resources.”

The observers found that the candidate registration process was inclusive and provided voters with a genuine choice. Media covered the election campaign through a variety of formats, including editorial broadcasts, debates and paid advertising, offering voters a broad range of information about contestants and their programmes.

The legal framework provides a sound basis for the conduct of democratic elections, and the election administration performed in a transparent and professional manner overall, perceived as impartial by the majority of stakeholders.

However, the postponement of the introduction of a centralized electronic voter register meant that voter lists were again prepared by local authorities. As in previous elections, this resulted in concerns over their accuracy. The ongoing problem of unclear residency provisions to designate proper place of voting underscored these difficulties.

Also, mechanisms for the oversight of political financing are insufficiently developed and lacking in precision and adequate enforcement. A lack of clarity over the division of competencies among different levels and bodies of government also raised concerns over the provision of clear and sufficient funding to allow them to carry out their respective tasks.

Election day procedures, including voting and counting, proceeded calmly and were conducted in a generally orderly and transparent manner.

Source: OSCE. Published on 6 June 2011 in Chisinqu.

“A new response to a changing Neighbourhood”

2011-05-27T09:15:00.001+02:00

STATEMENT by Mr Kristan VIGENIN, Co-President of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly and Chairman of the EP Delegation to the Euronest PA on the occasion of the publication of the Joint Communication by the European Commission and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on “A new response to a changing Neighbourhood”

Mr VIGENIN congratulated the Commission and the High Representative on the new communication, which presents a re-adapted strategic approach to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

The commitment to work together towards "deep democracy", as one of the main priorities in the document, will bring more clarity on the goals and the road ahead in the relations with our neighbours. There is a clear signal that not only the responsibility but also the accountability for the results achieved is shared.

With regard to the Eastern neighbourhood, it is essential that the Communication makes a reference to articles 8 and 49 of the Treaty on European Union. The Communication also focuses on the need for better tailoring of the partnership offer towards individual countries through the "more for more" approach. The membership perspective is a strong incentive for some of our partners in the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly. It gives more added value to the strengthened cooperation with the EU and demands a deep commitment from our partners.

The drafting of annual reports on the progress of the neighbouring countries provides greater opportunities, both for the EP to play its key role in the assessment process and for the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly to have a fresh input to the monitoring and implementation of the main lines of the new ENP.

Mobility and people to people contacts; media freedom; support to political parties, NGOs and social partners will be main subjects of discussion in the Euronest bodies and I commend the Commission for setting out the partnership with civil society as a priority. This shows that we have learned our lesson from recent events in North Africa.

Finally, it is crucial for the Member States to understand that the new ENP will not be successful unless it is supported by the joint efforts of all EU institutions and countries. Individual actions would undermine the solid basis for a common EU strategy that has been presented in this document.

Interview: Moldovan Foreign Minister Reaffirms Policy Of European Integration

2011-05-23T10:38:00.001+02:00

Moldovan Foreign Minister Iurie Leanca says that further integration with Europe is the only way forward for his country and the best way of resolving the long-standing frozen conflict in breakaway Transdniester.

Leanca visited RFE/RL's headquarters in Prague and participated in a wide-ranging conversation about his country's ambitions and the challenges it faces.

RFE/RL: The current ruling coalition came to power as a bloc largely against the Communist Party. How is it functioning now and does it actually stand for something?

Iurie Leanca: Having a coalition in power is a reflection, an expression of a certain maturity of the society. But from what I understand, a coalition, or the exercise to work or act in a coalition, is never a very easy exercise. We are in the Czech Republic and from what I understand, they also have a coalition government of three parties. And from what I understand it is not a very easy way of co-habitating. They have their own problems -- I don't know whether they are bigger or smaller than is the case with the Moldovan coalition, but these problems exist everywhere, from what I understand.

Now, the Moldovan coalition -- maybe in the first place it was against the Communists, but I think it is also a coalition in favor of something. And the most important objective is in favor of modernizing Moldova. It is not by accident that the coalition is called the Alliance for European Integration.

And I think that it unites us. Yes, there are differences, differences in terms of foreign policy. There are differences in terms of how to pursue economic policies or the social policies. Yes, there are animosities. Yes, there are rivalries and the [upcoming] local elections show that we are not exempt from any human feelings.

But look at the decision made by my party to withdraw its candidate for mayor of Chisinau and to support the current mayor, the incumbent one. It was not an easy decision. You might tell us it was a decision based on certain realities. Maybe. But we made this decision. We have proved we can, maybe, take a decision which is not very popular in our own party, but shows that we can really work for the interests of the country. Again, it is not an easy exercise but I think there are more elements which unite us than things which are problematic within the coalition.

Seeing The Positives In Eastern Partnership

RFE/RL: A lot of people have been skeptical about the European Union's Eastern Partnership and are saying that it has been largely pushed off the agenda. What is your view?

Leanca: By the way, it is quite interesting -- to some extent, maybe symbolic -- that my visit takes place almost two years after the launch of the Eastern Partnership initiative here in Prague in May 2009. Let me mention in the beginning that the then-Moldovan authorities were very unhappy with the fact that Moldova was included in the Eastern Partnership because they felt that Moldova deserves very special treatment and should be put somewhere together with the western Balkans in the same package.

And maybe there is some rationale in this attitude, but the problem is that during eight years they did everything possible and impossible in order to make the distance between us and Brussels bigger and not closer. When we started to work as a government, we proceeded from the understanding that this is a reality and we cannot change it.

And since it is a reality then we need to benefit from all those opportunities which were enshrined in this initiative once it was launched -- the association agreement and the visa-free-regime perspective and the so-called free-trade area and the common aviation space and the cooperation in energy. These elements are all envisaged in the Eastern Partnership.

And there is another very important principle which is very dear to us -- the principle of differentiation. Because if Belarus is not eager to join the EU or Azerbaijan, from what I understand, wants more like Switzerland's EU relationship and doesn't necessarily envision its membership -- that's their sovereign decision. In the case of Moldova -- again, I don't see another alternative, I don't see another viable option -- therefore, this principle of differentiation should be applied. And that's what we discuss with our European Union friends.

I don't see, by the way, it's not my impression that the Eastern Partnership has become a less important initiative. No, on the contrary, France, for instance, just recently has appointed an ambassador-at-large for the Eastern Partnership and France didn't have in the previous two years such a special coordinator of French policies in this respect. And due to the fact that there is a group of countries -- like Sweden, the Baltic countries, the Visegrad group, Romania -- the interest for this initiative -- at least that's my feeling -- is not diminishing.

Of course, there are new challenges -- the developments in northern Africa, for example, lead to discussions on redistributing some financial resources. But, again, I don't have the feeling that it is less important and I do believe that we could use the existing framework in order to get out of the Eastern Partnership and to get just a bilateral-relationship treatment.

You know that the European Union, the commission, is now finalizing the review process of the European Neighborhood Policy. And when the exercise was launched at the end of last year, those who shaped or drafted the future principles of the future Neighborhood Policy wrote something that the countries of the Eastern Partnership could get as close to the EU as they wanted except the membership perspective. Since December, less than half a year, I am very happy to see that no one speaks anymore about this principle being stipulated in the review process that is about to be published. On the contrary, we hear that a certain reference to Article 49 from the Lisbon Treaty, which envisages the right of any European country which meets certain criteria to apply for membership. And I think that is an excellent transformation.

So, again, Moldova is more or less happy with the existing framework, of course, provided that it will not keep us forever from the chance to move beyond it and to discuss about the prospects to have the right to apply for membership. And we will do this -- we haven't decided when because we need to make sure that our internal developments will be as positive as last year and that what happened last year was not just a kind of accident of history and now we come back to the chaos. No, we need to prove the sustainable developments of the economy, the political institutions. And then, after you have more arguments, to apply for membership. And we will do that.

Again, the Eastern Partnership is not an impediment in this respect. And we are very keen to make sure that the Warsaw summit in September will produce some positive decisions -- and the most important for us is to make sure that the reference to this article is somewhere there. At least, the Czechs, the Poles, the Swedes -- from what I know -- are working to this extent.

RFE/RL: It is good to hear a positive assessment of the Eastern Partnership.

Leanca: It depends what the country wants. For instance, our Belarusian friend, the minister of foreign affairs, whenever he would come to meetings dedicated to the Eastern Partnership, we would speak just about money and would complain [that] they don't give us enough money.

I don't think the Eastern Partnership is just about money without any kind of preconditions. It is in the first place about sharing the same values, I think. So if you have the right approach, if you come with the right arguments and you have some data, I think the response is also positive and at least that is what we experienced in our relations with the commission and the member states.

RFE/RL: Could you tell us about your country's relations with Georgia?

Leanca: I don't want to hide from you that there are some impediments -- and the impediment is the sensitivity of one country. We proceed from the fact that we have common problems -- we are, so to say, hosting frozen conflicts. We have common aspirations and we need to exchange experience. And there is already a quiet, good exchange of experience.

For instance, Georgians are learning from us how to negotiate the association agreement, because we have managed in a very short period of time to become real champions in this respect. We are learning from them how to reform the police, for example, especially the road police. The minister of the interior was in Georgia just a few weeks ago. We hope that a few experts from Georgia will come to us and will show us, advise us, how to implement this concept, how to fight more effectively against corruption.

And I'm sure that in the fall we will have also the visit of the prime minister to Georgia on the invitation which was addressed before by President [Mikheil] Saakashvili. I think the cooperation, the dialogue is proceeding pretty well and is mutually beneficial.

Transdniester Conflict

RFE/RL: Since you are here in the Czech Republic, I was wondering if it is possible that you could see the "civilized divorce" between the Czech Republic and Slovakia as a model for a settlement of your Transdniester conflict?

Leanca: Interestingly enough, these questions about the Czechoslovak model of civilized divorce (painful, but civilized) were asked yesterday and I was a bit surprised to hear that one could draw some parallels. I think that there are no similarities.

In Czechoslovakia, there were two nations -- two identities, distinct identities, two languages -- whereas Transdniester is a very artificial entity. Still the ethnic Moldovans represent almost 40 percent. So, it has nothing to do with identity. It has nothing to do with religious confessions. It has to do just with the political problems.

Let's not forget that Transdniester was created as a problem before the break-up of the Soviet Union, as a labyrinth to keep Moldova inside the Soviet Union and it is developing based on this model. I don't know whether Transdniester is really self-sustainable as an economic model.

Let me bring you just one figure -- on the right bank of Moldova, even the most impoverished categories pay today $400 per 1,000 cubic meters [of natural gas]. More than $400, which -- even if there are no average prices for gas because it is not yet a full commodity -- but still, we pay almost the same that consumers in Romania or in Bulgaria pay. In Transdniester, consumers pay something like $85 per 1,000 cubic meters. And this money is not even sent to the entity Moldovagas, which pays for the consumption of the gas to Gazprom. No, it is consumed locally in Transdniester.

As a result of this, every year, the debt of Transdniester is increasing and it is now almost like $2.5 billion. Without this money, would they be able to exist? I think no. Without the so-called humanitarian assistance from Moscow which is allowing them to add to the pensions a certain amount of money, would they be able to exist. I doubt it. So, again, I don't think it is viable, neither as a political entity nor as an economic entity.

So, because of this, the only chance is, of course, to make sure that we can create the conditions for their smooth, harmonious reintegration. But any solution of the Transdniester conflict -- and that is what I'm telling almost every day to our European partners -- should be achieved not at the expense of our European future, but just to consolidate our chances to become [a member of] the EU. Any other solution is not viable and will not, in fact, be accepted in Chisinau.

Ukraine's 'Leverage'

RFE/RL: Could you describe Moldova's current relations with Ukraine, particularly in the context of the Transdniester situation?

Leanca: Relations with Mr. [Kostyantyn] Hryshchenko are developing in a positive way from a cold start into a more personal, positive, and constructive relationship, number one.

Nunmber two, Ukraine has a huge potential to help us to address the Transdniester conflict. Maybe Ukraine on its own and together with us would not be able to resolve the conflict, but Ukraine has the leverage -- and especially the former administration when Mr. [Petro] Poroshenko was the minister showed that it has the leverage -- to make the Transdniestrian leadership hear the opinion of Ukraine and of Moldova.

You'll remember when we started the demarcation process on the Transdniestrian segment [of the border], the initial reaction was negative. [Transdniester leader Igor] Smirnov was summoned to Kyiv after the flow of goods in Odesa stopped to Transdniester for two days and suddenly he became very flexible and very cooperative.

So what I would like to see from the current Ukrainian administration -- and of course we are trying to pursue this line -- we want them to be a lot more active. Their position is that first we need to address the demarcation, the property issues, and then we'll be able to focus. I don't think these two exclude one another.

But again, I hope that in July maybe we'll have a package deal that will represent a win-win situation for both sides on the property and on demarcation. And then based on that happy end to these difficult, very sensitive, very delicate relations, we will be able to focus more on Transdniester. We'll be able to focus more on energy. And we'll be able to work maybe better together on our common aspirations, European aspirations.

RFE/RL: Thank you very much for visiting RFE/RL in Prague.

Leanca: I hope you will continue to broadcast. I hope we will be able to continue to benefit from your help, from the way you present developments in a very fair and unbiased situation. Moldovan society still needs this, so I hope you will have always the financial resources to continue.

By RFE/RL. Published on 18 May 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/interview_moldova_foreign_minister_reaffirms_policy_of_european_integration/24179142.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers – Ukraine presents its priorities

2011-05-17T10:55:00.001+02:00

Ukraine has just taken over the chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for the next six months.

Ukraine considers the Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers as an opportunity to contribute to the developments of modern European processes in which the Council of Europe plays a significant role. It will ensure that the goals and priorities of the Council of Europe will continue to be pursued, in particular the strengthening of democracy, respect for the rule of law and protection of human rights. Ukraine intends to initiate practical steps in order to advance in the implementation of the main priorities of the Council of Europe and strengthen the Organisation’s political role.

Within the framework of its Chairmanship, Ukraine will focus on the following priorities:

1. Protection of Children’s rights. The Ukrainian Chairmanship intends to strengthen the coordinating role of the Council of Europe in implementing regional and national initiatives of member states with regard to the protection of children’s rights, with an emphasis on the implementation of existing programmes and decisions of the Organisation as well as the development of new priorities.

2. Human rights and the rule of law in the context of democracy and stability in Europe. The Council of Europe created an efficient system of human rights protection. As a second priority of its Chairmanship, Ukraine will give special attention to the prevention of violations. The international conference on “The role of prevention in promoting and protecting human rights” to be organised in Kyiv on 20-21 September, will be a practical contribution of the Ukrainian Chairmanship to this end.

3. Strengthening and developing local democracy. Strengthening democratic processes at local and regional level in Europe, by ensuring effective implementation of the principles of local self-government in European countries, using the potential of the Council of Europe as a standard setting Organisation in this area constitutes a further priority for the Ukrainian Chairmanship. The 17th session of the Council of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for Local and Regional Government will be held on 3-4 November in Kyiv under the Ukrainian Chairmanship.

To promote continuity within the Council of Europe, prior to assuming the chairmanship, Ukraine had held consultations with the United Kingdom and Albania as forthcoming chairs. As a result, for the first time ever three consecutive chairmanships of the Committee of Ministers will work along the same lines in pursuing the goals of reform of the Council of Europe, thus setting a new practice in the modus operandi of the organisation.

Chairmanship’s website
http://www.coe.int/t/dc/files/presidences-sessions-cm/presidences/ukraine/default_EN.asp?

Source: Council of Europe. Published on 11 May 2011.

OSCE media freedom representative offers assistance to improve media freedom in Azerbaijan

2011-05-16T15:11:00.000+02:00

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatović,concluded a four-day visit to Baku during which she called on authorities to improve media freedom in Azerbaijan and offered them her Office’s assistance in reforming media laws.

The visit, which took place following an invitation from President Ilham Aliyev, was Mijatović's first to Baku.

“I had open and frank discussions with Azerbaijani authorities about the legal media framework and the latest developments in the media-freedom field. The concerns I raised were taken seriously” Mijatović said.

“We agreed that the media-freedom situation needs further improvement so that Azerbaijan can fully meet its OSCE media commitments. President Aliyev assured me that reform of the media environment will continue as part of Azerbaijan’s modernization plans. He also assured me that the Internet will remain free.”

Mijatović urged the authorities to ensure that the perpetrators and masterminds of all attacks on journalists, including the 2005 assassination of the Monitor editor Elmar Huseynov, are brought to justice. She also called on the authorities to prevent violence against the media and to ensure that journalists and social media activists can perform their work in a free and safe environment. In addition, she raised with the authorities the recent harassment of two journalists from Azadliq newspaper, and voiced her concerns about restrictions on the work of journalists during recent demonstrations.

“The authorities should allow for more pluralism, especially in the broadcast media. Access to information for the media should be granted to all media. Restrictive changes brought to the media legislation in recent years should be reversed, the transparency of the activities and accountability of the country’s media regulator must be guaranteed and the political independence of the Public Broadcaster should be ensured,” she said.

Mijatović offered her Office’s assistance in reforming media legislation. During her visit, she participated in a Conference on 11 May organised by the OSCE Office in Baku and the Press Council. At the conference Mijatovic expressed hope that a law decriminalizing defamation in line with international standards would be adopted soon.

In addition to President Aliyev, Mijatović held talks with Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov; Interior Minister Ramil Usubov; Ali Hasanov, the head of the Presidential Administration’s Social and Political Department; Human Rights Commissioner Elmira Suleymanova, Aflatun Amashov, Head of the Press Council and Nushiravan Maharramli, the chair of the National Television and Radio Council. She also met with journalists and representatives of media nongovernmental organizations.

On 10 May Mijatović visited newspaper editor Eynulla Fatullayev in prison.

Source: OSCE. Published in Baku, 13 May 2011.

Euronest Parliamentary Assembly establishes four committees and two working groups

2011-05-11T10:11:00.005+02:00

During the Constituent meeting of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly which took place in Brussels on 3 May 2011, 4 standing committees were established with the aim of preparing the works of the plenary and to contribute to the Assembly’s inter-action with the Eastern Partnership multi-lateral platforms.

The following four standing committees are set up:

- Committee on Political Affairs, Human Rights and Democracy;
- Committee on Economic Integration, Legal Approximation and Convergence with EU Policies;
- Committee on Energy Security;
- Committee on Social Affairs, Education, Culture and Civil Society.

Each of the standing committees will be composed of 30 Members, 15 from the Eastern Partners’ component and 15 from the European Parliament.

The S&D Group nominated Mr Göran FÄRM as co-Chair of the Committee on Economic Integration, Legal Approximation and Convergence with EU Policies, Mr Knut Fleckenstein as co Vice-Chair of the Committee on Political Affairs, Human Rights and Democracy and Ms Iotova Iliana Malinova as co Vice-Chair of the Committee on Social Affairs, Education, Culture and Civil Society.

In addition, two Working Groups were set up,namely:

- working group on ´Belarus´;
- working group on the ´Rules of Procedure´

S&D member Ms Edit Herczog will be the co-Chair of the working group on the ´Rules of Procedure´.

For Journalists In Belarus, One Of World's Least-Free Countries, Things Only Getting Worse

2011-05-10T10:40:00.001+02:00

Sandwiched between Cuba and Myanmar on Freedom House's annual Freedom of the Press listing, Belarus has little to celebrate on World Press Freedom Day on May 3. And the already dismal situation in the authoritarian country is definitely taking a turn for the worse.

The New York-based NGO Freedom House this year lists Belarus among the 10 worst-rated countries on its index, states where "independent media are either nonexistent or barely able to operate, the press acts as a mouthpiece for the regime, citizens' access to unbiased information is severely limited, and dissent is crushed through imprisonment, torture, and other forms of repression." Those 10 states are Belarus, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Myanmar, North Korea, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

And the Freedom House report was written before authorities in Minsk began court proceedings to shut down the country's two main remaining independent media outlets -- the newspapers "Nasha niva" and "Narodnaya volya." The Information Ministry has issued each of the newspapers three official warnings in recent months over "wrong coverage of events."

'Who Will Hear Us?'

The stepped-up pressure on the independent media in Belarus is part of a general crackdown on political dissent following the disputed reelection in December of longtime President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The repression only got worse following the April 11 terrorist bombing in the Minsk subway system, which left 14 dead and scores injured.

Renowned actress Zinaida Bandarenka published an open appeal to Lukashenka urging him to end the persecution of the two papers.

"I think he is acting as if he hasn't noticed our appeal," she says. "There is still a small hope, but then, when they really do shut down these papers…This is our last chance to address him. There is no other opportunity. If they close these papers, who will hear us? Will the official media publish our pain and our cries? Of course not."

The government's steps against the two papers provoked criticism from the media freedom representative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Dunja Mijatovic says the move will "further diminish media pluralism in the country."

Minsk ordered the OSCE to close down its Belarus office at the beginning of the year, following OSCE criticism of the December 2010 presidential election.

'They Will Close, Of Course'

Opinions about what will happen next are divided on the streets of Minsk.

"A lot of people read these newspapers. Everyone buys them. They are quite popular," one man says. "And they really write about what people want to hear, what they want to know. Apparently someone doesn't like that, and so they will close the papers, of course."

"I don't think they will be shut down," another man says. "It would just give another reason to argue that the principles of democracy are violated in Belarus, that we have here the last dictatorship in Europe."

The Belarusian Association of Journalists is calling on ordinary citizens to appeal to the Information Ministry and ask officials to withdraw their case against the newspapers. Association lawyer Andrey Bastunets tells RFE/RL's Belarus Service that the goal is to keep the case from making it to court.

"If the case goes to court then, most likely, the verdict will not be in favor of the independent media," Bastunets says. "Therefore, it is important to morally sway the representatives of the organ that filed the case -- the Information Ministry -- so that they feel that we aren't talking about two independent publications, but about their readers, people who are being deprived of their chosen publications."

The case is scheduled to begin on May 11.

For now, journalists at the two newspapers are impressed with the support they have received from readers and the general public. "Narodnaya volya" Deputy Editor Marina Koktysh says the paper has been targeted by officials before, when they barred the state newspaper-kiosk system from selling it and when their printer suddenly refused to print it.

As a result, the paper's staff remains defiant and is preparing contingency plans to move underground or to publish from abroad. For now, Koktysh says, the paper is actively working the system.

"You know, as they say, hope dies last," she says. "We don't plan to get on our knees before anyone, not before Lukashenka, not before any of his bureaucrats. But we think that now we need to knock on every door. Even if they are closed. And if there is even the smallest chance to save the newspaper, we have to grab it."

By RFE/RL. Published on 3 May 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/belarus_press_freedom_least_free_countries/24089877.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Buzek: "Today's meeting in the European Parliament is a historic event"

2011-05-09T17:32:00.001+02:00

On Tuesday 3 May, the President of the European Parliament Jerzy Buzek launched the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly.

After the meeting EP President Buzek said:

"Today's meeting in the European Parliament is a historic event. Cooperation between the European Parliament and legislatures of the eastern partner countries has begun in earnest. Our aim is to help build vibrant democracies, free market economies and foster the rule of law. This is a forum of the people, by the people and for the people.

Today's meeting is a major step towards closer cooperation that we hope will ensure prosperity for all citizens in the region. The people of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are close to our hearts. There is a long way ahead of us. But it is important that we have embarked on it.

While the European Union is focused on the changes in North Africa, it is equally committed to it's Eastern Neighbourhood. The launch of Euronest is a tangible example of that.

Today's inauguration took place without the participation of Belarus. I am confident that in the future Belarusian legislators will join us once the country holds free and fair elections.

Closer ties among our parliaments will give additional legitimacy to actions taken by governments in the framework of the Eastern Partnership.

I would like to thank my colleagues from the parliaments of the partner countries for expressing their determination for this new project to bear fruits. Euronest must bring tangible results for the citizens. It's success is in our hands."

Source: European Parliament website
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/president/view/en/press/press_release/2011/2011-May/press_release-2011-May-4.html;jsessionid=211E53C1D861AF03844141A898DB8F3F

Ashton welcomes the convening of the first Euronest meeting

2011-05-06T10:06:00.002+02:00

Address of HR/VP Catherine Ashton to the First meeting of EURONEST
European Parliament, Brussels
Tuesday 3 May 2011

Mr President of the European Parliament, Honourable Speakers,
Honourable Members,

I warmly welcome the convening of the first meeting of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly today. I would like to congratulate those who have come to Brussels to take part in this important occasion, as well as the Members of the European Parliament present today.

I would like to highlight three points: first, the significance of Euronest; second, the priorities of the European Neighbourhood Policy and of the Eastern Partnership, and third, the contribution that I hope Euronest will make to the realisation of these priorities.

First, Euronest is particularly important for the EU High Representative because it completes the institutional framework of the Eastern Partnership. The EaP is not only a partnership of governments: it is also a partnership of peoples and of the Parliaments that represent them. We already have numerous fora for meetings among civil servants; we have meetings of Ministers and Heads of Government; and we even have a forum for civil society, the EaP Civil Society Forum. But only now does the Eastern Partnership have its own parliamentary assembly.

It is regrettable that the Belarus parliament is not represented at this first meeting of Euronest. That is because Belarus did not live up to the democratic standards expected of the Eastern Partnership participating states. I do hope that respect of democratic values in Belarus will improve, and that Belarus parliamentarians will be able to join this assembly in the future. It is Euronest that will have to monitor the situation in Belarus and take that decision when the time is ripe.

Second, this meeting takes place at a time of historic upheavals in the Southern neighbourhood of the EU. These people-led movements demand more democracy, rule of law and respect of human rights. Or, as they would put it, they demand dignity. They show us that we can achieve real stability, prosperity and security in the neighbourhood of the EU only if we build them on these foundations.

I believe this applies to the South of our neighbourhood as it applies to the East and to the EU itself. And what better guarantee of democracy, rule of law and human rights can we imagine than democratically elected parliaments, which pass fair laws and ensure they are enforced in full respect of human rights? This shows the importance of your role and of parliamentary cooperation.

The attention of the EU is currently focused on the South, but I can assure you that the East is not forgotten. Far from forgetting it, we have actually set ourselves some very ambitious goals:

I. Negotiations on New Association Agreements

We are currently negotiating new Agreements with five partner countries. These cover all aspects of our relations. Ultimately they could include, as an integral part, the establishment of deep and comprehensive free trade areas with the EU – leading to full access to the EU’s internal market.

II. Mobility

Mobility is a critical issue for our partners – and one which has an enormous potential to transform the lives of our citizens and bring us closer. We have made good progress with the launch of Action Plans for Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova last year and we are advancing toward our goal of negotiating Visa Facilitation agreements – albeit at different speeds - with all our partners.

III. Deepened Sectoral Cooperation in key areas such as energy and transport.

In the area of energy, Ukraine and Moldova’s accession to the Energy Community Treaty are important in ensuring closer links between our energy markets through the adoption of the EU acquis.

IV. The strengthening of the administrative capacity of partners including through the implementation of Comprehensive Institution Building Programmes (to a total value of €173 million over 2011- 2013).

V. Efforts to support cohesion within our partner countries through the development of Pilot Regional Development Programmes (worth approximately €70 million over 2012-2013).

We will take stock of progress in all these areas at the second Summit of the EaP in Warsaw this September. The Summit will be the occasion to renew our joint commitment to the ambitious goals of the Eastern Partnership and to the values and principles that found it: and in particular democratic principles and practices, the respect for human rights, good governance and the rule of law.

There is no competition between the South and the East of our neighbourhood: any additional resources allocated to the South to address the current upheavals there and the needs of our Southern partners will not come at the expense of the East and will not result in reduced resources for the East in any way.

Increasingly, the EU will allocate resources to its partners based not on geographical location in the East or in the South, but on the principle of conditionality and differentiation, sometimes called “more for more”. “More for more” means that the EU will allocate more resources to those partners that are willing to make more progress towards universal values and EU standards and are ready to engage in serious reform efforts.

The EU has much to share with its neighbours: successful peacebuilding, after a devastating second world war; effective political integration based on human rights, democracy and the rule of law; the experience of a relatively recent transition to democracy of many Member States; prosperity built on deep economic integration; a sense of solidarity among its people and its member states; and an independent, thriving civil society which actively participates in governance and acts as a counter-weight to state institutions.

Events in the Southern neighbourhood of the EU have brought to the fore the need for the EU to engage more strongly in democracy promotion, to enhance democratic processes and improve the workings of democratic institutions in our partners. One possibility that we will examine is the establishment of a European Endowment or Foundation for Democracy that would channel support for democracy promotion through civil society actors.

This is one of the main results of the ENP review, which will be laid out in a Communication of the European Commission and High Representative later this month. The other main points that will be highlighted by the Communication include the need for partnerships with peoples and societies; the need for enhanced political dialogue, and the need for greater political steering of our relationships.

Which brings me to my third and last point: what is the contribution of Euronest to the ENP and to its eastern dimension, the EaP?

After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is a more cohesive political actor beyond its borders. Euronest can make a very important contribution to political dialogue and political steering of the EaP at the level of parliaments. Furthermore, I believe it is very important that the EU be open to its partners. The EU must learn to listen more to its partners in its neighbourhood, so it can better shape its policies. Euronest provides a very good opportunity to do that. Euronest can also help provide more visibility for the EaP. Together with the EaP Civil Society Forum, it can help provide feedback and guidance for the EaP and bring it closer to the concerns and the needs of the people.

Most importantly, Euronest is a multilateral forum where partners can exchange experience on reform and approximation to EU standards and on legislation to enhance democratic governance in their countries. I mentioned earlier our goal of concluding Association Agreements. These Agreements include a commitment to democracy, rule of law and respect of human rights. Parliaments have an essential role to play in adopting legislation that furthers these values and in monitoring its effective enforcement. Progress towards these values will help speed up the conclusion of Association Agreements and will be a crucial part of their implementation.

I wish you a productive and successful inaugural meeting of the Euronest parliamentary assembly, which will put in place the necessary institutional arrangements. And I look forward to the important contribution of Euronest to the realisation of the goals of the Eastern Partnership.

EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly inaugurated

2011-05-04T14:28:00.002+02:00

The EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly, bringing together MEPs with elected representatives from the EU's eastern neighbour countries, held its inaugural meeting on Tuesday. The aim of the body is to provide a parliamentary dimension to the EU's eastern neighbourhood policy. "We have created a powerful tool today," said EURONEST Co-President-elect Kristian Vigenin (S&D, BG) at the end of the constituent meeting.

The EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly's constituent meeting was opened by EP President Jerzy Buzek, who observed that the democratic reform processes of the eastern partner countries must be strengthened. "Stable countries can only be democratic countries; democracy is the only way to stability," he said. He added that the Parliamentary Assembly was crucial in bringing citizens of this region closer together. "If we want more cooperation and more integration, we have to start with parliamentary cooperation, because it represents contacts between people," he said.

Adjourning the meeting, Co-President Kristian Vigenin emphasised that "this assembly is one of two equal partner components: equal in rights and responsibilities", and expressed his confidence that EURONEST members will live up to both. At a press point afterwards, he underlined that "the establishment of this body is the strongest signal we could send" about the potential for cooperation between the EP and the eastern partners. Co-President Borys Tarasyuk (Ukraine) echoed this view, and also appealed to all European Union institutions not to give in to the temptation to divert attention and funds from the eastern to the southern neighbourhood.

Decisions taken

The Parliamentary Assembly adopted and signed its constitutive act, approved its rules of procedure, set up two working groups (on Belarus and the Rules of Procedure) and formed four committees (one on Political Affairs, Human Rights and Democracy; one on Economic Affairs, legal approximation and convergence with EU policies, one on Energy Security and one on Culture, Education and Civil Society).

It also elected its two Co-Presidents, Messrs Vigenin and Tarasyuk, as well as 8 Vice-Presidents, to form a Bureau: Vahan Hovhannesyan (Armenia), Elkhan Suleymanov (Azerbaijan), David Darchiashvili (Georgia), Igor Corman (Moldova), Traian Ungurenau (EPP, RO), Ryszard Czarnecki (ECR, PL), Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy (ALDE, NL) and Jacek Saryusz-Wolski (EPP, PL).

Background

The EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly was devised to provide a parliamentary dimension to the EU's eastern partnership, as part of the EU's neighbourhood policy. It consists of 60 MEPs and 10 MPs from each of the five eastern partner countries. Belarus is a special case: although a part of the eastern neighbourhood, there was much discussion about how to allow its participation in EURONEST without giving legitimacy to Alexander Lukashenko's regime. In the end, the constituent meeting was held without any representatives from Belarus in attendance.

Source: Website of the European Parliament
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/content/20110502IPR18529/html/EURONEST-Parliamentary-Assembly-inaugurated

In Pictures: Euronest Constituent Meeting

2011-05-04T10:04:00.002+02:00

Euronest Parliamentary Assembly Launched Today

2011-05-03T17:46:00.000+02:00

Programme

9.00-9.30hrs

1.Welcome by Prof. Jerzy BUZEK, President of the European Parliament, and presentation of the Speakers of the Parliaments of the Eastern Partners.

9.30-9.45hrs

2.Address by Mrs Catherine ASHTON, High Representative/Vice President or her representative

9.45-10.30hrs

3.Addresses by the Speakers or the Heads of Delegation of the Eastern Partners

10.30-11.15hrs

4.Adoption of the Constituent Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Euronest PA

5.Signature of the Constituent Act of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly by the Speakers of the Parliaments of the Eastern Partners and the President of the European Parliament

6.Election of the Bureau of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly:
-2 Co-Presidents
-8 Vice-Presidents

11.45-12.15hrs

8.Adoption of the decision on setting up four parliamentary committees and approval of the Rules of Procedure for the committees

9.Adoption of the decision on setting up two working groups

12.15-12.30hrs

10.Final remarks by the Co-Presidents

12.30hrs

11.Closure of the meeting and

12.Opening of the constituent meetings of the standing committees

Euronest PA to be launched on 3 May

2011-04-29T09:44:00.002+02:00

The first Constituent meeting of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly is scheduled to take place on Tuesday 3 May 2011.

Despite various attempts to launch this assembly, the political situation in Belarus, and as a consequece of that, their participation in this assembly, delayed this launch for more than a year.

Nevertheless, both the members of the European Parliament and the members from the 5 Eastern countries, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine understood the importance of launching this parliamentary assembly and worked together towards reaching a compromise which would pave the way to initiate this project.

European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek and the Speakers of Parliaments of the Eastern Partners will open the session.

During this meeting, the Constituent Act and the Rules of Procedure wil be signed. In addition, there will be the election of the Bureau of the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly and the adoption of the decision on setting up four parliamentary committees and two working groups.

OSCE Mission to Moldova supports prosecution service reform

2011-04-20T16:13:00.001+02:00

The role of prosecutors and reform of prosecution services were discussed today at a roundtable event held by the OSCE Mission to Moldova in co-operation with the General Prosecutor’s Office.

Prosecutors from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, whose countries’ prosecution services have successfully completed the transition to European norms, were invited to share their experience and best practices with their counterparts and experts from Moldova.

“The project does not aim at providing a single model for reform - rather, Moldovan officials can learn about the experiences of the Baltic states when confronting the same problems, to see what worked and what didn’t work, without reinventing the wheel,” said Ambassador Philip Remler, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova.

Prosecutor General Valeriu Zubco and Parliamentary Advocate Anatol Munteanu participated in the event, together with representatives of the Parliament, the government and civil society.

Today’s event is part of a larger project to support the prosecution service. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the OSCE Mission to Moldova and the General Prosecutor of the Republic of Moldova in March.

Source: OSCE. Published on 20 April 2011

OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs issue statement

2011-04-15T10:35:00.000+02:00

The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, Ambassadors Bernard Fassier of France, Robert Bradtke of the United States, and Igor Popov of the Russian Federation, released the following statement:

"The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Ambassadors Bernard Fassier of France, Robert Bradtke of the United States, and Igor Popov of the Russian Federation) traveled April 11-14 to Yerevan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Baku. Joined by Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson in Office (PRCiO), the Co-Chairs met separately with Armenian President Serge Sargsian, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and the de facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh. In their meetings, the Co-Chairs discussed next steps for reaching agreement on the Basic Principles. It is the strong view of the Co-Chairs that the time has arrived to finalize and endorse the Basic Principles and move to the drafting of a peace agreement.

On April 13, the Co-Chairs crossed the Line of Contact (LOC) by foot, before continuing to Baku. As with their crossing of the LOC in September 2010, this was intended to demonstrate the importance of maintaining and strengthening the 1994 ceasefire and that the LOC should not become a permanent barrier to contacts among neighboring peoples, as well as to reaffirm the Co-Chairs' need to visit any areas affected by the conflict. In conjunction with the crossing of the LOC, the Co-Chairs also visited part of the region southwest of the city of Terter. In addition, the Co-Chairs visited the village of Orta Karvend, accompanying the PRCiO in monitoring the area where the reported March 8 incident occurred.

Building on the March 5 joint statement made in Sochi by the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the Russian Federation, the Co-Chairs also presented to the sides a draft mechanism for investigation of incidents along the front lines with the participation of all sides. The Co-Chairs will continue to work with the parties to create as soon as possible a transparent and objective investigation process, with the goal of enhancing confidence, decreasing the risk of miscalculation, and saving lives.

The Co-Chairs expressed their concern that the planned opening of an airport in Nagorno-Karabakh could lead to further increased tensions. They cautioned that the operation of flights to and from this airport could not be used to support any claim of a change in the current status of Nagorno-Karabakh under international law. The Co-Chairs urged the sides to reach an understanding in keeping with international conventions and agreements, as well as current practice between Armenia and Azerbaijan for flights over their territory. The Co-Chairs welcomed assurances from the sides that they will reject any threat or attack against civil aircraft, pursue the matter through diplomatic steps, and refrain from politicizing the issue.

The Co-Chairs will travel to Washington in late April for consultations with senior United States government officials, and to discuss the status of progress towards a peace settlement."

Source: OSCE. Published on 14 April 2011

Minsk Bombing Has Everyone Asking: Who Could Benefit?

2011-04-14T10:53:00.002+02:00

With the investigation of Belarus's deadly subway tragedy still in the early stages, it is impossible to say who might have been responsible for the rush-hour attack that left 12 dead and more than 200 injured.

But everyone is asking the question that Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka posed to his security advisers at an emergency meeting hours after the blast: Who stands to gain from the terrorism and bloodshed?

Lukashenka said he wouldn't "rule out that this 'gift' was from abroad," but added, "we must also look inside."

Meanwhile, the Belarusian Internet and blogosphere are nearly unanimous in their opinion: the main beneficiary of this tragedy is likely to be Lukashenka himself, who can use the security crisis as a pretext for any number of political moves.

In recent weeks, the government has been shaken by a profound economic crisis and forced to ask Russia for up to $3 billion in emergency stabilization funding as the public has been queuing to buy up hard currency and durable goods. The latest security crisis could be used -- as similar ones in the past have -- to crack down on the opposition or to justify austerity measures.

Investigators have confirmed that the explosive packed the force of 5 to 7 kilograms of TNT and was detonated by remote control, indicating a fairly high level of preparation and sophistication.

Vladimir Lutsenko, a colonel with Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), is certain -- "100 percent" -- that the Minsk bombing was the work of international Islamist terrorism targeting peaceful civilians.

"When they murder innocent women and children on the streets of a peaceful city, everyone is terrified and everyone is hurt," Lutsenko says. "They blow up mosques in Iraq and Pakistan. They blow up apartment blocks in Moscow. They blow up skyscrapers in America."

Lutsenko adds that speculation that the explosion was organized either by the Belarusian authorities or by the country's weak and fragmented political opposition is "stupid."

"They said the same thing about Moscow -- that the FSB is blowing up Russia, that Putin blew up the homes of civilians in order to come to power," Lutsenko says. "We've heard this nonsense before and I won't be surprised if we hear it now, too."

The Official Response

But despite Lutsenko's certitude, Belarus has no history of Islamist terrorism. In 2005, a bomb in Vitebsk injured 40 people. An unknown anti-Lukashenka group reportedly claimed responsibility for the attack, but no one has been convicted. In July 2008, an explosion injured about 50 people at an Independence Day concert attended by Lukashenka. That attack was never solved either, despite a massive investigation led by a high-profile investigator.

Belarusian political scientist Yury Chavusau recalls those incidents and predicts a familiar response this time from authorities.

"I still remember the explosion in Vitebsk in 2005," Chavusau says. "Like the July 3 [2008] explosion, it was accompanied by, you might say, thorough, mass arrests of representatives of the opposition. Therefore you can suppose that -- regardless of the strength or weakness of the security structures -- the reaction to this terrorist act and the activities of the investigation will be similar -- irrationally massive. They simply don't know any other way, our security forces."

In fact, police have announced the detention of "several" people in connection with the latest attack. In addition, police press secretary Alyaksandr Lastovsky warned the media not to spread "stupid rumors" or foment panic in society. He warned that the police have the power to "make the strictest warnings to those who make up rumors or spread them."

Redistributing Influence?

Belarusian state media have given the incident blanket coverage, focusing on the solidarity being shown by the nation and showing images of ordinary citizens helping one another in the time of crisis.

In addition to using the security crisis to defuse discontent prompted by Belarus's fiercely disputed presidential election in December 2010 or the current economic panic, Lukashenka could use the opportunity -- as he did following the 2008 bombings -- to reorganize his security team.

"I think there could be a redistribution of influence within the ruling elite, and it isn't certain that this redistribution will be to the advantage of the security structures," analyst Chavusov says. "They have become too strong in recent times and the regime is too dependent on them."

Removing key security officials who carried out the postelection crackdown on the opposition could even help Lukashenka mend his fences somewhat with the West, which has imposed sanctions on Belarus over this issue.

By RFE/RL. Published on 12 April 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/minsk_bombing_everyone_asking_who_benefits/3555193.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Group of States against Corruption publishes report on Armenia

2011-04-12T10:42:00.004+02:00

The Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) today published its Third Round Evaluation Report on Armenia in which it finds that further amendments to the Criminal Code are necessary to comply with Council of Europe standards. GRECO also calls for a strengthening of the supervision over the funding of political parties and election campaigns.

Regarding the criminalisation of corruption [theme I], GRECO welcomes the 2008 amendments to the Criminal Code, but finds that in order to fully comply with the standards of the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption the legal provisions need to be further amended to ensure – among other things – that the mere request for a bribe can be prosecuted, that all persons who work in the private sector are covered and that Armenia can prosecute all corruption offences committed by its citizens abroad. The main challenge lies with the effective application of legislation. In this context, Armenia is strongly urged to take further measures to increase understanding amongst practitioners of the legal provisions and of the level of proof required in bribery cases.

Concerning transparency of party funding [theme II], GRECO acknowledges that a reform process aimed at improving accountability and transparency of political finances is currently underway. Armenia is encouraged to address in this context the various deficiencies identified in the Law on Political Parties and Election Code, such as the fact that caps on private donations and expenses only apply during election campaigns, the lack of regulation of donations in kind and the lack of transparency of the funding of election campaigns at local level. In addition, it must be ensured that all violations of the rules can be punished and that the sanctions foreseen for these violations are proportionate. Above all, it is of pivotal importance to strengthen supervision over the funding of political parties and election campaigns: it should be ensured that an independent monitoring mechanism is in place and that it has the authority and financial and human resources to investigate infringements of the rules on political financing.

In the report GRECO addresses 19 recommendations to Armenia. The implementation of these will be assessed by GRECO in the second half of 2012, through its specific compliance procedure.

Source: Council of Europe. Strasbourg, 11 April 2011

Crackdown on independent media in Belarus

2011-04-11T11:59:00.002+02:00

Statement by the spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the crackdown on independent media in Belarus

The spokesperson of Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission, issued the following statement today:

“The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is deeply concerned by news of the detention of Mr. Andrzej Poczobut, a correspondent for the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, during his journey to the EU Delegation to Belarus in Minsk.

This is yet another example of ongoing human rights violations conducted by the authorities in Belarus since the presidential elections on 19 December 2010. The EU strongly condemns all harassment, arrests, and intimidation of representatives of the Belarusian independent media as well as violations of the fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the media.

The EU calls upon the Belarusian authorities to end at once the prosecution of independent journalists for slander or other politically-motivated charges. The EU also urges the Belarusian authorities to cooperate fully with the OSCE representative on Freedom of the Media.”

Press release: Brussels, 10 April 2011

Commissioner Štefan Füle on the European Neighbourhood Policy Review

2011-04-08T11:52:00.003+02:00

Štefan Füle European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Address to the European Parliament on the European Neighbourhood Policy Review European Parliament Plenary Session Strasbourg, 6 April 2011

European Parliament Plenary Session

Strasbourg, 6 April 2011

President, Honourable Members,

I am delighted to have this opportunity for an exchange of views with you on the European Neighbourhood Policy. In the context of the current events in the southern Mediterranean, redeveloping this policy could not be more important.

In fact over the past nine months the Commission has undertaken a review of the Policy, and I want to take this chance also to thank you for your input to the consultation – which took responses from partner countries, EU Member States, academics and civil society groups.

I have read both the Mário David report on the South and the Marek Siwiec report on the East, and find them each significant and useful. I am pleased that our thoughts are along the same lines.

You will have noticed that the results of our previous discussions on Neighbourhood Policy are already reflected in the Communication on a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity of 8 March. Now we are preparing for the wider Communication on the results of the Review, which is due to be published in May.

A key outcome of the Review is a new emphasis on differentiation of the Neighbourhood Policy according to the needs and wishes of each partner country. While the Policy will continue to offer engagement to all partners, every neighbour is different and has different aspirations.

Some partner countries want to progress as far as they can towards the European Union – indeed as far as accession. But others prefer to make the most of other benefits of the Neighbourhood Policy. So it will deliver "more for more" in a specific and differentiated way – alongside stronger political steering of our relationships with our partners.

Nevertheless, as both Mr. David and Mr. Siwiec recommend in their reports, our shared values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights will be at the heart of the revised Neighbourhood Policy for all partner countries.

They should find their expression in stronger joint commitments to elements indispensable to democratisation: I am thinking in particular of free and fair elections, freedom of expression and association, judicial independence, the fight against corruption, and security sector reform.

Also as highlighted in both reports, the revised Neighbourhood Policy will recognise and act on the importance of civil society. Non-governmental organisations have the expertise and experience to deliver democratic and market-oriented reforms from the bottom up, based on shared values.

A thriving civil society gets citizens involved and helps to hold governments to account. So the European Union will complement its relations with governments with much closer engagement with civil society. This is also important at a regional and sub-regional level – where, for example, the Eastern Partnership's Civil Society Forum has been making good progress.

The forthcoming Communication will offer more detail on the approach towards the two sub-regions of our Neighbourhood. It will spell out how we see the Eastern Partnership developing further in the wake of the Summit under the Polish Presidency.

In the South, the Union for the Mediterranean has the potential to make a real difference – but frankly it has not yet done so and must be revitalised. Its promise lies in developing concrete economic projects with a focus on employment, innovation and growth. The UfM’s Secretariat is best placed to act as a catalyst and bring together states, International Financial Institutions and private companies to work on such economic projects.

I would like to mention briefly three other elements brought to light by the Review, which will be key to the revised Neighbourhood Policy.

First, the role of trade and economic integration to help advance stability and prosperity in partner countries. The most significant vehicle to achieve this is the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.

A successful DCFTA has transformative power – regulatory reforms made by a partner country are anchored through trade.

Next, the need for improved mobility between partner countries and the European Union – since there is no better way to promote European values than through sharing experiences person to person. The Neighbourhood Policy will seek improvements to mobility, without losing sight of security.

Finally, the desire expressed in the consultation by many partner countries for greater political engagement with the European Union. Closer and more substantial political dialogue across all areas of our relationships will help us resolve difficult issues in a spirit of mutual confidence.

Thank you for your time. I look forward very much to the coming debate and will take on board your views.

Source: Press Release RAPID

On The Verge Of Economic Disaster, Minsk Turns To Moscow

2011-04-07T09:53:00.002+02:00

With an economy teetering on the brink of collapse and a nervous population standing in hours-long lines to buy foreign currency or gold, Minsk is going hat in hand to Moscow seeking relief.

The open question is: What price will Russia demand for bailing out Belarus and its authoritarian leader, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka?

Russia has long been pushing Minsk to sell off key state assets including oil refineries, chemical plants, oil and gas pipelines, and machinery plants. In addition, Moscow has been calling for Belarus to open its markets to Russian goods, tearing down barriers that exist despite the fact that the two countries are members of a unified customs zone.

"It is a matter of the privatization of shares, the entrance of Russian capital into Belarus, and the opening of markets to Russian products," notes Yevgeny Minchenko, director of Russia's International Institute of Political Expertise.

Belarus has run through 20 percent of its hard-currency reserves since the beginning of the year and implemented a partial currency devaluation at the end of March. Long lines are forming at exchange booths that are rapidly running out of dollars and euros.

Panicky Belarusians are meanwhile buying up cars, gold, and nonperishable staples like sugar, tea, and coffee as they desperately seek to retain the value of their savings as fears of further devaluations mount.

Moscow's Terms

On March 31, Belarus presented Moscow a plan to stabilize the economy that envisions $2 billion in credits from the Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic Community (Eurasec) and $1 billion from Russia. It also proposes a tightened monetary policy, structural and tax reforms, and reduced state spending.

However, Moscow has been slow to react. Deputy Finance Minister Dmitry Pankin told Interfax on April 5 that Russia had made "no promises" and that Moscow was studying the proposed macroeconomic reforms.

Belarusian economist Syarhey Chaly tells RFE/RL's Belarus Service that no serious restructuring can be carried out so quickly and the talks must really be focused on other matters.

"It's obvious that there are conditions, but they aren't being publicly discussed. Most likely, the conditions are very concrete," Chaly says. "Because we are in a very bad situation and have painted ourselves into a corner, Russia can demand practically anything it wants."

Russia's hand is further strengthened because Lukashenka may have miscalculated in his normally wily geopolitical balancing act, political scientist Minchenko says. "There is no possibility to play the game that Lukashenka loves to play," he says, "weaving between Russia, the West, China, and Latin America."

No Room To Maneuver

Prior to Belarus's December presidential election, the European Union offered Lukashenka a $4.2 billion aid package if the poll was conducted fairly. Not only was the election held in poor esteem by outside monitors, but Lukashenka also launched a brutal crackdown on the political opposition in the wake of the poll. The EU aid offer was withdrawn and the West began imposing fresh sanctions.

In addition, the bad economic situation was brought to the current crisis by populist measures Lukashenka adopted in the run-up to the vote. In particular, he raised salaries in the country's enormous public sector at a time when Russia was raising the rates it charges Belarus for oil and gas.

The current crisis will likely force Lukashenka to roll back those promises and could prompt a devaluation of the national currency by as much as 40 percent.

After years of oppression and marginalization -- as well as the postelection crackdown -- the political opposition in Belarus is hobbled and in a poor position to capitalize on the growing public discontent. But the panic puts additional pressure on Lukashenka to come to terms with Moscow quickly.

By RFE/RL. Published on 6 April 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/belarus_turns_to_russia_on_verge_of_ecenomic_collapse/3549085.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Restrictive measures against certain officials of Belarus

2011-04-06T09:38:00.004+02:00

Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with the Council implementing Decision 2011/174/CFSP implementing Decision 2010/639/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against certain officials of Belarus

On 21 March 2011, the Council adopted Council Decision 2011/174/CFSP1. The Council Decision amends the list of individuals subject to restrictive measures in Belarus. This declaration is made to announce that the following countries have declared that they share the objectives of Council Decision 2011/174/CFSP: The Candidate Countries Croatia*, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro* and Iceland+, the Countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidates Albania,Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and the EFTA countries Liechtenstein and Norway,members of the European Economic Area.

They will ensure that their national policies conform to this Council Decision.

The European Union takes note of this commitment and welcomes it.

Published on 22.03.2011 in the Official Journal of the European Union no. L 76, p. 72

Nagorno-Karabakh Tries To Make A Mark In Washington

2011-04-05T12:14:00.002+02:00

From the outside, it looks more like a dentist's office than an embassy. In reality, it is neither.

But a glance at the website of Nagorno-Karabakh's office in Washington, D.C., would suggest that inside this unremarkable, flagless building a few blocks from the White House exists something that at least resembles an embassy.

The website includes a "country profile," a list of "national holidays," information on the region's government and economics, and a section with instructions on how to obtain a visa.

Robert Avetisyan, whose styles himself the permanent representative of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic to the United States, explains, "We implement all the procedures and we render the same assistance and render the same services as an embassy does."

Avetisyan, however, does not hold a diplomatic passport. And Nagorno-Karabakh is not a country.

Indeed, with a largely Armenian population on the one hand, and legal ties to Azerbaijan on the other, the region's long-term status is far from settled.

Unrecognized, But With An Office

Nagorno-Karabakh was the site of a bitter six-year war between Armenia and Azerbaijan from 1988-94 that saw tens of thousands killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. The mountainous territory unilaterally declared independence in 1991 and has enjoyed de facto autonomy since a cease-fire was declared in 1994.

But landlocked and isolated, it remains largely dependent on Armenia. Nagorno-Karabakh is even represented by Armenia in the Minsk Process, the international -- and largely inert -- attempt to resolve the dispute.

But the de facto government in Stepanakert, Nagorno-Karabakh's capital, has established its Washington office in an effort to raise its profile in the hope that proximity to levers of power might sway the debate on the territory's status.

"In the views of major actors and in the eyes of the international community, 'territorial dispute' is a negative thing," Avetisyan says. "And there could be more or less a negative stance towards this issue. But if it's people who are fighting for their freedom and trying to finalize the decolonization process of the Soviet Union, it's an absolutely different story."

Avetisyan says one of his office's primary duties is to maintain the website, which along with embassy-like sections also contains detailed accounts -- from his side's perspective -- of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

'Misleading The U.S. Public'

Yerevan claims that Nagorno-Karabakh is a historically Armenian territory called Artsakh. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, when both Armenia and Azerbaijan gained independence, Yerevan and Stepanakert have argued that the territory has a right to self-determination.

Baku, on the other hand, claims that the territory is historically Azerbaijani and maintains that any attempt to detach Nagorno-Karbakh violates its territorial integrity.

Azerbaijan's embassy in Washington says that the office is "misleading the U.S. public" by spreading Armenian "propaganda" and presenting itself as an official representative of a territory that has no sovereignty.

The office's website directs would-be visitors to the territory to contact the Nagorno-Karabakh office in Armenia, which it says issues visas.

Nasimi Aghayev, a spokesman for the Azerbaijani Embassy, says that in the eyes of Baku, that direction amounts to promoting illegal activity.

"Because the Nagorno-Karabakh region is an internationally recognized part of Azerbaijan, those who want to travel there should respect the laws of Azerbaijan," Aghayev says. "And Azerbaijan has made it clear that traveling to Nagorno-Karabakh without permission by the authorities of the Republic of Azerbaijan is illegal and inadmissible."

Avetisyan also sends a monthly newsletter to influential Washington think tanks and produces a bimonthly general newsletter, which he says is read by "thousands" in the Armenian diaspora.

Front For Armenian Lobby?

Together with the Embassy of Armenia, his office helped organize an event last September at the U.S. Capitol commemorating of the 19th anniversary of Nagorno-Karabakh's self-proclaimed independence. The Congressional Caucus on Armenian Issues co-sponsored the event, which was attended by Senator Mark Kirk (Republican-Illinois), the caucus's co-chair.

Due to its strong ties to Armenian-American organizations, however, Avetisyan must regularly counter those who say that his office is simply a front for Washington's influential Armenian lobby.

Indeed, his two rooms are provided free of charge by the Armenian Assembly of America, a lobbying group that shares a floor of the building. The office appears among a long list of lobbying groups registered under the Justice Department's Foreign Agents Registration Act.

Until recently, the cost of running the office was defrayed by Armenian-American groups, although Avetisyan says expenses are now completely covered by Nagorno-Karabakh's de facto government.

But Avetisyan, who freely admits that the support he receives from Armenian groups is "priceless," remains reluctant to accept the "lobby" description.

"It depends on what we call [a] 'lobby.' If we promote the interests of a state, if we promote the interests of ordinary people, if we promote peace, then yes," he says, "if that can be considered a lobby."

Abkhazia 'More Of A Player'

Whatever it's called, analysts say the clout the Armenian lobby enjoys in Washington has been indispensible for Nagorno-Karabakh's representative office.

Thomas de Waal, an expert on the Caucasus at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Washington think tank, notes that there might be better arguments to justify an office representing Abkhazia, a breakaway region in Georgia, than Nagorno-Karabakh.

"If you compare Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, Abkhazia is larger, it has stronger institutions, it has an opposition, it has a media, and a stronger civil society than Nagorno-Karabakh," de Waal says. "So objectively speaking, Abkhazia is more of a player in the region than Karabakh. So there's an inconsistency there when you compare the two on the ground, [but] it all really comes down to Washington politics rather than local realities."

Georgia, of course, is one of the United States' staunchest allies.

De Waal says, however, that Nagorno-Karabakh remains largely isolated from the outside world and struggles to have its voice heard "thanks to the efforts of Azerbaijan."

What he calls the office's "positive role" is that it represents the voice of "a rather ignored party in a very important regional conflict."

Whether a distinct voice, a proxy for Yerevan's interests, or something in between, Avetisyan admits that he is not getting the attention he envisioned for his office.

His contacts are mainly with lawmakers already attuned to Armenian interests, and chances to speak with State Department officials are few and far between. But he says his office will continue on its mission.

Avetisyan is also not the only Nagorno-Karabakh representative abroad. The territory's government has offices in Australia, France, Germany, Lebanon, and Russia, as well as in Armenia.

By Richard Solash. Published on 29 March 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/nagorno-karabakh_armenia_azerbaijan_embassy/3540574.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

East-Invest programme aimed towards Eastern Partnership countries to be launched in Brussels

2011-04-01T20:02:00.000+02:00

East-Invest programme, the new regional tool for the economic development of the Eastern Partnership region, will be launched on March 31st 2011 by the 85 partners of this EU-funded project during a conference in Brussels.

The Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan Füle describes this programme as “one of several concrete programs that will accompany and support the Eastern Partnership Countries on the road of economic transformation towards economic integration with the EU".

85 partners of the project, including business support organisation from EU and Eastern Partnership Countries will adopt the work plan of activities that will be presented during the conference.

The main objective of this meeting is to promote and offer the audience an insight into the overall working background, the different project activities that will be implemented and the provisional time frame.

East-Invest, a € 8.75 million project, is a new regional investment and trade facilitation initiative for the economic development focussing on support to small and medium size enterprises from Eastern Partnership region.

The main objectives of the East-Invest are to develop business networking and multiply exchanges between public and private organisations from European Union and Eastern Partnership region through:

•Encouraging public-private dialogue and promoting consultation of private sector in decision making;

•Facilitating exchange of best-practices and supporting creation of partnerships between EU and Eastern Partnership companies;

•Developing the capacity of Eastern Partnership SME support organisations.

More information:

http://www.enpi-info.eu/eastportal/events/1767/Launching-conference-of-the-East-Invest-Programme

Press Release: RAPID. Brussels, 31 March 2011

Gay Rights At Center Stage In Battle Over Moldova Antidiscrimination Bill

2011-03-31T10:56:00.002+02:00

When the Moldovan government submitted a draft antidiscrimination law to parliament last month, conservative Orthodox Christian forces in the country treated it as a call to battle.

And that call was heeded by U.S. pastor and lawyer Scott Lively, who traveled to Chisinau to warn the country against adopting any measure that would bar discrimination against homosexuals.

The bill outlaws discrimination against anyone on the basis of religion, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, color, sex, age, disability, sexual orientation, political opinion, or social status. It was proposed as part of Moldova's effort to gain an association agreement with the European Union.

The controversial Lively believes homosexuality is a lifestyle choice with dire social consequences and has made a career in recent years campaigning against gay rights around the world. His website claims he has spoken in more than 30 countries.

"I've been dealing with these laws all over the world and I recognize -- as I said there in the lectures I gave and the media interviews that I gave -- an antidiscrimination law based on sexual orientation is the seed that contains the entire tree of the homosexual political agenda with all of its poisonous fruit," Lively tells RFE/RL, "and that, if you allow an antidiscrimination policy to go into effect, it essentially puts the power of the law and the government into the hands of gay activists and makes people who disapprove of homosexuality criminals."

Mainstream science rejects the notion that sexual orientation is a matter of personal choice.

Antihomosexual Crusader

Lively was invited to Moldova in January by two conservative Christian groups -- Pro Familia and Moldova Crestina.

"The antidiscrimination bill is only a seed. Once it is planted in a country, it turns into a whole tree that bears poisoned fruit," Pro Familia Vice President Vitalie Marian tells RFE/RL's Moldovan Service.

Marian adds that Lively "explicitly told us that this bill is just the beginning, and later homosexuals will be given rights, starting with the right to hold public demonstrations."

Since Lively's visit, Pro Familia has created an online "black list" of Moldovan public figures who support gay rights. The list includes several parliament members and the head of state television. People who appear on the list can have their names removed by submitting a written statement opposing the antidiscrimination measure.

Lively, who heads the Temecula, California-based Abiding Truth Ministries, co-authored the controversial book "The Pink Swastika," which argued that homosexuality in the Nazi Party contributed to militancy in the Third Reich.

He played a prominent role in generating support for a widely criticized bill in Uganda that would criminalize homosexual activity and, in its original version, called for the death penalty for some homosexuals.

Fears Of Genocide, Child Abuse

Boris Dittrich, acting director of the advocacy group Human Rights Watch's lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) program, just returned to the United States from a trip to Moldova, where he discussed Lively's visit with rights advocates in Chisinau.

"He came there with a story like what he told in Uganda, that if this antidiscrimination law would be accepted, the society would be homosexualized and the homosexuals would take over and it would be very dangerous," Dittrich says.

In Uganda, Lively met with lawmaker David Bahati, who drafted the antigay bill, and gave speeches in which he tied gays to the 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda.

"He stirred up a lot of fear in Uganda," says Warren Throckmorton, an associate professor of psychology at Grove City College, a Christian college in Pennsylvania, who has followed Lively's activity. "He told them that homosexuals had an unusual interest in children and so that to protect your children, you should construct stronger laws against homosexuality and enforce them."

In Moldova, however, Lively did not publicly advocate criminalizing homosexuality, but limited himself to campaigning against the antidiscrimination bill. He said he met with one member of parliament while he was in Chisinau.

Exporting U.S. Culture Wars

Lively is not the first controversial U.S. antihomosexual campaigner to find his way to Moldova. Psychologist Paul Cameron -- a sex researcher who argues that homosexuality is associated with child sex abuse and other social evils and whose work has been repudiated by major professional associations in the United States -- visited the country in October 2008 and again in May 2009.

Cameron campaigns actively for the criminalization of homosexuality on public-health grounds, Throckmorton notes, and so he "promotes laws against homosexuality much in the way some countries criminalize or sanction smoking in public places. He just believes that homosexuality is harmful to health and harmful to the culture."

Julie Dorf is a senior adviser with the Council for Global Equality, a U.S.-based NGO that works to oppose human rights abuses directed at individuals because of their sexual orientation or gender identity. She criticizes Lively and Cameron for exporting a message that has been rejected in the United States.

"And in the last few years we've seen them increasingly going around the world exporting their hatred and spewing these complete lies and misconceptions about LGBT people, preying on the vulnerability and, in some cases, the ignorance of people around the world by getting them very excited with the idea of getting rid of homosexuality," Dorf says.

Angela Frolov, head of GenderDoc-M, Moldova's main LGBT group, tells RFE/RL that Cameron was allowed to address university students during his Moldova visits.

Long Battle Ahead

Lively says the effort to adopt antidiscrimination legislation around the world has been spearheaded by gay activists. He argues that they are distorting the historical conception of human rights and points to the United Kingdom as an example of the danger he thinks lies ahead for Moldova.

"By adopting this [antidiscrimination measures] and normalizing homosexuality, it [the United Kingdom] has turned real human rights on its head and the people who are attempting to defend and live out religious freedom and family values as they've always been understood are now the ones being discriminated against," Lively says.

"And people who define themselves by voluntary sodomy -- a voluntary lifestyle based on sodomy -- now have the power to suppress and oppress people who are simply attempting to exercise their religious freedom and long-established traditions as regards family and human sexuality."

Human Rights Watch's Dittrich says the proposed legislation in Moldova is similar to discrimination protections adopted in other parts of the region, such as Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia. He notes that the countries in that part of the world "didn't have antidiscrimination legislation, so it's very good that they include sexual orientation and hopefully also gender identity. So, it's not a wild law, no. This is to protect people against discrimination."

The Moldovan legislation has passed through two parliamentary committees, but is now stalled. Influential lawmakers from the opposition Communist Party have declared in the wake of Lively's visit that they will not consider the bill as long as it includes protections based on sexual orientation.

Dittrich says the measure faces a long political process.

By Mircea Ticudean, Robert Coalson. Published on 14 March 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/gay_rights_take_center_stage_in_moldova/2337579.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

EU Set To Retool Policy Toward Neighbors

2011-03-30T10:21:00.002+02:00

The European Union is overhauling its policy toward its eastern and southern neighbors as the 27-nation bloc seeks a fresh approach to integrate post-Soviet countries.

Since 2004, the EU's Neighborhood Policy has sought to court those same 16 countries with offers of financial assistance in exchange for progress on political and economic reform.

A more targeted program, the Eastern Partnership, was established in 2008 and aims to strengthen political and economic relations between the EU and six former Soviet states -- Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine -- through visa agreements, free-trade deals and strategic partnership pacts.

Stefan Fuele, the EU's Enlargement Commissioner, said on March 27 that a revised version of the Neighborhood Policy will be rolled out in May. Speaking at the Brussels Forum, an annual meeting focusing on EU policy, Fuele said the revised approach will include stricter conditions for aid.

"As a result of this review process, you are going to have still one neighborhood policy covering both dimensions, east and south," Fuele said. "But you will have a much bigger differentiations not only between the south and the east but also within the south and within the east, with minimum of benchmarks and with individual programs for each and every of our partners."

Fuele added that the EU's new diplomatic corps, the External Action Service, would be deeply involved in the new policy and several EU embassies in target countries would be upgraded.

Pushing For More

The new catchphrase European officials are using to describe the policy change, "more for more," stresses that both expectations and rewards will be greater for participants in the Neighborhood Policy.

"A reformed European neighborhood policy should reward real progress. We want more for more," Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, whose country is due to take over the rotating six-month EU Presidency in July, said. "The faster the reforms, the greater the openness to European processes in the countries concerned, the faster the EU should respond."

Sikorski also stressed that the methods that had brought in the 10 countries from Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland, into the EU from 2004-07 are no longer applicable.

"I believe that we have run out of steam on the model that brought us, in central Europe, into the EU, and the model was this," Sikorski said. "We give you a very large carrot; membership after a grueling period of reform that requires a sort of national obsession on the part of the candidate countries. Since we are not prepared to give that big promise to the Eastern partnership countries, we should create a system of small carrots spaced out in sync with their political calendars so that particular government incentives to make reforms which they themselves would benefit."

The flip side of "more for more," of course, is that countries who fail to reform can expect "less for less," officials say.

Tough Postelection Tack

The policy changes come amid an ongoing crackdown on opposition activists in Belarus, a participant in both the Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership program, following a presidential election in December that critics say was marred by fraud.

Brussels had recently been courting Belarus with offers of better relations in exchange for political and economic reform.

Since the crackdown, the EU has imposed travel bans and asset freezes on Belarus's authoritarian President Alyaksandr Lukashenska and 157 of his associates. Brussels added an additional 19 names to the sanctions list last week.

Both Fuele and Sikorski said the EU was monitoring the situation in Belarus closely and did not rule out more sanctions in the future.

In an interview with RFE/RL, Slovak Foreign Minister Mikulas Dzurinda, said he plans to push for a new round of economic sanctions at an EU foreign ministers' meeting on April 18.

"I am feeling from the beginning that only strong, tough economic sanctions can help," Dzurinda said, "especially to people detained in prisons on political grounds."

Likewise, Sikorski says Belarus's continued participation in the Eastern Partnership will be contingent on Minsk's behavior in the months prior to the program's upcoming summit in Warsaw in September.

Being Jaruzelski?

Due to the visa ban, Lukashenka will not be allowed to attend the Warsaw event. Sikorski says the Belarusian leader now has a choice: emulate Poland's last Communist ruler, Wojciech Jaruzelski, who negotiated a transition to democracy, or share the fate of deposed leaders in Egypt and Tunisia who were forced out of power in disgrace.

"It is still president Lukashenka's choice whether he wants to, metaphorically speaking, become General Jaruzelski," Sikorski said. "In other words, [become] a dictator who represses his people but then starts transition his country towards democracy, or whether he want to end up like the gentlemen in our southern neighborhood."

Meanwhile, several southern EU member states, most notably Spain, have argued that given the dramatic transition taking place in North Africa and the Middle East, the EU should divert more money to that region at the expense of Eastern Europe.

But Salome Samadashvili, Georgia's ambassador to the EU, told RFE/RL that Brussels should continue to reward the progress that has been made in her country and several others in the east.

"I am sure it is in the interests of the EU to continue to helping us to succeed because we also create a very good example to the southern neighbors," Samadashvili said.

By Rikard Jozwiak. Published on 28 March 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/eu_to_retool_policy_toward_eastern_neighbors/3539603.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Exiled Belarusian Presidential Candidate Senses Opposition's Moment To Unify

2011-03-29T14:07:00.002+02:00

Ales Mikhalevich woke up on Belarus's election day -- December 19, 2010 -- as one of nine candidates vying to replace President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, the man known as "Europe's last dictator."

Some 24 hours later, after a violent crackdown by the authorities on citizen protests against election fraud, Mikhalevich began the day in jail -- along with other top candidates and some 700 supporters.

The crackdown generated international condemnation and a fresh round of sanctions on Minsk by Brussels and Washington.

Now, the 35-year-old Mikhalevich is hundreds of kilometers from home, in the Czech Republic, which granted him political asylum on March 24. He told RFE/RL that from the safety of the European Union, he will devote his energy to activism and work to hold the Lukashenka regime's accountable.

"For the moment, I'm working more as a political activist," he says. "As a lawyer, I would like to make use of all international legal mechanisms -- and I've discovered that there are many of them -- because this isn't just about political prisoners; it's about torture in Europe on the borders of the European Union.

"I want to use my experience and knowledge in order to stop torture and ensure that there are no longer political prisoners in Belarus. I'm not thinking so much about my future political career."

Concentration Camp Conditions

Mikhalevich was discharged from a Minsk detention center on February 19, but only after he agreed to sign an agreement to collaborate with Belarus's State Security Committee (KGB).

In actuality, he said he never has -- and never would -- work with the security forces.

"I would be afraid above all of not being able to look my friends in the eyes if I became an agent of the KGB," he told RFE/RL. "I signed that document on cooperation knowing that I would immediately call a press conference and explain that I was in investigative custody and signed such a document."

Mikhalevich told reporters after his release that the conditions in jail were like a concentration camp. He said guards made him stand naked outdoors in freezing temperatures, deprived him of sleep, dragged him across the floor while handcuffed, kept him in an overcrowded cell, and interrogated him without a lawyer.

Recalling the experience, Mikhalevich said he knew that lesser-known prisoners probably experience even worse conditions.

"It's possible to survive under any circumstances. I calmed myself by thinking about the people imprisoned in secret camps -- in the gulag -- who were in much worse conditions and went through things that were much worse," he says.

"One of the main conclusions I reached was that, if they're going to publicly torture and mistreat former presidential candidates and public figures, understanding full well that sooner or later those people are going to talk about it, I could only imagine what would happen with former customs officials or law enforcement officers they're mistreating, understanding full well that no one is going to intercede on their behalf. Because who in our society is going to say, 'Oh, what a pity, they're mistreating customs officials.' "

Thorn In The Side

Mikhalevich said he also knew that regardless of what happened to him while he was in custody, he had already become a thorn in the side of the Lukashenka regime -- a role he says he now plans to expand by working closely with international rights groups.

"The authorities were in a situation where anything that they did with me would be bad. If they put me in jail, that would have created some bad publicity. If I stayed in Belarus, that would have been bad because they would have had to conduct a serious investigation into the acts of torture I talked about at [my postrelease] press conference." he says.

"The fact that I left is also bad because I'm now working with international organizations, with lawyers, with the United Nations commissioners on questions of torture."

Mikhalevich told RFE/RL that because the authorities had prohibited him from leaving Belarus, when he decided to leave the country he left his mobile phone in Minsk, suspecting that the KGB uses people's phone signals to track them.

He said a friend drove him into Russian territory and then into Ukraine. With his current passport in police custody, he used an old passport at the border crossings. In Kyiv, Mikhalevich got in touch with several embassies, but the Czechs agreed "pretty quickly," he said, to issue him an entry visa.

The former presidential candidate said he intends to return to Minsk "as soon as possible, as soon as such an opportunity presents itself," but doesn't rule out trying to have his family -- he has a wife and two daughters -- join him abroad.

According to the Belarusian news agency BelaPAN, the country's top prosecutor is likely to ask the Czech Republic to extradite Mikhalevich.

Still In Prison

Meanwhile in Minsk, fellow former presidential candidates Andrey Sannikau and Mikalay Statkevich remain in prison. Another ex-candidate, Uladzimer Nyaklyaeu, remains under house arrest.

More than 40 protesters have been charged with instigating mass disorder and several have already been jailed for up to four years.

Mikhalevich said as the repression continues, Lukashenka is unwittingly helping the opposition.

"I think that Lukashenka is now doing a lot to help the opposition unify. It's always easier to unify against someone," he says. "I was a very soft candidate. I didn't criticize Lukashenka. I simply said that I had a different program, that the present government doesn't have answers to most of the questions, but that the government undoubtedly had done some good things in the past.

"Even people like me, who are ready to work with the government, are being driven by it into open, radical opposition. So I think that precisely after December 19, after that night of mass arrests and cracked heads, unifying will be much more likely."

By RFE/RL. Published on 29 March 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/belarus_mikhalevich_lukashenka_asylum_czech_republic/3540152.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

In Wake Of Japan Disaster, Safety Of Armenian Nuclear Plant Questioned

2011-03-24T10:51:00.003+01:00

Just a half-hour drive from the Armenian capital, Yerevan, a Soviet-era nuclear power plant sits precariously on an earthquake fault line.

Environmentalists have long said the Ararat Valley, located just 16 kilometers from the Turkish border city of Igdir, is an extremely dangerous place to house the Metsamor nuclear power plant. And those concerns have only become more urgent amid the ongoing crisis at Japan's crippled Fukushima plant.

"There are five earthquake tectonic breaks [near the plant] -- one is 34 kilometers [away], another is 16 kilometers away, and one is at a distance of only 500 meters," explains Hakob Sanasarian, chairman of Yerevan's Greens' Union environmental group. "And [yet] today they say it is safe. The one who controls such a facility would, of course, praise it."

Armenian government officials have until now insisted that their country is immune to the kind of nuclear emergency Japan now faces.

They say the Metsamor power plant's reactors could withstand up to a magnitude-8 quake, and that such a powerful earthquake is highly unlikely to hit the country anyway.

But amid fresh questions about the safety of the plant in the wake of Japan's crisis, Armenian Prime Minister Tigran Sarkisian announced that a safety review would be conducted.

"We will once again discuss this question and invite international experts to get their assessment of what measures we must take in order to raise the safety standards at our nuclear power plant," Sarkisian told a cabinet meeting on March 18.

Vahram Petrosian, director of the government's research institute on nuclear power plant operation, defends the plant's safety standards. "Not only our experts, but also international seismologists" say the plant could withstand an earthquake of magnitude 8.

Petrosian and others have made this claim, despite the fact that a devastating 6.9-magnitude quake hit the area just over two decades ago.

Nevertheless, Ashot Martirosian, the head of the State Committee on Nuclear Safety Regulation, says Metsamor's cooling system is more reliable than that of Japan's Fukushima plant.

"The Metsamor reactor is cooled by a second contour, which is a separate system, a separate barrier," Martirosian says. "Theoretically, such an emergency situation cannot arise here."

Critics Doubt Reliability

Gia Arabidze, a dean at Georgia Technical University in Tbilisi and a specialist on nuclear issues, takes issue with such claims.

Arabidze says that while Metsamor's normal operations pose no threat to Armenia or bordering countries such as Georgia and Turkey, if an earthquake the size of Japan's were to hit Armenia the results could be devastating.

"The probability for the plant to be damaged in the case of a powerful earthquake is high," Arabidze says. "The nuclear power plants in Japan are far more earthquake-resistant than those which were built in the former Soviet Union, and if we see these problems at the Japanese plant today, you can imagine what problems could occur in the case of a similar disaster in Armenia."

Karine Danielyan, a Yerevan-based environmentalist, says that seismically, the Ararat Valley is "the worst place for a nuclear power plant. The example of Japan shows how unpredictable [the reliability of safety features] is."

Likewise, Frank Barnaby, a U.K.-based nuclear physicist, says that based on the design and age of the station it is unlikely to maintain safety standards during a powerful earthquake.

"Nuclear power plants that are that old have very old-fashioned safety features. I mean, modern power plants are much safer, and even those are not safe enough to withstand a Japanese type of earthquake followed by a tsunami," Barnaby says. "So I think that story is probably incorrect; I would think the Armenian plant is certainly not safe."

Working To Meet Standards

Metsamor, which currently supplies 40 percent of Armenia's nuclear power, was shut down for seven years after a massive 6.9-magnitude earthquake in 1988 that left 25,000 dead. The epicenter of the 1988 earthquake was 75 kilometers from Metsamor.

The Soviet government, which then ruled Armenia, cited security concerns in closing it. But a crippling energy crisis in newly independent Armenia in the mid-1990's led the government to reopen the plant's second reactor amid strong international criticism.

The European Union has classified the plant's light-water reactor as one of the "oldest and least reliable" of 66 such facilities built in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Since 1995 both the EU and United States have spent tens of millions of dollars to improve safety standards at Metsamor.

Moreover, Suren Azatian, Metsamor's former director-general, cautions that the plant is "not that protected" against radioactive leaks. He says that unlike Metsamor, Fukushima has concrete containment vessels around its reactors that appear not to have been breached after the tsunami.

Azatian adds that Armenia should continue to rely on nuclear power, although the country's safety standards must be revised after the Japanese emergency, just as they were after the devastating 1986 Chornobyl disaster.

"One must not panic and say that this is terrible technology that must be abandoned. That's wrong," Azatian says. "Such an approach would be unjustified. After all, our nuclear power plant continued to operate during the [1988] earthquake, which was no less devastating."

According to Petrosian, more than 1,200 measures have been taken to enhance the safety of the facility at the demand of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency since the plant was relaunched in 1995. He says the implementation of such measures was continuous.

By 2016 the Armenian government intends to replace the old Soviet-era-built station with a new one that would meet Western safety standards. Efforts on construction of the new plant are behind schedule, and the Energy Ministry is considering extending the existing plant's term of operation.

By Astghik Bedevian, Ruben Meloyan, Courtney Brooks. Published on 19 March 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/armenian_nuclear_plant_safety_questioned/2343485.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly will help political dialogue and democracy in the Eastern Partnership

2011-02-11T21:36:00.000+01:00

"Time is on our side, the EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly will help political dialogue and democracy in the Eastern Partnership", says Kristian Vigenin MEP (Bulgaria, S&D), Chairman of the European Parliament Delegation to the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly.

Brussels, 10 February 2011 - The Conference of Presidents of the political groups of the EP has given today the green light for the organisation of the constituent meeting of the Euronest PA, the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Parliament and the Eastern Partner Countries. It took time to reach this decision but the inaugural session should now be prepared for early Spring in Brussels. The participation of one of the Eastern Partners, Belarus, would be provisionally suspended for political reasons.

"I am satisfied with the outcome of today's meeting, after all, our continuous efforts have helped to shape a united position in the EP. We will now continue our consultations with the Partners for making our common Assembly an inclusive and integrational experience, and hopefully it will be a success story" declared Vigenin at the close of the meeting.

"We have already a clear agenda in front of us: our absolute priority is working together, in the EURONEST PA and its bodies, to make it possible that 10 Belarusian colleagues take their seats as soon as possible. A special Working Group will facilitate this process. I am convinced that the new opportunity for political dialogue which will be created will inevitably play in favour of more democracy in all the countries of the Eastern Partnership."

International Donors’ Conference “Solidarity with Belarus”

2011-02-10T16:46:00.001+01:00

Štefan Füle European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy International Donors’ Conference “Solidarity with Belarus” International Donors’ Conference Warsaw, 2 February 2011

Ministers, Ambassadors, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I welcome the opportunity to address you today. This conference is an occasion to send a strong sign of support from the EU to Belarusian civil society during this difficult period.

As outlined by Minister Sikorski, the EU took an important decision on Belarus on Monday. The most visible part of our decision was to put nearly 160 people under sanctions. This includes some of Belarus’ leadership and those close to the post-election repression, including President Lukashenko. This was a decisive step to mark our disapproval, and this is what the press has focused on. The US also followed suit by adopting similar sanctions on Monday evening.

High Representative/Vice President Cathy Ashton and I have clearly deplored the violence. We have demanded the immediate and unconditional release of all detainees. And we have called for an end to the ongoing persecution of civil society.

We were left with no alternative but to apply sanctions. They could only be reviewed if Belarus took real and convincing steps towards the release and rehabilitation of all detainees, as well as ending the repression of democratic forces.

While the sanctions have attracted a great deal of political and media attention, we must not lose sight of the other, equally important component of our decision. I refer to our decision to reinforce our links with, and support for, civil society. With these measures, we are seeking to avoid isolating the Belarusian population. I believe we have an important responsibility in this regard.

The European External Action Service and the Commission have been working closely in recent weeks to identify ways that we can intensify our support to the people of Belarus.

Our first step was to develop measures designed to provide urgent support to the victims of repression and to increase assistance to civil society. Our indicative budget for this activity – financed through the Instrument for Stability – is €1.7 million. This includes urgent support to the families of those who have been detained on political grounds, as well as to civil society, including students and independent media. Such support includes legal and social assistance, as well as counseling.

We will also make financial support available for Belarusian NGOs and independent media outlets willing to organize awareness and advocacy campaigns in Belarus and in the EU, such as conferences and workshops. This support should be available in the next few weeks.

As regards medium-term support, we are currently reviewing our funding support for the period 2011 – 2013. In light of recent events, I am pleased to announce today that the Commission intends to increase its funds and support for civil society fourfold.

As a clear demonstration of our unequivocal support to civil society in these difficult times, we will increase our funding from the currently available €4 million to €15.6 million. Our support will target primarily Belarusian NGOs, independent media and students who are subject to the regime’s repression.

We will provide support in three main ways:

First, we will provide increased funding under the Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the Non State Actors programme. Our goal here is to strengthen civil society’s capacity to promote democratic reform and small-scale local development activities.

Second, we will maintain our annual one million euro funding to the European Humanities University in exile in Vilnius for the young generation in Belarus to pursue high quality, free education.

Third, we will provide scholarships and promote student mobility and exchanges between education institutions from Belarus and the EU more generally. We intend to draw on our experience from the Erasmus Mundus and Tempus programmes. I would like to take this opportunity to invite you all to pool efforts and increase your own assistance to students. Students are a particularly vulnerable group but they have a crucial role to play in the future development of their country.

In addition, it is important that we work together to reinforce links between civil society in EU Member States and civil society in Belarus. This can be done by facilitating travel to the EU for Belarusian people through visa facilitation agreement. In the meantime, we need to better coordinate the possibilities that Member States already have to waive or reduce visa fees for certain categories of citizens. The Commission is ready to assist in this process by sending an expert mission to Minsk to coordinate Member States' actions.

We also intend to make the best use of the Eastern Partnership multilateral track, and in particular the Civil Society Forum to strengthen and empower Belarus’ civil society. We will shortly be making proposals in this regard. As a regional forum, the Eastern Partnership multilateral track provides a unique vehicle to strengthen our civil society contacts with partner countries - particularly in such difficult times, as witnessed in Belarus.

Our success in facing challenges that lie ahead will rest to a large extent on the level of coordination between the Member States of the European Union and other international donors. As a family of democratic countries, we interact on both policy and funding priorities. Accordingly, we strengthen our original individual contributions. For maximum impact, it is also necessary to co-operate with some of the most engaged stakeholders such as the Nordic Council of Ministers and the community of non-governmental organizations.

Before we begin our detailed discussions on how to support civil society, let me conclude with a proposal. I believe that we should follow this meeting with one of our regular EU-led informal Donors' Coordination Meetings on Belarus. We have successfully used this platform several times a year since 2006. Indeed, most of you have been regularly represented there and provided valuable input.

Drawing on the expertise of this well-established forum, we can prepare the implementation and coordination of the planned contributions announced today. I propose that this follow up meeting take place in late February / early March, when most assistance policies are ready for implementation.

I believe that providing increased funding to support civil society is of vital importance. And it's even more important to create the conditions and environment to allow this funding to bring real change for those working and struggling in Belarus. Let's use this Donor's Conference and the follow-up meetings as an ongoing dialogue to explore the best ways for us to support Civil Society in Belarus.

'Troubled' By Minsk Visit, U.S. Senator Urges Coordinated Moves To Counter Belarus Abuses

2011-01-24T16:57:00.001+01:00

A group of prominent U.S. senators has called for a strong and coordinated response by the United States and European Union to the crackdown on democracy activists following the December reelection of Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka.

Six U.S. senators signed the letter, to EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton, urging targeted sanctions against Lukashenka and other officials and a ban on business with Belneftekhim, Belarus's state oil company.

Among the signatories is Senator Richard Durbin (Democrat-Illinois), who just returned from a trip to Minsk. He spoke to RFE/RL correspondent Heather Maher on the eve of Lukashenka's inauguration on January 21, which was boycotted by world leaders.

RFE/RL: Senator Durbin, why did you decide to sign the letter to EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton calling for joint U.S.-EU sanctions against Belarus?

Richard Durbin: I was so troubled by what I found in Minsk. Being with the families of those political candidates who are now languishing in prison -- it just struck me as an outrage that [President Alyaksandr] Lukashenka would do this.

When I met with his foreign minister and asked for an explanation, he asked me to be more forgiving of Belarus because they were, in his words, "a new democracy." And I found that to be totally unacceptable. To think that you would systematically arrest and imprison political prisoners tells me that Belarus is not even close to the democratic values that we want to see.

RFE/RL: Tell me how you came to be in Minsk to meet with these families?

Durbin: I'd just been in Lithuania -- they were observing the 20th anniversary of Bloody Sunday, when 14 just common people in Vilnius were killed by Soviet tankers and paratroopers and 1,000 were injured. I drove over to Minsk and sat down with other families fighting for freedom in that country. You couldn't escape the historic parallel.

RFE/RL: You said you met with government officials, among them the foreign minister. Was it just yourself in the meetings and did the officials know that you were meeting with families of the detained?

Durbin: I doubt if there were many things about my trip that they didn't know or monitor. But I met personally with [Sergei] Martynov, who is the foreign minister in Belarus, and told him about the disappointment we felt over the actions of Lukashenka.

RFE/RL: And in response, he asked you to be more understanding?

Durbin: Yes. And of course they are trumping up these charges that this was a conspiracy inspired by Poland and Germany, and I'm not sure who else, to overthrow the government of Belarus. It is an outlandish charge, as extreme as the actions that they took against their political opponents.

RFE/RL: How would you characterize the meeting after you expressed your concern and the minister responded by saying the West needs to show more understanding? Did the mood become hostile? How did it end, diplomatically speaking?

Durbin: Well, diplomatically [speaking], they called it "frank and candid." And I would say it ended with Martynov and the Lukashenka government totally unrepentant. In fact, he turned around and flew into Europe to meet with some representatives of the EU to charge that Poland and Germany were involved in some conspiracy against Belarus. I mean, it was unfortunately a very extreme comment by someone who has little or no defense to offer.

RFE/RL: The letter that you signed asks the EU to join the United States in speaking with one voice on Belarus and impose sanctions that carry "very real and significant consequences" for Lukashenka and other Belarusian officials responsible for human rights abuses, vote fraud, and the continued detention of opposition presidential candidates and party leaders following the December 19 presidential election. If that doesn't happen, are there any steps you plan to take in the U.S. Congress to keep the pressure on Belarus?

Durbin: I have tried to work with the [Obama] administration to make sure we did things in concert with the European Union, and my feeling is that [White House] is going to move forward. I've spoken to some of their representatives. I think we ought to work with [the EU]. My impression is that sanctions, whatever they might be, are not very effective unless they're coordinated by many nations. So unilateral efforts have very little impact; I think we will have much greater impact if we work together.

By RFE/RL. Published on 21 January 2011
Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/us_senator_troubled_minsk_visit_urges_coordination_counter_belarus_abuses/2282810.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

As Corruption Rises Worldwide, Georgia Proves The Exception

2010-12-13T13:37:00.001+01:00

It wasn't too long ago that the sight of police inspired anxiety among residents in Georgia, where encounters often ended -- as they do in many parts of the former Soviet Union -- with the extraction of a small bribe.

But after an intensive drive to purge the country of petty corruption, many ordinary Georgians say they actually welcome the sight of police.

"Everything has really improved," says Shalva, an elderly car owner in the capital, Tbilisi. "There is no way the patrol officers are taking bribes. They even changed my flat tire for free so that I could keep on driving. What could be better than this?"

Anecdotal evidence like Shalva's may only go so far. But in its 2010 Global Corruption Barometer, the corruption watchdog Transparency International (TI) says statistical data also attests to the fact that a remarkable transformation has taken place over the past several years in Georgia as the government of Mikheil Saakashvili has pursued aggressive anticorruption reforms in the public service sector.

"There is no other country at the moment where more people see a decrease in corruption in their country, and where more people say the government is effective in fighting corruption," says Mathias Huter, a senior analyst with TI's Georgia office. "I think this is an indication that the Georgian government's efforts to fight petty corruption have been very successful."

Besting The Neighbors

Worldwide, TI reports that corruption trends have been on the rise, with even Western and other developed countries reporting an increase in perceived corruption as the global economic crisis has eroded trust in public institutions.

In Georgia, by contrast, an astonishing 78 percent of people surveyed say they have seen a decrease in corruption in their country. Seventy-seven percent of respondents evaluate the government's efforts in fighting corruption as "effective."

Such numbers not only put Georgia in good stead internationally. They also present a sharp contrast to other newly independent states in their post-Soviet neighborhood, where corruption remains endemic. In Russia, for example, only 26 percent of people surveyed say the state has been effective in battling corruption; in Ukraine, that figure drops to 16 percent.

And in Georgia's South Caucasus neighbors, Armenia and Azerbaijan, half of respondents say they have seen an increase in corruption, with only a handful reporting a decrease and the rest saying the situation remains unchanged.

"What is outstanding in Georgia compared to the other newly independent states is the amount of people who say that they have paid a bribe in the past 12 months," Huter says. "In Georgia, this number is very, very low -- it's only 3 percent of the people surveyed. So this is definitely a number that is remarkable for the region."

Higher Up, Problems Remain

The Georgian leadership is likely to celebrate the new findings as proof of the country's resilience in a near-constant climate of adversity. Saakashvili's government has seen its early aspirations of NATO and EU membership dim significantly in recent years under hostile pressure from Moscow and growing doubts about Tbilisi's democratic credentials.

Georgia has recently received a number of accolades, including plaudits from the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for ease of doing business and anticorruption efforts.

The new TI report will only contribute to Georgia's emerging reputation as a place where business, rather than democracy, has become a priority. (Another watchdog, Freedom House, in recent years has relegated Georgia to its lower, pre-Rose Revolution democracy ranking after several years of improvement on political rights and civil liberties.)

Even Georgia-watchers who applaud the achievements in battling petty corruption say the country is far from corruption-free. Political parties and the judiciary, in particular, remain largely unreformed.

Observers also point to the trend of crony capitalism, also called "elite" or "grand" corruption, that continues to flourish unchecked in government inner circles, out of view of the general public -- whether it's the awarding of a national lottery contract or handing near-monopoly control to Georgia's dominant Internet service provider, Caucasus Online.

"A government contract is being awarded and it's pretty clear who's going to get it in advance. If you don't know somebody, you're not going to get it," says Lincoln Mitchell, a Georgia expert and associate research scholar at the Harriman Institute at New York's Columbia University. "Businesses who want to, say, support candidates from other than the government party are going to encounter trouble running their businesses. I think a lot of businesses are aware of the possibility of shakedowns for taxes or bribes, depending on how you see it. So that higher level does still exist."

Cultural Change

Other critics note that the government, with its considerable influence over the country's television media, has been able to trumpet its corruption-reform achievements in a nonstop PR blitz.

Shorena Shaverdashvili, the publisher and editor in chief of the Georgian magazine "Liberali," says with some 85 percent of Georgians receiving their news via television, Saakashvili's administration has been hugely successful in shaping its own public image.

Still, she and others cannot dismiss the importance of the government reforms. The culture of corruption has been so effectively eradicated from day-to-day life, she says, that it's highly unlikely that Georgia will backslide anytime soon, even under different leadership.

"Before, you really had to pay bribes to get your passport in time, and it was actually a hellish procedure to go through," she says. "It was driving time, and you had to go to 10 different people, and the bureaucracy behind it was horrible. There's definitely less corruption in public offices."

By Daisy Sindelar. Published on 9 December 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/georgia_corruption/2243593.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Armenian-Turkish Relations Depend On People, Not Protocols

2010-11-11T13:49:00.000+01:00

Most historical anniversaries are marked by either solemn commemorations or festive celebrations. Others, despite their initial significance, quickly fade from the public mind. The first anniversary of the historic "protocols" between Armenia and Turkey resembles the latter -- with little discussion and even less fanfare in either country.

The October 10, 2009, Armenian-Turkish protocols sought to chart a course toward a "normalization" of relations, but the initial optimism of opening long-closed borders and establishing diplomatic relations has now been proven premature, if not unfounded.

The breakdown of the Armenian-Turkish normalization process was largely due to two factors. First, Turkey made a strategic mistake in underestimating Azerbaijan's vehement opposition to the protocols. For Turkey, the protocols represented an important effort to correct a failed policy, as well as a bid to regain more options for Turkish policy, which had become subservient to Azerbaijan's interests.

Turkish policy in the region had become narrowly defined by the parameters of maintaining closed borders with Armenia and withholding diplomatic relations. Such a policy is not a policy, and it clearly failed to force any concessions from Armenia. Rather, it tended to be counterproductive, serving to unite Armenians and encouraging Armenia to adopt tactical responses to overcome its isolation.

The second factor that abruptly ended the process was the fact that the protocols themselves shifted from being a diplomatic effort to normalize relations with Armenia to become a domestic political issue within Turkey. The protocols became hostage to domestic Turkish politics, taking on a new context of accusation and insinuation, whereby Turkey's ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party was attacked by the opposition for supposedly betraying Turkey's traditional ally, Azerbaijan. Turkish-Azerbaijani relations were transformed from an important element of Turkish foreign policy to an essential component of domestic Turkish politics.

Informal Starts

Nonetheless, beyond the doomed protocols, a process of engagement has emerged between Armenia and Turkey. This engagement has taken place on several tracks, including expanding people-to-people contacts and cooperation between civil-society organizations, as well as more limited efforts in the cultural field.

Civil-society and people-to-people contacts have become quite dynamic, with regular exchanges and visits on both sides of the closed border. Within this context, although Turkey has yet to open the closed physical border, the mental border between Armenia and Turkey has opened, at least partially.

This opening can be seen in this week's (October 14-17) visit to Armenia of over two dozen Turkish civil-society activists and leaders, participating in the so-called Ani Dialogue, featuring several days of events with their Armenian counterparts. Organized by the Istanbul-based Hrant Dink Foundation (named in memory of the slain Turkish-Armenian journalist) and implemented by the Caucasus Institute in Yerevan with the support of the Heinrich Boell Foundation, the Ani Dialogue represents an important form of engagement, despite the lack of formal diplomatic progress.

Moreover, in terms of facing the legacy of the genocide issue, the 1915-16 mass killing of Armenians by Turkish forces, Turkish society has also been moving, albeit too slowly at times. On April 24, when Armenians mark the anniversary of what they believe should be officially recognized as genocide, one of the most significant commemorative events was held not in Armenia, but in Istanbul itself, with Turkish participants.

Mixed Result

But there have also been missed opportunities -- especially in the cultural area, most recently involving the Turkish government's planned reopening of an Armenian church in Van. After many months of expectation and preparation, several thousand people attended a special ceremony marking the restoration of the historical Armenian Holy Cross Church on the island of Aghtamar at Lake Van. Most notably, Armenian priests were able to conduct services in the ancient church for the first time in 95 years.

Yet despite the emotional buildup to the ceremony, the long-awaited event turned out quite differently than expected. In many ways, the ceremony was a disappointment. It was also a missed opportunity. Only about 50 guests were able to attend the service in the small church, and about 1,500 Armenians, including 700 from Istanbul and about 200 from outside Turkey, watched nearby.

But many more were expected. And perhaps many more would have come, but things went wrong. Despite promises by various Turkish officials, the ceremony was held in a church with no cross. The cross itself was not the only problem, but the failure to erect it was seen by Armenians as a test of Turkish sincerity and goodwill. And, unfortunately, the way the event transpired meant the Turkish side failed that test.

The selection of this particular Armenian church by the Turkish officials was no accident. It has a special place in Armenian history, both as a religious symbol and because of its architecture. It was also the subject of an emotional appeal by the late Hrant Dink, who argued in 2005 that the church should be used "to restore our spent souls."

All this suggests that the best hope for real normalization is on the lowest level, people-to-people exchanges instead of state-to-state negotiations. But it also requires a reaffirmation of sincerity and commitment from the Turkish side. Otherwise, the October anniversary of the Armenian-Turkish protocols will remain nothing more than a footnote to a shared history whose interpretation remains anything but shared.

By Richard Giragosian. Published on 11 October 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Armenian_Turkish_Relations_Depend_On_People_Not_Protocols/2187064.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Statement of the PACE pre-electoral mission to Moldova

2010-11-10T11:03:00.000+01:00

A pre-electoral delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) paid a visit to Chisinau to evaluate the election campaign on the eve of the 28 November 2010 parliamentary elections in Moldova. The delegation held meetings with the Acting President of Moldova and Speaker of the Parliament, the leaders of the main political parties participating in the elections, the Chair and members of the Central Election Commission (CEC), the President of the Constitutional Court and the Chairman of the Audiovisual Co-ordinating Council, as well as representatives of the international community, NGOs and the media.

The pre-election delegation noted with satisfaction the confidence of political stakeholders in the transparent functioning of the Central Election Commission. The delegation also highlighted the improvement in media coverage of the election campaign, including by public broadcasters which in the past had shown a tendency to give predominantly favourable coverage to the ruling parties, regardless of their political tendency – a phenomenon which has been continually criticised by the Parliamentary Assembly. However, the delegation stressed that private TV channels, whatever their sympathy, should be balanced in their coverage to avoid becoming a platform for propaganda.

The pre-election delegation stressed that a number of concerns have subsisted throughout this election campaign. The delegation was informed about recurrent problems concerning the quality of the voters’ lists, and therefore urges the CEC, as well as local authorities, to take all the necessary steps between now and 28 November to improve the quality of these lists. The delegation also expressed its concern over information it received regarding a lack of transparency in the financing of the election campaign. Transparency is essential to guarantee the fairness of the conduct of the elections and to reinforce citizens’ confidence in the democratic election process.

A number of interlocutors expressed concern about the risk of misuse of administrative resources by the authorities, and a rise in tension in the run-up to the elections. In this regard, the delegation strongly condemns any attempt by local authorities, whatever their political affiliation, to use administrative resources for the election campaign. The delegation calls on the political stakeholders of Moldova to abstain from any aggressive rhetoric as well as attempts to put pressure on political opponents, or any other actions contrary to the principles of the Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters of the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission.

The delegation stressed that democratic elections are not limited only to voting day. The authorities of the country and all political stakeholders have the heavy responsibility of ensuring the necessary conditions for the free expression of the will of all the citizens of the Republic of Moldova.

The pre-election delegation recalls that since the parliamentary elections on 5 April 2009, Moldova has entered a spiral of political and institutional crisis. In this regard, the delegation stresses the crucial importance of the early parliamentary elections on 28 November 2010, the results of which should allow, at last, the formation of functional state institutions in conformity with the Constitution and permit the state authorities to concentrate their efforts on resolving the urgent problems of the citizens. After the elections, the leaders of the main political parties should immediately enter into a constructive, responsible dialogue in order to achieve the broadest possible consensus to resolve the crisis.

This delegation is convinced that the active participation of citizens in the elections, and continuous trust in the democratic process, despite current lassitude, could help to end the political crisis.

The pre-electoral delegation has been assured by the authorities of Moldova, as well as by the Central Electoral Commission, that all measures will be taken to eradicate the problems identified in order to guarantee the democratic character of these elections.

The Parliamentary Assembly will send a 30-member delegation to observe the elections on 28 November 2010.

Source: PACE. Strasbourg, 27 October 2010

Remarks by HR/VP Ashton after EU - Ukraine Ministerial

2010-10-28T11:46:00.001+02:00

I am pleased to welcome Foreign Minister Gryschenko to Brussels. Ukraine is a European country. Our relationship is very important and we want to deepen and to develop it.

In the course of the conversations we had we covered a wide-range of issues for both the EU and for the Ukraine, particularly in view of our up-coming Summit on 22 November.

We want to move forward on the negotiations for an Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. We also look for progress in our dialogue on visa liberalisation.

We are looking forward to the local elections this weekend. Ukraine has a habit of good elections, and should preserve and of course build on that.

There was discussion too of the recent ruling of the Constitutional court. We know that further constitutional reform is a key priority and we hope that it would be carried through an inclusive process with the aim of establishing a lasting system of checks and balances that accord with European standards.

We had a good and extensive exchange of views on our relations with Russia, which is a strategic partner for both of us.

And we have been looking at the situation in Belarus, which is preparing for elections on 19 December. The conduct of those Presidential elections will be very important for our relations.

And we discussed Transnistria in the Republic of Moldova. The EU and Ukraine are partners in the 5 + 2 settlement format. We will continue our co-operation, and we both want to see the moves forward.

And finally, we discussed the issue of piracy which for Ukraine is a major issue because of the hostages that have been taken who are Ukrainian and our ability to collaborate effectively, not just in the missions we have to fight piracy but also as strategic partners together in this sense. To be able to develop ways in which we can support leadership in the region in order to be able to deal with this issue. But more than anything a great pleasure to see you and I am also looking forward to a visit I hope to make very soon to Ukraine.

Brussels, 26 October 2010

Georgia Offers North Caucasus Residents Visa-Free Travel As Kremlin Cries Foul

2010-10-27T15:08:00.001+02:00

Lali Pitskhelauri lives just a short drive away from her sister. But the two women haven't seen each other for more than a decade.

Pitskhelauri runs a small guest house and a roadside kiosk in the Georgian town of Stepantsminda, not far from the Russian border. Her sister lives on the Russian side of the frontier in the North Ossetian capital of Vladikavkaz.

Between them stands the Zemo Larsi (Verkhny Lars in Russian) checkpoint -- the only land border crossing between Russia and Georgia that does not pass through Georgia's Russian-backed separatist regions of South Ossetia or Abkhazia.

Pitskhelauri says she hasn't been able to visit her sister for 11 years.

"How do you think it feels? And it is all because of politicians. It is politicians who closed the road and cut us off from each other."

She asks, distraught, "Why shouldn't we be able to visit each other?"

Victims Of A Decade-Long Struggle

Pitskhelauri and her sister are unintentional victims of a long-standing struggle between Tbilisi and Moscow, which has escalated markedly during the past decade as Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has sought to steer his country into NATO and out of Russia's sphere of influence.

Russia closed the Zemo Larsi crossing in 2006, as relations between Moscow and Tbilisi deteriorated following the arrest of four alleged Russian spies by Georgian authorities. Diplomatic relations were ultimately severed following the five-day war in August 2008.

The two countries agreed to reopen Zemo Larsi in March. But in the absence of diplomatic relations, it remains difficult -- often prohibitively so -- for Russians or Georgians to cross it.

That, however, is about to change -- at least for those on the Russian side of the border. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has signed a decree allowing residents of Russia's seven North Caucasus republics to visit Georgia for up to 90 days without a visa.

Manana Manjgaladze, a spokeswoman for Saakashvili, says it was the lack of formal diplomatic relations between Tbilisi and Moscow that made it extremely difficult for Russians, who live only two to three hours from the Zemo Larsi, to get a Georgian visa.

"The people who live in these republics of the North Caucasus had to go all the way to Moscow to the Swiss Embassy [which handles Georgian interests in Russia] to receive a Georgian visa," Manjgaladze says.

Restricted Visas

To be sure, the decree does not signal improved relations between Tbilisi and the Kremlin. A statement from the Georgian Interior Ministry about the lifting of visa requirements reflects ongoing tensions between the two countries. It says residents of the North Caucasus can now travel to Georgia "to do business, receive an education, and to rest and enjoy all the good things that they are deprived of in their own country -- which is run by a corrupt and repressive federal regime."

Nugzar Tsiklauri, chairman of the Georgian Parliament's Committee on Relations With Compatriots Residing Abroad, says the decree was necessary because of Russia's record on human rights in North Caucasus republics like North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya, and Daghestan.

"There are massive violations of human rights and there are killings of journalists [in the North Caucasus]," Tsiklauri says. "Human rights activists have gone missing or are being killed."

Tsiklauri adds, "In this situation, the historical obligation of Georgia is to focus on the North Caucasus and help in all ways possible the people with whom we have lived alongside for centuries."

Unclear Limits On Both Sides

Kremlin officials have responded angrily to Saakashvili's decree -- describing the move as a "provocation" and an "attempt to divide Russia's population into different categories."

Andrei Nesterenko, a spokesman for Russia's Foreign Ministry, says the decree will "create obstacles to contacts between our citizens."

"Russia consistently stands for improving neighborly relations in the Caucasus and building a normal, calm life, which Mr. Saakashvili tried to disrupt by unleashing war in August 2008," Nesterenko adds.

Nesterenko says Russia has no problem with Georgia or the Georgian people. He says poor relations between the two countries are the result of "a problem with the regime" of Saakashvili, adding, "Mr. Saakashvili tried to disrupt [neighborly relations] by unleashing war in August 2008."

He also describes Saakashvili's actions as "spastic" and "aimed to cause more annoyances" that "only cause more problems for Georgian citizens.

Some Georgian opposition politicians are also questioning the wisdom of the move.

Levan Vepkhvadze, deputy chairman of the Georgian parliament, has said the free movement of Ossetians across the border could facilitate the "creeping annexation" of Georgian territory that is claimed by some North Ossetian groups.

Former Georgian parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze has warned that abolishing the visa requirement could have disastrous consequences for Georgia. She says Russian border guards may not permit Russian citizens without a valid Georgian visa to leave the Russian Federation through the Zemo Larsi checkpoint. She also wonders if the decree will give Moscow an additional pretext to accuse Georgia of harboring "terrorist groups" from the North Caucasus.

Some North Caucasus political figures also are questioning the political implications of Saakashvili's decree, suggesting it is an attempt to exploit anti-Russian sentiments in the North Caucasus.

Boris Ebzeyev, president of Karachay-Cherkessia since 2008, says Saakashvili's decree reflects "the death throes of a regime trying at all costs to restore its irrevocably tarnished luster."

Colonel-General Arkady Yedelev, deputy head of the North Caucasus Federal District, says Saakashvili should have discussed the lifting of visa requirements with Moscow instead of issuing a decree "on a whim."

A Trickle Of Traffic

But that's not how Georgian residents near the border crossing feel.

Dodo Gomiashvili, an elderly Georgian woman who operates a kiosk close to the Zemo Larsi crossing, says Moscow should respond by also lifting visa requirements for Georgians so that she can visit her relatives in North Ossetia.

"There are many of us here who have sisters, brothers and cousins on the other side," Gomiashvili explains.

RFE/RL correspondents have visited the Zemo Larsi crossing since the decree took effect a week ago. They report only a trickle of traffic passing through the border.

That's not enough to bring the new jobs desired by unemployed Georgians in the region.

"This measure isn't bringing us anything good," 31-year-old Giorgi Khutsishvili attests. "I'm working in my garden doing whatever I can to help my family survive so we don't starve this winter."

Khutsishvili says he would be happy if Russia would lift his visa requirements so he can cross into neighboring North Ossetia to sell his vegetables and other products from Georgia.

By Ron Synovitz. Published on 20 October 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgia_Offers_North_Caucasus_Residents_VisaFree_Travel_As_Kremlin_Cries_Foul/2196150.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Russia In Moldova – Soft Power Or Soft Force?

2010-10-25T17:10:00.001+02:00

Depictions of the election campaign in Moldova as “a war between East and West” for influence in the tiny country (such as a recent analysis by the U.S. geopolitical research firm Stratfor) are mistaken if only for the simple reason that just one side is fighting this war. But to understand what I mean, it is important to look at the different ways the concept of “soft power” is understood by Russia and the West.

The term “soft power” came into widespread use in the 1990s in the West to signify “the attraction of a positive example.” This is the kind of “soft power” that the European Union exerts in Moldova. The bloc does nothing to force Moldova to cooperate or integrate with it; on the contrary, it has established a mass of difficult conditions that limit the opportunities for rapid integration.

The EU’s message to Moldova is simple: The more you are like us, the faster integration will proceed, not sooner and not later. It is therefore not surprising that as soon as Moldova elected a government that espoused a European path of development, Europe opened up to Moldova to a degree that previously no one had dared dream of.

Russia in recent years has also taken up the banner of “soft power,” but it understands this term as the cloning of the outward manifestations of Western soft power. Russia has begun financing “nongovernmental” organizations and “independent” mass media outlets that are willing to advance the Kremlin’s understanding of Russian interests (interests that, as a rule, contradict the interests of Moldova itself).

Nothing Attractive

In particular, Russia is pushing the idea of an “Eastern vector” of development for Moldova, at a time when the overwhelming majority of Moldovans support further European integration. The problem, though, is that Russia has no universal idea that might be attractive to other countries. The communist ideology that it offered in the 20th century has been nearly completely marginalized now. In the meantime, the West is attractive to Moldova because of the practical results of the idea of democracy, which has demonstrated itself as the most effective means of social organization. Those results are beneficial most of all to those countries that are trying to imitate the West and so there is no reason to compel anyone in any way.

But Moscow is inclined to see democracy as a hostile ideology that is being spread by the West in order to increase its own influence in Russia’s neighborhood. And this particular interpretation can’t help but color Russia’s actions in the region. Moscow really is battling against the West for influence in the region, while the European Union is content with merely remaining a positive example that is attractive to Moldova mainly through its pragmatism and the mere fact of its existence.

Russia, unfortunately, in its virtual isolation so far has nothing to offer in competition against the West (or to attract Moldova). It cannot boast of an effective system of government or a high standard of living or an active citizenry whose rights are protected. Instead, what Russia is presenting in Moldova (and other countries) as “soft power” -- in contrast to the natural attractiveness of the West -- is highly reminiscent of the old Soviet joke “everything they try to build turns out to be a Kalashnikov.”

'False-Flag Operation'

Russia’s social engineers understand the term “soft power” as a synonym for “information war.” The idea of an information war is simple – it is a complex of measures designed to prompt the population of the target country to begin to act contrary to its own interests and in support of Russian interests without even realizing it. Political campaigns and campaigns in the media targeting political leaders and forces that Moscow opposes have become the norm in Moldova.

But all of Russia’s efforts to employ soft power inevitably end up turning into the use of “hard power” – that is, the use of direct force or economic power against another country. No one in Moldova is surprised by the periodic introduction of undeclared trade embargoes against Moldovan goods. While the Kremlin elegantly shifts the blame for these embargoes on chief Russian health inspector Gennady Onishchenko, when it comes to it political and media campaigns, Moscow prefers to act through intermediaries, taking advantage of political or geopolitical actors that have some credibility with the target audience for its political message.

This is the tried-and-true “false-flag operation.” It is no secret that Russia still has serious levers of influence within Romania left over from the days of socialist brotherhood. Moscow’s influence has only been bolstered by the global economic crisis. Of course, Moscow prefers not to advertise these levers but rather to use them to guide events in the “proper” direction. In particular, it is unlikely that Russian media would have any significant influence on Moldova’s pro-Western (pro-Romanian) electorate, while Romanian information sources are highly regarded.

In this context, it is hard not to be skeptical of the unsubstantiated claim in the Stratfor report that the United States has asked Romania to set up nongovernmental organizations, media outlets, and investment funds in Moldova. True soft power does not need to resort to irrational or covert methods. The genuinely interesting thing about this claim is how widely it has been re-reported in recent days throughout the region.

The very idea that there is a standoff between East and West in Moldova is itself an artificial idea that has been imposed from the outside. The majority of Moldovans long ago made their choice in favor of European integration. There is not a single serious political force in the country now that would not espouse European integration, if only because that position wins votes.

But that position does not suit Moscow, so it keeps on fighting.

By Irina Severin. Published on 24 October 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_In_Moldova__Soft_Power_Or_Soft_Force/2199530.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Armenian-Turkish Relations Depend On People, Not Protocols

2010-10-18T09:04:00.000+02:00

PERSPECTIVES OF GOOD COOPERATION BETWEEN S&D AND THE PARTY OF REGIONS OF UKRAINE

2010-10-14T19:15:00.001+02:00

S&D leader Martin Schulz and the president of the Party of Regions of Ukraine, Mykola Azarov, agreed today in Brussels to further continue and intensify the contact between the main Progressive Group in the European Parliament and this Ukrainian party.

The two officials had a formal meeting and signed the Memorandum between the S&D Group and the Party of the Regions of Ukraine.

The document is meant to intensify the contacts between the two organisations with a view to supporting the Party of the Region's ambition to strengthen the Ukraine's EU-integration process.

Said Martin Schulz, signing the memorandum:

"The document signed today represents the opening of our cooperation for the coming two years and will contribute to better mutual understanding in bringing Ukraine nearer to the EU, and the EU nearer to Ukraine. For S&D it is an important moment.

"In a spirit of one important point for us, as Socialists in Europe, we need Ukraine as a strategic partner of the EU. I think Ukraine, and I am grateful that prime-minister Azarov shares my view, also needs the EU. We discussed very intensively before we signed the agreement that we will cooperate on the basis of all European values: democracy, openness and freedom; and in the light of this mutual understanding, I'm looking forward with a lot of hope for our cooperation."

As a follow up to the singing of the memorandum, the debate "The future of EU-Ukraine relations" concluded that European perspectives are important for the country.

Said Adrian Severin, S&D vice-president, responsible for the Group's foreign affairs issues, who chaired the debates:

"Unity is extremely important when we speak about Ukraine. The guiding principle should be therefore to achieve the cohesion of the country, in economic, social and political terms.

"We hope and wish to have in Ukraine a 'pro-Ukrainian leadership', which strives for democracy and cohesion in Ukraine.

"This represents, at the same time, a pro-European approach of Ukraine, consistent with the aim of political association, economic integration and institutional convergence with the European Union, before sharing with the latter the institutions.

"The presence of the prime-minister Mycola Azarov is a message of the vision of Ukraine on its own European future".

Click on socialistsanddemocrats.eu to see a video of the signing the memorandum by Martin Schulz and Mykola Azarov and an interview with Adrian Severin on the conclusions of the round-table "The future of EU-Ukraine relations"

The Future of EU-Ukraine Relations: Speech by PM of Ukraine Mykola Azarov

2010-10-14T13:01:00.001+02:00

Chairman, Members of the European Parliament, Excellencies and ladies and gentlemen,

I would like to express my gratitude to the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament and to the Kyiv Centre for International and Comparative Studies for the opportunity to address this distinguished and esteemed audience.
Just prior to the opening of the conference Mr. Martin Schulz and I signed the memorandum of co-operation between the Party of Regions of Ukraine and the Group of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament

The relationships between the two political forces that we represent are those of partnership and co-operation. The memorandum, without doubt, shows the significantly enhanced European dimension of policy in my party which is the leading political force in Ukraine, as well as in the policy of the Ukrainian government in general.
The memorandum marks the end of a rather long period in the Ukrainian history when our political opponents did their best to create the image of the Party of Regions as an anti-democratic, anti-European political force in hope it would be rejected by the rest of Europe. They worked hard at that, and there are still those who believe these misrepresentations.

But that is behind us. Today we have turned a new page in Ukrainian-European relationship.

Let me ask a direct question: did the Party of the Regions have a vision of Europe that guided it when it took part in this year’s democratic elections and when it formed the new government?

Some believe that our only motive was to serve the interests of our electorate, as well as of the political and business community of the eastern regions of Ukraine situated along our border with Russia.

We are certainly acting on to the mandate of our voters. But we did get support all over Ukraine - in the east and in the west, in the south and in the north. This support was greater in some regions than in others, but people supported us across the country.

That is why I will give you a totally different answer. I expect some are going to find this answer rather surprising in view of the stereotypes about people who come from the Donbass area and speak Russian – the language I am addressing you in.

My answer is – we see our goal first and foremost in creating a truly European order in Ukraine, in creating the European spirit – the goal that our opponents liked so much to speak about and did nothing to achieve.

Let me explain our vision in greater detail.

First, in order to start implementing the policy of “transformation towards Europe” we had to win the democratic elections in a dignified, truly European manner. Our candidate Viktor Yanukovich did that. And let me emphasize a very important fact – it was not a victory in a so called “third round” conducted due to a court order. It was a victory in elections conducted in full compliance with Ukrainian legislation and with European standards. This fact is confirmed by multiple election observer missions, that of OSCE among them

Secondly. Having won the country’s leadership in a transparent, democratic and European manner it is absolutely in our best interests, never mind any other party, to consolidate that approach.

This approach is now facing a further test: the local elections to be held on October 31st this year. These elections should and will be conducted as free, democratic, dignified European-like elections. As the head of the leading party, I personally invited European institutions to take part in missions observing the pre-election period and the elections themselves. Speaking to you here on the ground of the European Parliament, I am inviting all of you as well: visit Ukraine and see with your own eyes what is going on in our country. You will find the situation as I have just described it.

Third. We all know that transparent electoral procedures are necessary but not sufficient for a European-type democracy to function. To function, a European-type democracy needs to be efficient. This kind of efficiency can be achieved through the president, the government and the parliament majority working together, in harmony. We have succeeded in establishing this kind of cooperation in Ukraine - this is a real achievement.

Let me assure you: as long we are in office, the rest of Europe is not going to witness unsightly situations like those that took place in Ukraine not long ago, when the president could officially instruct the foreign minister and Ukrainian diplomatic missions abroad to launch a campaign traducing the acting prime-minister. I am sure such embarrassing events will never happen again as long as we are in government.

I am happy to say that the Group of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament has promised to support us in pursuing the goal of strengthening society, of overcoming the divisions that had formed in the past years. Let me repeat that the memorandum we have signed today says that our European friends will support “the endeavour by the Party of Regions to overcome the current partisan and political divisions and to establish a climate of democratic consolidation in Ukraine”.

Fourth. It is characteristic of the European democratic model that a political force that has won leadership as a result of democratic elections focuses effort and resources towards reforms aimed at a vibrant, dynamic advancement of the society. If this policy is not followed, parties once leading rapidly slip into political oblivion. This slide is what is happening now with the parties of the “orange” political sector in Ukraine.

Naturally, we are not ready to follow them into their unfortunate fate. This is not the choice we make. That is why, from our very first days in office, we took upon ourselves the difficult task of launching sometimes uncomfortable reforms aimed at bringing Ukraine close to the European standards.

I am not going now to elaborate on the purely economic reforms. We have described all the reform process in great detail in the agreement we signed with the International Monetary Fund. This important institution, by the way, had declined any cooperation with the previous Ukrainian leadership, has renewed support and credits for Ukraine. This demonstrates the IMF’s faith in the new Ukrainian leadership, a leadership that is not just good not at writing attractive plans on paper, but also at keeping promises. The IMF experts are sure: our leadership team will not use a cent of the money they lend on anything else but the realization of deep structural reforms.

Recently we have been discussing a truly revolutionary new tax code. In this regard, let me give you just one but one very important fact – during all the nineteen years of Ukraine’s independence there had not been a single political force that had enough political will to present and adopt a document that significant.
I also would like to mention that we adopted the law "on the basic principles of the functions of the natural gas market", a law fully in compliance with EU norms and standards. Adopting this law made it possible for Ukraine to join the Energy Charter treaty.

I would like to say a few words about our social reforms. Our team has taken up the challenge of eradicating the greatest evil, the main obstacle on the way to Ukraine’s Europeazation - the evil of corruption.

We started with the reform of our judicial system which, in the unanimous view of both Ukrainian and European experts, is the sphere that is most heavily affected by the canker of corruption.

Last July we adopted a law on the judiciary and the status of judges that is essentially European. The process of improving the health of the judicial system started almost immediately. Law-enforcement structures got to work efficiently, and during the past few months more top officials faced charges of theft and corruption than had been the case during the whole 5-year period of the previous government.

We have considerably expedited the process of the judicial reform. The President formed the relevant working group in August. The group has been efficiently working on a new version of the criminal code of Ukraine and a new law on the public prosecutor's office, the work being guided by the recommendations of the GRECO group of the Council of Europe. We have also been working hard on the development of the newly proposed package of anti-corruption bills, the main focus being made at working out the mechanisms for effectively enforcing those laws since these mechanisms had been very not clearly formulated in the previous versions of the bills.

Fifth. European democracy is the democracy of the middle class, of the sector of population with an economic stake in society. Poverty is the main enemy of democracy, since it provokes the emergence of dictatorships and authoritarian regimes and stimulates the growth of extremist and nationalist attitudes among the population.

As back we did in the midst of the electoral campaign, we again state it clearly: the Party of Regions is totally against the populist answers to the problem of poverty. We see the only way of fighting poverty to be ensuring steady economic growth, with the priority going to the development of high-tech sectors.

There is a point I would like to emphasize especially: upon winning power, we faced the severe consequences of the preposterous – and this is not an exaggeration – preposterous populism of the previous government, when any ready cash used to be wasted in order to patch the holes constantly emerging in the state budget or thrown in to the abyss of buying food. As a sad result we had an unprecedented 15% fall in the general economic growth and a 25% fall in the industrial production.

We have managed to stop this disastrous policy, to stop the plundering of the state budget or spending it “on food”. The result was almost immediate: within the first half year alone we have achieved GNP growth of 6% and the industrial production growth of 12%. We have not yet caught up with the rapid pace of “the Asian tigers”, but we are seriously ahead of the EU states in this aspect. The Ukrainian stock market is now one of the world’s top five most intensively developing markets. Investors’ faith in Ukraine’s economy is steadily growing.

Alongside tax reform and the pension system reform this steady economic growth provides us with the opportunity for a balanced approach towards industrial development and technological advancement, while enabling the growth in peoples’ income and social protection for the vulnerable. We are fully determined to create a wide and vigorous middle class of well-to-do Ukrainians – people who will never cast their votes for dictators and populists out of poverty or despair.

And finally - sixth. European-type democracy is inconceivable without guaranteeing human rights and freedoms. During our term as the parliamentary opposition we did not allow our opponents to shrink the spectrum of democratic freedoms in Ukraine. All the gains that the young Ukrainian democracy has achieved during the years of independence have been fully in effect. Having won national leadership, we advocate the rigorous observance of essential human rights and freedoms, including the freedom of press and the establishment of independent public TV.

We have also promised our voters to enhance the range of language and humanitarian rights. Ukraine is a multi-ethnic country, and the duty of the government is to guarantee for all the minorities and ethnic groups the right to enjoy a wide variety of state services in one’s mother tongue. To solve this problem, we turned to the European example of dealing with issues of this kind, namely the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The Charter was ratified in Ukraine long ago – but on paper only as it was practically ignored by the previous government.

On the basis of the Charter - that is already being actively implemented by our local authorities - and taking into account the recommendations offered on the issue by the Council of Europe, we are going to adopt a new law on languages. We expect this law to provide wide guarantees for language, educational and other humanitarian rights for the entire Ukrainian population.

Let me focus now on our international policy.

The goal we intend to pursue is to bring a true European sense into Ukraine’s foreign policy, not just in warm-worded speeches but in reality.

What do I mean by stressing “in reality”? Let me dwell on five important issues in this regard.

Issue 1. As regards national security, we have been taken into account both our own experience and the experience of those states that in the past found themselves on the front line of geo-political confrontation. To ensure our security we have chosen a European model, the model of non-participation in any military-political alliances. In our internal political language, we call this priciple “vneblockovost”, meaning being out of any block.

Let me emphasize this: we have chosen this model because it represents a European tradition and is widely understood and successful. History has shown us the fruits of this approach – neutral European states enjoy stable and succuessful development. Having said this, I want to point out that Ukraine is going to contiunue her active cooperation with NATO, the EU and other regional institutions to propote further enhancement of international security.

Issue 2. We have absolutely rejected the previous government’s approach to Ukraine’s relations with Russia, our neighbor and our largest economic partner. We consider the previous political attitude to be confrontational and deeply anti-European in essence.

Why do we claim that the previous policy was in fact anti-European?

By way of example, look at the official website of the President of Russia. You will see that Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel, one of the most respected European leaders and representing a major European state, found the time and the opportunity to meet with the Russian leader sixteen times within the past two and half years. Keep this figure in mind when you hear that during the same two years there was only one meeting between President Yushchenko and President Medvedev. Moreover this was a short informal meeting during a CIS summit.

When one hears voices saying that Viktor Yanukovich has been meeting with his Russian counterpart too often, one should take into account that we have dropped far behind many European countries as regards the intensity of the agenda in of our dialogue with Russia; we are also behind when it comes to investment from and trade with Russia. That is why we have set a, rather ambitious, goal of reaching the pre-crisis level of $40bn in Russian-Ukrainian trade turnover, while German-Russian trade turnover in 2008 alone was estimated at $63.7bn.

Issue 3. In the recent years Europe has been enhancing its presence in developing world markets. In contrast, during the past five years there has not been any state visit by a senior Ukrainian leader to countries such as India or China. Today we are doing our best to make up the lost ground, and we do it following the European experience.

I have recently read in the press that during the latest visit of the Chinese prime-minister Wen Jiabao to Italy the agenda included signing trade contracts for the total sum of € 2.25bn. As we don’t have time to wait for the Chinese leaders to visit Kyiv, our President paid a visit to Beijing this September, heading an impressive group of Ukrainian entrepreneurs. As a result, a number of documents were signed, bringing a potential total investment of $4bn. You see, we have even succeeded in getting a little ahead of Italy in this aspect. But on the whole, our new policy towards Russia and China shows we are ready to follow the lead of our fellow Europeans.

Issue 4. Mistakenly, in recent years Ukraine positioned herself on the front line of the geo-political confrontation, the government justifying this choice by sloganizing about “the export of democracy” and “the orange revolution”. Ukraine’s previous position on joining NATO finished in Europe being split in half on the issue and it seriously damaged our relations with many countries.

For this reason, one of the goals of our leadership team is to exclude any repetition of this scenario regardless of other political developments. We are determined to contribute to turning Eastern Europe away from a battlefield for spheres of influence and into a region of security, stable development and cultural dialogue.

Kyiv supports political initiatives aimed at the enhancement of Europe’s security system, be it steps initiated in Moscow or in any European capital. In this respect, it is not co-incidental that the issue of Ukraine’s role and place within the modern geo-political, economic and security space was one of the major topics discussed during the meeting between Presidents Viktor Yanukovich and Nicolas Sarkozy in Paris on October 7th this year. The EU intends to work on this issue in full cooperation with Russia.

Ukraine is determined to vigorously promote the initiatives for enhancing the system of European security during the term of Ukraine’s presidency in the OSCE in the year of 1213.

And finally, the fifth issue is developing the Ukraine-European Union relationship.

While we were in political opposition, our party did learn some important lessons from Europe. One of these lessons is choosing an appropriate approach towards our bilateral relations.

For years we have seen “the orange leaders” beg Europeans to give them “a perspective on EU membership” or for ’“some political hints”. This, frankly, could hardly be considered as proper European behaviour against the background of economic and political destabilization in Ukraine.

We are convinced that our relations with the EU should be established politically and reflected in agreements. If we set off on a route we should know what the final goal of our destination is. This is the logic of life. But we well realize that it is unwise to concentrate all our efforts on the final goal alone – there is a whole way to go. That is why we support the pragmatic approach suggested by the EU and, from the very beginning, have focused on realistic and practical steps, have been willing to compromise and have worked to reach mutually binding formal agreements reflecting those compromises.

There are three important points I would like to discuss in this regard.

The first point is political association and political dialogue. We view the association as the best form of relationship with Europe think that it will serve both parties for a long time being to come based as it is on compromise.

The second point is the free-trade zone. Yes, there has been some slow down in the talks on free trade, but we should not over-dramatize this fact. Our standpoint here us quite clear: we should move forward towards well-known “four freedoms”: that is the free flow of goods, services, capital and labor. If, in order to ensure these freedoms, we need to change the approach, let’s go ahead and change it. If not, let us seek goals that are a bit less ambitious and reach agreements wherever they are reachable.

Let me illustrate this point with an example. Recently a free-trade agreement has been signed between the EU and South Korea. It took South Korea several decades to develop its powerful economy, its high-tech industry, to gain its international reputation before this country came to the conclusion that free trade with Europe is more profitable than protecting South Korean market from competition. Ukraine has been independent for just 19 years, and only now has approached a point when technological advancement can become a part of the country’s agenda.

Another example is Malaysia, a country that is ready to start free-trade negotiations with the EU, a country that is far ahead of Ukraine in its economic and technological development. I have recently read an interview of my Malaysian counterpart Najib Tun Razak who said: Our strategy is high-quality economic advancement, and this is the reason why we are not ready to accept any kind of investment indiscriminately, as, for example, investments in mass-production of consumer goods involving hard human labor. And on the contrary, we will give priority to investments raising the value of human input and stimulating innovative technologies.

I have given these examples to emphasize that Ukraine, just like our colleagues from Europe and Asia, wants the free trade with Europe to become a powerful stimulus for innovative technological development.
What we cannot allow is the death of whole branches of our economy that could be swallowed by the new competition.

And finally, the third point – a plan of action concerning visa-free entry to Europe for Ukrainian citizens. I want to make our standpoint towards this issue absolutely clear. We consider the visa-free entry to the EU a powerful stimulus for the Europeanisation of the Ukrainian people, helping them get move towards a true European outlook, attitudes and values.

Unfortunately, the requirements that the EU often imposes for Schengen visa applicants from Ukraine are far too severe, and this impedes Ukraine’s Europeanisation. In fact, we see an absurd situation today: Ukrainian citizens, who have enough money to travel over the world, give up European travels facing the mega-bureaucratic and often humiliating red tape they have to go through seeking Schengen visas.

Instead they choose to go to Turkey, Egypt, Thailand or the Arab Emirates - countries that do not impose such visa obstacles. Sure, we want our citizens to travel all over the world, to learn about many different cultures. But let me ask you: isn’t Europe interested in welcoming Ukrainian tourists and thus providing them an opportunity to learn European values and ways first hand, directly from Europeans themselves? That is it surely in the EU’s best interests and the current approach of erecting a visa fence against fellow Europeans is a disservice to Europe as a whole.
Having said all this, I want to make it clear that I am far from saying we are moving ahead “super-smoothly”, without errors and difficulties.

My goal is to promote the understanding of our agenda, aimed – let me repeat what I said before – aimed at creating a common European homeland, not in speeches but in practice.

We will greatly appreciate any assistance, any criticism concerning errors and shortcomings in our work – we do have them, in just the same way as any party, any leadership.

This is the goal of the agreement with Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament that we signed today – to launch the relationship of partnership and to exchange both constructive criticism and support that is so important between partners.

Thank you for your attention. I will now appreciate your questions, your criticism and your comments.

The Future of EU-Ukraine Relations

2010-10-12T09:21:00.002+02:00

One Year On, Turkey-Armenia Rapprochement Stalled

2010-10-11T15:41:00.001+02:00

One year ago, on October 10, 2009, Armenia and Turkey signed two protocols aimed at normalizing relations.

The signing of what many political pundits termed a “historic” deal took place in Zurich, the culmination of painstaking diplomatic efforts by the two countries’ presidents and by international mediators, primarily Switzerland and the United States.

The Western-backed process began with Turkish President Abdullah Gul’s historic September 2008 visit to Yerevan, following an invitation by his Armenian counterpart, Serzh Sarkisian, to attend a soccer World Cup qualifier between the national teams of the two neighbors.

The two leaders watched the return leg of the match in the Turkish city of Bursa a year later, just four days after their foreign ministers, Edward Nalbandian and Ahmet Davutoglu, inked two protocols committing to the establishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of their borders soon after the documents were ratified in both countries’ parliaments.

But a year on, the future of the protocols remains unclear, as no parliamentary ratification of the documents has taken place in either country.

Meanwhile, the cautious optimism surrounding the future of the deal, which faced domestic opposition in both countries, has fizzled out.

Links To Nagorno-Karabakh

Official Yerevan and political majority leaders in Armenia had repeatedly stated the country’s strong readiness to complete the ratification of the protocols in the Armenian legislature, but only after Turkey made that step first.

But since the signing ceremony, senior officials in Turkey have sought to link ratification of the protocols with progress in a separate dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Yerevan responded by saying the protocols contained no conditions regarding that issue and that Ankara should, therefore, proceed with the ratification of the agreements unconditionally.

The diplomatic bickering eventually led to Sarkisian suspending the ratification process in the Armenian parliament last April. But he indicated that Yerevan was not, for now, withdrawing its signature from the documents – a statement welcomed by the international community, in particular by the United States and the European Union.

Turkey Gets Its Way

Views on the future of the protocols remain largely pessimistic at this moment – at least on the Armenian side.

Alexander Arzumanian, a senior member of the opposition Pan-Armenian National Movement (HHSh), believes true normalization is not a priority for Turkey.

"Turkey used the protocols to solve its most important issue, as [due to these protocols] it has become a full player in this region and has gotten its own place in the negotiating format for a Karabakh settlement,” he says.

The opposition member, who served as Armenia’s foreign minister from 1996 to 1998, argues that Armenian authorities should not have launched the process the way they did, since Turkey, he claims, views all things within one package -- that is, to make Armenia abandon its long-standing effort to gain international recognition of the World War I-era mass killings and deportations of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire as genocide, as well as to persuade Armenia to make concessions over Karabakh in favor of Turkey’s regional ally Azerbaijan.

The announcement of a road map for a Turkey-Armenia rapprochement in April 2009 made the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun) quit the governing coalition.

'Failed To Show Goodwill'

Giro Manoyan, a foreign policy spokesman for the now opposition party, insists that Yerevan must move further toward withdrawing its signature, as the current process only benefits Turkey.

"I think the first anniversary [of the signing of the protocols] is a good occasion for Armenian authorities to withdraw their signature from the protocols," Manoyan says, "considering the fact that Turkey has failed to show goodwill, and in reality is currently using the protocols for a different purpose than what they were meant for."

Another opposition party, Heritage, which vehemently opposed the protocols from the outset, shares Dashnaktsutyun’s position. The leader of the Heritage party’s parliamentary faction, Stepan Safarian, says Armenia must withdraw its signature from the document considering the “constant speculations” from Turkey.

'Good Partner'

Armenia’s ruling party, meanwhile, thinks Armenia has benefited from the process in terms of “showing itself as a good partner” to the world.

"Armenia may consider the problems it has raised before itself in connection with the protocols solved, in the sense that the Armenian side has proved to the entire world that it is a good and constructive partner, that it seeks to solve problems with all neighbors peacefully, through negotiations, and is ready to start certain relations unconditionally," says Republican Party of Armenia (HHK) lawmaker Karen Avakian. "This process needed to be started, and I think it was necessary to once again unmask Turkey, to make Turkey show its [true] face to the world."

Avakian does not exclude that dialogue between Yerevan and Ankara may still continue “if Turkey shows constructive behavior.”

“I think sooner or later Turkey will realize the gravity of these issues and will not take into consideration the Karabakh process,” Avakian added.

In a recent interview with the Austrian news magazine "Profil," Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian also gave an indication that Armenia does not consider the process of normalization with Turkey as having completely failed.

“We hope that the process is not dead, but suspended,” he said.

By Tigran Avetisian, Suren Musayelyan. Published on 10 October 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/One_Year_On_TurkeyArmenia_Rapprochement_Stalled/2186246.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Štefan Füle European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Ukraine and the World: Rethinking and Moving on 7th annual meeting of Yalta

2010-10-07T10:38:00.002+02:00

European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy
Ukraine and the World: Rethinking and Moving on
1 October 2010

Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honour to participate in this conference. I am grateful to the Board of YES for its kind invitation. I look forward to a stimulating debate.

Turning to the subject of this particular session, “The Global Order and its Key Players” I should like to make some general observations and then focus my intervention on one key player that I know best - the European Union.

Since the collapse of the Communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1991, there has been a number of attempts to define an emerging “new global order”.

While I don’t intend to better the attempts of others today, I should like to highlight some key elements which help in understanding the global and regional challenges that we face at the beginning of the 21st century.

Compared to the certainties of the Cold War, partly forged in this very building in February 1945 and sustained at a huge human cost, the picture today is highly complex involving a multiplicity of actors.

Perhaps the most distinctive and important aspect of the Global Order today is the impact of globalisation. I refer here to the extraordinary processes by which liberalised trade and capital flows have combined with vastly improved services, transport networks and revolutionised means of communication to create globalised economies and societies. We have all witnessed the benefits and dangers of these processes at first hand.

As a result, we are seeing today the emergence of multiple global players and a multi-polar world. Some of these players are nation-states with powerfully developing economies. Some are non-state actors which nevertheless carry more economic weight than states and some of which have a greater potential to influence public opinion than governments.

The clearest examples of this are of course multi-national business and investors. But the new global players also include national and international media organisations. Many of these organisations are able to draw upon powerful new communication technologies. As a result they are often faster and more flexible than the traditional national media. Civil society actors and networks are also playing an increasingly important domestic and global role.

These are new realities to which we need all to adapt: nation states as well as international bodies such as the UN, the International Financing Institutions, the OSCE and, of course the EU. And it is clear that all of the institutions I have mentioned are engaged in a process of reflection and reform in order to adapt to our rapidly changing realities.

At the same time there is also strong agreement, that common challenges can best be met by shared responses, whether in the areas of tackling poverty; disease; climate change; terrorism or promoting economic development. In some cases the answer is closer coordination; in some, shared responsibilities and in some defined areas the best answer is pooling of national sovereignty.

The European Union has undergone extraordinary changes in the past 20 years. Its membership has enlarged beyond recognition to include countries from South, Central and Eastern Europe. It has established the world’s largest, most prosperous and sophisticated single market and a single currency which is today the world’s second currency. It is the leading trading and exporting power in the world and the second largest source of foreign direct investment. It is the largest global provider of development aid. And today, following the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU is developing the tools to ensure that it has a stronger, unified voice on the international stage.

As the force of globalisation continues to grow - with all the prospects that it holds out for economic development and prosperity - I believe that the trends towards greater convergence and cooperation in Europe are unstoppable. As President Barroso recently expressed it, in an address to US partners:

“We either stand together and prosper or we fall separately. That is a fact of life in the 21st Century1”.

Ladies and Gentlemen, what do these developments represent for Ukraine? The picture I have drawn of globalised economies and societies involving complex interactions between a multiplicity of actors presents a dilemma for every state. Choices have to be made between relying on what could be deceptively described as “known certainties” on the one side, and a reform agenda which apparently takes more risks by embracing change in order to stimulate sustainable growth and prosperity on the other.

Such an agenda includes promoting increased competitiveness of industries and businesses so that they can participate in international markets and attract attention around the globe; the development of an attractive and reliable investment climate; the modernisation of infrastructure and efforts to ensure that the workforce is equipped with appropriate skills and experience. And here, to be clear, I am not just talking about political stability but, first and foremost, about respect for the rule of law.

At the same time an environment in which innovation and creativity can flourish requires the existence of open societies in which a free media, civil society and diverse political actors can thrive. These reforms are particularly necessary in a world in which the competition for attention from a multiplicity of actors and investors is increasing.

President Yanukovych has repeatedly stated that the path towards the European Union “is one of reform”. He is absolutely right in this. Reform is key to exploiting the enormous potential that exists in the relationship between the EU and Ukraine. In the European Union itself, we have recognised the importance of a reform response to the economic and financial global downturn in our Europe 2020 strategy2.

Ukraine has undertaken a number of important economic reforms in recent months. What is important is that these reflect common reform priorities of Ukraine and the EU. As such they draw us increasingly close. For its part the EU will respond to these positive steps. Above all it will continue to support Ukraine in driving forward the reform agenda.

However reform involves much more than a political decision to move in a particular strategic direction. Reform is a process that needs to be delivered in the short, medium and long-term. For example Ukraine’s imminent accession to the Energy Community is an excellent development. But it is only the beginning of a long path of reform that will transform the energy sector and thereby attract substantial inward investment. Let me be blunt here: any strategic decision to move towards the European Union without a reform process to accompany it, is illusory and just rhetoric.

Dear Ukrainian friends, the European Union is ready to accompany you in implementing your economic reform agenda. We are a passionately committed partner in this. We are ready to show flexibility where we can. We are ready to make compromises where we can.

But I have to stress that there is an area where we will not compromise. We will not compromise on those common values which form the basis of our relationship: respect for human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles. This is the fundamental understanding that has bound together the Member States of the European Union since its establishment. And it is this same commitment that will ultimately define how close the EU and Ukraine come together.

Turning to the new EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, I should like to underline its importance. The Agreement offers Ukraine the prospects of political association and economic integration with the EU. It is much more than words on paper. It is essentially an ambitious blue-print for reform, addressing all of the issues I have already outlined. The Agreement offers the prospect of a gradual opening of the EU’s internal market of 500 million consumers to Ukrainian businesses and investors, a market 10 times larger than any of Ukraine’s other neighbours.

This is not an abstract or theoretical exercise. Once in place, it is estimated that the deep and comprehensive free trade area with Ukraine will bring substantial benefits to our citizens. For Ukraine the impact of the agreement is likely in time to be overwhelmingly positive, involving real income increases; gains in international trade; productivity; employment generation and ultimately poverty reductions. It will impact positively on consumers, businesses, investors and workers. One study from 2007 estimates improvements in overall social welfare of more than 5% and long-term skilled and unskilled wage increases of more than 4% as direct effects of an extended FTA with Ukraine3. These kinds of projections are useful; but they are only models. The benefits in terms of prosperity and increased revenue will only be achieved and enjoyed if the right conditions are in place.

Equally important, the process of reform through approximation to EU standards is a process of modernisation which will strengthen Ukraine’s capacity to compete on international markets beyond the European Union.

Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen there is still much work to do if the EU and Ukraine are to enjoy the full benefits of our developing relationship. We are deeply committed to completing our work on the Association Agreement. We believe this offers Ukraine the prospect of coming much closer to the European Union in practical and tangible ways. This represents the best way of making progress towards future steps in our relationship. We look to all our Ukrainian partners, its political leaders, business and civil society to make this a reality.

Only by working closely together we will be able to provide an answer to the challenges of the present and the future. It is important that we do not stay prisoners of the past in our thinking and in our actions. Instead we should work together to unleash our full potential in the interests of all our people.

The question is not that Ukraine needs Europe. Or indeed, as mentioned last night, that Europe needs Ukraine. We need each other to realise our full potential. This requires a commitment from both sides. We are ready for that. Are you?

Source: Website of Štefan Füle European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy

Azerbaijan And The West: Beyond Interest, Toward Commitment

2010-10-04T15:55:00.000+02:00

A friend in need is a friend indeed. I couldn’t agree more. Yet, it is the times when we are savoring our success or trying ever harder to reach our goals that we appreciate a friend’s supportive smile or pat on the back. Whether we get it or not does not affect our success, but it does ease our way and make it more pleasant.

The greatness of success has always depended not just on how it is achieved, but on being able to share it with those who have accompanied you throughout the sweet and bitter journey.

The cooperation Azerbaijan forged with the West, especially with the United States, has over the years been characterized as strategic by many, short-term by some, and untruthful by others. However, even when relations reached an all-time low, Azerbaijan never wavered in its commitment to its partnership with the West. Time and again, when buffeted by strong winds, Azerbaijan has needed understanding and a firm stance from the United States, while the United States has expected the same from us, however strange it might seem given Azerbaijan’s size on a global scale.

When Azerbaijan was forced into full-scale war with its neighbor in the early 1990s, it expected no less than a balanced approach from the West. Instead, all it got was Section 907, banning any direct U.S. aid to the Azerbaijani government. History might not repeat itself, but it does rhyme. Ten years later, the United States’ government was in need of friends, big and small, to support the war on terror. In the blink of an eye, while most of the region’s countries were still hemming and hawing, Azerbaijan contributed peacekeeping troops to the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq and served shoulder-to shoulder with a U.S. Marine battalion, providing security for the Haditha Dam, a vital infrastructure in Al Anbar Province that produced one-quarter of Iraq’s electricity. With 11 rotations and more than 1,000 troops, Azerbaijan underscored its loyalty to the United States.

The same year, 2002, Azerbaijani troops also joined the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, becoming the first CIS member to contribute troops. Six years later, in 2008, when many allies were pulling out of Afghanistan in despair, President Ilham Aliyev submitted a bill “on the status of Azerbaijani troops carrying out peacemaking operations abroad” to the Azerbaijani parliament, which envisaged doubling the peacekeeping troops in Afghanistan.

In yet another gesture, the Azerbaijani government demonstrated an unfeigned faithfulness to its friendship. More than NATO 100,000 troops flew through Azerbaijani airspace in 2009 alone. Approximately 25 percent of the coalition’s supplies going to Afghanistan pass through Azerbaijan. NATO member states transport 1,500 containers every month to the war-torn country through the territory of Azerbaijan. The growing size of Azerbaijan’s military contingent, the open airspace, and Baku’s full cooperation on the battlefield says a lot more than mere words can express.

Facing pressure from the Armenian diaspora, the United States Congress fell flat with a biased approach to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. It used the role of lobby groups as an excuse for a lopsided approach. Azerbaijan, on the contrary, in its commitment to its promise on the war on terror, successfully prevented and dealt with terrorist threats, including those from Iran, despite constant pressure from the latter. Numerous plots were intercepted, criminals detained, potentially tragic scenarios avoided.

Because of its continuous good terms with the United States, Azerbaijan was accused of “cooperating with the Great Satan” on Iran’s Sahar-2 television channel -- which is broadcast in the territory of Azerbaijan without authorization -- and threatened by the Iranian authorities. It is not difficult to appreciate that pressure from 71 million Iranians is a much greater problem than pressure from 1.5 million Armenian-Americans.

Favoring Western Companies

Azerbaijan stands for and does many things that, for some reason, go unnoticed around the world. Astonishingly, Azerbaijan is one of the only major Caspian hydrocarbon-producing countries that has exported almost exclusively to the West. The biggest oil-and-gas contracts signed since 1994 -- including Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) and Shah Deniz -- favored Western companies over Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and other options.

As for the pipelines, construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector (AGRI), and Azerbaijan’s repeatedly positive attitude toward the Nabucco pipeline are clear evidence of Azerbaijan’s willingness to forge effective energy cooperation with the West. Despite Russia’s evident disapproval of such cooperation, Azerbaijan stays true to Euro-Atlantic projects. Azerbaijan took great steps to secure its oil revenues for future generations by creating the State Oil Fund, the transparency of which is maintained internationally by Western experts.

Azerbaijan has proven itself as the world’s fastest-growing trade route and a telecommunications hub in Eurasia. Azerbaijan, almost solely, is financing the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars-Istanbul railroad, one that will connect Central Asia with Europe along the shortest route. The country took gigantic steps to contribute to the improvement of the East-West corridor. The question is not whether the source of these projects is in Azerbaijani oil revenues, but whether the outcome is worth the input. For everyone should know that Azerbaijan’s vibrant growing economy and regional power are strengths, not weaknesses to be ashamed of.

Taking into account the complexity of U.S. involvement in the region and the juxtaposition of its foes and allies, Azerbaijan automatically becomes a country best suited for cooperation and partnership. Azerbaijan is one of the very few secular Muslim states of the region that has displayed a model of religious tolerance throughout its history. The cultural links that Azerbaijani people share with Americans might have been limited in the early 1990s, but following countless education and cultural-exchange programs, promoted both by the U.S. and Azerbaijani governments (such as FLEX, IREX, Muskie, Fulbright, State Oil Company (SOCAR), Azerbaijan State Scholarship and U.S. Peace Corps programs), understanding between the two states has grown immensely.

When U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was on an official visit to Baku, aside from all other official meetings, she requested a special gathering with a group of young Azerbaijani leaders. She got to meet 10, five of whom were graduates and alumni of U.S. high schools, universities, and other educational-exchange programs. Nothing could embody the spirit of Azerbaijan’s Western stance more than this outcome of cooperation over the years -- Azerbaijan’s outstanding young people.

However, as much as the Azerbaijani government can do to maintain its friendship with the United States, it is ultimately the determination of the United States upon which this partnership will rely. The famous business speaker Art Turock once said: “There's a difference between interest and commitment. When you are interested in doing something, you do it only when circumstances permit. When you're committed to something, you accept no excuses, only results.”

Circumstances did not permit Azerbaijan to send its troops to Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Iraq when there were young soldiers dying from Armenian bullets every day on the front line. The circumstances were not in our favor when we were resolute in our attempts to thwart Russian pressure against engaging in full-fledged energy cooperation with the West. Nor were they positive when we had to face Iran numerous times to support the United States. Interest is what government officials and decision makers rely on; commitment is what the ordinary people expect.

All in all, it is not promises we need from time to time from our great ally across the ocean, but a little genuine understanding and appreciation of who we are and what we stand for.

By Elnur Baimov. Published on 29 September 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Azerbaijan_And_The_West_Beyond_Interest_Toward_Commitment/2171638.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Kremlin's Ruling Party Boosts Ties Across The Former Soviet Union

2010-10-01T10:59:00.002+02:00

As Kyrgyzstan gears up for crucial parliamentary elections on October 10, former Prime Minister Felix Kulov's Ar-Namys party has picked up a key endorsement from Russia's ruling United Russia party.

Ar-Namys on September 22 signed a cooperation agreement with United Russia, the colossus that controls executive and legislative branches across the Russian Federation and is headed by Russia's most powerful politician, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

Following a model that seems to have worked in Ukraine, where a pro-Western president was replaced earlier this year by a pro-Russian one, United Russia is also now working actively with friendly parties in Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia -- all countries whose political vector is up for grabs in the next 18 months.

According to a United Russia press release, the Kyrgyzstan agreement includes not only political cooperation, but also calls for the development of "equal and mutually beneficial cooperation between Russia and Kyrgyzstan in the economic sphere, the creation of beneficial conditions for the development of entrepreneurial, investment, and scientific activity."

Further blurring the lines between party activity and national policy, the cooperation agreement was signed on United Russia's behalf by the head of the party's Supreme Council, Boris Gryzlov, who is also speaker of the Russian State Duma.

Deepening Ties

The Ar-Namys agreement is just the latest in a series of such pacts United Russia has signed with parties throughout the former Soviet space. Earlier this month, United Russia signed a similar pact with Moldova's Democratic Party, headed by former Communist Marian Lupu.

Lupu told a press conference after returning from Russia that the agreement with United Russia is part of his party's "pragmatic" view of relations with Russia.

"We need relations of cooperation, not confrontation with Russia. This is the message of the political agreement we signed. Second, Moldova cannot ignore and will not ignore the Russian Federation. Third, we have to be pragmatic and constructive if we want the best for the citizens of Moldova," Lupu said.

Moldova is expected to hold parliamentary elections in November, and analysts say Moscow hopes to split Lupu away from the pro-Western, four-party ruling coalition.

United Russia also has a cooperation agreement with the Renewal party in Moldova's breakaway Transdniester region.

In Georgia, United Russia works with the opposition For A Just Georgia movement of former Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli, which describes itself as "having a classic right opposition orientation."

Sergei Markov, a Russian Duma deputy and United Russia official, told RFE/RL's Georgian Service that the key issue is improving relations between the two countries.

"United Russia's main goal is to support those political forces that are in favor of better relations between Georgia and Russia. Noghaideli is among them," Markov said.

"But he is not the only one coming out for such a position. Some lawmakers even from [Georgian President Mikheil] Saakashvili's party in private conversations acknowledge the insanity of his policies."

United Russia also has cooperation agreements and provides direct financial assistance to the ruling parties in the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

In 2005, United Russia signed a cooperation agreement with the Party of Regions in Ukraine. Earlier this year, Party of Regions head Viktor Yanukovych became president of Ukraine, embarking on a noticeably more pro-Russia course than his predecessor.

Konstanin Kosachyov, who is chairman of the Russian State Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee and heads United Russia's Commission on Interparty and International Ties, told RFE/RL's Russian Service that working with Yanukovych is "simple."

"For us any president of Ukraine is absolutely fine who is realistically oriented toward the interests of Ukraine. [Former President Viktor] Yushchenko interpreted those interests in a false way. Yushchenko thought they consisted of getting as far from Russia as possible and quickly moving toward the West," Kosachyov said. "That is precisely why we had such a hard time with him. But with Viktor Yanukovych, it is simple for us. He has a significantly more precise and adequate understanding of Ukraine's interests."

United Russia's overriding concern in all of these alliances is advancing Russia's political and economic interests in the region. That is why the party, which proclaims itself in Russia as right-of-center, is comfortable working with left-leaning parties in Moldova and Ukraine, a right-leaning ally in Georgia, and parties of indeterminate ideology in Kyrgyzstan, South Ossetia, and Transdniester.

'Pragmatic Line'

The key factor in United Russia's alliances is the willingness of partner parties to adopt what it calls a "pragmatic" line in relations with Moscow.

Petre Mamradze, a spokesman for Noghaideli's For A Just Georgia party, lays out a position typical of United Russia's partners.

"We are doing everything we can to improve relations with Russia. Being realists, we see this is the ruling party of Russia. According to all opinion polls, the overwhelming majority of this enormous country supports Vladimir Putin and the party that he heads. For Georgia, this is a fact; it is reality. And if we ignore it, we will disappear," Mamradze said.

United Russia's aggressive alliance-making seems to fit into the larger pattern of Moscow's evolving foreign policy. A Foreign Ministry working paper that was leaked to the Russian version of "Newsweek" magazine earlier this month emphasizes that Russia no longer views the world in terms of "friends" and "enemies," but exclusively in the framework of "interests." It urges Moscow to create a range of formal and informal tools for advancing Russia's modernization agenda through foreign ties.

In the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the concept paper emphasizes "supporting the activity of Russian economic operators in the CIS space." It sets the goal of "actively attracting Ukraine into the orbit of economic cooperation with Russia" and "facilitating the expansion of the activity of Russian business in Kyrgyzstan."

The paper does not list promoting stable democratic development in the CIS as a national interest for Russia, and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev told a conference in Yaroslavl this month that parliamentary democracy has been "a disaster" for Kyrgyzstan.

United Russia's position at the nexus of politics and business in Russia means that parties allying themselves with United Russia can expect significant material support in their election campaigns. Noghiedeli's For A Just Georgia and Lupu's Democratic Party both have slick, multimedia websites, for example.

Alexander Rondeli of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS) says Moscow is "acting now often not through state channels, but through the party United Russia, which can also hardly be considered a political party."

"But if you take this as an attempt to influence the political situation inside Georgia and set up some sort of pro-Russian opposition against the current authorities, you can also assume that definitely without financial contributions this won't work," Rondeli said.

By Robert Coalson. Published on 29 September 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Kremlins_Ruling_Party_Boosts_Ties_Across_The_Former_Soviet_Union/2171505.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region

2010-09-29T09:49:00.001+02:00

The Council today adopted a decision concerning restrictive measures (visa ban)against the Transnistrian leadership (13623/10).

The decision extends the restrictive measures until 30 September 2011. It also extends the suspension of the measures for a further period of 6 months (until 31 March 2011), in order to encourage progress in reaching a political settlement to the Transnistrian conflict, addressing the remaining problems of the Latin-script schools and restoring free movement of persons.

At the end of the suspension period, the Council will review the restrictive measures in the light of developments.

The EU is committed to continue its efforts in order to contribute to a viable settlement of the Transnistria conflict, based on the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova. It also re-affirms its call for a resumption of formal settlement talks in the 5+2 format as early as possible.

Source: Council of the EU. Published in Brussels on 27 September 2010

EU Special Representative for Moldova addresses OSCE Permanent Council, urges restart of formal '5+2' Transdniestria negotiations ahead of Summit

2010-09-28T10:25:00.001+02:00

Kalman Mizsei, the European Union Special Representative for Moldova, addressed the OSCE Permanent Council today, calling for a restart of formal "5+2" negotiations on the Transdniestrian conflict by the OSCE Summit in December.

The OSCE and the EU are part of the 5+2 process for settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict, which includes the sides (the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria); the mediators (the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the OSCE); and the United States and the EU as observers.

"The resolution of frozen conflicts in the OSCE area represents a priority for all participating States in order to strengthen security in Europe. Resumption of official negotiations in the 5+2 format by the upcoming OSCE summit would represent a success for Europe as a whole," said Mizsei. "The launch of formal negotiations in the 5+2 format will show the clear commitment and seriousness of all participants for dialogue and co-operation in identifying a comprehensive, long-lasting and durable solution to the conflict."

"We are convinced that it is in the best interest of Transdniestria to immediately capitalize on the positive atmosphere that has been created this year and engage in official talks."

Mizsei said he recognized the relentless and good efforts of the Kazakh Chairmanship to achieve the resumption of the official 5+2 negotiations.

He added: "The European Union is striving for a solution that is equitable and balanced, that will promote lasting security in the region and that will lay the groundwork for prosperity on both banks of the Dniestr/Nistru River. I hope that in the upcoming period that we will have the wisdom of informed self-interest and also the courage and responsibility to do the possible, solving a conflict that is eminently solvable."

Mizsei also addressed EU-Moldova relations, the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine, and internal developments, including Moldova's planned early parliamentary elections in November.

The mediators and observers, including the EU Special Representative, visited Moldova from 20 to 22 September and met the leaders, political negotiators and other senior officials on both sides and the chairs of the joint experts working groups on confidence-building measures. The next informal 5+2 meeting will take place in Vienna on 27 and 28 September.

The Permanent Council is a main decision-making body of the 56-country OSCE. It meets weekly in Vienna to discuss developments in the OSCE area and to make appropriate decisions.

Source: OSCE. Published in Vienna on 23 September 2010

Commission welcomes Ukraine in Energy Community

2010-09-27T14:22:00.000+02:00

The European Commission has today welcomed Ukraine joining the European Energy Community. The Community extends the EU internal energy market to South East Europe and enhances the overall security of supply. The Protocol on the Accession of Ukraine to the Energy Community was signed today at the Energy Community Ministerial Council in Skopije (Macedonia).

Günther Oettinger, European Commissioner for Energy said: "This is a major step both for the Energy Community and for Ukraine. Ukraine will have access to a pan-European energy market, based on the principles of solidarity and transparency. For the Community, Ukraine is an important new member and security of supply further improved."

The accession Protocol was signed today by Mr. Yuriy Boyko, Minister of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine, and Mr. Fatmir Besimi, Minister of Economy of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, acting for the Presidency of the Energy Community. The Vice-Presidency (European Union) was represented by Mr. Fabrizio Barbaso, Deputy Director-General for Energy at the European Commission.

The Ministerial Council of the Energy Community had approved the accession of Ukraine in December 2009, but the signature of the Accession Protocol was made subject to the adoption of a gas law in compliance with EU relevant rules. Today's signature follows the enactment of the new Ukrainian gas law last July. The Ukrainian Parliament is now expected to ratify the Treaty establishing the Energy Community, after which Ukraine will become a member of this international organisation

Background:

The Energy Community entered into force on 1 July 2006. The parties have committed themselves to liberalise their energy markets and implement key EU legal acts in the area of electricity, gas, environment and renewable energy. The secretariat in Vienna monitors and assists in the implementation process. Full Members are: The European Union, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and Modova. Observer Status: Georgia, Norway and Turkey.

http://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME

Source: European Commission. Published in brussels, 24 September 2010

What Does ‘Confederation’ Mean In The South Caucasus?

2010-09-22T09:21:00.002+02:00

On July 18, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili met with his Azerbaijani counterpart, Ilham Aliyev, in Batumi and mentioned the idea of a “confederation” between the two countries. The phrase quickly got people wondering what exactly the president had in mind. Analysts have been raising questions and offering ideas ever since.

Journalists and political commentators from the countries of the South Caucasus have examined the idea (whether they endorse it or not) in the context of confrontational geopolitics. In August, Russia and Armenia agreed to extend the pact on the presence of Russian military bases in Armenia until 2044. At the same time, they expanded the format of bilateral military cooperation: henceforth Russia is obliged to defend Armenia from any external threat, which Yerevan expects primarily from Azerbaijan. In short, Armenia has become an even closer Russian ally than it was previously.

The discussion of a possible Georgia-Azerbaijan confederation was immediately placed in the traditional context of the “vertical” axis of Russia-Armenia (and, possibly, Iran) and the “horizontal” axis of Georgia and Azerbaijan (and, possibly, Turkey). And they don’t forget overseas allies, asserting that, of course, the idea of a confederation comes from Washington and is aimed at containing Russia. In a nutshell, after the failed Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, everything has come back to its place: we loved to talk about all these things back in the 1990s.

But what concrete political and legal steps would be necessary to realize this “confederation” project? I haven’t heard anything specific about this yet.

First, let’s take a look at exactly what Saakashvili said, some two months ago. “A few years back I said that we must form confederative relations,” Saakashvili said. “In fact, relations between our countries are far beyond the relations that two countries ordinarily have. We are a continuation of one another.”

In short, the Georgia-Azerbaijan confederation, according to the president, is not a project for the future, but a description of the present. That is, the term shouldn’t be viewed in strictly legalistic terms, but as a rhetorical figure of speech that signifies “particularly close relations between countries.”

What’s more, people in the president’s entourage insist that the same could be said of Georgia-Armenia relations: there as well, the level of closeness is very high. Of course, the Armenian side welcomes the use of this term (even rhetorically) considerably less.

To be sure, it would be hypocritical to speak about an equivalence between Georgia-Azerbaijan and Georgia-Armenia relations. Under the circumstances of the cold war with Russia, Georgia can’t be pleased by the intensification of Russia-Armenia military cooperation. There’s no getting around that.

Enemies And Friends

Nonetheless, neither Georgia nor Armenia would benefit from drawing strict geopolitical conclusions from the two clear facts that Russia and Georgia are enemies, while Russia and Armenia are allies. Likewise, Russia and Azerbaijan do not intend to become enemies just because Azerbaijan and Armenia are enemies and Armenia and Russia are allies. The geopolitical formula that the “friend of my enemy is my enemy” does not apply in the Caucasus today. And thank God.

Since the August 2008 war with Russia, Georgia has placed more significance on regional relations and has actively sought to intensify ties with all the countries of the region without regard for their relations with one another. There is an element of competition with Russia in this. Russia’s policy of not recognizing the Saakashvili government is an effort to isolate Georgia internationally. Moscow wants not only to undermine Tbilisi’s support in the West, but also to exclude Georgia from regional connections.

Saakashvili is taking countermeasures, so far generally with success. Of course, one can always argue about what “success” means, but under the present circumstances Georgia views any sign of warming relations with the countries of the region as a success - and, at the same time, as a failure for Russia.

Russia is actively working to draw Azerbaijan into its sphere of influence with various economic projects. While Turkey and Armenia were flirting under Western patronage and Azerbaijan felt forgotten and rejected by its closest friends -- Ankara and Washington -- it seemed that some sort of geopolitical shift was possible. But the accelerated construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad and new steps toward realizing the Nabucco pipeline project show that the Georgia-Azerbaijan-Turkey axis of cooperation is still functioning. It is such projects most of all that are the real content of the rhetorical term “confederation.”

But, on the other hand, the opening in March of the Russia-Georgia border crossing at Verkhny Lars is not a sign of the warming of Russian-Georgian relations (as Western experts want to believe). It is an expression of Armenia-Georgia cooperation, since that road is needed most of all by Armenia. What difference does it make whether such a friendship is or is not called a “confederation”?

By Ghia Nodia. Published on 17 September 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/What_Does_Confederation_Mean_In_The_South_Caucasus/2160662.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Waving The Banner Of Azerbaijan's New Oil Boom

2010-09-17T09:26:00.000+02:00

Winston Churchill once said that "If oil is a queen, then Baku is her throne." Azerbaijan's oil wealth has a long and storied history. But its oil industry was born in the late 19th century. Initially dominated by British, Dutch, Swedish, and Russian companies, it later became a center of Soviet might. Azerbaijani oil fuelled Soviet tanks and aircraft during World War II and sated the domestic needs of the Soviet Union for decades.

Today, however, 20 years after Azerbaijan gained its independence, the country is experiencing a second oil boom. Only this time, Azerbaijan is in charge of its natural resources, and Azerbaijani citizens are reaping the benefits.

Oil To Education

The foundation of this boom was laid in 1994 when, despite resistance from many quarters Azerbaijan, managed to sign the "contract of the century" with leading oil companies. This document enabled the start of construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline in 2000.

This second oil boom has changed the geopolitical and geoeconomic situation in the South Caucasus. After the (BTC) oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline was laid. Now the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, which will link China and Paris, is under construction. In terms of geopolitics, these projects open new opportunities for Euro-Atlantic integration. In terms of geoeconomics, they strengthen globalization, bringing continents closer and improving Europe's energy security.

The South Caucasus region has been engulfed in the flames of ethno-political confrontation and interstate conflict for the past 20 years. Foreign-policy clashes can easily sink economic stability. Development policies in such a complex geopolitical situation, even with the help of petrodollars, do not always yield positive results.

It is important for Azerbaijan to transform its "black gold" into intellectual potential. Therefore, 5,000 young Azerbaijanis will be sent to study abroad between now and 2015 under a decree by President Ilham Aliyev. Public democratization and economic transformation begin with public awareness, and this understanding shapes the agenda of Azerbaijan's government.

Building democracy is a gradual process, and it must be considered in parallel with political and economic reforms. Former U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt's statement that "misery and freedom are incompatible" sums up the challenge that Azerbaijan faced a decade ago. Over recent years, a great deal of effort and energy has gone into making the Azerbaijani citizen financially independent.

'Neo-Azerbaijanism'

The country has been strengthened economically. In the past six to seven years, the poverty rate has been brought down from 49 percent to 11 percent. More than 900,000 new jobs have been created, 600,000 of them permanent. And some 5,000 new enterprises have started up.

Azerbaijan does not spend its petrodollars on increasing wages or social benefits that could lead to serious inflationary consequences. In the nearest future, Azerbaijan will become an international aid donor.

This is just a short list of the prospects that have been opened up by the second oil boom. These are not just words, but a record of real action.

Recently, the world's biggest flag (70 by 35 meters) was raised on the world's tallest unsupported flagpole (162 meters) in Baku. This is not only a sign of our economic strength, which allows us to implement such projects. This is neo-Azerbaijanism, which is present in the country's new politics, economy, and socio-cultural life. The world's tallest flagpole symbolizes a new understanding of the inner spirit and power of our national identity and a reassessment of Azerbaijan's place in the global context. Today it is clear that we are no longer just a bridge. From now on, we are a center of regional politics -- and this will form the basis of Azerbaijan's foreign policy for the coming decades.

By Elnur Aslanov. Published on 16 September 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Commentary_Waving_The_Banner_Of_Azerbaijans_New_Oil_Boom/2159588.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Armenian Opposition Tells Election Experts It's Dissatisfied With Reforms

2010-09-16T13:18:00.000+02:00

Armenia's leading opposition forces told European election experts that they remain adamant in dismissing electoral reforms promised by President Serzh Sarkisian's governing coalition, RFE/RL's Armenian Service reports.

Representatives from the opposition Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun), the Armenian National Congress (HAK), and Heritage Party (Zharangutyun) told officials from the Venice Commission, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in separate meetings on September 14 that the government draft on reforming elections would not address chronic vote-rigging in Armenia.

The election experts were on the first day of a fact-finding visit to Yerevan. The visit is aimed at assessing the Armenian authorities' stated efforts to improve the conduct of elections in the country.

Armen Martirosian of the Heritage Party told RFE/RL that the authorities would retain "numerous opportunities for carrying out vote falsifications."

"This gives us no hope that the authorities are preparing to hold normal elections," he said.

Armenian authorities have pledged to improve the conduct of elections in the country, along with other political reforms, under pressure from the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly (PACE).

The pro-government majority in the Armenian parliament has already drafted fresh amendments to the electoral code and submitted them to another Council of Europe institution, the Venice Commission, for examination.

Dashnaktsutyun's Artyusha Shahbazian said he and other deputies from his party urged the two European bodies to help ensure that an alternative electoral reform package jointly drafted by Dashnaktsutyun is not being ignored by the ruling coalition.

The opposition package was sent to the Venice Commission this summer. "They have received our proposals and said they are still looking into them," Martirosian said.

The HAK, which is not in parliament, presented the visiting experts with a separate seven-point plan of electoral reform, according to Vladimir Karapetian, a senior member of the opposition alliance. Karapetian declined to disclose changes sought by the HAK, saying only that they are "mainly of a technical nature."

"We believe that by accepting the proposals made by the opposition and international organizations, the authorities will show whether they have the political will to change the conduct of elections," Karapetian told RFE/RL.

By RFE/RL. Published on 16 September 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Armenian_Opposition_Tells_Election_Experts_Its_Dissatisfied_With_Reforms/2159516.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Statement by Herman VAN ROMPUY, President of the European Council, following his meeting with Viktor YANUKOVYCH, President of Ukraine

2010-09-15T09:16:00.002+02:00

"I am pleased to welcome President Yanukovych back to Brussels. Our regular meetings demonstrate the continued dynamism of the EU - Ukraine relationship.

We have continued our discussion on issues of fundamental importance for the EU - Ukraine relationship, ranging from the status of the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, through a broad range of reforms.

Ukraine is seeing a period of political stability, based on a strong parliamentary majority. This enables Ukraine to move forward with important reforms. The agreement found between Ukraine and the IMF on a new Stand-by Arrangement demonstrates the government's willingness to find solutions. Fulfilment of the criteria of the Stand by Arrangement will enable the EU to move forward with the disbursement of our Macro-financial Assistance to Ukraine.

With Ukraine moving forward in her reform process, the EU stands by her side, to support and assist with both advice and financial resources.

Ukraine is a European country, and we share basic core values, on which we build our societies. Democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights are the core values we share and strive to implement in practice. We also discussed the importance of guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary and the freedom of the media.

Over the past years, Ukraine has received considerable respect for the consolidation of democracy and the freedom of speech. Ukraine's legacy as an open society is an important one, and needs to be further built upon.

PACE committee welcomes ‘political will’ for ambitious reform in Ukraine, but warns that democratic principles need to be respected

2010-09-14T09:40:00.002+02:00

The Monitoring Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) has welcomed the political will being shown by the new government in Ukraine for an “ambitious and far-reaching package of reforms” – but warned that they were being implemented in a hasty manner.

In a draft resolution unanimously approved yesterday at a meeting in Paris, the committee said the reforms needed “wide political consensus and public support”, which in turn was only possible if parliamentary procedures and democratic principles were strictly respected.

For the reforms to be successful, government and opposition should also jointly implement constitutional changes first, the committee declared. “Lasting political stability” in Ukraine required a clear separation of powers, as well as a proper system of checks and balances between the executive, legislature and judiciary.

The parliamentarians also expressed their serious concern at allegations that democratic freedoms – such as freedom of assembly, expression and the media – have come under pressure in recent months. “Any regression in respect for and protection of these rights would be unacceptable for the Assembly,” they said.

The co-rapporteurs, Renate Wohlwend (Liechtenstein, EPP/CD) and Mailis Reps (Estonia, ALDE), intend to return to Ukraine in the near future to discuss their findings and conclusions with the authorities and other relevant parties, if possible before the Assembly debates the report at its forthcoming plenary session (4-8 October 2010).

Source: PACE. Published in Strasbourg on 10 September 2010

OSCE Mission to Moldova holds roundtable discussion on gender equality in politics and the economy

2010-09-13T09:37:00.000+02:00

How politics and economic growth benefit from greater participation by women, including in times of economic crisis, was the focus of a roundtable discussion held by the OSCE Mission to Moldova in Chisinau today.

"Moldova could gain substantively from using the economic and political potential of its entire population, especially in times of economic crisis," said Ambassador Philip Remler, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova. "The financial crisis has hit people very hard - including women. We hope that today's recommendations will help political and economic leaders take advantage of women's potential for the benefit of Moldova."

Experts from Austria, Belarus, Moldova, Slovenia, Sweden and Ukraine shared best practices and lessons learned on how political leaders and the electorate can benefit from a focus on women's role in political and economic life. The discussions highlighted the contribution of gender equality to economic growth, the impact of quota and non-quota mechanisms, the key role of women leaders and associations in promoting women's participation in politics, and how the media can have a greater impact by promoting women.

A large number of participants, including Members of Parliament and government officials, female political and business leaders and representatives of political parties, civil society organizations, media and international organizations attended the event. The roundtable discussion resulted in recommendations to help Moldovan leaders and civil society better strive for gender equality in the political and economic fields.

The event was part of the OSCE Mission to Moldova's Anti-Trafficking and Gender Programme.

Source: OSCE. Published on 9 September 2010

Is Armenia Russia's Partner Or Pawn?

2010-09-07T10:20:00.002+02:00

Two years after the brief but destructive war between Russia and Georgia, Moscow has further consolidated its power and influence in the South Caucasus by concluding a modified defense agreement with Armenia that significantly extends the lease for Russia's largest military base in the region.

Most small states are compelled to look to large powers for security, and Armenia is no exception. For a small country like Armenia, which is doubly landlocked -- with no outlet to the sea and with two of its four borders closed -- security concerns are paramount to national survival.

In large part reflecting this reality, Armenia has been driven ever closer to Russia. In the broader context, Armenia's embrace of Russia comes as no real surprise. But the Armenian-Russian "strategic partnership," as hailed by Armenian officials, has become defined more by a dangerous degree of Armenian overdependence than by an equitable alliance. And Russian dominance over Armenia has only increased in recent years, as Moscow has acquired outright control over many strategic sectors of the Armenian economy, from energy to transport.

The asymmetry of the Armenian-Russian relationship was most recently evident in the signing of a modified security accord during a visit to Armenia by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Signed on August 20, the agreement is seriously flawed, however, and has sparked criticism within Armenia for four main reasons.

First, the terms of the newly modified basing agreement are both unusual and questionable. The agreement resulted in the extension of Russia's sole military base in the region by another 24 years, to 2044.

The initial agreement, signed in 1995, granted Russia the right to maintain its military base at Armenia's second-largest city, Gyumri, along the Armenian-Turkish border, and was not due to expire until 2020. Despite the stationing of a small squadron of MiG-29 aircraft and S-300 missile-defense systems at the base, the facility is rather insignificant in purely military terms, with its roughly 3,000 Russian personnel mainly serving as a "trip-wire" to any attack from NATO-member Turkey.

Moreover, both the military posture of the Russian presence and the mission and mandate of the base are based on "threat misperception," reflecting an outdated and now inappropriate Soviet-era doctrine.

Nevertheless, the Russian base in Armenia provides a firm foothold for the Russian presence and offers Moscow an attractive potential platform for power projection. But it satisfies Russian interests that only happen to coincide with Armenia's perception of insecurity.

But perhaps most insulting for Armenia, the base is the only such facility where the host country not only foregoes any form of rent or payment but has agreed also to pay all operational costs and expenses of the facility. While other countries, such as Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan, receive lucrative annual payments in return for hosting Russian military facilities, Armenia is a clear loser.

Second, the modified Armenian-Russian defense accord offers Armenia little in the way of any clear military advantage. Despite the agreement's formal declaration to "ensure the security" of Armenia and promises to provide "modern compatible weaponry and special military hardware" in the future, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov openly admitted there would be "no real or functional change" to the mission or mandate for the Russian base.

Speaking in an interview on Armenian television prior to the signing of the agreement, Lavrov also dismissed Armenian concerns over the pending sale of S-300 air-defense systems to Azerbaijan by noting that they are "defensive weapons designed to protect a territory from external missiles," adding that Moscow would "never supply arms to regions where such supplies may destabilize the region."

Beyond such vague pledges of support in the event of attack, this Russian security pledge does not bolster Armenian security in any concrete sense. If anything, it only reinforces the impression that Armenia has been steadily mortgaging its own national security in return for short-term and meager returns.

The agreement has been defended by Armenian officials as providing an important deterrent to Azerbaijan, which Armenia accuses of launching two military attacks in recent months, beginning with a successful probe of Armenian defensive positions along the Line of Contact separating Nagorno-Karabakh from the rest of Azerbaijan. The most recent skirmish, an August 31 assault by Azerbaijani forces that was successfully repelled, demonstrates that the accord does little to deter Azerbaijan from considering the use of military force to "resolve" the Karabakh issue. In fact, this third problem with the Armenian-Russian security agreement centers on a flawed premise -- that it provides greater security for Armenia.

A fourth shortcoming in the agreement stems from its broader implications for Armenian statehood. The agreement is widely seen as yet another dilution of Armenian independence and sovereignty, especially as the accord may also expand the role of the approximately 2,000 Russian border troops in Armenia. Since the onset of independence, it has actually been Russian border troops that have secured Armenia's border with Turkey.

And this latest agreement may deal a further blow to Armenian sovereignty by deploying additional Russian border guards to Armenia's other borders, with Iran and Georgia, if not Azerbaijan. A Soviet-era legacy, yes, but it is clearly also a liability for any independent state.

By Richard Giragosian. Published on 3 September 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Commentary_Is_Armenia_Russias_Partner_Or_Pawn/2147689.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Is There A Foundation For Peace Between Russia And Georgia?

2010-09-06T10:44:00.001+02:00

The director of the Moscow Carnegie Center, Dmitri Trenin, recently published his proposal for a peace agreement between Russia and Georgia. According to his article, a logical (and possible) solution to the standoff consists of two parts.

First, Georgia should recognize Abkhazia's independence in exchange for the return of the Gali district (which is almost entirely populated by ethnic Georgians).

Second, Russia should withdraw from South Ossetia in exchange for some sort of intermediate status for that region between independence and Georgian control, with a special security role for Russia.

The obstacle to this plan, according to Trenin, is Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili -- first, because he is bad and, second, because Russian leaders Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev have sworn not to negotiate with him and they are not going to go back on their word. But if Saakashvili leaves office in 2013 and does not become prime minister, then such a solution could be possible.

Theoretically, all this is possible. If one proceeds from the idea that returning Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgia is impossible (because Russia will never allow it and because the people who live there don't want it), then compared to the present situation, such a solution would be better for Georgia. It is all quite rational.

So what's the problem? Is it just Saakashvili?

It is obvious, but true, that in order to reach a peace settlement, all sides have to really want to. It has to be the top priority for everyone, particularly if reaching an agreement means makes painful concessions. It is hard for me to imagine any Georgian leader who could survive politically after making such a decision. The alternative would have to be very bad and the dividends would have to be enormous.

Under what circumstances would the parties want to make such serious concessions?

An anonymous commentator posting a comment on Trenin's "The Moscow Times" article asked a good question: "What do we need peace with Georgia for anyway? Why should we give South Ossetia back?"

And it's true that it would be extremely illogical for the Russia that invaded Georgia in August 2008 to endorse Trenin's plan. The basic idea of the war was the conviction that the West is Russia's enemy and Georgia is a Trojan horse in Russia's backyard. Georgia and its foreign protectors had to be taught a lesson and shown who is the boss in the "near abroad."

Two Russias

They didn't quite manage to get this lesson across, since Saakashvili is still in power and continues to stubbornly pursue his policies. So what is the point of making life easier for him by normalizing relations? The worse things are for (a pro-Western) Georgia, the better they are for Russia.

Trenin, working for an American center in Moscow and writing in an English-language newspaper in the capital, is proceeding from a different view of Russia. The Russia that Trenin imagines (as do some Western analysts and politicians) might be provisionally called "Medvedev's Russia" (as opposed to the real "Putin's Russia"). This Russia, on the one hand, has not rejected its claims to great-power status (which in practice means demanding a privileged role in, at the least, the "near abroad").

But, on the other hand, this Russia has ceased to consider the West an enemy and, on the contrary, wants to establish a "modernization alliance" with it. No one knows exactly what this means, but the practical implication for the West is clear: It must strengthen Medvedev -- or, at the least, it must not do anything to weaken him. This Russia won't become a democracy but at least it will be more rational and predictable. It will be a Russia one can do business with. Such a Russia really does need to improve relations with Georgia (of course, after "Crazy Misha" leaves office) in order to remove the most serious source of disagreement with the West.

As far as Georgia is concerned, of course it is better to have good relations with Russia than bad ones. But the practical question is this: What concrete concessions would have to be made in order to "buy" better relations with Russia (the Russia that really exists, not the one that is imagined by Russian and Western Medvedevites), and what concrete dividends can Tbilisi hope to receive?

In order even to begin thinking about possible solutions, one must first imagine a Russia that is capable of genuinely recognizing Georgia's right to choose its own government and its own political course. But no such Russia is anywhere in sight. The very fact that Moscow refuses to talk to Saakashvili proves that Moscow believes Georgians do not have the right to choose their own government.

That is why projects like Trenin's are only theoretically interesting. Today's Russia and today's Georgia have no need for them.

By Ghia Nodia. Published on 31 August 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Is_There_A_Foundation_For_Peace_Between_Russia_And_Georgia/2144230.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

EU-Ukraine: Partners for securing gas to Europe

2010-08-04T08:44:00.003+02:00

Procurement Notice: Preparatory studies for the modernisation of the Ukrainian Gas Transit and Storage - 28/07/2010

In the framework of the Joint Commission-Ukraine-IFI Declaration agreed at the March 2009 EU-Ukraine Joint Investment Conference on the modernisation of the Ukrainian Gas Transit System, the procurement notice for the technical feasibility study and the environmental and social impact assessment study has been issued. Details are available on the website of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) at the following address:

http://www.ebrd.com/pages/workingwithus/procurement/notices/csu/100723F

International Investment Conference on the Modernisation of Ukraine's Gas Transit System, Brussels 23/03/2009

Ukraine is a key transit country for oil and gas supplies from Russia to the EU and has expressed its wish to be integrated in the EU and South East Europe energy markets. Energy is therefore a sector that will continue to be at the centre of EU-Ukraine relations and where co-operation will continue to grow substantially over the coming years. The gas transit system of Ukraine represents the backbone of gas supplies to Europe, accounting for 20% of the EU’s gas consumption and 80% of Russian gas exports to the EU, as well as carrying substantial quantities of Central Asian gas.

In this context, an International Investment Conference on the Modernisation of Ukraine's Gas Transit System is scheduled to take place in Brussels on 23rd March 2009. This conference, to be co-hosted by the European Commission and the Government of Ukraine, will bring together representatives of the EU, Ukraine and third countries, as well international financial institutions and the private sector.

The conference will be a major step forward in ensuring that the Ukraine’s gas transit system operates at the highest levels of efficiency, transparency and reliability.

Joint Declaration:
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/energy/events/eu_ukraine_2009/joint_declaration_en.pdf

Conference Documents:
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/energy/events/eu_ukraine_2009/index_en.htm

Source: European Commission External Relations

Council of Europe anti-torture Committee interrupts visit to the Transnistrian region of Moldova

2010-08-03T09:43:00.001+02:00

A delegation of the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) began a visit to the Transnistrian region (*) of Moldova on 21 July 2010. Against the background of the CPT’s reports on its previous visits to the region in 2000, 2003 and 2006, the intention of the delegation was to review the situation of persons deprived of their liberty in police and prison establishments.

Following initial consultations with Sergey Stepanov, the person responsible in the region for justice-related issues, the CPT’s delegation commenced a visit to the remand section (SIZO) of Colony No. 3 in Tiraspol on 22 July 2010. However, the delegation was informed that, unlike the Committee’s previous visits, it would not be allowed to interview remand prisoners in private. Such a restriction contradicts one of the fundamental characteristics of the preventive mechanism embodied by the CPT, namely the power to interview in private any person deprived of his or her liberty. Consequently, the Committee’s delegation decided to interrupt its visit to places of deprivation of liberty in the region until such time as the enjoyment of this power could be guaranteed.

Nevertheless, the CPT’s delegation visited Penitentiary establishments Nos. 8 and 12 in Bender; these establishments are located in an area controlled by the de facto authorities of the Transnistrian region but form part of the prison system of the Republic of Moldova. The opportunity was also taken to review the treatment of persons detained by the Moldovan police. In this context, the delegation paid follow-up visits to Temporary detention isolators in Anenii Noi and Bender, as well as to the Temporary detention isolator of the General Police Directorate in Chişinău. Further, the delegation interviewed in private a number of newly-arrived remand prisoners at Chişinău Penitentiary establishment No. 13 on the subject of their treatment by the police.

At the end of the visit, the CPT's delegation had a meeting with Alexandru Tănase, Minister of Justice of the Republic of Moldova, and senior officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Prosecution Service and the Department of Penitentiary Institutions, and presented to them its preliminary observations.

The visit was carried out by the following members of the CPT:

- Jean-Pierre Restellini (Swiss), Head of delegation
- Anna Lamperová (Slovak)
- Joan Miquel Rascagneres (Andorran).

They were supported by Johan Friestedt of the CPT's Secretariat, and assisted by Jürgen Seiger, Public Health Officer, Münster (Germany).

Source: Council of Europe. Published in Strasbourg on 30 July 2010

Will Moldova Be The Next Ukraine?

2010-08-02T11:53:00.002+02:00

Less than a year after the country's last elections, the Republic of Moldova finds itself at a crossroads once again. The "Twitter revolution" in Chisinau last April that made waves in the international media mirrored, somehow, the 2004 Orange Revolution in neighboring Ukraine. It took six years for the Ukrainians to turn their clocks back, when they elected Viktor Yanukovych -- the main adversary of the Orange revolutionaries -- president earlier this year. Moldova's pro-Western coalition, the Alliance for European Integration, which formed a slim majority in parliament and a pro-reform government a year ago, may have an even shorter lifespan.

Authorities in Chisinau have scheduled a September referendum on how to elect the country's president, and they are likely to schedule new parliamentary elections for sometime in November. This round of legislative elections was prompted when lawmakers failed to elect a president after repeated attempts last July, prompting the current constitutional crisis. If the fragile coalition of four parties that essentially only had one thing in common -- a desire to defeat the Communists -- collapses, it is very likely the Communists will return to power.

In that case, Moldova would join the growing list of countries in Russia's "near abroad" whose pro-Western reform efforts failed. Ironically, these things are happening at a time when Washington's "reset" policy has apparently produced much-improved relations with Russia and EU members seem to be announcing new energy, military, and trade deals with the Kremlin every day.

Like in Ukraine and Georgia, the main focus of the Western donors in Moldova is on the central government's policies and upper-echelon reforms. Less attention is given to strengthening and support of the four pillars that should contribute to long-lasting reforms in post-totalitarian countries: civil society, independent media, judiciary, and local public administration.

In this piece, however, I'd like to focus on media and civil-society matters. Independent media outlets are rightly considered the watchdogs of any democratic society. However, in CIS countries, after decades of Soviet rule, these watchdogs are -- at best -- young and inexperienced. Even where they are allowed to operate without undue interference, they do not have sufficient strength or professionalism. They are always vulnerable to being turned from watchdogs into the attack dogs of the ruling parties.

Media Does Matter

This has certainly been the case in Moldova. Here, the majority of independent media (along with nongovernmental organizations, including think tanks and universities) found themselves in difficult straits during the eight years (2001-09) of Communist rule. Only a few outlets and NGOs reported on corruption, human rights violations, and abuse of power by officials during these years. The vast majority were either restricted, persecuted, destroyed, or co-opted by the Communist authorities.

Although it was a tough environment for investigating and reporting, some human rights groups and media outlets -- with the support of some Western donors but mostly relying on the dedication and courage of certain individuals -- were in a position to report on the election fraud of 2009 and the other abuses of power that culminated in the mass protests in April of that year. They continued to report on the brutal suppression of those protests and the arrests, torture, and even killings of demonstrators by the Communist-backed law-enforcement agencies. All this pressure and the sacrifices of the young Moldovans who took to Chisinau's main square forced repeat elections in July 2009 that brought the current liberal coalition to power.

But in the wake of those elections, some important changes began. A good number of professionals from the nascent NGO community were recruited by the new coalition to enter parliament or work in the government. As a result, in many cases the NGOs they left were less comfortable criticizing state institutions and less motivated to do so. Many who remained in the NGOs felt that criticizing the authorities would only help the Communists in their bid to regain power.

The same thing happened in the media. It was one thing to criticize former Communist President Vladimir Voronin or his old, Soviet-style apparatchiks, but quite another to criticize former colleagues who are now in politics -- or your own relative who happens to be a minister or a friend who is in parliament. Worse, according to some reports, some of the new politicians have begun acquiring their own "independent" media outlets, either directly or by proxy. Sometimes these deals are even touted as examples of "foreign investment" in Moldova!

Getting Beneath The Surface

Although the ruling coalition is described in shorthand as liberal and pro-Western, a closer look at those who sit in parliament and occupy government offices reveals a much more mixed picture. In addition to some honest and principled reformers, there are former members of Communist governments, former Soviet-era diplomats and KGB officers, and some just plain opportunists. It is no wonder no post-independence governments or legislatures -- including the current ones -- have had any real interest in adopting serious lustration legislation.

Moldovans often complain that their country was not treated during the 1990s like the Baltic states were, but they don't acknowledge that their politicians lacked the courage of their Baltic counterparts and did not, like them, restrict the participation of the Soviet-era nomenclature in government from the very beginning of independence. The Baltic states have, over the last two decades, often selected presidents, parliament speakers, and other top officials from their diasporas abroad. Many of these officials were even born in exile.

But Moldova never made any significant attempts to recruit ethnic-Moldovan professionals from abroad. Instead, they have been viewed suspiciously as outsiders or, worse, even as traitors. In this regard, it seems the most Moldovans simply have not cut their ties with the Soviet past.

Power Check

That is precisely why it is crucially important for Moldova to have a strong and vibrant civil society, including independent media, NGOs, and universities. Otherwise, each time there is election, the politicians who gain power will be tempted to adopt authoritarian means or follow the path of Vladimir Putin, who, by the way, is considered a role model by some Moldovan leaders.

During the Communist period, it was common to see elected officials or other public figures joining the Communist Party. That is why it was embarrassing and depressing on July 1 to see that nine rectors of Moldova's main public universities unanimously and publicly declared their support for the Liberal Democratic Party, whose leader is the current prime minister. I was reminded of the days when whole enterprises, collective farms, and universities raised their hands to support some Communist resolution or to praise Leonid Brezhnev's latest book. I couldn't help but think that this was another sign of the Soviet-era vassal mentality that remains engrained in Moldovans, even intellectuals such as these rectors.

Moldovan civil society and media, of course, must do the heavy lifting in forming a sustainable democratic country themselves. They must continue to expose corruption and abuses and incompetence. They must continue to hold officials to account for their campaign promises, even as they continue to criticize Communist policies and remind the public that the Communist Party remains the main obstacle to Moldova's democratic development.

Every society needs institutionalized checks and balances -- including Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. Moldova stands at a crossroads now, and Western donors should focus on finding ways to help develop the pillars upon which any sustained democratization effort must rest.

By Vlad Spanu. Published on 30 July 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Will_Moldova_Be_The_Next_Ukraine/2114358.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Has Moscow Had Enough Of Belarus's Lukashenka?

2010-07-29T10:48:00.002+02:00

Has the Kremlin finally had enough of Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka? The past two months have featured a gas war between Moscow and Minsk and a televised mudslinging match between Lukashenka and the Kremlin.

Lukashenka had long been one of Moscow's most reliable partners in the former Soviet space. But in recent years he has increasingly become an irritant, cozying up to the West, refusing to recognize the independence of Georgia's pro-Moscow separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and demanding cut-rate prices for Russian natural gas.

And now there are increasing signs that the Kremlin has had enough.

'The Godfather'

On July 4, the Gazprom-owned television station NTV broadcast the first installment of an unflattering documentary about Lukashenka titled "The Belarusian Godfather."

"Until recently, the Western press referred to Lukashenka as 'Europe's last dictator,'" the narrator says as the documentary begins. "He has compared himself both with Hitler and Stalin, and considers himself the godfather of all Belarusians."

The program covered the suspicious deaths and disappearances of Belarusian opposition figures in the late 1990s, suggesting that they were victims of a government-run death squad. It delved into Lukashenka's private life. It reminded viewers of the billions of dollars in support Russia has given to Belarus:

On July 15, Lukashenka hit back, airing an interview on state-controlled television with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, a bitter foe of the Kremlin.

Saakashvili thanked Lukashenka for not recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia and accused the Russian authorities of waging a "propaganda war" against Belarus.

Citing the still-unsolved killings of journalist Anna Politkovskaya and human rights activist Natalya Estemirova, the Georgian leader said Russia was in no position to criticize any country's human rights record.

The tit-for-tat continued on July 16, when NTV aired the second installment of "The Belarusian Godfather," which linked Lukashenka to self-exiled Russian oligarch Boris Berezovsky and ousted former Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev.

Backing The Opposition

The mudslinging follows a nasty dispute over gas prices in June. It also comes as Lukashenka prepares to seek a fourth term as president in elections slated for early next year.

Alyaksey Yanukevich, leader of the opposition Belarusian Popular Front, says the documentaries are a clear sign that Moscow is considering forcing Lukashenka from power.

And he believe that "in any case it benefits Russia for Lukashenka to be weak. This policy the Kremlin is carrying out is to weaken and personally humiliate Lukashenka." Yanukevich says the "Godfather" is only the first "of what will be regular information attacks."

Some analysts note how opposition leader Alyaksandr Kazulin -- a former political prisoner who ran against Lukashenka for president in 2006 -- was quoted heavily in the documentary. Andrey Dynko, editor in chief of the Minsk-based Belarusian-language weekly "Nasha Niva," says this may be a sign that Moscow may look kindly on a fresh bid by Kazulin to oust Lukashenka in the 2011 election.

"In general, I think these two films have strongly cheered the opposition political forces up, because they have seen a new field for activity," Dynko says. "They have been given new hope."

Or Just A Warning?

Leonid Zaika, director of the Minsk-based think tank Strategia, says it appears that the Kremlin has prepared a "fine-tuned operation" to oust Lukashenka by depriving him of the economic aid and cheap energy that keeps the Belarusian economy afloat and by stealthily backing an alternative candidate for president.

The coup de grace, Zaika predicts, will come if Lukashenka fixes the vote and Moscow joins the West in refusing to recognize Lukashenka's reelection as legitimate.

"If Washington, Brussels, and Moscow all don't recognize the election results, then the situation changes completely," Zaika says. "They don't need to do anything else. They don't need any conspiracies. The Kremlin can act legitimately and lawfully."

Analysts caution, however, that Moscow would not make a serious move to oust Lukashenka unless they were certain they could control the transition and install a pliant president in his place.

Pavel Sheremet, a political analyst for the Russian daily "Kommersant," says a more plausible scenario is that Russia is attempting to frighten Lukashenka into being more obedient and deferential to the Kremlin.

"I would be wary to make the far-reaching conclusions that Moscow has a plan for a regime change in Belarus. It is quite possible, and we have already seen it many times, that it may be a pressure campaign not to oust Lukashenka but to make him take some actions in his presidential post," Sheremet says.

"He will keep his post, he will not be prevented from winning triumphant victories, but he will have to pay for this by making concessions in the customs union or the political union with Russia."

By RFE/RL. Published on 19 July 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Has_Moscow_Had_Enough_Of_Belaruss_Lukashenka/2104099.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Georgia: PACE rapporteurs welcome democratic developments but stress need for continued efforts to maintain public trust

2010-07-27T09:45:00.002+02:00

Kastriot Islami (Albania, SOC) and Michael Aastrup Jensen (Denmark, ALDE), co-rapporteurs for the monitoring of Georgia by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), have expressed their satisfaction with the positive political developments that have taken place following the recent local elections in Georgia.

At the end of a five-day visit to Tbilisi (12-16 July 2010), the co-rapporteurs said: “The efforts of both authorities and part of the opposition to maintain a constructive dialogue and to secure the opposition’s rightful place in the governance of the country are an important step for the consolidation of democracy in Georgia.” They underscored that the planned electoral and constitutional reforms should be based on an all-inclusive process: “A wide political consensus and solid public consultation process on the direction of these reforms are essential to ensure public trust, not only in the electoral process, but in the political system as such.”

On human rights in Georgia, the co-rapporteurs welcomed the overall improvements with regard to the judiciary and judicial system. However, they expressed concern about problems brought to their attention regarding the administration of justice and guarantee of a fair trial: “Further efforts by the authorities in this field are necessary as even the perception that justice is selective, or that obstacles to the right of a fair trial could exist in this country, undermine public trust in the justice system and ultimately in the authorities themselves.” They highlighted the positive role played by the Public Defender in this field and urged the authorities to swiftly address the concerns expressed in his forthcoming report to the Parliament of Georgia.

They also extensively discussed the reforms in the penitentiary system and welcomed the overall direction of these reforms. However, they cautioned that the continuing increase in the number of prisoners in Georgia, already high, could undermine these reforms. In addition, they noted that concerns with regard to the treatment of prisoners as well as their healthcare remain, and encouraged the authorities to address these areas as a priority.

During their visit the co-rapporteurs also visited the Kaheti region to familiarise themselves with the impact of reforms regarding local self-government as well as minority populations. “During our visit to an ethnic Ossetian village in Kaheti, all ethnic Ossetians we met stressed the improvements made with regard to the living conditions of the minority population since 2003, as well as minority relations in general,” said the co-rapporteurs. “The fact that they feel fully integrated into Georgian society is especially important in the light of some questions raised recently with regard to the multi-ethic character of Georgia,” they added.

The co-rapporteurs will present an information note on this visit to the Monitoring Committee during its meeting in Paris on 9 September 2010.

Source: PACE. Published in Strasbourg on 27 July 2010.

Eastern Europe's Frozen Conflicts Look To Kosovo Ruling

2010-07-26T09:53:00.002+02:00

The International Court of Justice's (ICJ) ruling that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia was legal is of direct interest to other countries with secession crises or frozen conflicts.

The ICJ has said its ruling approving Kosovo's declaration of independence is unique to Kosovo.

That essentially means the justices do not want it to stand as a precedent for the world's many other places where regions have seceded or want to secede from their home countries.

But as the instant reaction of many governments to the July 22 decision makes clear, the court's ruling is being regarded -- rightly or wrongly -- in more universal terms. And nowhere more so than by parties involved in secession crises or frozen conflicts themselves.

'Guidance' For Bosnia's Serbs

Among the first to react to the court's ruling affirming Kosovo's 2008 unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia was the leader of Bosnia-Herzegovina's Serbian entity, the Republika Srpska.
Prime Minister Milorad Dodik suggested that if Kosovo's secession from Serbia did not violate international law, then the same standard should be applied to the Bosnian Serb entity's long-standing desire to leave Bosnia.

"For a long time, we in the Republika Srpska have not been happy in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Dodik told reporters in Banja Luka late on July 22.

"We respect the Dayton agreement [that ended the war in Bosnia], but the ICJ decision can serve us as guidance for our continuing fight over our status and our future."

Haris Silajdzic, a Bosniak who is the chairman of Bosnia's tripartite presidency, immediately responded that the country's borders were immutable.

"Any attempt at disintegration will be prevented, as it was the last time," he added.

The Serbian entity has never made a secret of its aspiration to join Serbia proper, a desire that directly contributed to the four-year war in Bosnia. The war ended after the intervention of NATO with the Dayton peace agreement in 1995 creating Bosnia as a federation of Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats.

Legal Limbo

Dodik's regarding the ICJ ruling as "guidance" for the future may be a measure of how much secessionist movements will regard the ruling as vindicating their efforts -- despite the court's own deliberately narrow interpretation.

The ICJ ruled that international law contained no "prohibition on declarations of independence" and so Kosovo's declaration "did not violate international law."

But the court avoided ruling on whether Kosovo's statehood was legal under international law, leaving the decision on whether to recognize the territory's independence to individual countries.

Thus far, 69 countries have recognized Kosovo's independence, including the United States and many European Union members.

Several major powers -- including Russia, China, and Spain -- concerned about secessionist regions of their own, have not recognized Kosovo.

No Change In Transdniester

In Moldova, officials of the breakaway Transdniester region have yet to comment publicly on the ICJ's decision.

But top advisers to Moldova's government say the ruling will not change any of the main players' views of the crisis, including those of Transdniester's main backer, Russia.

"On the Transdniester side, we all know what their statements over the last 18 years have been [demanding full independence], so I don't see how the ICJ decision could change that," says Nicu Popescu, a foreign-policy adviser to Moldova's Prime Minister Vlad Filat.

"As for Russia's statements and policies, Russia has constantly supported Moldova's territorial integrity and I'm absolutely sure that this stance will continue, and there's no reason at all why Russia's support for Moldova's territorial integrity should change."

The predominantly Russian-speaking population of Transdniester attempted in 1990 to secede from Moldova and since then has maintained a separate but unrecognized government with Moscow's support.

Georgian Stalemate

The Georgian government, which has lost two regions to secessionist movements backed by Moscow, also sees the court decision as doing little to change the status of its frozen conflicts.

"I think the decision probably will be used by regimes that are encouraging such kinds of small separatist regions," explains Kote Kublashvili, the chairman of Georgia's Supreme Court.

"Because prior to the decision, those regimes already used the situation very well and officially declared that [the Kosovo] case will affect other would-be-recognized separatist regions. Today's decision and those which have been made before [regarding recognition of Kosovo] will be widely debated first in terms the legal but also the political point of view."

South Ossetia fought a war of secession from Georgia in 1991-92, and Abkhazia did the same in 1992-93. Both have been recognized as independent by Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru -- but no other countries -- in the wake of the 2008 Russia-Georgia war.

Leading figures in the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia say they are encouraged by the court's ruling.

"The fact that Kosovo has been recognized in accordance with international law can be seen as a definitive precedent for Abkhazia, and I think it will serve as an important precedent for Abkhazia," says Irakly Khintba, a Sukhumi-based political analyst.

"I'm not saying that Abkhazia will be recognized simply because it recognized Kosovo. But it is a serious political and historic step [for Abkhazia], that demonstrates that, in the current political environment, it is possible to recognize a state in spite of the will of the 'master state' that it is trying to separate from."

The deputy speaker of South Ossetia's parliament, Valery Dzitsoity, says he regards Pristina's situation as directly comparable to Tskhinvali's. "And moreover, I believe that South Ossetia has more of a foundation to expect recognition of its independence from the West than Kosovo," he adds.

Dzitsoity says that this is because "South Ossetia declared its independence at a time [September 1990] when Georgia was only recognized by Ukraine and was not a member of the UN. And Kosovo is separating from an internationally recognized state and a member of the UN."

No Agreement In Nagorno-Karabakh

Yet another frozen conflict whose parties may look to the ruling is Nagorno-Karabakh, the predominantly ethnic Armenian region that broke away from Azerbaijan following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The head of the opposition Armenian Revolutionary Federation parliamentary faction, Vahan Hovhannisian, hailed the ICJ ruling.

"The judgment clearly states that a unilateral proclamation of independence cannot be viewed as unlawful. For this, of course, there should be prerequisites, and Karabakh has at least the same prerequisites as Kosovo, if not more," Hovhannisian said.

"It means that now we get a new instrument, a new opportunity to struggle for the international recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh republic."

But Baku says it does not consider the Kosovo ruling pertinent to the Karabakh conflict.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Elxan Poluxov told RFE/RL's Azerbaijani Service that Azerbaijan believed the ICJ's decision applied "only to Kosovo."

"Conflicts differ and there is no single solution for all conflicts," Poluxov added. "We don't see that the decision may somehow affect the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and negotiations on this conflict should have their own format."

Ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh fought a war of secession from Azerbaijan in 1991-94, backed by Yerevan.

Most of the region of Nagorno Karabakh today is governed by the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh republic, while the territory remains internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan.

By Charles Recknagel. Published on 23 July 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Eastern_Europes_Frozen_Conflicts_Look_To_Kosovo_Ruling/2108088.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Ukraine An 'Example Of Democratization' To Region, But 'Threats To Progress Emerging'

2010-07-22T09:11:00.003+02:00

The Washington-based organization Freedom House, which measures the degree of liberty in countries around the world, says Ukraine is setting an example for its region in the progress it is making in democratization.

But Freedom House's director of studies, Christopher Walker, warns of possible dangers ahead in an interview with RFE/RL.

RFE/RL: You have said that the success or failure of democratization and the development of civil society in Ukraine has a significance that goes beyond its own borders. Please explain this potential to influence the region.

Christopher Walker: The success or failure of Ukraine as a democratic state in a region which is more defined by a scarcity rather than an abundance of such states is important because demonstration effects can matter, and Ukraine has managed -- certainly in the context of the non-Baltic former Soviet Union -- to make some very important headway in a number of key areas, to the extent that if we start to see reversals or erosion of some of the institutions we have seen [emerge] over the past decade or in particular over the past half-decade, this would be a damaging signal to other countries in the region that may look to Ukraine as an example in a very difficult environment.

RFE/RL: How do you rate Ukraine's efforts at democratization over the past decade? Have they managed to build stable institutions and a degree of accountability into their system?

Walker: If you look at the post-Soviet period, there were hopes certainly that in the immediate aftermath of that time that things would move forward swiftly. [But the situation] became in the end -- certainly in the period of [President Leonid] Kuchma -- it became rather difficult on a number of counts, including press freedom. This was exemplified to the outside world by the murder of the [investigative journalist] Heorhiy Gongadze, and those events about a decade ago led many to believe that meaningful reform would be extremely difficult.

But then the events of the Orange Revolution opened the door to a different way of doing things, and I think what has been notable since that time has been the institutionalization of open, competitive elections, the ability of civil society to function and play a meaningful role, and the news media. In a wilderness of unfreedom, Ukraine's news media has been a very notable exception, one which now needs to be safeguarded.

RFE/RL: Is the progress in democratization and civil society now under threat from the government of Moscow-leaning President Viktor Yanukovych? In what ways?

Walker: We've been hearing from colleagues and our analysts that a number of developments in the early months of this year, since the government took over, create some causes for concern, and our feeling is that to the extent there has been progress in a number of areas, that threats in those areas would be rather damaging to Ukraine's longer-term prospects for building a rules-based and open state.

In particular, pressures on civil society and news media which we gather have started -- they may not have reached full force, but the indicators are that there have been some growing pressures in those areas.

RFE/RL: How can the Western democracies help Ukraine?

Walker: The key steps which can be taken are first, to help safeguard the progress which has been made in recent years. This, I think, will be important for European and U.S. officials to consistently raise; it was very valuable for Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to raise these issues during her visit to the community of democracies meeting in Krakow.

At the same time, its important to ensure that the sort of support that Ukraine has gotten more broadly is not cut off too quickly, because it's clear that there are a set of emerging challenges that may argue for assistance for a variety of sorts, political and otherwise, for the foreseeable future.

By RFE/RL. Published on 13 July 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Ukraine_An_Example_Of_Democratization_To_Region_But_Threats_To_Progress_Emerging/2104238.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

EU Special Reps To Caucasus, Moldova To Get New Lease On Life, For Now

2010-07-16T10:02:00.001+02:00

The European Union appears on the brink of reversing a controversial plan to scrap its 12 special representatives to places ranging from the South Caucasus, Moldova, and Central Asia to Afghanistan and the Great Lakes of Africa, officials in Brussels say.

EU ambassadors met today for the third time this month to decide the envoys' futures. Diplomats speaking on condition of anonymity say broad agreement is emerging among the 27 member states that the mandates of all 12 will be extended by at least six months and their long-term fates left open, pending later debate.

If confirmed by EU foreign ministers at their next meeting in Brussels on July 26, the decision would mean a reprieve for the bloc's South Caucasus envoy Peter Semneby, the Moldovan special representative Kalman Miszei, and their colleagues in Macedonia and the Middle East. According to diplomats four were singled out in May by the EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton to lose their jobs in short order.

'Proper Representation'

EU diplomats say Ashton wanted to settle the issue by bureaucratic fiat but that news reports of her plans provided the affected countries and EU members who opposed the move an opportunity to force it onto the broader political agenda. The diplomats say Ashton had secured the backing of larger states but had hoped to avoid a wider debate.

Ashton's spokeswoman, Maja Kocijancic, told RFE/RL that the EU is currently looking into ways to integrate the special representatives into the European External Action Service (EEAS), the bloc's new unified diplomatic arm, which was established by the Lisbon Treaty and headed by Ashton. The EEAS is expected to be operational on January 1.

Kocijancic said the debate within the EU continues, adding that there is no decision yet. Ashton's aim, her spokeswoman said, is to assure that the EU has "proper representation" in partner countries.

Sweden, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Italy have been among the countries pushing strongly for an extension of the mandates of all 12 EU special envoys without prejudice to their eventual fate.

Reports that the envoys were about to be recalled and replaced by lower-level officials located in Brussels caused an outcry in Georgia and Moldova. EU diplomats, too, noted privately that the moves would amount to downgrading the affected countries and regions -- as well as their conflicts -- on the EU list of priorities. It would also send an encouraging signal to rival powers.

Ashton's spokeswoman rejected suggestions that the changes suggested by the EU's top diplomat entail the dilution of the bloc's presence anywhere in the world.

"The EU wants its foreign policy to be more active and more effective in the world," Kocijancic said. The heads of EU representations in partner countries will be strengthened under the EEAS.

Strategic Question Marks

Diplomats say during the ambassadorial debates held behind closed doors in Brussels on July 1 and 12, Ashton and her right-hand man, the British diplomat Robert Cooper, argued that in the future the EU should nominate special representatives only in three specific cases: for events or crises where the EU has no representation on the ground; to regions which need strategic attention; or for exceptional countries or crises, such as in Burma.

Ashton and Cooper, however, did not directly address the strategic implications of retracting existing envoys, diplomats say. Officials say Ashton repeatedly alluded to the fact that some of the existing envoys -- without naming any -- pose problems with their independent views. This is understood to reflect the concerns of some of the larger member states which feel envoys like Semneby complicate their relations with partners such as Russia.

Ashton also opposes suggestions that the EU could upgrade some of the envoys by replacing them with political heavyweights hand-picked from the ranks of former foreign ministers.

Ashton has suggested the French diplomat Pierre Morel, the EU's special envoy to Central Asia as well as the Georgian-Russian Geneva talks, be retained in his present duties, operating out of Brussels. Conflict resolution in the South Caucasus is formally part of Semneby's job description.

Fallout For Ashton?

Ashton's plans are part of a larger drive to bring all of the EU's diplomatic corps under the control of the EEAS.

But member states critical of the plans have pointed out that EU special representatives are appointed by the member states and can thus only be removed by the member states. Also, some capitals point out, the envoys whose positions will not disappear, will not join the EEAS but will continue to report directly to member-state ambassadors in Brussels. Consequently, officials say there has been strong pressure to exclude Ashton and her representatives from the debates on the future of the special representatives.

Ashton has been publicly criticized in a number of member states for being susceptible to pressure from Berlin and Paris, particularly in staffing decisions. The top civil servant in the EEAS will come from France, his deputies in turn from Germany and Poland. France and Germany are also said to have carved up between themselves some of the most lucrative EU ambassadorial positions outside the bloc.

By Ahto Lobjakas. Published on 13 July 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Special_Reps_Caucasus_Moldova_New_Lease_On_Life_For_Now/2099024.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Top U.S. Human Rights Diplomat: 'Democracy Takes Time'

2010-07-12T09:32:00.001+02:00

Following Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's trip last week to Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, RFE/RL’s Washington correspondent Heather Maher asked U.S Assistant Secretary of State Michael Posner, the top U.S. diplomat for human rights and democracy, for an assessment of what Clinton accomplished and of the rights situation throughout the region as a whole.

RFE/RL: How is Secretary Clinton's trip to Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus being assessed within the State Department?

Michael Posner: I would say, in general, I think people felt very good about the trip. It was a chance -- and in cases, her first [chance] as secretary of state -- to visit some key countries in the region, both to discuss shared interests and concerns and to strengthen relationships, but at the same time, to reach out to civil society and to express concerns about differences.

So I think she accomplished both. I think there was a sense that the visit and the personal contacts served a purpose in strengthening relationships and the shared agenda, but also there was a clear theme throughout: that we do believe strongly in, and are going to keep pressing on, the human rights and democracy and civil society issues as a routine part of the relationship.

RFE/RL: In her "Community of Democracies" speech in Krakow, Clinton said the following: "In Russia, while we welcome President [Dmitry] Medvedev's statements in support of the rule of law, human rights [activists] and journalists have been targeted for assassination, and virtually none of these crimes have been solved." In view of the success of the U.S.-led “reset” in relations with Russia, what is the White House prepared to do to keep the pressure on Moscow to bring the people responsible for these crimes to justice?

Posner: About a month ago, I was in Moscow and Vladimir for a civil society dialogue that Mike McFaul [the special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director of Russian and Eurasian affairs at the National Security Council] and the National Security Council co-chaired with [Vladislav] Surkov [Medvedev’s deputy chief of staff and a top aide to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.] And in the context of that dialogue, we raised cases, but I also met with people in the Foreign Ministry in Moscow following the dialogue.

I think the answer is, whether it's the [Anna] Politkovskaya case or the Natalya Estemirova case, we have and we will continue to raise concerns both privately and diplomatically, but also publicly. And also, on a third track, to continue to work with Russian civil society, human rights groups like Memorial, and the Sakharov Center and others to continue to press our concerns.

I think the Committee to Protect Journalists identified 16 cases in the last few years of journalists who've been killed. So this is not just one case. Politkovskaya has gotten probably the most attention, and she was a U.S. citizen, so we've raised that consistently. But I think it's imperative that we keep raising our concerns, again, privately and publicly. We are engaged. We have a range of issues and interests with the Russians, and we will continue to be engaged, but part of our engagement is on human rights.

RFE/RL: In that same speech, Clinton also announced a new U.S. initiative to, as she described it, “support the work of embattled NGOs.” The United States is contributing an initial $2 million to the fund and has invited other governments and private grant-making organizations to contribute as well. Can you give us any more details?

Posner: We've had, for a long time, what we call a “human rights defenders' fund,” which is small amounts of money to individual human rights advocates and their families when they get in trouble, or are put on trial, forced into exile, that sort of thing. That's really been a longstanding piece of what we support. And the idea here is to have a broader mandate, to have funds set aside to support civil society organizations, both in rapidly changing situations, but also to give them the opportunity to seek funds for projects and initiatives that are looking at broader issues.

So we're in the process now of sort of designing the criteria and so forth, but the commitment is $2 million from [the State Department's Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor budget,] and we hope that others in the [U.S.] government may also contribute and that other governments will also come in beside us and work in the same direction.

RFE/RL: Five years ago, the region Clinton just visited frankly seemed a little better off than it does today. A series of revolutions had brought reformers into power and there was hope that the old authoritarian ways had been shaken off for good. Today a glance around the region reveals that democratic progress seems to have slid backwards. What's your assessment of the progress, or lack thereof, in the region?

Posner: I'm reluctant to grade or rate countries. As a general matter I would say some of the exuberance about the “colored revolutions” -- certainly, there were very high expectations, some of which haven't been met.

But I think the lesson I draw is rather that the process of building democracy is not determined by a moment in time, or an election. It's building blocks over time that build sustainable democracies that endure. And maybe what we're seeing now, I think it is what we're seeing, the realization that it takes time and hard work and it's institution building. It's something you have to do, as the secretary said in Krakow, it's something you have to do 365 days a year.

So if you have an election but you don't have strong political parties, and you don't have a truly independent and open media, and you don't have Internet access for a huge percentage of the population, and you don't have an environment where, you know, empowerment of women is part of the picture, then all of the challenges that we've seen in some of these countries become more obvious.

And I sort of feel we're at a point now where everybody's taking a deep breath -- we're certainly doing that -- and saying, let's think practically about those building blocks, and what do we need to do to build something that's more sustainable over time?

RFE/RL: In the wake of Clinton's visit to Azerbaijan, opposition groups have complained that she didn't speak out as forcefully for civil society and media freedom as she did elsewhere. There's even a new joke going around the dissident community: President Ilham Aliyev is now saying, “Yes we can!” -- which is President Obama's old campaign slogan -- only Aliyev means, yes, Baku can imprison journalists and opponents of the government without suffering repercussions from Washington. The continued detention of the bloggers Adnan Hajizada and Emin Milli for publishing satire of the government and the extension of journalist Eynulla Fatullayev's prison sentence just two days after Clinton left the country makes it seem that he's right. Is he?

Posner: I know she raised [Fatullayev's] case and the case of the bloggers. She expressed concerns about human rights in both private meetings and publicly. But I wasn't there, so it really probably would be better to talk to people who were actually with her in Baku.

RFE/RL: Staying on Azerbaijan, the United States has been making noticeable overtures toward Azerbaijan for its continued and possibly increased support as a key transit point for military supplies flowing into Afghanistan. Defense Secretary Robert Gates paid a visit to Baku this spring that was seen as an attempt to warm up relations. How does the State Department square its efforts to press Aliyev on things like human rights and civil society with the Pentagon's apparently growing need for Aliyev’s cooperation with the war in Afghanistan?

Posner: Well, look, you know Azerbaijan is not unique in the sense that we both have military security interests and we also have a human rights agenda and concerns about violations. [Obama] has said [and] the secretary [Clinton] has said, “Our policy is going to be one of principled engagement.” Principled engagement means that we're going to be talking to and working with and have mutual interests with a number of countries where it's in our national interest to be engaged, but at the same time principled engagement means, where there are human rights problems and abuses, we're going to call them out and we're going to have those discussions in a straightforward way.

We can and need to be doing both, and we are doing both. And the nature of my job is that I'm either with the secretary or visiting places, supporting broad U.S. interests. But part of our interests, central to our interests, is the fact that we have a commitment to human rights and a universal set of standards. The same standard applies to every government, including ourselves.

By RFE/RL. Published on 10 July 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgias_Long_Farewell_To_Stalin_/2088243.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Discussions on Transdniestria settlement held in Vienna

2010-07-09T09:47:00.001+02:00

two-day meeting of participants in the "5+2" process for settlement of the Transdniestria conflict concluded today. It was held in the presence of Ambassador Bolat Nurgaliyev, the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for Protracted Conflicts.

The 5+2 includes the sides (the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria); the mediators (the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the OSCE); and the United States and the European Union as observers.

"This meeting represents a step forward for the negotiating process across a broad spectrum of issues," Ambassador Nurgaliyev said.

Representatives of the sides, the mediators and the observers discussed in depth approaches to resolve problems of freedom of movement that affect the daily lives of people on both sides of the River Dniestr/Nistru.

Representatives likewise reviewed various proposals regarding a system of guarantees for the negotiating process, including on the basis of documents signed in earlier years.

Representatives actively considered and made progress towards achieving the goal they set in March in Vienna and in their Astana meeting in May, with the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, of renewing official negotiations in the 5+2 format on a comprehensive political solution, which were suspended in 2006.

Participants of the 5+2 scheduled the next round of meetings in this process to take place in September in Chisinau, Tiraspol and Vienna.

Source: OSCE. Published in Vienna on 8 July 2010

Georgia’s Long Farewell To Stalin

2010-07-07T09:44:00.003+02:00

On the night of June 25, the monument to Josef Stalin in the city of Gori was removed. It will be moved some 100 meters to the museum that was built around the house where he was born. And on the place in the city’s main square where the statue previously stood, the authorities will erect a memorial to the victims of Russian aggression and Soviet repression.

The symbolism of these actions is completely obvious. On the spot where the dictator and occupier once stood there will be a memorial to his victims – and to the victims of those who continue to follow his line today. But if this is all there is to it, then why has the statue not been taken down earlier? Why was the operation carried out at night amid heightened security?

The symbolism of changing monuments is an important part of any radical political change. In Georgia, this change has been characterized, on one hand, by the rejection of the communist regime and, on the other, by the assertion of its national independence. And the second factor is more important emotionally.

The first victim, more than 20 years ago, was the monument to Sergo Ordzhonikidze, an early Soviet Politburo member and close comrade of Stalin’s who was born in Georgia and played a role in the Sovietization of the country in 1921. For most Georgians, Ordzhonikidze is a traitor who helped the enemy conquer his own homeland.

Soon after, the monuments to Soviet founder Vladimir Lenin were swept from their pedestals. This marked the symbolic end of Soviet power.

But Stalin continued to stand in Gori, although his sins against Georgia were certainly no less than Ordzhonikidze’s. Why?

National Pride

The lingering cult of Stalin in Georgia does not symbolize adherence to the communist system but rather national pride. He was the most powerful Georgian in history, the main victor of the main war of the 20th century. The whole world trembled before him, particularly the nation that had ruled Georgia for the previous two centuries. In the absence of Georgian statehood, his power was psychological compensation for the country’s weakness.

As paradoxical as it may seem, the history of the mass national-liberation movement in Georgia dates back to March 9, 1956, when the people spontaneously protested against the policy of de-Stalinization that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev announced at the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress. The demonstration was violently put down, but Stalin – rejected in Russia – became a symbol of the rejection of the official Soviet line. In the late Soviet period, his portrait could be found decorating the shops of Georgian cobblers and barbers; it became the sign of mass dissent.

But as soon as it became possible to be a genuine nationalist – that is, someone devoted to the idea of an independent Georgia – Stalin began to fade as a national symbol. More and more people came to understand that Stalin was a hero of the communist system and of Russian imperialism, not of Georgia.

But symbolic connections are living things. For many people, particularly the older generation, Stalin remained a revered figure. What’s more, when he ceased being a symbol of Georgian nationalism, Stalin became a symbol of local patriotism in Gori. At least, the loyalty of locals to their idol was the main justification for why even the new revolutionary reformist government of President Mikheil Saakashvili declined to touch the statue. What is the point in upsetting people for nothing, they said.

Of course, there was another opinion as well. Some wondered whether Georgia could really become a European democracy while at the same time continuing to glorify Stalin – even if only in one particular city. Could anyone imagine a democratic Germany that was home to even one monument to Adolf Hitler? The monument could not be reconciled with the image of a country that was trying to become part of the democratic West.

But the struggle against stone idols was not a priority for the Saakashvili government. It was too busy arresting corrupt officials and trying to build an army. So local guides on the state payroll continued to explain to astonished Western tourists what a great democrat Stalin was.

Game-Changer

The August 2008 war with Russia changed everything. For the occupying army from the north, the statue of Stalin was a symbol of something important. If the Leader is still standing here, they thought, that means all is not lost. That means Georgia can still be saved from the NATO-Judeo-Masonic disaster. The monument became a sort of fifth column of the enemy.

Despite growing calls to tear it down, the government moved slowly. After all, there were people on the streets calling for Saakashvili’s resignation and the authorities did not want to see them joined by legions from Gori. Then, in late May, there were local elections and the authorities did not want to lose them in this strategically important region. After the ruling party’s convincing victory in those elections, the excuses started to dry up. Summer, the heat, the World Cup…It was time.

And it turned out that the fears were exaggerated. Almost no one protested against the statue’s removal. The opposition didn’t even try to get the people to rise up. Georgia is now without Stalin and all is calm.

So what does this mean?

Two things, at least. First, Saakashvili’s government made what it thought was a risky move. That means it has recovered its self-confidence and, perhaps, is again capable of doing unpopular but necessary things. And second, now that Georgia knows it doesn’t have to love Stalin anymore, maybe it will develop some respect for itself as a state.

By Ghia Nodia. Published on 1 July 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgias_Long_Farewell_To_Stalin_/2088243.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs issue statement

2010-07-06T11:45:00.000+02:00

The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, Ambassador Igor Popov of Russia, Bernard Fassier of France, and Robert Bradtke of the United States, released the following statement:

The Minsk Group Co-Chairs (Ambassador Bernard Fassier, France; Ambassador Robert Bradtke, United States; and Ambassador Igor Popov, Russia) visited Yerevan and Baku July 3-5. Ambassador Bradtke and Ambassador Popov also visited Nagorno-Karabakh July 2.

In Nagorno-Karabakh, Ambassador Bradtke and Ambassador Popov briefed the de facto authorities on the latest developments in the peace process, including the June 26, 2010 statement of Presidents Dmitry Medvedev, Barack Obama, and Nicolas Sarkozy. They also discussed the June 18-19 incident along the Line of Contact. They deplored this incident as an unacceptable violation of the ceasefire, and reiterated their regret over the senseless loss of life and their strong condemnation of the use of force. In Yerevan, the three Co-Chairs met President Serzh Sargsian, Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian, and Minister of Defense Seyran Ohanyan. In Baku, they met with President Ilham Aliyev, Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, Defense Minister Safar Abiyev, and representatives of Azerbaijani internally displaced persons from the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

In their meetings in both Yerevan and Baku, the Co-Chairs stressed the commitment of their three countries to support a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karbakh conflict, based upon the Helsinki principles of non-use of force or the threat of force, territorial integrity, and the equal rights and self-determination of peoples. In that respect, they noted the progress that has been made and the recognition by both sides that the elements articulated by their three Presidents in L'Aquila and repeated in their June 26, 2010 statement must be the basis of a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. They urged the parties, in a spirit of constructive compromise, to take the next step and move towards completing work on the Basic Principles to enable the drafting of a peace agreement to begin. They called upon the sides to strictly observe the 1994 ceasefire and exercise restraint along the Line of Contact. During their visit, the Co-chairs also presented to the parties their plan to undertake a mission to the occupied territories in this fall, which was accepted in principle.

The Co-Chairs expect that a meeting will take place between the heads of their delegations and the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan on the margins of the OSCE Informal Ministerial in Almaty July 16-17.

Astana High-level Conference calls for implementation of commitments on tolerance and non-discrimination, increased co-operation with civil society

2010-07-01T09:26:00.003+02:00

The OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, State Secretary and Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan Kanat Saudabayev, at the conclusion of the High-level OSCE Conference on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination, expressed support for initiatives to strengthen dialogue and understanding, reaffirm respect for human rights and encouraged co-operation with civil society to prevent hate crimes and fight intolerance.

"Our conference clearly confirmed the commitment of Kazakhstan's OSCE Chairmanship and the OSCE community as a whole to strengthening tolerance, inter-ethnic and inter-religious accord," Saudabayev said.

Reading from the provisions of the Astana Declaration resulting from the conference, Saudabayev added:

"The OSCE Chairmanship reaffirms that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law is important in creating a context for intercultural, inter-religious and inter-ethnic understanding, and is at the core of the OSCE comprehensive concept of security."

"Together with the OSCE participating States, we call for implementation of the OSCE commitments with a view to devising and implementing effective policy measures aimed at preventing and responding to manifestations of racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, discrimination and intolerance, including against Christians, Muslims, members of other religions, Roma and Sinti, other ethnic and racial groups."

The Chairperson-in-Office emphasized that this could be done through legislation, law enforcement training, data collection and monitoring of hate crimes, education, media and constructive public discourse, as well as through the establishment of national institutions or specialized bodies.

He said OSCE participating States encouraged each other "to work with civil society in the prevention of hate crimes", and "to engage in co-operation with civil society and communities in inter-cultural, inter-religious and inter-ethnic partnerships".

He said also of importance is the proposal put forward by the Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev on 29 June to establish an OSCE Centre for Tolerance and Non-discrimination.

The two-day High-Level Conference on Tolerance and Co-operation gathered around 600 participants from OSCE participating States, OSCE institutions and international and non-governmental organizations.

Source: OSCE. Published on 30 June 2010

Despite Boost In U.S. Support, Russia's WTO Bid Still Faces Opposition In Georgia

2010-06-30T10:18:00.003+02:00

Addressing reporters eager to hear what came out of a meeting between two of the world's most powerful men, U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev spoke of beef and chicken.

Beef because Obama, in a show of U.S. hospitality, had taken Medvedev to his favorite burger joint for lunch that day. And chicken because the package of agreements struck by the two leaders included a pledge by Medvedev to allow U.S. poultry imports back into Russia after they were banned due to what Russia said were safety concerns.

That agreement brought the United States one step closer to fully backing Russia's bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), whose members conduct 95 percent of world commerce. Russian accession, Obama said, would benefit all involved.

"I emphasized to President Medvedev, I emphasized to his entire delegation, and I now want to emphasize to the Russian people: We think it is not only in the interests of the Russian Federation, but in the interests of the United States, and in the interests of the world, that Russian joins the WTO. So this is something that we want to get resolved," Obama said.

Concerns about agricultural subsidies, insufficient regulation of state-run companies, and lax intellectual property laws have all been part of U.S. reluctance to support Russia's WTO bid -- even after the countries signed a bilateral WTO agreement in 2006.

Obama said his economic negotiators were working hard with the Russians on tackling the "difficult issues" that remain, saying that they require "significant work." Their resolution, he suggested, "may be in the hands of the Russian government."

Medvedev himself described the outstanding issues as "minor problems" and said negotiators were expected to complete their work by the end of September.

Tbilisi Two-Step

But overcoming longstanding U.S. objections may not necessarily guarantee smooth sailing for Russia. The WTO, which oversees trade treaties and facilitates access to export markets, has 153 member states -- all of which are involved in the decision to admit new countries. Among those members is Georgia, which has long been at odds with its aggressive neighbor to the north.

Tbilisi, long angered by Russian support for its breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as a Russian embargo of Georgian wine and mineral water, for years threatened to use its WTO membership to block Russia's bid. A Georgia-Russia WTO working group was established but has so far failed to reach any agreements.

In recent months, opposition to Russia's WTO bid appeared to die down in Tbilisi, prompting speculation the government, chastened by the August 2008 war between the two countries, had changed its position.

But Niko Mchedlishvili, head of the Georgian prime minister's press office, told RFE/RL's Georgian Service there has been no such switch.

"The government's position remains unchanged. It stays the same as it was several years ago," Mchedlishvili said. "Not a single point has been changed in the document which resulted from the negotiations between Georgia and Russia. Therefore, all talk about a possible concession from Georgia's side during the negotiations with the World Trade Organization is an absolute lie."

Obama and Medvedev, during their Washington press conference, mentioned Georgia only once -- in connection to U.S.-Russian disagreement over Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- with no mention of Tbilisi's potential role in the WTO process.

Multiple Obstacles

Russian officials have made it clear that they consider full U.S. support the true necessity for gaining membership, which, according to a study commissioned by the World Bank, would encourage foreign investment and, by one measure, would mean Russia could annually gain about 3.3 percent of its GDP, or about $53 billion a year.

Last year, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov said Russia's accession depended almost entirely on the United States. Indeed, Russian officials and others have held the U.S. largely responsible for prolonging Russia's 17-year accession process. Ahead of his U.S. visit, Medvedev said pointedly that "the ball is in the U.S. court."

Many experts agree.

"This [Georgia's objection] is not the first issue. This will be left until later," Anders Aslund, senior fellow at the U.S.-based Peterson Institute for International Economics, said. "The main issues now are between the U.S. and Russia. One just needs to clean the table and [decide] how it should be done, and that's a couple of months of negotiations to sort out the technical things. But the important thing is that the U.S. and Russia trust one another."

With the success of the U.S.-Russian "reset" being hailed in both Washington and Moscow, trust indeed appears to be at its highest in years.

Gone is the plan -- put forward by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin -- to enter the WTO in a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, a move that clashed with WTO protocol and befuddled the United States. And with Medvedev tour of the U.S. tech hub Silicon Valley, which preceded his trip to Washington, the Russian leader is sending the message that his country is serious about changing and modernizing its economy.

'Every Opportunity'

Up next is the G20 summit in Canada, to which Medvedev and Obama were traveling together. Russia is the only G20 country that is not a member of the WTO, and after Medvedev's U.S. trip, that looks increasingly likely to change.

And yet, the Georgian problem remains. Matthew Rojansky, deputy director of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said Medvedev may be looking to Obama to eliminate that hurdle.

"Barring, potentially, a new [Georgian] government which has a different attitude about how you do conflict resolution with your enormous northern neighbor," said Rojansky, "the question is what influence the United States can have vis-a-vis Georgia if we [the United States] are set on paving the way to Russian accession."

The Russian news agency RIA-Novosti quoted Medvedev at Stanford University as saying, "As soon as Georgia gets a new leader we will have every opportunity to restore ties."

Until then, the United States may be looked to help bridge the impasse. Whether it's willing to do so, however, may be influenced by the state of Washington's evolving relations with Georgia.

Lincoln Mitchell, professor of international politics at Columbia University, said the United States, if it wanted to, could offer Georgia economic or other benefits as incentives to sway the Georgian stance, but is unlikely to use threats to strong-arm its Caucasian ally.

"My sense of things is that the U.S. isn't in a place right now where it is going to pressure Georgia to do this, particularly given the way Georgia -- I would say with some success -- has created this narrative of 'the U.S. is selling us out over Russia,'" Mitchell said. "I don't think [the United States] would then go in that context and ask [Georgia] to do something like this."

Aslund said that ultimately, a loophole in the accession process could allow Russia to join the WTO in spite of Georgian disapproval. WTO members must reach a general agreement, or "consensus" of potential members, which is technically not the same as a unanimous vote.

According to a spokesperson from the WTO, however, an applicant country doesn't come up for general WTO review unless disputes with individual members have been previously resolved.

By Richard Solash. Published on 25 June 2010
Copyright (c) 2010. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty
http://www.rferl.org/content/Despite_Boost_US_Support_Russia_WTO_Bid_Opposition_Georgia/2082635.html
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of S & D.

Statement by the Spokesperson of High Representative Catherine Ashton on Nagorno-Karabakh

2010-06-28T09:36:00.003+02:00

The spokesperson of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission Catherine Ashton issued a following statement today:

"The High Representative regrets the armed incident resulting in the loss of human life that took place during the night between 18-19 June along the Line of Contact in the context of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict. The High Representative calls on both sides to respect the ceasefire, restrain from the use of force or any threat thereof, and continue efforts for the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. The EU reiterates its full support to the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group and the work of the three co-chairs."

Published in Brussels on 22 June 2010